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Abstract 
This thesis aims to construct an ideal analytic framework of theoretical polycentricism 
based on methodological pluralism and reflectivism that can be applied to investigate 
transformation of the East Asian (EA) developmental states in a globalized economy 
and a democratic context. The ambition of this thesis is to present a more 
comprehensive account than those in reductionist (state or society centric) paradigms. 
This purpose was approached by expanding Mann's ideology, economy, military, and 
politics (IEMP) model into two meta-theoretical and multi-causal analytic 
frameworks and a theoretical arrow-diagram. Following these theoretical lines of 
reasoning, the empirical chapters attempt to verify the theoretical arrow-diagram by 
utilizing the real world laboratory, the case of Taiwan, and to test the validity of the 
hypotheses for inferring elements of continuity and discontinuity in the EA 
developmental states by sequential comparisons of two power configurations. 
The expansion of Mann's IEMP models can be justified on ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and empirical grounds. At the ontological level, the 
expanded model allows for reformulated poly-centric, meta-theoretical and multi- 
causal analytic framework. At the epistemological level, the expanded model 
comprises convergent and divergent realities by utilizing evidence of deductive 
materialism, rationalism and inductive idealism and reflexivity. At the methodological 
level, the ontological and epistemological purposes are concretized by analytic tools 
that go beyond structure and agency, the endogenous preferences of calculative 
rationality and account for ideational reflectivity or indigenous preferences in a 
diachronic period. At the empirical level, the TEMP model helps unpack the 
Taiwanese developmental state and identifies the politics of warfare, workfare and 
welfare to construct an institutionalized duality of its state's core overarching and 
infrastructural capacities for its rejuvenation. Therefore, the expansion of Mann's 
IEMP model preserves the Weberian's merits of the bureaucracy, reminds us of the 
risks of partisan politics, highlights the dynamics of capitalist development and the 
international system, and emphasizes the importance of reflexivity in civil society. It 
also contributes a more comprehensive analytic framework for both theories of the 
international relations and developmental state studies, and also to convergence and 
11 
divergence paradigms of IR and IPE theories. 
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In the past four decades, the four East Asian countries, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and South Korea, have been celebrated for their "extraordinary rates of 
economic growth, which moreover had been consistent with a relatively egalitarian 
distribution of income" (Onis, 1991: 109). They are described as the East Asian Newly 
Industrial Countries (EANICs) and East Asian (EA) `developmental states model' in 
the extensive existing literature. ' However, many recent works on liberalism and 
globalization make claims that the cornerstones of the EA developmental state model 
have eroded, and will inevitably be dismantled in a more intensively integrated global 
market. Further, these two trends suggest that the EA developmental states model is 
destined to perish in an era of economic globalization and the new international 
2 economic regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In the orthodox EA developmental states model, the abilities of these EA 
developmental states to discipline and dominate business and civil society have been 
based on their strong dominance over the economy and crucial forces that allow the 
control of key goods, access to which the private sector and civil society have 
depended on (i. e. Chan et al, 1998; Chang, 1999; Gordon et al, Haggard, 1990; 
Johnson, 1987,1999; Onis, 1991,1988, Woo-Cumming, 1999). As Leftwich notes, 
the developmental state model could be defined by six major components: "(i) a 
determined developmental elite; (ii) relative autonomy; (iii) a powerful, competent 
' The orthodox developmental states theories can also been seen in many empirical case studies as 
followed: Zhao & Hall, 1994; Haggard, S. 1994; Louis T. et al., 1982; Dent, 2002,2003a, 
2003bAkyuz Y., et al., 1998; ; Diamandouros & Johnson, 1986; Jenkins, R. 1991; Heginbotham & 
Samuels, 1998; Sindzingre A., 2004; Wad, P., 2004; Weiss, L., 1994,1995,2000; Wade, R., 2000, 
2003; Thobecke et al., 2002; Chibber V., 2002; Kwong, K-S. et al., 2003; Smith H., 2000; Thorbeck E. 
& Wan, H., 1999; Woo-Cuming M. (ed. ), 1999; Dwyer G., et al., 2003; Winn J.. 1994; Onis Z., 1991; 
Left A., 1994; Brodsgaard K. & Young, S., 2000; Kwong, K., et al,. 2001; McBEATH G., 1998; 
Waldner D., 1999; Macintyre, A., 1994; Cool I., et al. (eds. ), 1998; Bloch H, & Kenyon, P. (eds. ), 2001; 
Fields K., 1995: Drysdale P. (ed. ), 2000; Klintworth G. (ed. ), 1994; Xia M., 2000; Martin W., 1990; 
Hoesel, R., 1999; Chia S., 1997. Doner R., et al., 2005; Cheng T. & Chu, Y., 1999; Polidano C., 1998. 
2 See Pirie I., 2005; Huang, C., 2002; Lee, P., 2002; Wang V., 2000. 
1 
and insulated economic bureaucracy; (iv) a weak and subordinated civil society; (v) 
the effective management of non-state economic interests; and (vi) repression. 
legitimacy and performance" (Leftwich, 1995: 405). 
However, the state autonomy in these states is by no means relative but in an 
absolutely full sense in the existing literature (Brodsgaard and Young, 2000). 3 It must 
be a strong state with a high capacity to penetrate society, regulate relationships, 
extract and appropriate resources in determined ways (Midgal, 1987,1988,1994, 
1997). Therefore, since the early 1980s, the starting positions of these non-democratic 
EA developmental states are all attributed in the category of "strong state" and "weak 
society" in the extensive literature(see Burmeister, 1986; Leftwich, 1995; Migdal, 
1988,1994,2001; Onis, 1991; Skocpol, 1985; Weiss & Hobson, 1994; Weiss, 1997, 
1998,2002,2003). 
From the 1990's onward, the EA developmental states theory been more assertively 
fitted into the "bringing the state back in" approach. The determinants of their rapid 
economic developments have been simplified into three major variables: strong state 
autonomy, high state capacity and premium institutionalized mechanism design 
between the strong state and strong society (mainly refer to private sector) in these 
states (i. e. Dent, 2002; Evans, 1995; Skocpol, 1985, Wade, 1990; Weiss, 1997,1998, 
2002,2003; Woo-Cumming, 1999). In this sense, the EA developmental states theory 
is reduced to a deductive model which focuses on exploring how the state steers the 
private sector to achieve rapid and steady economic growth. 
This approach to the developmental states also implies a vertical state-society 
relationship. As such, it echoes modified neo-realism (i. e. Gilpin, 1987,2001; and see 
Hobson, 2000,2002), neo-mercantilism, neo-statism and state theory of the first-'l'ave 
neo-Weberian historical sociology (i. e. Evans, 1995; Skocpol, 1985; Weiss, 1998, 
3 As Brodsgaard and Young (2000) identify: "it is basic to the idea of the `developmental state' that the 
state has sufficient autonomy to impose the `right `policies on industry, and to prevent social demands, 
or the immediate indications of market forces, from getting in the way. " (Brodsgaard and Young, 
2000: 2). 
2 
2002; and see Hobson, 1998a, 1998b, 2000,2002a. 2002b). In the mean time. the 
economic successes of the EA developmental states provide strong empirical 
justifications and validity for these related state determinant neo-realists. 
Figurel. 1 reveals the analytic framework and hierarchic configuration of the 
"bringing the state back in" approach in which civil society and the capitalist class are 
reduced into dependent variables, dominated by the state. The state as a unitary unit 
conforms to international anarchy and competitiveness (Skocpol, 1985; Weiss, 2003). 
These related approaches are fundamentally setting out from a state-centric 
reductionism and structuralist position, despite their wish to `bring society or private 
capital back in' (i. e. Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1998). What they attempt to do is utilize 
these extra-political factors L. provide a `balanced-look image' and legitimation for 
the state-centric cage that still limits and constrains the boundaries of non-political or 
extra-political factors. I have mapped the common concerns, theoretical inferences 
and linearly deductive logics of these approaches in the Table 1.1. 




Figure-1.1 Analytic Framework of "Bringing the State Back In" Approach. 
3 
Table-1.1 Summary of Neo-Statists and Neo-Institutionalists Theoretical Frameworks 
Resources of State Key Key Organic Outcomes 
Autonomous Independent Dependent Interrelations ( Actual 
Power Variables Variables principal area 
of 
i nvestigation). 
Jonhson a. Authoritarian a. Strong a. Economic a. Weak private High economic 
(Classical regime with autonomy of growth in the sector growth and 
Developmental resources controlled the state. state. protected, led performance. 
State Model) capacity and b. High and dominated (export sectors) 
different means of capacity of the by the state. 
policy tools. governmental b. Top-down 
bureaucratic leadership of 
system . the state. 
Skocpol a. Needs rooted in a. Strong State capacity a. Class, The more 
('Bringing the geopolitical factors autonomy of from private sector autonomy of the 
State Back In') and dynamic of the state. conforming to and civil state the more 
international b. High anarchic and society are capacity for it to 
inter-state systems. capacity of the military deemed as discipline the 
b. Domestic governmental competition. `fetters' and domestic `fetters' 
responsibilities for bureaucratic intervening and prevent 
law and order. system. variables to conforming to 
the state. anarchy and 
c. Insulated political b. Top-down military 
managers. leadership o competition- 





export sectors in 
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Market) resources controlled the state protected, led performance. 
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of policy tools. elites). efficiency of by the state. export sectors). 
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b. High government market by `set 
capacity of the and private the wrong 
governmental sector. price' and 
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State) c. Territorial power. penetrate its state and penetrated 
centrality. civil society society. society 
b. Mainly and b. The (Competitive 
infrastructural consolidate its interactions state in 





I (IEMP) power 
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Evans Taken for granted Embedded The a. Top-down State industrial 
(Embedded institutional autonomy of comparative leadership of and economic 
Autonomy) arrangements, the state advantages of the state to transformation 
linkages and established on the private promote (investigations 
mechanisms. the networks sector to competitiveness in exported, 
ties with participate in of domestic advanced and 
`husbandry' the global enterprises in electronic 
and market. the global enterprises). 
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policy to bind and market. 
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arrangements, state to competitive set and transformed 
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and tools (especially to new niche b. The state technology- 
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b. The state delegated to the enterprises and 
capacity to private sector. financial 
coordinate, c. Top-down institutions and 
select, and leadership of policies). 
discipline the the state. 
private sector. 
However, the central themes of the orthodox EA developmental state theory and its 
revisions confront theoretical, empirical and methodological impasses and challenges, 
especially as the global market integrates more intensely and as the internal civil 
society and private sectors become more robust and assertive. At a theoretical level. 
the theoretical genesis of the orthodox EA developmental states models and revisions 
set out from perspectives of economic competitiveness and performances of these 
countries, and highlight how these states survive in the international anarchy and 
competitiveness in terms of their distinctive institutional arrangements. They reduce 
the major independent variable to the determinant role of the state to provide 
parsimonious causal inference models. 
Therefore, these models are state-centered and make overly strong assumptions about 
the behaviour of self-interested governmental bureaucrats. These theorists have 
established a distinguished divergent model and theory from normative state theory 
and theories of the development of capitalism for explaining the economic 
performances of these EA developmental states. Their approaches to the EA 
developmental states have also provided detailed investigations into policies and 
institutional prerequisites in these states. However, these models may actually be too 
one-sided from the angle of the state to elucidate their vulnerabilities in the face of 
globalized capitalism or account for changes in social forces. 
Moreover, analyses within the extensive literature are largely descriptive and 
empirical ones and put much weight on the effectiveness of the state capacities. They 
are concerned more with ostensible economic accomplishments of these EA 
developmental state rather than the changes inside these states (i. e. Dent, 2002; 
Johnson, 1987,1999; Wade, 1990; Weiss, 1998,1999,2000,2002; Woo-Cumming, 
1999). At a more profound level, the neo-Weberian approach to bureaucratization in 
the EA developmental states does have radical implications for their institutional 
rationality and privileges material over ideational forces, however this approach also 
exhibits a subterranean reductionism, rationalism and materialism. However, the 
transformation of one state is never a simple process. These theoretical approaches do 
not illuminate the transformations experienced by the EANICs. 
At an empirical level, since the theoretical discipline of the EA developmental states 
theory has for so long been preoccupied with stasis and continuity on long-term of 
over- social-mobilizations, therefore, it cannot account for the incapacity of the EA 
developmental states to effectively intervene in the market as usual in globalization. 
These theories do not suggest a persuasive explanation for the dismantling of the 
core capacity of these states. They only observe that there is a divergence from the 
previous model (see Dent, 2002; Wade, 1998,2000; Weiss, 2002; Woo-Cummings. 
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1991). In this sense, the EA developmental states model can only exist in a 
variable-controlled vacuum where the spatio-temporally fixed variables. such as the 
international environment, global production system, geo-politics, and domestic 
political system and civil society are constant and static as preconditions. However, in 
the empirical laboratory, these preconditions could not be possibly controlled. 
At a methodological level, the major methods to operate these models succumb to the 
pitfalls of state-centric reductionism and deductive parsimony in which political 
change is confined within the context of a definitive set of rules and regularities that 
remain essentially static over time. These models usually work on the basis of static 
comparisons between two punctuated stasis periods of time. However, they still can 
not provide suffice evidence to improve its generality to other different 
spatial-temporal cases (i. e. Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1998,2000,2003, and also see Chiu 
& Lui, 1998). They overemphasize the institutional arrangements and policies of the 
state, and the path-dependent legacy that are trans-historical givens transmitted from 
the past and assert they will be bequeathed to the future. Methodologically, it is a 
synthesized approach of `historical and rational-choice institutionalism' (see Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; Hay & Wincott, 1998) in a material-rationalist framework. 
As Johnson (1987) admits there are methodological problems in using intentional 
government intervention as the central explanatory factor for economic growth as it 
will preclude the causal factors other than governmental policy, failure to recognize 
long-term trends, and incur the possibility of mistaking random fluctuations for 
intentional results (Johnson 1987: 146 cited in Moon & Prasad, 1998). He further 
points that the "inferring direct causal relationships between intentional government 
intervention and economic performance over time could be a risky and presumptuous 
undertaking" (Moon & Prasad, 1998: 14-5). In addition, as Woo-Cummings 
acknowledges, their renewed explanation of EA developmental states model is 
4 Instead it attributes the state's retreat from some part of the economic realm as a consequence of the 
"empowerment of a new kind of bureaucrat" that have American Ph. Ds and are ideologically 
influenced by liberalism and democracy as in the South Korea case (Dent, 2002: 42; Weiss, 2002: 
33-37; Woo-Cummings, 1991: 191-2) or caused by reasons of "departing from the Asia model" and 
"the inner wheels of national politics and class" (see Wade, 2000: 108). 
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"concerned less with causality and predictability than with the totality of the 
Northeast Asian experience" (Woo-Cummings. 1999: 3). She emphasizes that the 
boundaries of the general and the particular and of the predictable and the contingent 
are far from clear, and the interaction among them is so profoundly complex that we 
cannot, in the end, apportion the totality of a historical experience into neat causal 
categories. We seek instead what Hegel meant by the metaphor of the Owl of Minerva: 
a full understanding of where we have been" (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 3). As such, 
research methods employed by the deductive state-centered trends do not adequately 
account for substantial change over time. 
For remedying the aforementioned shortcomings and recognizing the realities of 
increasing power in civil society (referring to the private sector), the revisionists of 
EA developmental states theory try to make up for the lacuna of linkages between 
state-society and provide renewed theoretical and deductive models for legitimizing 
further state interventions. These revisions of EA developmental state theories, 
particularly Evans's `embedded autonomy' and Weiss's `governed interdependence' 
models, set out from institutionalism and suggest "strong states are typically 
characterized not only by a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy and capacity, but 
also by the existence of a significant degree of institutional interaction and dialogue 
between the state elites and autonomous centers of power within civil society" (Onis, 
1991: 123). They also try to find evidence even in a `strong society', that the state can 
still play the directive role of pilot through its distinctive capacity and institutionalized 
state-business cooperation. It also suggests the state can do a particular job that the 
private sector cannot do in the international competitive market. That means these 
approaches are substantially state-centric and advocate neo-mercantilism. However, 
these revisionists' models, emphasizing the particular institutional arrangements in the 
EANICs, still can not provide sound justifications for how their `frozen snapshot' 
revised models can contribute to provide generalized applications over time (see 
Chiu& Lui, 1998: 152-3; Evans, 1995: 247,1997). 
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Rationale for Research 
Problem one: Accounting for Non-state (Resistant) Forces 
This thesis is inspired by the puzzles Peter Evans left in the last two chapters of his 
book, Embedded Autonomy, which concerns the future of EANICs and their 
developmental states model. In his work, Evans utilizes a comparative institutional 
approach to investigate relations between state and capital (informatics industries) 
relations in three developmental states (South Korea, India and Brazil) and highlights 
their distinctive state-society relations and institutional arrangements that lead to 
different economic performances. Unlike the orthodox EA developmental states 
research that desperately argues for the perpetually leading role of the state even in 
the globalized economy, Evans has conceived the state and private sector symbiosis in 
EA developmental states to be unstable and not static. Therefore, he reminds us of the 
limitation on the continuity of the EA developmental states model in globalization and 
their democratic regimes, and its applications to other areas or sectors. He concludes 
his approach by offering ideas on how the transformation of state-capital relations 
would change the basis of subsequent state involvement in the future (see Evans, 
1995: 234,246). Accordingly, he suggests the reconsideration of the same dynamics at 
the societal level is necessary (Evans, 1995: 225). 
Evans also perceives state-society ties to be vulnerable in the EA developmental states. 
He asks whether private capitalists will be gradually robust enough to develop their 
own agenda and reshape the process of industrial transformation. Will this threaten 
the stability of the state-society coalition? Will these social constituencies that the 
developmental states help bring into being fulfill "Marx's vision of the bourgeoisie as 
calling forth its own gravedigger" (Evans, 1995: 229)? Accordingly, he points out that 
the dismantling forces in these EA developmental states will come from the bottom of 
society (labour). He questions whether the primary supporters of the state-the 
entrepreneurial groups- which are less dependent on the state when industrial 
transformation are successful will establish alternative alliances such as the 
international market networks. Actually, Evans has been sensitized to the 
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methodological `snapshot' problem in his works, disputing general statements by 
cases sampling and freezing at a particular period of time. 
What Evans suggests to prevent this dismantling of state-society relations is to 
re-speculate on the possibility of expanding the scope of state-society links to include 
a broader range of groups and classes, to build new ties or `joint projects of 
industrialization' to other groups and establish a new `embedded autonomy' tie (Evans, 
1995: 206-250). However, as a comparative historical institutionalist, Evans does not 
justify these possibilities from any case of an EA developmental state, instead he 
provides his empirical evidence by illustrations of left-wing " agrarian communism in 
the Indian state of Kerala" and "European social democracy in Austria"(Evans, 1995: 
235-43). At a methodological level, from the historical institutionalist perspective, the 
empirical cases using different spatio-temporal fixes cannot provide any validations 
for the theoretical application of EA developmental states model to other areas. 
Thus, neo-statist or neo-institutionalist approaches to the EA developmental states 
have provided detailed investigations into institutional arrangements and mechanisms 
in the EA developmental states during their economic take-offs. However, they may 
actually be too one-sided from the angle of the state and neglect changes in their 
establishing prerequisites. Moreover, extensive literature and analyses fall into purely 
descriptive and empirical ones that put much weight on the credit of the state 
capacities. Nonetheless, we need to come to grips with ongoing processes as well as 
the new challenges that will reshape the role and status of the states as East Asia's 
economies become more mature and its civil societies become more assertive. It is 
also necessary to consider the resistances to the state. The recent work of these 
developmental state theorists does not adequately consider the issue of resistant power 
to the state. 
Problem Two: Failing to Describe and Explain the Transforming Character of the 
Developmental State-The Case of Taiwan 
Moreover, at the theoretical or empirical levels, little of the existing literature sets out 
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to explore changes in the resource origins of the major pre-conditional variables in the 
EA developmental states model or to trace their modes of developments in the 
globalized economy and democracy in these states. On the contrary, the orthodox 
synchronic EA developmental states theory and model are taken for granted as a 
covering law or a historical end to explain the perpetual state-centric forms of the 
EANICs, removing them from spatio-temporal geo-political and domestic changes. 
Therefore, the academic debates concerned with the future and development in these 
states get caught on dichotomies such as `state vs. market' or `realism vs. liberalism'. 
Therefore, is it reasonable to cast doubt on how these authoritarian `mono-regime' EA 
developmental states confront the challenges from globalization and democracy? 
I will justify my selection of the Taiwanese case in Chapter Two but in the meantime 
it is worth summarizing the important transformations in this developmental state that 
warrant closer scholarly attention. In five decades, Taiwan has experienced three 
radical political, economic and social transitions. From the political aspect, Taiwan 
developed from a militarized attack-back base to an authoritarian state, then from an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic polity. From the economic aspect, Taiwan's 
economic performance moved from a colonial and agrarian heritage to an 
authoritarian, resources controlled, and exported-oriented `economic miracle'. 
However it has more recently been moving from a developmental (divergent) mode of 
capitalism to an uncertain mode of capitalist development. From the society level, its 
weakness and lack of natural resources make it politically and economically 
vulnerable to be controlled by any intruding forces. However, it has still accomplished 
the first democratic and direct universal-suffrage system in Chinese-ethnic based 
society and has developed a diverse, multiple and closely networked society. 
Ideologically, Taiwan has developed from a stylized Leninist and military `police 
state' dominated by an authoritarian anti-communist regime to a state with fragmented 
national and plural identities and with freedom to tolerate and preach diversified 
thinking and ideologies. Economically, Taiwan has developed from a resources- 
starved and weak agrarian society controlled by a strong state to a pro-capitalist 
market famous for its high quality IT products and the fourth highest foreign 
11 
exchange reserves in the world. Militarily, from the geo-political perspective, Taiwan 
entered alliances with other North and East Asia states in an anti-communist coalition 
along the Pacific Rim dominated by the U. S. to a diplomatically isolated state with a 
precedent military intension and increasing economic interdependence with China. 
Domestically, Taiwan moved from a militaristic and police state suppressing its civil 
society and private sectors with inward military power to a democratic state with 
constitutional legitimacy of protecting basic human rights. And last, politically, 
Taiwan has made the transition from a limited system of elections to a comprehensive 
electoral system with universal suffrage. The President, governors and representatives 
at different levels are all now elected. 
The Arguments of this Thesis 
For these reasons, the impacts of the integrated global market and new emerging 
democracy on these EA developmental states have opened up questions about the 
continuity and discontinuity of their post-war authoritarian model. The general aim of 
this thesis is to anatomize the original model by re-examining and re-conceptualizing 
the causal premises and major variables in the orthodox EA developmental states 
theory. This will enable me to develop a more nuanced analytic model to investigate 
the overall nature of change of these states and develop my critique of the original 
model. I will use the real world laboratory- a case study of Taiwan as an empirical 
litmus test to assess the overall changing nature and validity of the new constructed 
model. Therefore, this thesis aims to both establish a theoretical model and examine 
the empirically changing nature in these states. 
On the basis of this argument, this thesis rejects the explanation provided by 
state-centered institutionalism in which the omniscient capacities of the state to pick 
the winner, set the wrong price and channel the right path are taken for granted (e. g. 
Johnson, 1987,1999; Wade, 1990,2000; Weiss, 1997,1998,2000,2003; 
Woo-Cumming, 1999). My thesis also rejects the hierarchic levels implied in the 
`bringing the state back in' approach. Instead, this thesis proposes that the continuity 
and discontinuity of the EA developmental states in the future should be understood in 
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relation to the variations of social forces and resistance to the state. As such, in this 
thesis, the state and its resistance will be presented as a polycentric constellation of 
power. Further, this thesis insists the continuity and discontinuity issues in the EA 
developmental states should not be understood as a dichotomy between state l's. 
market or realism vs. liberalism, but should be conceived as a process that comprises 
both path-dependency and path-shaping in their reproduction and transformation. 
Addressing this argument will contribute to the construction of more nuanced but 
essentially more realistic and balanced account of the transformation of the EA 
developmental states. 
Therefore, in developing this argument, this thesis takes an overtly theoretical and 
classical state theory approach to reconstruct an analytic model that highlights the 
processes and dynamics of the political mechanisms. Moreover, this framework 
should be able to apply to reinvigorate EA developmental states studies within the 
globalized economy and democracy, and simultaneously refer to its resistances. This 
thesis therefore adopts Mann's prescription of using the IEMP model (ideology, 
economy, military and politics power networks) and uses the conception of resource 
of autonomous power (Mann, 1986,1988,1993) to help devise and expand 
frameworks for the construction of a more sophisticated and dynamic empirical 
investigation into the transformation of the EA developmental states. My starting 
point is to problematise the orthodox EA developmental states theory by elucidating 
and re-investigating the theoretical presumptions and causal inferential logic that 
underpinning the EA developmental states analysis. Further, I will attempt to 
re-conceptualize and redefine these critical conceptions in terms of probing the 
resources of autonomous power held by the developmental states. This will enable me 
to establish a more elaborate analytic framework, and then apply it empirically in 
answering the substantive research questions about the continuity and discontinuity of 
the EA developmental states. 5 Explanations of the continuity and discontinuity in 
In this thesis, continuity means path-dependency on the existing institutional arrangements that were 
established from past spatial-temporal fix (Jessop, 2000 &2001; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). It also 
"implies that whatever change occurs is incremental, iterative, cumulative and unidirectional. 
Furthermore, it implies that all moments in this gradual or evolutionary process are of equal 
significance and, hence, an even unfolding of events over time" (Hay, 1999b: 260). "Path-dependency 
implies that the prior development of an institution shapes current and future trajectories. In 
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these EA developmental states should not be a zero-sum or dialectic fluctuation but a 
dynamic process of both path-dependency and path shaping (see Hai-, 1999a, 1999b; 
Jessop, 2000 &2001; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 6 
The rest of this chapter concerns the theoretical, empirical and methodological issues 
found in research of the EA developmental states. I will clarify the conceptualizations 
of state autonomy, state capacity and their inter-relation since they are the highlighted 
theoretical points deployed in the orthodox EA developmental states theory and their 
revisions. I will also reinvestigate these pre-conditional variables and their causal 
inferential logic, and attempt to analyze academic presumptions about the state's 
institutional arrangements and political mechanisms through which the EA 
developmental states are characterized and constituted. Based on these investigations, 
I will provide critical reflections on them. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized into seven sections. The outlining 
conceptualizations of state autonomy, state capacity and their inter-relation will be in 
turn approached by the discussions of the nature and resources of state autonomy; 
problematization of state autonomy in the EA developmental states model; characters 
of state capacity; reflections on the revisions of neo-institutionalism of the EA 
developmental state; and the typology of state autonomy and state capacity relations. 
The last section will provide a synthesized general account of the EA developmental 
states model and their revisions. 
Section 1.1: The nature and resources of `state autonomy' 
It has been noted that state autonomy is a theoretical focus and a central cross cutting 
comparison, "discontinuity implies rupture, transformation and an altering of trajectory- a process or 
processes of change punctuated by reversals, tipping points, turning points or other strategic moments 
of heightened significance" (Hay, 1999a: 26). 
6 Transformation can be linked to the dialectic of path-dependency and as the product of reflexive path 
shaping (Jessop, 2001: 1230). The transformation of the state can be the circular between 
path-dependency on existing institutional legacies to the resistant path shaping from social forces, 
then following another renewed trajectory reshaped by the resistance of the state. 
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concern of different approaches to state theory especially statism and neo-'Marxism. 
The former insists that the complete autonomy of the state is formed from political 
pressures and political processes that shape the state form and function (Steinmetz: 
1990). To a statist, state autonomy signifies that the "state conceived as organizations 
claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are 
not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society" 
(Skocpol, 1985: 9). For Skocpol, the state is a set of administrative, policing and 
military organizations, whose basic functions of the state are to "maintain order 
domestically and to compete with the other states" (Hobden, 1998: 3). In other words, 
state autonomy originates from its uniqueness as an administrative and coercive 
device noted for its Westphalian territorial sovereignty (see Weber, 1978). 
This neo-Weberian-influenced notion of the state and state autonomy significantly 
underpins the work of historical sociological statists including Tilly, Skocpol, Mann 
(see Hobden, 1998,1999a, 1999b; Hobson, 1998a, 1998b, 2000,2002) and the EA 
developmental states theorists. Also, the state is depicted as an institutional ensemble 
or structured field of action with a unique centrality in both nation and international 
formation (e. g. Cerny, 1990; Jessop, 1990: 278; Krasner, 1998; 1999; Skocpol, 1985; 
Mann, 1986). However, these neo-Weberfan statists all acknowledge that the strength 
of state autonomy is spatio-temporally varied. 
Conversely, the neo-Marxists set out from a society-centred and class struggle 
perspective. For them, "many different approaches allow that some degree of 
autonomy is possible or even necessary and give many ways to conceptualize its 
`relative autonomy"' (Jessop, 1990: 85). Even Marxists are quite complex with the 
variables that could be involved in the different approaches, in that it can still 
synthesize the state as a social relation of domination over the people, and that of 
class domination. The state, it is purported, prolongs the long-term interests of the 
capitalist classes and bourgeoisie. 
However, throughout the fairly disparate conceptualization of state autonomy, both 
statists and neo-Marxists share one point: they recognize that the degree, scope and 
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strength of state autonomy are not fixed and may vary according to spatial differences. 
State autonomy could be diffused, de-centered and de-territorialized (Block. 1980: 
Jessop, 1990,2000; Mann, 1983; Miliband, 1983; Skocpol, 1985). To statists, the 
uniqueness and distinctiveness of the state means it cannot be superseded or evaded 
by any other social organizations. To neo-Marxists, the relative autonomy of the state 
is an unavoidable consequence of the capitalist state compromise in class struggles, in 
order to prolong the interests of the dominant class. 
In order to further explicate the substance of state autonomy, the remaining part of 
this section will be organized into two subsections to probe the nature and resources 
of state autonomy identified by Weberian statists and the EA developmental states 
model. The first will be presented by contrasting works of two neo-Weberian 
rationalists, Skocpol and Mann, and outlining their inferential rationale of state 
autonomy. The second subsection will investigate resources of state autonomy in the 
EA developmental states model. 
1.1.1. Resources of state autonomy in neo-Werberian statist approach 
According to Skocpol, the autonomy of the state derives from (a) needs rooted in 
geopolitical factors and the dynamic of inter-state systems; (b) its domestic 
responsibilities for law and order; (c) the activities of political managers-especially 
career officials- who have weak family or personal ties to the current dominant 
socio-economic interests; and (d) periods of crisis. The state is conceived as a 
powerful and independent actor (Skocpol, 1985: 20-1). Following this line of 
reasoning, the state is conceived as a set of unitary institution with its distinctive goals 
for competing with the other social forces and interstates system. 
Based on the above, Skocpol further concretizes the conceptualization of state 
autonomy by means of "the autonomous power of the bureaucrats" and "locates elite 
autonomy among specialized bureaucrats" (Mann, 1993: 51). She points out that the 
self-interested incumbents in the government will integrate into a unitary group and 
pursue autonomous power to expand their own interests. Thus the autonomy of the 
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state is pursued via the decision-making behaviors of self-interested governmental 
bureaucrats. However, the purposes of these elites' self-interested behaviors are 
envisioned as to maintain order domestically and to compete with other states (see 
Skocpol, 1979). 
Unlike Skocpol, who simplifies state autonomy by reducing it to specialized 
bureaucrats, Mann focuses more on the uniqueness and functions of the state as a 
social control organization (Mann, 1988). He suggests that resources of state 
autonomy should be identified with its characteristics of "necessity", "multiplicity of 
functions" and "territorial centrality" (Mann, 1988). These characteristics are used to 
account for the origins and resources of the state's autonomous power. The "state 
power will coalesce around a combination of political power with economic, military, 
or ideological power" (Hobden, 1999: 4). Therefore, Mann also claims the state is a 
unique organization in human history, and is a social development which can 
concurrently possess the four strong resources of autonomous powers (IEMP) and 
effectively control the territorialized and centralized materials and people for the 
purpose of attaining human goals (Mann, 1988). Being a statist, like Skocpol, Mann 
poses his "autonomous power of the state " and the state "organizational 
materialism" as partially derived from the Weberian ideal type bureaucracy of the 
state, and advocates developing the distinct identity and distinctive institutions of the 
state (Mann, 1993: 52,54-63; and see Hobden, 1998,1999a, 1999b; Hobson, 1998a, 
1998b, 2000,2002a). 
However, by examining Mann's and Skocpol's inferential rationales and their 
predications of state autonomy, the differences and disparities between them in 
contents can still be conceived. The resources of state autonomy posited by Skocpol's 
four preconditions as described can be further unpacked. The first precondition of the 
origin of state autonomy means the state and political elites are endowed with the 
technocratic monopoly in order to protect the territory and defend against intruding 
enemies when threatened by international anarchy and competitiveness. This 
autonomy comprises the ultimate legitimacy of technocratic- bureaucratic speciality 
and centrality especially in the decision-making processes of diplomatic policies and 
17 
militarism that concerns national security and warfare policy. For Skocpol, this 
ultimate legitimacy constructed to protect state authority's self-evident goals and 
interests free from challenges by any other domestic power entity. 
The second precondition of state autonomy originates from the need to maintain 
domestic social order, cohesion, stability and reproduction. As a legitimate 
dominator and regulator of domestic orders, norms and coercion, the state could 
interpenetrate society by means of law, administration and legal violence. The third 
precondition refers to the autonomous bureaucratic institutions and civil servants 
who are insulated from socioeconomic interests with their own distinctive and 
unitary interests. The last precondition of state autonomy refers to periods of crisis, 
during which the state legitimately assumes any means of responsive policies. In sum, 
according to Skocpol, with the exception of the periods of crisis, state autonomy is 
mainly developed from its militarism, technocratic-specificity and insulated, 
autonomous and self-interested bureaucracy, especially those which are concerned 
with war-making and foreign policy. 7 Warfare is not only central to Skocpol's notion 
of international system, but also is a determining factor in domestic development (see 
Hobden, 1999b). 
For sustaining these theoretical proconditions of the origins of state autonomy, 
Skocpol separates the state and society, and class and interests. To her, there is a clear 
line of demarcation between the state and society, and between the domestic and 
international boundaries. In Skocpol's view, the mode of domestic capitalism is totally 
separated from the mode and logic of international capitalism. The resistances inside 
the domestic territory are deemed as hostile "fetters" to the actions of the state and 
impede its unitary strategies in a competitively international (both military and 
capitalist) system (Hobson, 2000: 175-91, and also see Halliday, 1994, Hobden, 1999a, 
2001). 8 This makes Skocpol's state version almost no different from neo-realism and 
7 In Skocpol's framework, the state is allocated to a perpetually competitive and anarchic international 
system in which all states need to be prepared for accidental and unpredicted war, emergencies and 
crisis. It's a classical work of realism. 
8 To this, Halliday also posits similar comments to Hobson's: "for some, such as Skocpol, there is a 
distinct area of autonomy which is greatly enhanced by the state's international role" (Halliday, 
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falls into "historical institutionalism and statist reductionism" (Hall & Taylor, 
1996: 938; Hobson, 2000: 182). 
Skocpol recognizes that "elite powers and cohesion vary. Constitutions matter. 
Democratic constitutions prohibit elite autonomies allowed to authoritarian ones" 
(Skocpol 1979 cited in Mann, 1993: 51). 9 As Mann comments that: Skocpol admits 
state autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of each and every government; instead 
it differs over time (Mann, 1993). However, this acknowledgement substantially 
implies domestic resistances will impede a unitary action of the state and 
demonstrates the imperativeness of strong state autonomy for its successful survival 
in international anarchy and competition. Ostensibly, "Skocpol conceptualizes the 
state as `Janus-faced' as having a dual anchorage in domestic socio-economic 
relations and the inter-state system" (Hobson, 2000: 182; Skocpol, 1979: 32,1985) 
and compensates "the second tier" flaw of neo-realism by re-emphasizing the 
importance of the state-society relation. However, Hobson argues that: "Skocpol 
reduces the international system to a `primitive' structure of anarchy" (Hobson, 
2000: 182) and is effectively "kicking the state back out" (Hobson, 2000,2002: 66). 
Mann's "resources of state autonomous power" (Mann, 1986,1988,1993) provides 
similar resources of state autonomy to Skocpol's. Like Skocpol, Mann emphasizes the 
speciality and importance of geopolitics, territory, diplomacy, national security, and 
war. However, he addresses the autonomy of the bureaucratic institutions by 
significantly highlighting the capacity of penetrating infrastructures in and through 
civil society, in contrast to Skocpol's concerns with autonomous and self-interested 
bureaucrats. Further, Mann rejects the emphasis on true elitism-realism, regarding it 
as exaggerating the power and cohesion of the state actors (Mann, 1993). 10 Obviously, 
1994: 79). 
9 However, Skocpol dose not provide any information on how the autonomy of the self-evident goals 
posited by the political elite or authority are to be prohibited and constrained. She emphasizes more 
the legitimacy of them. 
10 Mann notes that the state-centred institutional approach will proliferate organizational complexity 
into fragmented and departmental autonomy. Therefore, it is necessary to crystallize these fragments 
rather than highlight their multiplicity (Mann, 1993: 54). 
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the autonomy of Weberian bureaucracy in Mann's work is different from that of 
Skocpol's. 
As regards the political aspect, Mann devotes more attention to the democratic 
mechanisms and representations in the modem state and recognizes the influences of 
plural forces and interests. This is in comparison to Skocpol's emphasis on political 
elite superiority or their despotic and distributive autonomy over civil society. What 
makes Mann's IEMP model significantly different from Skocpol's institutional statism 
is Mann's emphasis on the development and momentum of capitalism and how class 
struggles impact upon the state autonomy, something that Skocpol never takes 
seriously in her works and revision. From the power configuration perspective, Mann 
holds open the possibility that the state will be superseded by resistant forces in 
society (Mann, 1988). Thus, he labels his state theory `organizational materialism' and 
reserves the space for the dialectic between "interstitial emergence" and 
"institutionalization" and the mutual intertwining intricacies between state and society 
(1993: 728). 11 Thus, this process of institutionalized interstitial emergence will be a 
transformation, and not just a reproduction in the historical movement. 
For Mann, what makes states prominently differentiated from other social control 
organizations are their military and war-making necessities and their penetrating 
infrastructural and logistical capacities. Thus, we can consequently conclude the 
main disparities in Skocpol and Mann's theories fall on the contentions between the 
differences between `bureaucratic autonomy of distributive power' and 
`infrastructural or collective capacity'; and the status and character of civil society. 
Moreover, judging by Mann's recent revisions of state and international relations 
theories, his works are phrased as representative of a non-reductionist theory of the 
state and second-wave Weberian historical sociology (WHS). Mann's work is also 
non-realist sociology of international relations which contrasts Skocpol (1979) and 
11 For Mann, "(s)ocieties are constituted by multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, they 
perennially produce emergent collective actors whose relations with older actors are not yet 
institutionalized but then become so"(Mann, 1993: 728). 
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Tilly's (1990) state-centric first-wave WHS of neo-realist international relations 
(Hobden, 1998,2002; Hobson, 2000; 2001; 2002). As Hobson comments: "Skocpol 
does open up the `black-box' of the state and state-society relation,... in a way that is 
entirely congruent with Gilpin's `modified neo-realism "'(Hobson, 2000: 182). He 
further notes that: "as with Gilpin, a state's domestic agential power or autonomy, as 
well as state-society relations, are only intervening variables; that is, they are salient 
in Skocpol's work to the extent that they enable or prevent a state from conforming to 
anarchy and military competition" (ibid: 182). The evidence of this reduction of a 
state's domestic autonomy to the primitive structure of anarchy (warfare) can be 
found easily in Skocpol's definitions regarding the resources of the state autonomy. 
Hobson criticizes neo-statists (neo-institutionalist) and neo-realists like Tilly, Skocpol, 
Waltz and Gilpin in that they "drop the second tier (state-society relations) as 
independent causal variables, and thereby, `kicking the state back out"' (ibid: 190). 
The resistant forces in society (especially classes and capitalists) are deemed as 
"fetters" to the state's autonomy and actions for warfare. This gesture makes relations 
between the state and its resistances turn into a dialectical and zero-sum one. 
On the contrary, Mann's model leads to the development of a non-realist theory by 
addressing "a number of causal variables that can not be reduced to the international 
structure" (ibid: 192), and shifts from Weber's simplicity to complexity. Hobson 
asserts that the importance of Mann's model is "the attribution of international 
agential capacity to the state" (ibid: 197). States therefore, should be conceived "as 
having varying degrees of domestic agential state power, moreover, their varying 
relations with society also autonomously impact upon and affect international 
relations" (Mann, 1993,1996 cited in ibid: 203). According to Hobson "partially 
autonomous states are constituted through a multiplicity of partially autonomous 
non-state power resources-economic, ideological and military.... " (ibid: 202). 
Actually, this conception of mutual embedded relations between the state and 
resistances in globalization has recently attracted a good deal of academic interest in 
the regulation and governance schools, especially the divergent capitalism and 
corporatist-capitalism strands (Boyer, 2000; Boyer & Drache, 1996; Burrows & 
Loader, 1994; Jessop, 1990.1993,1994,1997,1998,1999a, 1999b, 2000: Thompson, 
21 
1994; Weiss, 1995,1998,2000,2003; Whitley, 1998,1999). 
In sum, by reinvestigating the power resource of state autonomy in both Skocpol's 
and Mann's works, one can clarify their distinctive perspectives on the positional 
relations among the state, civil society, domestic capitalist and international system. 
They provide resources for legitimating statehood and share the same perspectives of 
state autonomy resources on maintaining domestic order, militarism and national 
security necessities, however disparate on how state autonomy is practically 
implemented. 12 
1.1.2. Resources of state autonomy in the EA developmental states model 
In most discussions of the economic success of the EA developmental states, there is a 
high congruence with key variables associated with the strong state autonomy while 
positing diverse explanations on their resources. Some emphasize the importance of 
the weakness of class power, especially the bourgeoisie and agrarian power 
(Burmeister, 1990; Woo, 1991). Some discussions highlight the crucial institutional 
arrangements and economic policies (e. g. Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1987,1995; Gold, 
1986; Haggard, 1990; Jenkins, 1991; Wade, 1990; Weiss, 1999,2000; Woo-Cumming 
et al, 1999). Others attach great importance to entrepreneurial bureaucrats, efficient 
bureaucracy and the authoritative structure of the state (Chu, 1995; Evans, 1989,1995; 
Haggard, 1990; Woo, 1991; Wu, 2004). The environment of the international system 
and geopolitics in the Cold War, the colonial legacy and struggle between the West 
and the Communist block; the role of U. S aid and security strategy in strengthening 
both the economies and the geo-political alliances of Asia Pacific region are also 
stressed (Cullather, 1996; Woo-Cumming, 1984,1999; Evans, 1995, Jessop, 2000; 
Wang, 1999; Winters, 2000; Wu, 2004). 13 
12 It is also important to note what Skocpol and Mann attempt to do is to provide a generalized account 
for resources of autonomous power for any normative state, however not particularly referring to the 
EA developmental states. 
13 In fact, most deliberation on the economic success in the EANICs is from the same substance and 
sets out similar propositions. The abilities of these EA developmental states to discipline and 
dominate business and civil society have been based on their strong control over the economy and 
crucial forces that allow the control of key goods, access to which private sectors and civil society 
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Encompassing these core themes of the state-centric neo-Webreain institutionalists 
and rationalist neo-realism, the crucial variables and premises in the EA 
developmental states theories are the full autonomy of the state, the efficiency and 
high-quality bureaucrats and the high strength capacity of the state. Scholars 
influenced by `the bringing the state back in' trend significantly insist that the 
industrialization in these economies are initiated, controlled and implemented by the 
state (Hobson, 2001). As Migdal has pointed out, the stronger the states are, the less 
they are threatened by the other "rule-making" organizations which exercise or claim 
control over other groups in the society (1987: 401). These propositions assume strong 
and autonomous state power with resources controllability, capital-starved private 
sectors and weak civil society with no resources to resist state domination. 
Therefore, the origins of this authoritative autonomy derive from the necessities of 
geo-politics, nationalism, social mobilization and stability of social order. In short, 
Skocpol and Mann emphasize the `national security' and militarist necessities (expand 
to economy) in a crisis period (against Communism). For these countries, the 
purposes of development are to `catching up' the western developed states, `keeping 
ahead' in the advanced technology sector in the global market and surviving in the 
international anarchy system. As Johnson argued, nationalism, social mobilization and 
their unique spatio-temporal and geopolitical environments make the EA 
developmental states what they are (see Woo-Cumming, 1999: 2-3). It is a stylish, 
compounded mode of "warfare and Listian workfare state" that depends heavily on 
logistic and extractive capacities of the state justified by nationalist ideas. 14 
depend on. 
14 According to Jessop (1999), the initial mode of regulation in most East Asian developmental states 
can be characterized as an ideal-typical "Listian Workfare National State" (LWNS). It is an illogic(s) 
mode of globalization. The characteristics of LWNS are structured coherences under a national 
security and geo-politics considerations. It requires a strong developmental state and close 
coordination between the banking and industrial capitals that can then be mobilized behind a national 
accumulation strategy (Jessop, 1999: 32). As such, there are four dimensions of LWNS: "Listian aims 
to secure economic growth through export-led industrialization form an otherwise relatively closed 
national economy and combines catch-up supply-side interventions and neo-mercantilist demand 
management. Second, LWNS social policy had a distinctive workfare orientation. Third, the LWNS 
was national as economic and social policies were pursued within the historically specific matrix of a 
national economy, a national state and an imagined national economy. Fourth, LWNS was statist and 
state institutions were the major supplement to market forces in securing economic growth, full 
employment and social cohesion. " (Jessop, 2002: 5). In LWNS economic and social life are politically 
mediated. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore were typical LWNS by Jessop's definitions. The macro 
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However, this resources control perspective downplays resources of autonomous 
power of the EA developmental states that originates from non-resource controlled 
bases or from an institutionalized democratic law system and constitutionalism. It also 
neglects the realistic and basic operational mechanisms in a democratic regime. Even 
for states with a legal monopoly on means of violence and administration, any 
decision-making behaviour or political process of incumbent authority will be 
regularly examined by the electorate in those EANICs that are moving toward 
matured democracy. Especially, after the end of Cold War, in a democratic polity, the 
power resources of elected politicians mainly come from the constituency, laws and 
constitution, and not from dictatorial and despotic resources control. According to this 
preposition, it is reasonable to enquire: whether it is still possible to continue the 
developmental states model even when these constructing prerequisites have 
changed? 
As emphasized, little of the existing literature set out to explore the resources and 
bases of these variables and trace their developments in a globalized economy and a 
democratic polity. As Leftwich (1995) points out: "the failure to analyze the anatomy 
of the developmental state has been the major flaw in post-war development theory 
and policy" (Leftwich, 1995: 403). Steinmetz suggests: the "most `generous' test of 
any state-centered theory would involve examining states with high administrative 
capacities and strong executive leaders, both of which are alleged to be conducive to 
state autonomy" and "by assessment of the state autonomy focusing on key policy 
areas and critical historical cases" (Steinmetz, 1990: 244). Further, for the purpose of 
investigating the overall changing nature of the EA developmental states in the 
globalized economy and their democratization, it is necessary to adjust such a 
state-centric proposition by re-examining their autonomous power resources and 
expanding investigations to changes in their social bases concurrently. Only through 
speculating about the states' resources of autonomous power and resistant forces in 
international environments that sustained the LWNS to develop were the post war KWNS (Keynesian 
welfare national states) in the western countries. In Jessop's terms, "Keynesian, Listian and 
Schumpeterian refer to the particular forms of state economic intervention characterized a special 
mode of social regulation, and the terms Welfare and Workfare refer the particular form of social 
intervention of the state" (Wad, 1999: 5). 
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their societies, is it possible to provide a more comprehensive understanding about the 
transformations that take place. 
Section 1.2: Critical reflections of `state autonomy' in the EA developmental 
states model 
The theoretical and methodological deficits of EA developmental states theory have 
been noted previously. Here I will draw on the autonomy of state bureaucracy 
argument and political processes in a democracy, and try to provide some critical 
reflections. 
Firstly, in many constitutional and legislative democracies, particularly in the partisan 
composition of a democratic government, the most important positions in the 
government are politically appointed. It is arguable that the policy-making power of 
bureaucrats is still totally autonomous by their own self-evident wills and insulated 
from the resistant power or class struggles in spite of political manipulation. In many 
state studies concerning the role of state bureaucrats in social policy innovation, they 
show that the structural conditions including class power balance, party composition 
and state structure profoundly limit the scope and range of policies that bureaucrats 
are able to suggest (Huber & Stephens, 1992; Kim, 2000). When bureaucrats 
consistently suggest policies that are outside or opposite to the parameters set by that 
structural configuration, they are ignored and, if they persist, they may lose their 
positions (Stryker, 1989). From a long-term perspective, different state policy has 
both structural and strategic spatial-temporally moments. Structurally, the 
decision-making process of policy needs negotiations and mediation between 
different forces. Both of `supply-side' of infrastructural policy or `demand-side' 
welfare policy should be based on necessities of social development and supports of 
their social constituents. Strategically, in a democratic polity, the political party could 
not neglect preferences of populace. 
States do have a degree of autonomy on policy decision-making. However, the 
administrative autonomy endowed by the legal and constitutional system is distinctly 
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different from the self-interested one, though sometimes they are difficult to discern. 
However, in a democratic constitutional polity, implementation of policy-making and 
the behavior of incumbent bureaucrats should be under the discipline of elected 
politicians who are regularly examined by the voters and should correspond to law 
and legal procedures. A society's day-to-day existence is affected to a much larger 
extent by reference to power normalized by means of law, rather than by the brutal 
and self-interested employment of power. The principles of public policy are carried 
out by bureaucrats whose capacities are as holders of offices and operate in the light 
of and on behalf of not their own personal interests, but those public interests their 
office has been assigned to guard and pursue (Poggi, 1990). 
Halliday (1994) also argues: " once the state is seen as institutionally distinct from 
society, the question arises of the degree to which it can act autonomously, and 
represent values separate from the society, even if it is ultimately constrained by it" 
(Halliday, 1994: 79). The autonomous power of government endowed by the 
constitution and legitimacy should not be deemed as equivalent to power executed by 
the self-interested will of the bureaucrats. The autonomous power of governmental 
bureaucrats endowed by the constitutions, law or legislations in a democratic state is a 
variable not a perpetual one. As such, Mann argues that "Weber exaggerated the 
autonomy of bureaucrats" (Mann, 1993: 79). 
Furthermore, the assertion that the superior contributions made by the bureaucrats or 
officials to administrative policy actually confuse different problems. As Skocpol 
(1985) argues, with reference to the importance and influences of the long-standing 
civil service administrators or incumbents to social policy development in Britain, 
Sweden and the United States, the contribution of civil officials is more important 
than that of the political parties and interest groups. Consequently, her conclusion is 
that "autonomous state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce the 
authority, political longevity, and social control of the state organizations whose 
incumbents generated the relevant policies or policy ideas (Skocpol, 1985: 3-28). 
It is undeniable that there is a tendency to expand the collective interests in different 
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types of Weberfan organizations and strengthen their own autonomy. However, 
Skocpol's work still lacks sufficient evidence to draw a conclusion on superiority of 
their decision-making capacity. There is a more extensive body of literature concerned 
with the inertia of the long-term incumbent, governmental institutions which impede 
the evolutions of many public administrative issues rather than prove their 
contributions (e. g. Caniden, 1994). Weber's bureaucratic organization is one ideal 
type of human social control institutions, however not the imperative one (Foucault, 
1980). The advantages and deficits of the long-term incumbents in Weberfan 
organizations, especially governmental ones, are still are debated in different realms 
of academic works. Self-interest is always a trade-off issue and a universalistic 
problem of any bureaucratic organizations, even private ones. 15 If we observe this 
Weberian bureaucratic hierarchy and its organizational autonomy from a management 
point of view, this self-interested bureaucratic autonomy could be explained as 
informational asymmetry between governmental officials and their clients (civil 
society), or between the politically appointed chief executive level and incumbent 
level(Best, 2002). 16 
These impasses can be categorized as organizational and hierarchic management and 
informational transparency issues in Weberian bureaucratization rather than political 
ones. Actually, it is a different level of problem. As Mann notes, Weber, Skocpol and 
her collaborators emphasize that in the modern state, the technical speciality and 
administrative channels of communication permit surreptitious and limited forms of 
insulation (Mann, 1993: 67). Consequently, they assert that the "classes and other 
major power actors are not routinely organized to supervise all state action" (Mann, 
1993: 67). When the resistant forces disband or turn away, it will leave civil servants 
in peace and the departmental autonomy will re-emerge (Mann, 1993: 67). These 
15 In contrast to the private sector or economic organizations, organizational inertia and 
issues 
pertaining to self-interested incumbents in the governmental institutions, such as 
bureaucracy and 
hierarchy are quite similar. It is insufficient to assume that government officials , will diagnose social 
problems more sensitively and correctly or initiate better policies than partisan or interest groups. 
16 This is what Weber argued: that the spread of bureaucracies were a potential threat to 
democracy in 
the modern world, for the resource of their power is based on knowledge and technical expertise 
protected by secrecy (Best, 2002: 17-19). 
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propositions, however, seem vulnerable and unpersuasive in the faces of open public 
media and advanced informational communication technology. 1 In a democracy. the 
executive political party and politicians will take political responsibilities for their 
policies and will be re-scrutinized at the next polls. These inertial responses of 
incumbents in the political processes could then be explained as mechanical deficits 
of representative democracy and a partisan political system. These deficits reveal the 
limits of institutions with regard to transparency and management, and should not be 
considered a substantial source of state autonomy. 
Lastly, the actions of different parts of government are scarcely unitary ones and often 
contradict each other. In other words, as Hay comments, "the state as an agency of 
agencies tends to lack agency itself' (Hay, 1999: 322). The state actually comprises a 
diverse array of specific but none the less interdependent apparatuses and institutions 
that are "complex and internally differentiated systems in their own rights" (Hay, 
1999: 321). 18 What the modern state displays is a partial and latent unity, as "state 
elites are plural, not singular" (Mann, 1993: 51). It is quite difficult to define and reify 
what are the collective interests of the bureaucrats. What Skocpol claims is the 
"prerogatives of collectivities of state officials" (1985: 15) actually is a paradoxical 
definition of state autonomy. 19 
To sum up, according to the classical developmental state studies, EANICs depend on 
the despotic sense of `state autonomy' based on controls of material resources and 
groups of competent bureaucrats with high capability to mobilize society, to allocate 
17 Civil society is more likely to keep silent about what it is unable to change temporarily, whilst not 
being unconcerned. The state (or political party which takes office) can still insist on the correctness 
of their policies and administrative autonomy despite feedback from civil society, and can endeavor to 
pursue the interests of their own party (and politician) when developing election strategies. 
18 These agents enjoy some degree of latitude of relative autonomy from the centre that is reflected in 
distinctive organizational structures, institutional practices, operational procedure and modes of 
behaviour. 
19 What the bureaucratic politics school highlights as `the priority of non-altruistic policy by 
bureaucrats' and `self-interested autonomy' (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Olson, 1965) is a totally 
different level of problem from the issues of the autonomous power of the state as noted in the 
preceding section, especially in a democratic state, and in light of the fragmented nature of the state, 
political parties and interests groups. 
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resources, to steer development and to pioneer prospective industries. Few works 
expand scrutiny to concerns with other dimensions of state autonomy authorized by 
the law and constitution in a normalized democratic mechanism, even in revised 
editions (i. e. Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995,2002,2003; Weiss & Hobson, 1995). 
According to their rationales, the successes of the EA developmental states implicitly 
rely on two important institutional arrangements, namely, the inferiorities of private 
sectors, civil society and local government; and the negligible role of legislatures even 
though they are elected to represent different interests that comprise contradictions 
and struggles among various groups. 
Following this line of reasoning, not only the capitalism mode but also democratic 
mechanisms in these countries are divergent from normalized ones. 20 In order to go 
beyond this theoretical antinomy, more delicate investigations need to be developed 
on the mechanisms and variables to invigorate research on the EA developmental 
states. In this view, the discussions of transformation of the EA developmental states 
due to globalization and democracy do indeed need more thought about what has been 
changed in civil society and in resistances to the state, but not only in order to revise 
them. Rather than seeking new evidence to legitimize old developmental states models 
it is important to acknowledge the changing social bases and reflect on the 
contemporary relevance of these models. As I work toward this question, I will look 
more scrupulously at definitions of `state capacity' and interrelationship between state 
autonomy and capacity. 
Section 1.3: Characters of `state capacity' in institutional statism and the EA 
developmental states model 
I will re-conceptualize state capacity in two subsections. The first will review the 
contribution of Skocpol, Mann, and Gringle to our understanding of state capacity. 
The second subsection will show how `state capacity' is esteemed in the EA 
20 Therefore, these premises in the orthodox EA developmental states models make the political 




developmental states model. 21 
1.3.1 Normative definition of `state capacity' in institutional statism 
First, by highlighting the influential importance of the government bureaucrats and 
the state as an active agency, Skocpol defines state capacity as "the ability to 
implement the official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of 
powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstance" 
(1985: 9). In other words, state capacity means the executive and effective efficiency 
of governmental goals set by the state as they confront domestic resistance. The 
definition makes state capacity the counter to resistance, thereby emphasizing the 
coercive and repressing role of the state rather than the creative or steering one. 
Importantly, as with state autonomy, Skocpol acknowledges that state capacity will 
vary according to different sectors of government and different historical crosscuts. 22 
Moreover, as Skocpol implicitly or explicitly suggests, the ideal type of state should 
have `strong autonomy' and `high capacity'. 
Second, in Mann's organizational material IEMP model, the modem state and 
political power acts as "place and actor, infrastructure and despotic, elite and parties is 
dual, concerning both a center, with its multiple power particularities, and 
center-territory relations" (ibid: 61). Mann further argues that the cohesion of the state 
is always problematic. However, the increasing infrastructural interpenetration 
between state and society make them tightly intertwined. He notes further that the 
"`power' of the modem state principally concerns not the `state elites' exercising 
power over society but a tightening state-society relation" (ibid). 
21 Another contribution concerned with state capacity is made by Cerny's "structuration process of the 
state" (Cerny, 1990). This concept refers to the interplays between the state and other structures both 
endogenously and exogenously. Cerny also posits a similar two-dimensional matrix referring to 
internal strength of the state and its exogenous environment (See Cerny, 1990: 101). He emphasizes 
the autonomy and capacity changes and shifts "in different countries and in different circumstances, 
different levels of the state apparatus and different combinations of state actors", namely "different 
historical-specific-configurations" (Cerny, 1990: 47). 
22 Skocpol further suggests that the autonomy and capacity of different governmental sectors and the 
degree of their insulations from civil society are variable ones. 
30 
In order to sustain his state theory, Mann outlines a balanced perspective of political 
power about the modem state in his writings and identifies two distinctive dimensions 
of state power: despotic power and infrastructural power. On the one hand, despotic 
power derives from the inability of civil forces to control and fulfill those forms of 
territorial centralization, and denotes distributive power by the state elites themselves 
over civil society. Despotic power is also usually what is meant in the literature by 
`power of autonomy' (ibid). However, Mann emphasizes that civil society actors can 
23 withhold or undercut this power in a democracy (ibid). 
On the other hand, "infrastructural power is the institutional capacity of a central state, 
despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions"... 
"This is collective power, `power through' society, coordinating social life through 
state infrastructures (Mann, 1988,1993). 24 That is to say, the modem state penetrates 
its civil society mainly by means of intangible laws, administration and logistic or 
tangible infrastructures, but not by the despotic autonomy power. Nonetheless, these 
infrastructural powers are "(l)argely controlled by outside civil society groups (either 
by their financiers or by the electorate) as well as by the law" (Mann, 1986: 114). 
"Without the backing of a formidable social movement", the power of elected 
politicians and permanent bureaucrats to "change the fundamental rules and overturn 
the distribution of power within civil society is feeble" (ibid). After this classification, 
Mann uses his two dimensions of state power to produce four two-dimensional ideal 
types of the states shown in Table 1.2. 
23 This power means "(t)he range of actions that the state elite can undertake without routine 
negotiation with the civil society group" (Mann, 1993: 59). However, "the degree varying according to 
the ability of civil society actors to organize themselves centrally through representative assemblies, 
formal political parties, court factions and so forth. They can alternatively withhold powers from 
central politics or undercut state powers by strengthening transnational relations abroad" (Mann, 
1993: 59) 
24 It identifies a state as a set of central and radial institutions penetrating its territories ... 
(I)ncreasmg 
infrastructural power does not necessarily increase or reduce distributive, despotic power" (Mann, 
1993: 59) It differs from the social utility in any particular time and space by forms of territorial 
centralization which can not be provided by the forces of civil society themselves (Mann, 1988). 
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Table- 1.2 Mann's "Two Dimensions of State Power" 
(Despotic power j Infrastructural power (state capacity) 
(state autonomy) Low High 
Low Feudal (I Bureaucratic-democratic(BI) 
High Imperial/absolutist (II) Authoritarian (IV) 
Source: Mann, 1988: 115,1993 
Subsequently, Mann claims that in one way: "(s)tates in the capitalist democracies are 
weak, in another they are strong. They are `despotically weak' but `infrastructurally 
strong"' (Mann, 1988: 114). In these states there are few signs of autonomous state 
power-of a despotic type. In opposition to Poulantzas's and Skocpol's passive 
reductionist view of the state, Mann stresses the active role of the state in promoting 
the great social change by consolidating territoriality with its infrastructural (logistic) 
power. He identifies the importance of the state's role in consolidating its territoriality 
that is decided "in proportion to its infrastructural power. Mann emphasizes: "the 
greater they are or become, the greater the territorializing of social life" (ibid: 132). 
Even the states "move toward despotism is resisted by civil society groups, but the 
state-led infrastructural reorganization may result" (ibid). 25 This argument on the 
character of the state capacity expands Mann's points to suggest a more creative and 
active role of the state, which goes beyond the repression of civil society. In line with 
Mann's asymmetrical resources of power networks and developed trajectories, the 
capacities of different parts of the state are spatio-temporally varied and 
differentiated. 
Grindle provides a concretized definition and criteria of state capacity that offers four 
dimensions of operationalization: technical capacity, administrative capacity 
institutional capacity and political capacity (Grindle, 1996). According to Grindle, 
25 Mann claims: "every dispute between the state elite and elements of civil society, and every dispute 
among the latter which is routinely regulated through the state's institutions, tends to focus the 
relations and the struggles of civil society onto the territorial plane of the state, consolidating social 
interaction over that terrain, creating territorialized mechanisms for repressing or compromising the 
struggle, and breaking both smaller local and also wider transnational social relationships" (Mann, 
1986: 132). 
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"institutional capacity describes states having authoritative and effective `rules of the 
game' to regulate economic and political behavior. Technical capacity is the ability to 
formulate and manage macro-economic policies. Administrative capacity describes 
effective administration of basic physical and social infrastructure ... 
Political capacity 
consists of effective and legitimate channels for societal demand making, 
representation and conflict resolution- and having responsive political leaders and 
administrators" (Kjar et al, 2002: 18). 
In short, in institutional statism, the normative state capacity can be summarized into 
three themes. Firstly, there is the common and basic argument on state capacity 
referring to effectiveness and efficiency to manage the bureaucracy and implement the 
desired policies or goals of the state. Secondly, there is a high correlation between 
state autonomy and state capacity; however in the modem democratic state, state 
capacity does not necessary take the fully autonomous form. Thirdly, state capacity is 
the result of historical-specific configurations and differs in different countries, 
circumstances, sectors, levels and times. 
1.3.2 The highlighted `state capacity'in the EA developmental states model. 
According to the institutional statism, the scope of state capacity described above 
remains not particularly active in market interventionism. However, as Migdal 
emphasizes, the strong state should have sufficient autonomy in enacting policies and 
have means to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extracting resources and 
appropriate resources in determined way (Migdal, 1988). For the purpose of catching- 
up, the neo-statist insists that EA developmental states not merely need the capacity to 
provide public goods and infrastructures or regulate social order. They emphasize the 
EA developmental states have greater "managerial, co-ordination and control 
capacities" (Kim, 2000). 26 These neo-statists argue that the active capacities of the 
26 Managerial capacity refers to the ability of the insulated and cohesive elite and bureaucracy to 
formulate and implement economic policies; co-operation capacity refers to the establishment of an 
institutionalized mechanism between the state and business; control capacity refers to the resources 
appropriate and infrastructural power (Kim, 2000). 
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state should include fiscal extractive capacity, legitimation capacity. coercive capacity 
and especially steering capacity (Wang & Hu, 1993,2000). These statists' definitions 
of state capacities have comprised in Grindle's categories of the administrative, 
technical and institutional capacities. However, they emphasize less on political 
capacity as these states were authoritative ones. 
Since the mid-1980s, the successful transformation and excellent economic 
performances of the EA developmental states in IT technology and knowledge-driven 
economy have provided sound justifications and validations of neo-statists' theories. 
Certainly, these state theorists attribute these unparalleled performances to the 
steering capacity of the state and the co-operational institutional mechanism between 
the state and business (technical and administrative capacities). The empirical 
evidence supports the observed trend toward "competitive nations" (Cerny, 1990; 
Porter, 1990; Mann, 1997); the "operational function of the state" (Dunning, 1995; 
1997); and "strategic trade theory" (Brander & Spencer, 1985; Krugman, 1986) 
conceptions emphasized by neo-realism, neo-statism or neo-mercantilism. In this view, 
Mann's "infrastructural capacity" conception still remains quite conservative and 
conventional as it confines the state to the roles of "regulator and producer" (Evans, 
1995: 13) or provider of public goods and infrastructures (administrative and 
institutional capacities). 
In a nutshell, in the orthodox EA developmental states model, the prominent 
capacities mainly refer to the managerial, co-operation and steering capacities of the 
technocratic insulated bureaucratic cadres who show premium managerial talents that 
are impervious to rent-seeking interests and effectively intervene in the market or 
govern the market by means of 
, 
different policies as instrumental tools (see Dent, 
2002: 39-40; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990; Weiss, 1998,2000,2002). In this sense, the 
technical capacity is far more important than other capacities. In the revisionists' 
works the institutional, administrative and political capacities were organized in a 
despotic sense and subordinated to the technical one. For them, there is a clear 
demarcation, not only politically but also economically, between the international 
system and the state. Especially, for them, the development of international capitalism 
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follows an anarchic and competitive logic; however, the development of domestic 
capitalist trajectory and market could be controlled, operated, disciplined and 
governed ; moreover, the private sector needs the state to pilot and steer direction to 
ensure their survival in a competitive global market. 
Section 1.4: Reflections on the revisions of neo-institutionalism of the EA 
developmental states 
Having discussed the theoretical basis of state capacity, this section will in turn review 
two renowned revisions, particularly in referring to the economic development in 
Taiwan in the IT age; - first, is Evans's "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995); then 
Weiss's "governed interdepc+r: dence" (Weiss, 1995; 1998; 2000; 2002) model. I will 
investigate their inferential logic and argument on the continuity and dynamic of the 
EA developmental states, and then reflect critically on these two revisions. 
1.4.1. Evans' `Embedded Autonomy'model and monologue 
For highlighting the leading role of the state in economic transformation, Evans posits 
`embedded autonomy' as an ideal typical model to sustain and legitimate further 
interventions of the state in the transformation of the EA developmental state and in 
globalization. He asserts that the ability to effect the industrial and economic 
transformation of one state depends upon state-society relations or a dense network of 
ties to bind the state and societal allies together. For remedying the theoretical 
drawback of insulating separations between the state and society in the "bringing the 
state back in" approach, Evans suggests analyzing factors such as social and 
institutional linkages between the state and society as more influential consequences 
27 (causes) of the developmental process (Evans, 1995). 
To Evans, the EA developmental states rely on a pair of active roles (that he calls) 
"midwife" and "husbandry" which focus more on the relations between the state 
27 Evans argues that "different kinds of state structures create different capacities for action" (Evans, 
1995: 11). 
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agency and private entrepreneurial groups (1995: 13). 28 He explicitly asserts that his 
model will contribute as an alternative, in contrast to how "fostering growth is orten 
portrayed as a substitute for addressing distributional issues" (ibid: 6). 29 Reshaped 
state-society ties can reconstruct national comparative advantages to facilitate 
accumulation. He describes the underlying structural basis for sustaining state 
involvement in industrial upgrading and transformation as `embedded autonomy'. The 
precondition of `embedded autonomy' depends on "highly selective meritocratic 
recruitment and long-term career rewards to create commitment and a sense of 
corporate coherence" (ibid: 12)30 in the Weberian governmental bureaucracy as well as 
connectedness with the private sector by undertaking joint projects. 31 
Evans demonstrates his model using the case of the informatics policies of Brazil, 
India, South Korea and Taiwan that depended on a small group of the best and 
brightest highly selective "entrepreneurial bureaucrats" (ibid: 22 1). 32 This political 
dynamic comes from the "nationalist greenhouse through internationalization" (ibid: 
225). Namely, keeping the capacities and charisma of these "best and brightest 
bureaucrats" to shape the development trajectory, make the wisest decisions and build 
robust and coherent bureaucracies are the most essential prerequisites to the 
28 The `midwifery' role of the state focuses on promoting, inducing, and assisting the emergence of new 
entrepreneurial groups and infant sectors. The `husbandry' role of the state emphasizes "cajoling and 
assisting" policy that can steer and protect the private sectors to confront the challenges in global 
markets, "from simple signaling to something as complex as setting up state organizations to take over 
risky complementary tasks, such as research and development" (Evans, 1995: 14). 
29 For Evans, wealth creation is what the state should endeavor to promote. Therefore, he suggests this 
might be a plausible way to reconstruct the comparative advantages of the EA developmental states to 
participate in the global market by reshaping state-society ties with midwifery and husbandry policies. 
30 Evans argues that the autonomy of state apparatuses and bureaucracy given by this "corporate 
coherence" will transcend the individual interests of their private counterparts when implementing the 
"midwifery" and "husbandry" policies (Evans, 1995: 12-3), thereby creating a niche and stimulating 
private sector. 
31 Evans argues that "embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation 
that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, protecting the state 
from piecemeal capture, which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually 
undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors" (Evans, 1995: 248). 
32 These strategically located "entrepreneurial bureaucrats" formulated ideas about the possible futures 
of the sector and convinced the rest of the state apparatus to cooperate under their self-evident goals 
(Evans, 1995: 221). 
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establishment and continuity of the EA developmental states. Actually, it would be 
rather appropriate to say embedded autonomy is presenting the positive features and 
merits of Weber's ideal type state bureaucracy and state activism rather than referring 
to it as a specific feature of the EA developmental states. 
Evans himself raises questions about the possible continuity of embedded autonomy 
in the future from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. At the theoretical level, 
Evans's model is developed from the sector level of -the informatics sector. Within the 
limited resources of the state, it is quite reasonable to ask "should the same logic hold 
more generally? " and "could embeddedness be built around ties to multiple social 
groups? "(ibid: 17). Embeddedness within specific sectors unavoidably causes 
exclusion of other sectors and risks failure. It is also raises issues of domestic 
distributive justice, asymmetrical development, polarization on income levels, 
marginalization of definite groups with weaker resources and social instability. Evans 
admits that "the concept of embedded autonomy is useful because it concretizes the 
structural relations that lie behind the efficacy of the ideal typical developmental state, 
but it does not fully capture variations in state involvement across sectors and 
circumstances" (ibid: 247). 
Empirical observation shows that the EA developmental state in the 1990s was 
challenged by civil society, labour, entrepreneurial groups, international alliances and 
the state itself. These challenges make it difficult to maintain the model (ibid: 228-34). 
Besides, many political corruptions and scandals having occurred during and since the 
1980's in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and have caused the collapse of the 
`one-dominant- party system' and the `strong charismatic ruler polity' in these EA 
developmental states. Even Evans himself casts doubts on the proposition of `best and 
brightest highly selective entrepreneurial bureaucrats' possessing strong autonomy 
and high capacity who could continue to steer and lead the high economic growth 
mission of the state (ibid: 207-50). Empirically, it would be very risky to assume that 
long-term state development depends on the nationalism and the self-evident advice 
from the bureaucrats. 
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However. Evans argues his model still might be validated if the state expands the 
scope of state-society links to include a broader range of groups and classes. Evans 
emphasizes that "the process of seeking a more desirable niche in the global division 
of labor" and the renewed "joint project" (ibid: 234,246) initiated by the nationalistic 
"entrepreneurial bureaucrat" will make this dream come true. Evans even emphasizes 
the importance of distinctive structural differences of states and that "variations in the 
state involvement have to be built on the historical examination of particular states" 
(ibid: 10-1). This comment draws attention to theoretical and methodological 
weakness in Evans's model. 
In Evans's recent work, he justifies the importance of the stateness in the era of 
globalization in line with perspectives of new institutional economists such as North 
and Williamson who draw attention to state-society synergy (Evans, 1997). Evans 
agrees with the new institutional economics emphasis on "the necessity of governance 
structures and the pervasive importance of institutional frameworks to any kind of 
economic transactions,... "(ibid : 78) in the new global economy. He also provides 
evidence of the possible co-existence and positive-sum relations between effective 
state and strong civil society. However, as noted, the most salient and problematic 
argument in the "bringing the state back in" approach is the dominant and leading role 
of the state as a top-down actor, rather than the debate about the strength of the states. 
Evans retreats from this position in order to prevent the eclipse of the state. That 
renders his perspective of the state scarcely different from the governance theories of 
the regulation approach and neo-economic institutionalism. 
1.4.2. Weisss `Governed Interdependence'model and reactions 
The other renowned revision is proposed by Weiss. Weiss bases her revision on 
Mann's state infrastructural capacity conception to develop her novel approach for a 
"governed interdependence (GI) model" as one type of corporatism and as a special 
form of infrastructural power to revise state capacity and depict the capitalist 
characteristics of EA developmental states especially referring to Japan and Taiwan 
(Weiss, 1995; 1998; 2000). According to Weiss, the GI model refers to "a negotiated 
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relationship, in which public and private participants maintain their autonomy, yet 
which is nevertheless governed by broader goals set and monitored by the state. In 
this relationship, leadership is either exercised directly by the state or delegated to the 
private sector where a robust organizational infrastructure has been nurtured by the 
state policies" (Weiss, 1998: 38). 
Weiss claims that while Evans's "embedded autonomy" solves the problem of how 
and when the state is strong enough to control the state's autonomy without losing its 
effectiveness, her GI model could provide a novel problem-solving approach when 
the state and capital both are strong without compromising autonomy (ibid: 38). She 
asserts that the mutual dependence between the state and the private sector is the main 
factor behind the economic success and transformation of Japan and Taiwan. For 
Weiss, only with `governed interdependence' capacity, will these EANICs 
successfully transform into more advanced and competitive states (1998). 
However, Mann's `infrastructural capacity' and Weiss's `governed interdependence' 
still reach some theoretical impasses with regard to the EA developmental states 
especially with reference to globalization. Firstly, Mann's argument that the 
infrastructural capacity will facilitate and enforce the centrality and territoriality of the 
state seems problematic in a global economy. Once the state endeavors to establish its 
intangible or tangible infrastructures, it will enforce its capacity to penetrate civil 
society and increase the transparency in its civil society. 33 It will then be quite 
arguable what the consequences will be when the infrastructures simultaneously 
empower the state and the resistant forces of civil society. As Halperin (1998) argues, 
the capacity to be embedded and penetrate in and through society can cut both ways. 
The results could increase or decrease state autonomy and capacity. 
Secondly, Weiss makes the claim that, despite the institutional cooperative linkage 
between the state and the private sector, the state still can stand in a leading position 
33 Such as improving institutional transparency in terms of financial or monetary regulations and laws; 
constructing super highways, airports and harbors; communication networks, light fiber networks and 
media access. 
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while in the process of maintaining industrialization. She emphasizes the "coordinated, 
selective and disciplinary ' (1998: 43) governing capacity of the state, which casts 
doubt on whether the developmental state models can still continue their `rnediations' 
in the market operation with their democratic and capitalist developments, and even 
Weiss argues it is not intervention but promotion. 34 
Weiss further asserts "in the most advanced countries, the more the encompassing and 
cohesive the organization of the industry, the more cohesive and insulated the 
executive bureaucracy, and the tighter the links between the two, the greater the 
capacity for innovation" (ibid: 44). However, in a capitalist state, just as in the internal 
sectors of the state, the private sector is never unitary and is always occupied in 
contradiction and struggles, as it is more competitive than cooperative. Business and 
the private sector are often too fragmented to pursue a unified policy. The high degree 
of consent and the impact of societal processes and relations on the nature of the state 
and of state action are never simple ones as is shown by Weiss's observations and 
descriptions (Halperin, 1998; Nordhaug, 1997). 
Thirdly, Weiss also claims that her GI model could capture the dynamic picture of the 
state-business relations. However, what Weiss evinces in all her works still cannot 
avoid freezing a particular snapshot view, or focusing on the cases of specific sectors 
(1995,1996 and 2002). As Chiu and Lui contend Weiss's model is "at the empirical 
level, simply trying to replace one general homogeneous imagery of East Asian 
growth with another one" (1998: 152). "Weiss is liable to mix explanations with 
prescriptions" (ibid: 153). 35 In other words, we need to "separate prescription from 
explanation in the analysis of the role of the state in East Asian development, or even 
developmental processes in general" (ibid). 
34 It is undeniable that in Weiss's model, there is more a sense of the state's top-down decision-making 
role than an emphasis on the equivalent positions between the state and private sector (Weiss, 1998). 
'' Chiu and Lui suggest what needs to be done is to "as certain whether co-operation is really the case 
in a certain economy over a certain period, and then try to deduce the possible impact on economic 
performance (Chiu& Lui, 1998). 
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Fourthly, Weiss's model underestimates the pressures that stem from the broader 
society's demands on state welfare policies and their countervailing effects on 
economic growth, and also downplay the importance of constituency preference in a 
democratic polity in these EA developmental states. Actually, Weiss's model 
exaggerates the feasibility of transformation of "the Listian workfare legacy" (see 
Jessop, 1999: 32) in these EA developmental states. Weiss implicitly accepts that the 
originally motive power of domestic political imperatives is being displaced by 
"external pressures for financial liberalization in the 1990s" which are not part of her 
deductive design (1998: 22). She emphasizes that the core capacities dismantling of 
the developmental state issue is "the subject of a separate study of regime shift and 
can not be dealt with adequately" in her GI model (ibid: 34). 
As such, Weiss keeps her model in a variable-controlled vacuum, where the variables 
in the international environment, political system and civil society should probably be 
controlled as constants and static as preconditions in her GI equilibrium (ibid: 22, 
33-37). In that model, there are "no longer the developmental states, but the 
`transformative state"' (ibid: 29). However, development and democracy are never 
simple issues and sometimes contradict each other in the EA developmental states. 
Skimming discussion of the demands for welfare policies and the changes of political 
configuration will lead to a lopsided explanation of their developmental strategies. 
Lastly, here then, Weiss's GI model is the same as Evans's "embedded autonomy" 
model and could be proffered as an "ideal-type" for the EA developmental states in 
the future. However, I still argue that revisions of developmental state theory 
under-conceptualize the complexity of political processes and tend to reify a rather 
unlikely idealized political institutional configuration into a model of the EA 
developmental states (Nordhaug, 1996; Underhill &Zhang, 2005). 36 Both Evans and 
Weiss avoid the issue of `resources of state autonomous power' and `political process' 
issues and set out their models on historical path-dependence and assumptions of 
continuity in institutional arrangement in the past. The empirical symptoms need 
36 According to Weiss, the intensive institutional mechanism and bureaucracy are by no means unique 
to the EA developmental states, but a very ideal-typical characteristic of Weberian bureaucracy in any 
country. 
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careful diagnosis even if their prescriptions seem suitable. . 
In sum, the revisions of the EA developmental states theory attempt to revive the 
state-centered models by emphasizing the relational aspect of developmental statism 
rather than its interventionist aspect (Dent, 2002). However, the revisionists remain 
state centric and reductionist, not giving sufficient space for elite agency. The 
dynamics of domestic capitalism and civil society are all reduced and subsumed 
beneath the unitary logic of the state. 
Section 1.5: Typology of relations between `state autonomy' and `state capacity' 
According to the above discussions of statist developmentalism, we can still present 
neo-statist and neo-institutionalist synthesized category of relations between state 
autonomy and capacity. Table 1.3 offers a plausible two dimensional model that could 
be applied to a number of developmental states. 
Cells in Table 1.3 could be used independently to highlight any specific domain if 
necessary. For instance, the state autonomy and capacity typology in the domestic 
economy as revealed in Table 1.4. This two-dimensional model identifies more clearly 
overlapping power networks of the state depicted by Mann. The model reveals the 
asymmetrical power development of the state and its capacity to implement policies, 
which take the international and domestic domains into accounts simultaneously. This 
will be also close to what Mann calls the "polymorphous model of the states" (1993: 
75). The strength of state autonomy in any definite network will retain a relatively 
different degree of capacity, whereas, there could be other forms of interactions and 
interplay between different power networks of the state. Table 1.3 will provide the 
basic image of the myriad overlapping and entwining power networks and bring the 
analysis of any IEMP aspect of any definite state to a clearer description. However, it 
is important to acknowledge that it is not possible to provide a final measure of 
ultimate state power and which would allow me to simplify the interplay between the 
different power networks. Table-1.5 provides a synthesis of the theoretical 
perspectives of the EA developmental states theory and their revisions. 
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Table-1.3 Autonomy and capacity relations typology of the polymorphous states 
Autonomy Autonomy 
&capacity of the Ideology Econ omy Military Politic 
state I D I D I D I D 













CIr D H U M 
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"I" means International Level; "D" means Domestic Level. 
"S" means Strong, "M" means Medium, "W" means Weak. 
"H" means High, "M" means Medium, "L" means Low. 
Table- 1.4 The state autonomy and capacity typology in a domestic economy 
State Autonomy and State Autonomy 
Capacity Strong Weak 
High e. g. Developmental states; e. g. the U. S. (Federal Government); 
Capacity Weiss's `Governed Inter- Mann's `State Infra- structural 
dependence Model' Power' 
Low e. g. Predatory States in Africa e. g. Some Latin American and other 
Third World states 
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Table- 1.5 Theoretical perspectives of EA developmental states theory and revisions 
Theoretical origins Conceptions and means of political analysis 
Ontology Ontological State-centric structuralism, determinism and reductionism. 
presumptions None sensations to the `structure and agency' issue. 
Core State activism and state unitary on national development. 
theoretical Strong state autonomy and high state capacity. 
prerequisites Subordinated capitalism and civil society. 
Rationality of Weberian bureaucracy and autonomy of 
political elites. 
Materialism, nationalism and social mobilization. 
Epistemology Positivism Deductive materialism and rationalism. 
Generalized covering laws or predictive and parsimonious 
models. 
Methodology Means of Deductive and linear or billiard ball models and equilibriums. 
analytic logics Calculus and material rationality. 
Path-dependency. 
Tendential characteristics of rational choice institutionalism 
(neo-institutionalism). 
Inferential Collective interests of self-interested and rational bureaucrats 
criteria and and political elites. 
parameters Exogenous and instrumental preferences. 
Resources and Material power shift within unit, positional change and 
forms of reproductive logic. 
dynamics 
Power Top-down, hierarchic, relational structures and institutional 
structure arrangements. 
Sampling of Generally in the synchronic or snapshot approach, few make 
time periods use of comparative static strategy. 
Methods to Story telling; subjective observations, descriptions and 
test models prescriptions; nominal and ordinal variables comparisons. 
Nature of Anarchy Conflictual and competitive; a tendency to instability. 
international 
system 
Domestic Capitalism Dependent variable to the state; fetter to state autonomy 
environments Civil society Dependent variable to the state; fetter to state autonomy 
Theoretical The `bringing in the state back in' approach, realism and neo-realism. 
affinities Weberian statism, neo-mercantilism, competitive state theory, strategic trade 
policy theory. 
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Section 1.6 Purporting ideal typical analytic framework and chapter 
organization 
The general aim of this thesis is to investigate transformation of the EA 
developmental states in a globalized economy and democracy. Unsatisfied with the 
orthodox EA developmental states theory and their revisions, I will argue that the 
transformation of the EA developmental states should not be investigated from a 
one-sided or state centric perspective. I am particularly concerned about the overall 
nature, and transformation of these states and the changing role of the state, so it is 
necessary to deconstruct the state by investigating resources of autonomous power 
of the state and its resistant forces, then try to re-conceptualize the autonomous power 
resources of the state and resistance from different aspects. Such an analytical 
recasting could unearth distinctive development trajectories and dynamics and 
provide comparisons and contrasts in the state theory debate. By doing so, it will be a 
plausible way to probe and infer the scope, contents and possibilities of how the EA 
developmental states can interact with its resistances in the future, and to reshape and 
redefine its institutional composition. 
Therefore, drawing on the insights of critical social theory and neo-Weberian 
(non-realist) historical sociology and the methodological implications of historical 
institutionalism, this thesis will construct a comprehensive analytic framework and 
model that could be used to frame investigations into the transformations of these EA 
developmental states. Table-1.6 outlines the basis on which I will develop a more 
nuanced model that elucidates the continuity and discontinuity of the EA 
developmental states. It also clarifies the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological commitments and expectations of the framework used in this thesis. 
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Table- 1.6 The ideal-typical framework in this thesis. 
Purporting ideal typical analytic framework in this thesis 
Ontology Ontological Poly-centric and multi-causal indeterminism. 
presumptions Reject reductionism and structuralism. 
Go beyond the structure and agency dichotomy. 
Core theoretical Open-ended and contingent historical development. 
prerequisites Macro-social development is anarchic or unplanned. 
Go beyond a state-centric or society-centric 
approach. 
Epistemology Critical realism Deductive materialism and rationalism. (causal 
Post-positivism analysis). 
Inductive idealism and reflexivism. 
Convergent and divergent realities. 
Methodology Means of analytic Go beyond inductive and deductive method. 
logics Linear and non-linear model. 
A synthesized approach of historical and rational 
choice institutionalism. 
Path dependency and path-shaping. 
Strategic-relational inferences. 
Punctuated evolution and punctuated equilibriums. 
Calculus rationality and ideational reflexivity. 
Process and dynamics. 
Inferential Endogenous and constructed preference. 
criteria and 
parameters 
Resources and Material-based calculus logics. 
forms of Non-material (ideational and institutional) resources. 
dynamics Transformational logics (a constellated 
reorganization of any unit or power). 
Power structure Polycentric power configurations. 
Sampling of time The diachronic approach to change. 
periods Comparative static of periodisations. 
Methods to test Comparative historical sequences. 
models Methods applied by historical institutionalism. 
Nominal, ordinal variables comparisons, narrative 
analysis, within-cases strategies. 
Processing tracing. 
Theoretical Critical realism, post-positivism, historical institutionalism, the English 
affinities School and historical sociology of IR, constructivism, reflectivism and 
strategic-relational approach. 
46 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. The Introductory chapter comprises the 
introduction and literature review of the EA developmental states model. In Chapter 
Two, I have argued that an account of transformation of the EA developmental states 
should start from basic explorations of the overall changes on resources of 
autonomous powers of the state and resistant forces in the TEMP model. Only through 
investigating their power resources bases, power strength and interplays, can there be 
a clear test of their changing nature and structural power configurations. I also 
re-conceptualize state autonomy and capacity to specify the polymorphous aspects of 
the EA developmental states. These resources are used to construct and analytic frame 
work in Chapter Two. 
Chapters Three to Six provide empirical studies consistent with the research design to 
test the validation of the arrow diagram in 2.4 and hypothesis. Chapter Three provides 
a brief survey on specific historical juncture prior to 1950, the year KMT retreated to 
Taiwan as an antecedent condition. Chapter Four investigates the impacts of four 
independent variables (IVs) in 1949-1986, to show how the developmental state was 
constructed and how the power constellation shifted over four decades. Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six in turn investigate the changing power configuration among the four 
IVs by analyzing their autonomous power resources. Chapter Five reviews the 
variables of the international system and domestic capitalist development; and 
Chapter Six focuses on variables of civil society and the state's resistance to its 
resistances. These two chapters will outline the causal mechanisms as prelude to the 
discussion of the dependent variable in Chapter Seven. This chapter will review the 
investigations in the preceding chapters to explore the most prominently debated 
issues in the process of development in Taiwan, and then posit an ideal-type mode of 
how the developmental state in Taiwan can continue by re-territorializing and 
re-defining the boundaries and roles of the state. The thesis will end by summarizing 
the academic contributions of this thesis to the divergent and convergent paradigms in 
political science; and to international relation theory and developmental studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Constructing Analytic Frameworks - 
Resources of Autonomous Power of the State and Resistances 
In this chapter I will present the main conceptual tools and theoretical perspectives 
that I will be applying throughout this thesis. Drawing on the insights of state-centric 
developmental states theory, a generalized and stylized theoretical application in 
EANICs, in 1.1.2, I have examined the main theoretical basis and premise-resources 
of state autonomy in the EA developmental states model. This chapter will go further 
bringing in conceptions of resources of autonomous power, resistance to the state, 
and resistance to resistance to explore the dialectical relations between the state and 
its resistant forces, in normative state theory. This thesis will consider what 
neo-statists and neo-institutionalists stress; that the leading roles of the state in these 
countries are suspect, particularly as they are located in a globalized economy and 
possess democratic regimes. As highlighted, the perspectives of EA developmental 
state theories offer some useful insights into the miraculous economic take-off in this 
region over the past four decades. Nonetheless, we need to come to grips with 
ongoing processes as well as the new challenges that will reshape the role and status 
of the states as East Asia's economies become more mature and its civil societies 
become more assertive. This thesis aims to set out from the methodology and 
doctrines of the classical political and sociological theories to re-investigate and 
re-conceptualize the crucial variables in the orthodox EA developmental states theory 
and their revisions. 
By utilizing and expanding Mann's IEMP model, this chapter endeavors to construct 
polycentric models and multi-causal power configuration to re-investigate changes in 
the EA developmental states caused by integration with the global economy and 
democratic transition. However, change of this power configuration will induce a 
change in the organizing principle governing the distribution of power between the 
state and its resistant forces. This thesis insists that this power redistribution will 
involve a profound purposive transformation of the prevailing form of institutional 
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rationality in the EA developmental states. Therefore, the methods employed by this 
thesis do not reject the tendential rational choice institutionalist characteristics of 
economic calculus by rationality, however I insist that the methodological parameters 
should not only reflect the rationality inference and calculus of materials and 
institutions but should also expand into the ideational and strategic reflexivity of both 
structure and agency involved in the process of transformation. It is a more plausible 
and nuanced way to resolve the practical continuity and discontinuity issues in these 
developmental states. 
In this chapter, I will begin by de-constructing the state by probing the characters of 
state's resources of autonomous power in Mann's original IEMP model and explore 
his theory of the state. I will attempt to provide a theoretical legitimation for the 
resources of autonomous power of resistance to the state in my expanded IEMP 
models by reference to different levels of analysis that comprise international system, 
the state, domestic capitalism and civil society. Then I will bring in the conception of 
resistance to resistance to redefine the scope of the state. 
The chapter is organized into six sections. The first section will outline the concept of 
the resources of autonomous power of the state and resistance. The second section 
will discuss the significance and definition `autonomous power' in political analysis 
as Mann conceives its application to organizations and networks. The third section 
will discuss Mann's polymorphous "organizational materialism" and state theory in 
the IEMP model. Section four will consider the application of the IEMP model to the 
resistant forces. Section five will discuss Mann's methodology. The final section will 
expand on Mann's IEMP model in a way that will enable it to be operationalised in 
the research design of this thesis. This chapter will provide useful insights into the 
vital variables, institutional mechanisms and transformed processes in the EA 
developmental state theories. I will be able to re-view them through the prism of 
classical state theory and capture the empirical and historical complexity of the role of 
the states in the EA developmental states. 
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Section 2.1: The significance and definition of `autonomous power' in political 
anal`"sis 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate transformation of the EA developmental states 
in a way that is not one-sided or state centric. I am particularly concerned about the 
overall nature, and transformation of these states and the changing role of the state, so 
it is necessary to deconstruct the state by investigating resources of autonomous 
power the state and its resistant forces, then try to re-conceptualize the contents of 
autonomous power resources of the state and resistance from different aspects. Such 
an analytical recasting could unearth distinctive development trajectories and 
dynamics and provide comparisons and contrasts in the state theory debate. The 
outcome will provide a way of understanding how the EA developmental states might 
interface with resistant forces in the future, and reshape and redefine its boundaries. 
The significance of the concept of autonomous or independent power of the state has 
been discussed at length, especially in statist and Maxist literature (Block, 1980; 
Evans, 1995; Jessop, 1990,2002; Krasner 1978; Lukes, 1972; Miliband, 1983; Moore, 
1957; O'Connor, 1973; Poulantzas, 1968; Skocpol, 1985, Weiss, 1998,1999 and 
2000). Primarily, different theoretical approaches are offered that focus on issues 
regarding how the autonomous power of the state, executed by the political elites or 
government bureaucrats, and affected by the pressure of interests in civil society. 
Nevertheless, few state theories employ the same concept to measure autonomous 
power of resistance against the state power in empirical research, or construct 
theoretically applied work to elucidate the development of civil society and economic 
organizations. What has been done most by Neo-Marxist or normative statists is 
speculate on the execution and outcomes of the autonomous power of the state, 
however few of them focus analytic attention on these sources, causes, scopes, 
mechanisms or limitations. 
For pluralism and liberalism, the state is a reflective image mirroring the 
configuration of power among interest in society (Dahl, 1961: 228; Lindblom, 1965; 
MacPherson, 1973: 188; Nozick, 1974). There is no autonomous power of the state in 
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pluralism. In the Marxist strand, the state is "heteronomous" (Jessop, 1990: 89) and 
directed by demands and interests of dominant class and "reflects a complex 
parallelogram of (economic, political and ideological) forces" (ibid). In order to retain 
long-term benefits for the capitalists, the state possesses "relative autonomy" 
(Poulantzas, 1968) against civil society and the dominant classes. On the contrary, 
statists or neo-realists assert unitary state agency and the ability of the state to shape 
society. Accordingly, the state is endowed with fully autonomous power for its 
uniqueness among social control organizations. The key divide among the existing 
state theories could be synthesized into taking the autonomous power or autonomy of 
the state for granted or not. 
However, the conception of autonomous power is also important to scholars who 
emphasize the importance of the resistant forces to the state. None the less, few of 
them expand this discussion of the resistant forces to the state in their accounts of 
normative state theory. The rational problem-solving approaches (in Cox's terms, see 
Cox 1981) and Marxism are all stylized and terminated structural expressions or 
totalities which reduce the development of history to a mono-dynamic or logic. 
Individual agency is fatally constrained in the matrixes they provide. For further 
deliberating on the conception of autonomous power to solve these impasses, the rest 
of this section will attempt to identify and contrast the definitions and 
operationalisations of autonomous power in neo-statism and neo-Marxism by 
referring to the state and its resistance and to justify the contingent and emancipatory 
development of human history. 
As described in the Introduction, Mann identifies the power organizations of social 
control with three characteristics of form and four of substance that determine the 
overall structure of societies. The former refers to the forms or types of power that 
could be attributed into collective and distributive, extensive and intensive, 
authoritative and diffused powers; the latter refers to the IEMP powers model (Mann, 
1986; 1993). In Mann's model, he categorizes organizational forces into ideological, 
economic, military and political organizations and power networks that control these 
related powers. He embodies these four major organizations by referring to 
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transcending media, norms and values; capitalist development; militarism and the 
state in the modern w; orld. Meanwhile, Mann claims these overlapping power 
networks in the society possess different dynamisms and move autonomously with 
their own logics (1986: 1-33). However, Mann does not further clarify the practical 
operationalizations of these power networks at different levels (i. e. international or 
domestic levels), but rather he deploys the conception of `myriad overlapping and 
intertwining' to implicitly denote their complexities (see Hobson, 2001; Hobden, 
1999b). Figure 2.1 presents Mann's original IEMP power networks and analytic 
framework. 
Figure 2.1 Mann's Original IEMP power networks (Source: Modified from Hobson, 
2000: 196) 
As with respect to the definition of power, in the neo-or post-Marxists strand, Jessop's 
work is particularly noted and widely accepted by theorists of different paradigms- 
including critical theory (see Devetak, 1996; Linklater, 1990) and constructivism ( see 
Hay, 2002; Reus-Smit, 2003). 37 To Jessop, power configurations are spatial-temporal 
fixes (Jessop, 2000; 2001). The specific power configurations and hegemony projects 
of the state will generate a "historical bloc" or "historical junctures" (Jessop, 
2000: 333) to provide the departing point of any unfolding process of "structural 
37 Jessop (1990) admits his concepts of power and hegemonic project of the state are inspired by 
Gramscian explorations on hegemony and power, however he has recently gone on to emphasize the 
importance of going beyond structure and agency dichotomy in his `strategic-relational approach' (see 
Hay, 2002: 126-134,209-213; Jessop, 1990,2000,2001). 
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coupling and co-evolution" (ibid: 328) of continuity and discontinuity in history In 
this sense, Jessop's preliminary power structure is close to Cox's critical concepts of 
international power configurations and structural powers constellation (Cox, 1981; 
1995) and the work of many historical institutionalists and constructivists. It is a 
useful starting point of any specific historical analysis of the state. History is not 
assumed to be determined and Jessop's framework allows for an exploration of the 
power origins of the state. Jessop provides an open-ended and contingent base upon 
which historical analysis can be based. 
Particularly, Jessop emphasizes not that only the ecological dominant systems (i. e. 
economic or political systems) are operationally autonomous from the other 
extra-economic or non-economic systems in society. Jessop claims that these 
"operationally autonomous but independent systems share the same social space, their 
development tends to become structural coupled through mutual adaptation to the 
changes in their environment generated by the operations of the other 
systems-adaptations which are governed by each system's own operational code or 
organizational logic" (Jessop, 2000: 332). He also argues: "the effectiveness of state 
power depends on the balance of forces in a given situation and is thus reinforced 
through the mobilization of support for official policies as well as through the 
monopolization of the means of coercion" (Jessop, 1990: 128-9). Especially, in his 
`strategic-relational' approach, Jessop uses conceptualizations of "reflectively 
reorganized structural configurations" and "recursively selected strategies and tactics" 
(Jessop, 2001: 1223-1224) to concretize the empirical operations and processes of 
autonomous powers of both structure and agency. These statements of power by 
Jessop scarcely differ from prescriptions in Mann's IEMP model and historical 
institutionalism. As Hay (2002) notes, analysis of the distribution, exercises and 
consequences of power in a definite spatial-temporal fix is accepted by theorists with 
divergent stances. 
Therefore, the term awonomous power in this thesis is used to capture the 
characteristics of distinctive structures and agents that possess a certain degree of 
resources of power and could act autonomously and independently. This power will 
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not only be monopolized by the state but also be held by any social control 
organizations or agents. Further, the conception of organizational autonomous power 
in this thesis will concur with what Mann (1986) claims, is a different approach from 
Lukes's concept of power (1972). In contrast to Lukes, Mann emphasizes: "like 
Giddens (1979: 91) I do not treat `power itself as a resource. Resources are the media 
through which power is exercised "'(Mann, 1986: 6). Mann's central concern is not to 
investigate how the power is operationalised by the agents but to identify the major 
alternative `media' or power sources, then, try to devise a methodology for studying 
organizational power (ibid). In this way, he draws his attention to how different 
characteristic powers with material resources are actually used by the power holding 
organizations or institutions for the purpose of social control. 
Mann's definition of power, as used to explain state power is quite similar to Jessop's 
depiction of state power focusing on the `means and media' of power execution and 
resources of power. However, in contrast to Mann's emphasis on the calculable and 
quantitative materialist approach (even referring to `ideological power'), Jessop 
further expands the scope of power resources to the non-material facets (ideational 
and institutional powers) and insists the definition of power should be traced to its 
resources-not only in materials, but also to include ideas and institutions. However, 
the strength and practical operationalizations of power in ideational and institutional 
facets are mainly inferred from material resources of autonomous power in both 
Mann's and Jessop's original works (Jessop, 1990: 265; Mann, 1993: 52). However, 
Jessop's `strategic-relational approach' has paid particular attention to overcoming 
this impasse by drawing attention to the reflexivity of structure and agency (see Hay, 
2002; Jessop, 2001). 
In order to go beyond an ontological structure and agency dichotomy, the conception 
of resources of autonomous power in this thesis mainly refers to underlying forms of 
material capabilities, legal political, economic and social mechanisms, along with 
ideational resources available to actors. The rationalism and materialism in Mann's 
original model limited its explanatory capability and application weakness (see 
Hobden, 1998: 134-141,1999; Jacoby, 2004; Smith, 2003,233-34). To overcome this, 
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analytic models and framework used in this thesis will pay a particular attention to the 
operationalization of ideational power. 
Section 2.2 Characters of Mann's autonomous power organizations and networks 
According to Mann (1986), real social life is more complex than its dominant 
institutions. Mann recognizes "that there exist different sources of power, deriving 
from ideological, economic, military and political organizational forms. These 
different power resources combine in different ways at different historical moments, 
and the challenge is to tease out the source that might be dominant, the relationship 
between different sources of power, and how these different sources of power 
consolidate into different social relationships both at a particular historical moment 
and in comparison to other epochs" (Barnett, 2002: 118). The exploration of 
transformations of human society could be reached only through the study of the 
myriad social networks and different types of power, by developing a sophisticated 
understanding of the complex interconnections and powers of various crosscutting 
interaction networks. The more institutionalized these interrelations, the more the 
various power networks converge toward one unitary society. 
However, as Jacoby refers there are two implications arise from Mann's social power 
networks. The first is its duality, and the second is its omnipresence (Jacoby, 2004). 
As such, any dominant organization in society has never been sufficiently 
institutionalized to prevent `interstitial' emergence of new challenging forces, 
organizations, or even the state. That is to say, challenges to existing dominant power 
institutions will still emerge from between their interstices and around their 
edges--where the autonomous myriad power networks lie, creating new relations, 
institutions or movements that have unanticipated consequences for the old. This will 
enable a reorganizing spurt, and a reorganization of both the myriad networks of 
society and its dominant power configurations (Mann, 1986: 15-16,20). 
This is similar again to what Jessop suggests: " (t)he state is just one institution 
ensemble among others within a social formation, but it is peculiarity of charging with 
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overall responsibility to maintain the cohesion of social formation of which it is a 
part"(1990: 360). "(T)he exercise of the state's powers always comes up against 
structural constraints and resistance which inevitably limits its ability to master the 
social formation" (ibid: 361). The resistant forces have their own modes of calculation, 
distinctive logics, resources and capacities that will render them in turn recalcitrant to 
direct control by the state (ibid: 360-2). According to Jessop's more recent work, the 
globalized capitalism and political system are the most dominant ecological variables 
and imperatives in the social system and modern world. However, they still 
structurally couple and co-evolve with other interdependent systems that are 
operationally autonomous and have their own instrumental rationalities, logics of 
appropriateness and institutional dynamics (Jessop, 2000). 
Following this line of reasoning, the more resources one organization (i. e. the state) 
can control the more autonomous it is and the greater range and scope it could 
effectively dominate, however, none of them can monopolize any forms of power. As 
Hay notes, that while "theorists and critics from divergent political and ethical stances 
are unlikely to agree upon the legitimacy of the actions of the powerful, they may at 
least share a common analysis of the distribution, exercises and consequences of 
power within a given social and political context"(2002: 186-187). The approach 
stands apart from the distribution of autonomous power and provides a persuasive 
standpoint that the state is not the unique organization of power for social control. 
This approach could therefore be a feasible way to investigate the autonomous power 
of the state and resistant ones in the IEMP model from a power relative and 
distributive perspective. This power distribution perspective sustains the strong 
backdrop for the proposals for investigating transformation of the EA developmental 
states in the era of globalized economy and democratic political systems must take 
resistant forces at civil society and international system levels into consideration 
simultaneously, treat them as major independent variables in the process of state's 
transformation, and investigate their changes and dynamics via their resources of 
autonomous power. Without referring to these resistant forces, the analysis of state's 
transformation will be superficial. 
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Moreover, according to Mann, the IEMP model could be identified by the two other 
sources of autonomous power, power networks and organizations. In the first aspect, 
the power networks in IEMP model should be understood as overlapping and 
intertwined. Any historical crosscuts and events were impure and promiscuous with 
"varying combinations of the four power revolutions, carrying the classes, nations and 
their rivals forward in complex forms that often escape their own control" (Mann, 
1993: 4). They are not like billiard balls, which follow their own trajectory, changing 
direction as they hit each other. They are overlapping and intersecting power relation 
networks, entwined with each other, changing one other's inner shapes as well as their 
outward trajectories with different socio-spatial boundaries and dynamics. Different 
social control networks cannot be the mere consequence of other sources of social 
power. Their interrelations produce unanticipated, emergent consequences for power 
actors and reconstruct power configurations (Mann, 1986,1993,1997). Underneath 
different autonomous networks there still remains the sub-level of myriad 
sub-networks of power operation. Therefore, the political, economic and social 
transformation and trajectories have distinctive dynamics and always entwine more 
than one power source. 
The second character of IEMP power networks is that the transformation of these 
intertwined networks will proceed in non-dialectical and non-systemic ways. The 
consequences and results of their interactions will be contingent and unpredictable. 
Although the transformations of power networks have been multiple, entwined, and 
developed interstitially, nevertheless, the whole has been a non-systemic, 
non-dialectical process between historically given institutions and emergent 
interstitial forces. Not only the power organizations, but also the different power 
networks developed with their own partly autonomous and dynamic logic. No power 
agents could comprehend and take charge of all this (Mann, 1993). These two 
characteristics make Mann's IEMP model, unlike the other statist works, an 
open-ended and contingently inferred logical archetype. 
These two characteristics of Mann's IEMP power networks provide origins for the 
open-ended and contingent outcome of historic evolution. The process of state 
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formation and form should be analyzed in different networks and from different 
perspectives. Mann's IEMP power networks also suggests another possible 
convergent point between the neo-statist, neo-Marxist, critical theory and 
constructivism that share the open-ended and evolutionary perspective of the 
transformational processes and changes. 
Section 2.3 Mann's polymorphous "organizational materialism" and state theory 
in the IEMP model 
Mann is to a greater or lesser extent a neo-Weberian statist (see Hobson 1998,2000, 
2002; Hobden, 1998,1999a, 1999b, 2002). According to Mann's IEMP power model, 
he postulates a quite different point of view about the autonomous power of the state 
from other radical statists' views such as theorists of the "bringing the state back in" 
or "first wave neo-Weberian historical sociology" trend (Hobson, 1998). Mann (1993) 
asserts that he "believes that states are messier and less systemic and unitary than each 
single theory suggests" and recognizes that he has "borrowed from all the principle 
state theories to generate his own partly institutional, partially functional 
polymorphous theory" (Mann, 1993: 88). Mann also understands the limits and 
constrains of autonomy of the state in a representative democratic regime, but rejects 
democratic voting as ultimately decisive. He argues that "more forms of power than 
voting and shared norms help decide outcomes" (ibid). Consequently, he applies 
characteristics of his original IEMP network on the reproduction of state power 
configurations and allows the possibility of varying "imbalance power" or 
"asymmetrically developed power" within the state power networks as he has 
developed in his IEMP model. He names it "cock-up" or "foul-up" state theory (ibid: 
53). 
Mann characterizes the modern state with four higher-level crystallizations in line 
with his IEMP power network of the state: capitalist, representative, national and 
militarist (ibid: 81). He then further concretizes these four higher-level crystallizations 
into capitalist economic relations and development; representation in democracy 
polity and centralized versus local regional power; national centralization by 
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infrastructural power in Weberian bureaucracy; and the professionalizing and 
bureaucratizing of state militarism and foreign policy (ibid: 81-2). He emphasizes the 
institutional particularities of the state and describes his model as embodying 
"organizational materialism" and embracing "institutional statism" (ibid: 52). 
However, the asymmetrically developed autonomous IEMP powers of the state mean 
that Mann's four state's crystallizations become a form of `polymorphous statism'. As 
Hobden comments "Mann's concern is to develop a notion of the state that stresses its 
multifaceted and contradictory characteristics" (1998: 4). 
Therefore, by prominently emphasizing the influential power of social control 
organizations and existing power structures and networks, we can claim that Mann 
has embedded materialist structuralism and substantial historical institutionalism into 
his IEMP model. However, Mann does not give up on the importance of human will 
as a major dynamics in progressive history. Moreover, Mann asserts it is impossible to 
develop a general state theory that could be applied to convey characteristics and 
aspects of all states in the real world, and insists that there is no single universal and 
final measure of political and state power. He argues "for diverse crystallization to 
result in a singular system state would require not only extraordinary organizing 
abilities by the state officials but also extraordinary political interests by civil society 
actors" (Mann, 1993: 79-80). Mann insists contemporary modern states are constituted 
non-dialectically and contingently by entwined contests over all four crystallizations, 
therefore any single state crystallization may weigh more heavily on state behavior 
and cause consequences for others (ibid: 86-8). 
To Mann, what makes the modem states different from other social control 
organizations are their capabilities in establishing institutional infrastructures. Mann 
aims to provide evidence for "the regulation of aspects social life which are 
distinctively territorially centered" (1993: 88), however civil society is unable to 
centralize and territorialize these aspects by itself. As such, he highlights "the central 
state personnel may constitute an autonomous power actor" (ibid: 88) with 
"infrastructural capacity" (Mann, 1986,1993). While this is similar to Skocpol (1985) 
and Evans's (1995) views about the autonomous power implemented by government 
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bureaucrats and the asymmetrical power distributions among different sections of 
government. Mann leaves more space for new challenges from resistant forces to 
supersede the dominant power in existing power configurations. Mann also allows for 
more open-ended possibilities and contingence for transformation of the state than in 
classical statist or neo-institutionalist theories. This will be explicated in more detail 
in the next section. 
Section 2.4 Legitimating the application of IEMP model into resistant forces to 
the state 
In Mann's IEMP and state crystallization model, the state is not a unique organization 
proposing to effectively attain human goals. Functional and institutional 
distinctiveness and uniqueness from other social institutions makes the state acquire 
autonomy and control to mobilize territorialized and centralized resources. However, 
this specific difference still leaves a space for the social forces to challenge the control 
and autonomy of the state (Mann, 1986b; 1993: 88). Even Mann insists that increases 
in state infrastructural power will territorialize social relations, however he still 
acknowledges that the control of resources oscillates between the state and civil 
society, and is actually a dialectical relation between them. When the power of 
infrastructures pioneered by the despotic state shift into civil society or resistances, it 
will increase their general power to supplant or resist the uniqueness of the state. 
Mann acknowledges "if the state then loses control of its resources they diffuse into 
civil society, de-centering and de-territorializing it" (Mann, 1986b: 134-135). 
In Mann's recent writing about development of modern states and globalization, he 
takes a more prudent attitude toward the autonomy and capacity of civil society and 
the local, international, transnational and global network (1993: 61; 1997: 472-96). 
He indicates there are five ideal-types of analytical socio-spatial power networks or 
levels- a local (sub-national)network, a national(state) network, an international 
(geopolitical) network, a transnational (macro-regional) network, and a global 
network (see Barnett, 2002; Mann, 1997) . 
Mann also emphasizes the capacity of civil 
society to control the state, especially in the democratic-party states (1993: 61) and 
60 
admits the possibility that globalized capitalism impacts on state soverei2ty (1997: 
472-96). Therefore, Mann even claims: "modern states and civil societies 
interpenetrate too tightly for autonomy without power" (1993: 61). Mann reminds us 
that "while the contemporary international system gives significant advantages to 
states, there are another ways in which the playing field is leveled; that there are also 
normative forces that constrain state actor; and that the state system does not define 
global politics or preclude non-state actors from bringing about historical change" 
(Barnett, 2002: 117-8). 
As Barnett notes, "Mann's modified network approach identifies the possibility of 
several, analytically distinct, spaces of interaction, the organizational forms those 
interactions produce, and the different resources and powers that those organizations 
possess" (2002: 117). The state's objectives and process of policy implementation are 
determined by "collective restraints upon both state's infra-structural and despotic 
organizational authority" (Jacoby, 2004: 409). The former is "curtailed by 
decentralized networks of power such as market forces, arms proliferation and 
anti-statism" and that will entail "some degree of decentralization and collective 
co-operation with non-state groups" (ibid: 409-410). The latter relates to "the state's 
distributive power or the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake 
without routine institutionalized negotiation with the civil society groups", however 
"limited by localized interests, judicial autonomy and multilateral regimes" (ibid: 
410). To Mann, " the state is polymorphous, enjoying many different identities as a 
home to both distributive, despotic action independent of domestic and geopolitical 
influence and to collective, infra-structural action restrained by forces of sub-state 
localism and supra-state internationalism" (ibid: 412). 
As Mann explicitly points out, the power of the modem state principally concerns not 
state elites exercising power over society (in reference to despotic autonomy of 
political elites) but the infrastructural power located in "a tightening state-society 
relation, caging social relations over national rather than the local-region or 
transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far more of social life than 
had earlier states" (1993: 61). Thereby, the `asymmetrical power network' principle 
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could also be applied to explain the development of resistant forces at social and 
international levels. Alongside the processes of contingently mutual interpenetrating. 
the autonomous power networks of the state and resistant forces will differentiate and 
diversify following their distinctive logics or momentums. Some powers proliferate, 
enforce and some retreat. However, Mann admits "the power autonomy of both states 
and classes has essentially fluctuated, dialectically. There can be no general formula 
concerning the `timeless' degree of autonomous state power" (1986b: 130) and the 
resistant forces to the state. . 
Even the radical statists insist that the state should be the unique and central 
institution in social analysis and a major independent variable of the causal inference 
model in social life, and they still cannot deny and neglect that the autonomous range, 
scope and measures of the state are variable and will be challenged by other agents 
possessing resistant power (Evans, 1995; Jessop, 1990: 282,360-4; Skocpol 1985: 14, 
19; Weiss, 1998). As Mann points out different state theorists share one congruent 
view: "that states are both actors and places, that these places have many mansions 
and varying degrees of autonomy and cohesion, yet also respond to pressures from 
capitalists, other major power actors, and more general expressed social needs"(1993: 
53). Moreover, state autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental 
system. The actions of autonomous state change over time by its very structural 
potential in relation to particular kinds of socioeconomic and political environment, 
and with given interests and resources. That is, the powers of the state should be 
examined from the relational perspective over domestic and transnational non-state 
actors and structure. As Skocpol states, "not only does the scope for autonomous state 
action vary but so do the capacity and readiness of state managers to follow an 
independent strategy relative to non-state actors" (Skocpol, 1985: 14,19). 
A few state-oriented accounts of the developmental state in EA also recognize the 
limitation and application of the developmental states model and the possibilities of it 
being superseded by social forces or international alliances (e. g. Evans, 1995; Skocpol, 
1985; Weiss & Hobson, 1995). This is what Evans concludes commenting that the 
research results should be sobering (1995: 227-50). The vulnerability and weakness of 
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the EA developmental states originated from the variable relations between the state 
and society. Once the social structure changes, the original cooperative and mutual 
benefiting structure changes too. "As the process of industrial transformation 
unfolded, the power and interests of private entrepreneurial groups changed" (ibid: 
224). Private businesses will develop their agendas and seek new alliances to 
supersede the organizations and policies that created them, and force the state itself to 
change. The growing insurgency will mushroom from repressed civil society (labour 
class) and its request for their political and economic justices. Apparently, the 
reciprocal shaping of state and society is not always mutually reinforcing. Informatics 
agencies were transformed and sometimes marginalized by the industries they helped 
create. At a more general level, the social structural bases of the developmental state 
have been at least partially undercut by the new industrial society it helped created 
(Evans, 1995: 227-50). 
In order to overcome these impasses in EA developmental states model, the present 
thesis accepts the basic lines of social development and research strategies posited by 
Jessop (1990,2001), Mann (1986,1993) and theorists influenced by critical theory 
and historical institutionalism. I am adopting an evolutionary perspective which 
implies that a large part of macro-social development is anarchic, unplanned, "blind 
co-evolution" (Jessop, 2000: 333) but spatio-temporal coupled and thus varies in 
accordance with the prevailing environments. The historical juncture here is also in 
line with Cox's (1986) "historical structure" conception defined as "a particular 
configuration between ideas, institutions and material forces" (Cox, 1986: 218). As 
described above, it is a convergent perspective shared by these related approaches. In 
particular, this thesis aims to assess the relative weight of different institutions and 
social forces in determining specific outcomes in a changing conjuncture from a 
power distributive perspective and insist the possibility of co-revolution (Jessop, 1990: 
103) and contingent processes. The inevitable contingent necessity of social 
development will be highlighted in the investigations of the continuity and 
discontinuity of the EA developmental states. 
At a more profound level, rather than taking the EA developmental state model as a 
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given and a trans-historical feature, this thesis seeks to investigate the structures and 
resources that constitute them, and the processes that have led to their formation and 
how they have varied result in contemporary forms in the geographical and historical 
spatio-temporal fixes. Following this line of argument and reasoning, I will analyze 
the waxing and waning of resources of autonomous power in the state and its 
resistances, and investigate the changing nature of the state and re-define its 
boundaries. 
Section: 2.5 Applying Mann's methodology to this thesis 
In Mann's original model, the dialectic power resources between the state and 
resistances, between structures and agency are perpetual and continuously interacting 
ones. Nevertheless, the whole was a non-systemic, non-dialectical process between 
historically given institutions and emergent institutions. This section will investigate 
the transformational dynamics of organizations in Mann's model and anatomize the 
methodology he employs. I conclude by showing how, with appropriate modification, 
his model will be applied in this thesis. 
2.5.1 Manns dynamics of transformation and methodology of power resource 
According to Mann, any social control power networks (mainly, the organizations and 
institutions) interact and overlap with other power networks with their specific 
resources of autonomous power. Therefore, human history is made by these myriad 
and endless intertwining interactions. However the operationalizations of these power 
configurations are impure and promiscuous. They are interweaved intricately "in and 
out of one another in a complex interplay between institutionalized and emergent 
interstitial forces" (Mann, 1993: 10). No single power agents could comprehend and 
take charge of all this. In Mann's work, he ostensibly places more weight on human 
agency than any path dependency on legacies and historical structures that shape, or 
limit, transformational dynamics. He argues that: "the dynamic of society comes from 
the myriad social networks that humans set up to pursue their goals" (Mann, 1986: 
19). Tunneling ahead to achieve their goals, underneath ostensibly stable networks, 
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human beings emerge forming new networks with rival configurations to the existing 
ones (ibid: 1-33). Nonetheless, Mann states that -the driving force of human society is 
not institutionalization. History derives from restless drives that generate various 
networks of extensive and intensive power relations. These networks have a more 
direct relation to goal attainment than institutionalization has" (ibid: 13) and that the 
"`interstitial emergences' are outcomes of the translation of human goals into 
organizational means" (ibid: 16). 
Mann provides two resources to explain the emergences of institutional 
transformation and changes. The first resource of change refers is the resistance of 
unsatisfied agents to the existing power networks or structures. Mann claims that the 
"societies have never been sufficiently institutionalized to prevent interstitial 
emergence" (ibid: 16) and prevent resistant forces from superseding the old ones. The 
second resource of change comes from the weakness of institutions themselves, that is, 
the reproduction of existing institutions is incomplete and unstable. Mann agrees that 
"many networks remain interstitial both to the four power sources and to the dominant 
configurations; similarly, important aspects of the four sources also remain poorly 
institutionalized into the dominant configurations. These two sources of interstitial 
interaction eventually produce a more powerful emergent network, centered on one or 
more of the four power sources, and induce a reorganization of social life and a new 
dominant configuration"(ibid: 30). Therefore, in Mann's IEMP model, the 
goal-pursuing and unsatisfied agents are the major resources of the organizational 
changes and transformation in history. 
However, even though Mann's explanation of resources of change emphasizes the 
goal-attaining impetus of human beings (agency), he still endows the structural power 
networks (mainly referring to the social control organizations and historical 
constructed power structures, tangible or intangible) with the same impetus and 
dynamics to change as human beings. These structural dynamics and impetus are 
embodied distinctively developing logic to change and transform. However, Mann 
does not further clarify the dialectic relations between structure and agency or provide 
accounts of how to go beyond them as do Giddens (1979,1984) and Jessop (1990). 
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Mann concentrates more on how the material power resources are "willed by the 
organizations or institutions" (1986: 6) in forms that are extensive and intensive; 
collective and distributive; and authoritative and diffused. Mann claims his 
methodology of power focuses on problems of "organization, control, logistics, 
communication- the capacity to organize and control people, material, and territories, 
and the development of this capacity throughout history.... rests on measuring 
socio-spatial capacity for organization and explaining its development"(ibid: 2-3). 
As such, Mann deploys his methodology and approach to power by emphasizing 
conceptions of `organizational materialism' and `history of power'. It is not difficult 
to refine Mann's IEMP model by paying closer attention to the structure-agency 
issues. Mann tackles the structure-agency in a way that is similar to those of critical 
realists (see Archer 1998; Bhaskar, 1989; Lewis, 2002). In critical realism, structure 
and agency can not be reduced to each other and enjoy a certain degree of autonomy 
from the other. Mann's method also reveals the combination of latent structuralism 
and historical institutionalism, while not overlooking the concerns of material- 
rationalists (see Dimaggio, 1998; Hall and Taylor, 1996,1998; Hay and Wincott, 1998; 
Jessop, 2001). 
Therefore, Mann's method indeed provides a more deliberate approach than the 
structural power relation approach employed by the classical statists or rational-choice 
institutionalists and essentially involves using duality to transcend the structure- 
agency dichotomy (see Jacoby, 2004). However from a methodological perspective, 
Mann does not further provide distinctions or deliberations that explain changes of 
substantial nature and characteristics of power or how these powers realistically 
operate beyond the structure-agency dichotomy. There is little recognition of the 
differential capacities of actors, and despite the reflexive transformation of structure 
by agency. 
Many empirical or revised works on the transformation and change in the EA 
developmental states, accepting statists or neo-institutionalists assumptions, set out 
from a similar conception of structural power as historical institutionalists do (see 
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Hall and Taylor, 1996: 941). They prominently highlight the active role of the state 
agency, emphasizing the `activism of the state'. Further. they subtly and substantially 
emphasize the static continuity of a historical and institutional configuration of power 
array as `state reductionism' does, on the other hand. Thus, the activism of state 
agency employed in the orthodox developmental states model and its revisions is used 
to legitimize the perpetual leading role of the state and to argue for path dependent 
effects generated by existing `state capacities' and `policy legacies' that support the 
reproduction of the state. Therefore, the agents in resistant forces are conceptualized 
(contextualized) as `fetters' opposed to or against the state. The resistant forces are 
implicitly depicted as reactive and their agency is understated. 
As such, the major methodological deficit in the `bringing in the state back' approach 
is that it can not provide a persuasive interpretation on the changing characteristics 
within the states or account for the impact of resistant agents. Likewise the vigour of 
these major actors, who have reflexive capacity, is not explored. Thus, 
transformations of power configuration in these states depicted by the statists are 
presented in a superficial way. As Ruggie comments on realism, these accounts 
"contains only a reproductive logic, but no transformation logic" (1986: 152). For 
neo-statists or neo-institutionalists, the changes in the EA developmental states are 
deemed as a `change in unit' and as a `power shift'. They are not seen as a change of 
the unit (see Hall, 1998). Whereas, "a shift is a locational redistribution of power, 
wealth or leadership within the unit. A transformation is a structural and a 
configurational reorganization of any unit" (ibid: 270) that concerns more of the 
substantial nature of power. 
The major purpose of this thesis is to probe the continuity and discontinuity of the EA 
developmental states by developing a more nuanced method in relation to the 
variations of social forces and resistance to the state. The investigation of 
transformation in these states will insist the resources of transformational dynamics 
should exist in the pre-existing structure of any given time and derive from the current 
exercise of human agency not only referring to the state but also include resistant 
forces. Therefore, this thesis will reject methodological reductionism and avoid the 
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deterministic reduction of actors to reflections of state determined structures. The 
major agents will be portrayed "as constantly drawing upon pre-existing social 
structures in order to act, with the ensuing actions subsequently bringing about the 
reproduction or transformation of those structures" (Lewis, 2002: 19). 
2.5.2 Manns methodology for inferring power resources and networks 
As noted, Mann's work is prone to emphasize subterranean structuralism and 
historical institutionalism. 38 In Mann's original IEMP model, he deploys his 
"methodology to `quantify' power, to trace out its exact infrastructures, and it is 
immediately obvious that quantities of power have developed enormously throughout 
history" (Mann, 1986: 30). Apparently, this approach is deeply seated in rational 
materialism. 
However, Mann's method in his model leaves an ambiguous paradox. Jacoby argues 
that Mann purports to use "a systematic methodology to generate a generalized form 
of knowledge" (2004: 404) and study the large-scale social changes. He states that 
Mann's work and methods are distinguished from neo-Weberian sociology in four 
ways. "The first is his fusion of structural conceptions of large-scale social change to 
the empirics of individual action. The second is his four part theorization of social 
power and its implication for the analysis of the state. The third is his endeavour to 
find a middle ground between comparativist and linear historiography. The fourth is 
his combination of contextual specificity and nomothetic generality" (ibid: 404). 
Jacoby describes Mann's methodology as resting on "a multiple micro-foundation 
basis" that commits to "methodological individualism" and with empiricism replacing 
"theoretical complexity as a means of approaching causal primacy" (ibid: 407). This 
approach combines the "fundamentally materialist accounts of goal-directed 
behaviour with abiding, if instrumental, emphasis on the causal role of organized 
38 In Mann's IEMP model, the existing power structure is characterized by path dependency and 
highlighted by the prominent importance on distribution of power in a polity as a structural 
conjuncture and entry point at any given point in time and develop their causal inference logics 
mainly along with Weberian materialistic rationality (Jacoby, 2004; Mann. 1986,1993) . 
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ideologies, and a re-affirmation of Weber's focus on unintended consequences" (ibid). 
Accordingly, Jacoby recognizes that Mann attempts to "synthesize the historical 
narrative with the science of causality" and "seeks to merge idiographic depictions of 
past events with nomothetic interpretation of continuity and change" without 
deductive method (ibid: 408). In this view, causal relations in Mann's historical 
narrative method are inferred from the inductive historiographic observation (see ibid: 
414). This method introduces an integrated causal narrativity into comparative 
trajectories to explain long-term persistence and change without conflating 
mechanism and law (see ibid: 414; Somers, 1996). It also is a methodological "turn to 
history with an agenda that went beyond testing propositions derived from general 
theory" (Calhoun, 1998: 849) and avoided a formulaic version of the positivist 
objectivity and hypothetico-deductive sequence (see ibid: 417). 
However, this combination of a holistic and individualistic level draws causes some 
criticism. Hobden contends that there exists a serious weakness in Mann's analysis 
that conflates the outsider and insider accounts. These two versions co-exist within 
Mann's work and result in multiple accounts (see Hobden, 1998: 139). Smith (2002) 
argues that the major problem lies in Mann's ambiguity about how power resources 
are to be evaluated. As noted, Mann's method is to quantify power, even ideological 
power, in the historical narrative. To Mann, "ideology is not something that 
constitutes the identities or interests of actors; instead, it intensifies the cohesion, the 
confidence, and the power of an. already-established social group ... 
it largely 
strengthens whatever is there" (Mann, 1986: 24; Smith, 2002: 233-34). Mann's model 
still remains exogenously constructed since it is a subterranean rationalist and 
materialist approach. "Understanding is ultimately reducible to explanation" in 
Mann's work (Smith, 2002: 234). 
Mann explicitly, though somewhat superficially, highlights the dynamic of the 
goal-pursuing human agency. However, he implicitly tends towards a path-dependent 
view of historically-given power structures and networks that he uses as an analytic 
starting point. At least, in his model the major causal inference of power resources and 
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process of social transformation and changes are set out from an evolutionary 
perspective in that the structures and agency are mutual and dually constrained and 
constructed. However, Mann's combination on historical narrative and materialism 
does not resolve the ambiguities between insider and outsider accounts (explanation 
and understanding), and does not go beyond dichotomy between structure and agency. 
In summary, Mann rejects a "hypothetic-deductive formulation" and "positivist 
objectivity" (Jacoby, 2004: 417). 39 However, according to Smith that "Mann's sources 
of social power ultimately have to be causal" (Smith, 2002: 233). At least, in my view, 
the inferential logic and operationalization of power resources and power networks 
should be causal. Mann's major methodological weakness is that he has not 
effectively escaped the pitfall of self-interested calculation of interests and 
preferences within rationalism and materialism, especially in ideological power 
resources (see Reus-Smit, 2002: 125, Smith, 2002: 233). That blurs the definition of 
power resources and interest and brackets power resources to interest. 
2.5.3 Suggestive methodological modification to Manns model 
As highlighted in section 2.1, the autonomous power in this thesis will be in line with 
Mann's method to identify the major "media" or power resource (Mann, 1986: 6). Yet, 
for remedying the weakness in Mann's original model, the power media and resource 
need further deliberation and modification, especially by referring to the ideological 
power resources. As Reus-Smit notes, within Mann's model of human behavior, "the 
role of ideas in the constitution of human interests is explicitly bracketed, confining 
ideational factors to the realm of means", however, "in the absence of richer 
exploration of the role of ideational factors in constituting actor's preferences, Mann 
is left with nothing more than a ubiquitous will to power" (Reus-Smit, 2002: 125). 
Moreover, Reus-Smit posits that the neo-Weberian's formulation may successfully 
provide a different conception of state from the neo-realists, however, they are a 
39 Mann's method "sets out the assumptions upon some which he proceeds through an explicit and 
comprehensive theoretical criterion" (Jacoby, 2004: 417) (referring to the inductive-historical narrative 
on power networks). 
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"striking similarity between their conception of interest and power and that deployed 
by classical realists" (such as Morgenthau) (Reus-Smit, 2002: 126). For this particular 
concern on the constructive role of ideas or ideology on human interest (see ibid: 
130-2), Reus-Smit suggests observations on three mechanisms-imagination, 
communication and constraint-through which the ideational forces that affect the 
behaviour of actors, both individually and collectively- can provide compensations to 
rationalist (realist) weakness(see ibid, 2002: 132). 
In this thesis, at the collective level, the empirical investigations on the ideational 
power resources will pay a particularly attention to these aforementioned three 
mechanisms; at the individual level, will follow the "strategic-relational" approach 
(see Hay, 2002; Jessop, 2001)40 to explain some behaviour or actions of the major 
actors. According to McAnulla, the merit of such dialectical approach makes "much 
clearer distinction between structure and agency than Giddens" (2002: 280). In this 
approach, "structure is clearly the starting point" (ibid: 280), however, the key 
concept is that of strategy. It refers to "the ability of agents to alter structural 
circumstances through an active process of strategic learning" (ibid: 281). McAnulla 
argues that "actors are reflexive and formulate strategy on the basis of partial 
knowledge of the structures. It is possible for actors to formulate strategies which 
overcome the problems created for them by strategically selective contexts" (ibid: 
280-1). By employing this approach, it could provide investigations of changes inside 
related structures and agency, and more interrogations concerned with transformation 
of the state. 
By doing so, ideational forces will be scrutinized with more constructive meaning on 
the formations of preference and interest in this thesis. It will also be a more nuanced 
method to go beyond dichotomy between structure and agency and to overcome the 
explanatory materialism and the tendency towards rationalism in Mann's model and 
40 According to Hay, "the concepts of strategy and strategic selectivity thus provide the building blocks 
of the strategic-relational approach" (Hay, 2002: 130-1). In that, "actors are conceptualized as 
conscious, reflective and strategic" (ibid: 13 1). It also provides "a range of crucial insights into the 
analysis of political power and political change, whilst exhibiting a particular sensitivity to the role of 
ideas (ideational forces) in the understanding of political dynamics"(ibid, 134). 
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other neo-Weberfan works. 
Section 2.6: Constructing Expanded Mann's IEMP Model and Research Design 
2.6.1. Expanding Manns IEMP model 
This thesis will construct an analytic framework and model that can be applied to 
further interrogations of transformation of the EA developmental states. I will 
investigate changes in the expanded TEMP power networks at the levels of the 
international system, economic organizations and mode of capitalism, civil society 
and the state as independent variables in the case study of Taiwan and probe `the core 
capacity and autonomy of tl, e state' and its `resistance to their resistances' in the 
expanded IEMP model. These four clusters of analytic independent variables are 
geared to construct a polycentric power constellation comprises the interplays and 
interactions between them over time. Each was the production of the trajectory of ties 
linking the past, present, and future. They exist inside a macro pattern of trends and 
processes and are part of it. Their interplays and interactions will consequently 
reshape a distinctive changing power configuration and relations between these 
independent variables and further accord to redefine the natures and boundaries of 
them. The consequences of these changing independent variables interactions and 
interplays can account for redefining the role and scope the state as the dependent 
variable of the former. The expanded analytic frameworks are shown in Figures 2.2, 
and 2.4., and theoretical `arrow- diagram' in Figure 2.3. They are consistent with the 
assumptions summarized in Tablel. 6, and will contribute towards a more nuanced 
understanding of continuity and discontinuity of the EA developmental states. 
The expanded Mann's IEMP models are based on the "power resources distribution" 
and "multi-causality of social changes" conceptions emphasized in section 2.1. This 
shows that the power resources will not only be monopolized by the state but also be 
held by other social control organizations and agents. This approach of probing the 
`origins and resources of autonomous power' will enhance the profile of the `resistant 
forces to the state' and thus expand Mann's original TEMP model into a polycentric 
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framework (as shown in Figure 2.2). These analytic levels are employed by theorists 
to be the major macro independent variables and they play crucial roles in state 
transformation, including not only in economic but also in extra-economic or 
non-economic forms of institutional reproduction. Therefore, these four clusters of 
independent variables could provide a strong test with high uniqueness and high 
certitude (Evera, 1997: 30-4). It also will be a persuasive method to investigate the 
autonomous power of the state and resistant ones in the TEMP model from a relative 
power and distributional perspective. Further, for re-defining the boundary of the state 
and refining the scope of effective state intervention, I will re justify the role of the 
state in the EA developmental state in terms of `resistance to the resistances' 









Figure- 2.2 Power of the state versus resistances in IEMP model (Expanded from 
Mann's original model with the conception of `resistance'). 
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The expanded Mann's IEMP model could further build up into a testable preliminary 
theoretical `arrow- diagram' (as shown in Figure 2.3) to elucidate the continuity and 
discontinuity issues in the EA developmental states. 
(Antecedent Condition) (Independent Variables) 
Specific Historical Juncture: - State institutions and mechanisms 
(Intervening Variables: Causal Mechanisms) 
Changing power 
, Capitalist development and economic-* configurations and constellations 
organizations transformation 
Civil society transformation 
X International system 
between state, international system, 
capitalism and civil society 
state resistance: 
a. institutional inertia 
b. path dependency 
c. new trajectories of the state 
d. new modes of governance 
(Dependent Variables) 
The continuity and discontinuity 
-* of the EA developmental ............... -*Specific Historical Juncture 
states and model 
(Changes of state autonomy and capacity and 
re-definition of boundary and scope of the state) 
Figure-2.3 Theoretical `arrow-diagram' of continuity and discontinuity of the EA 
developmental states. 41 
2.6.2 Research questions 
41 According to Evera, conditional variable is "a variable framing an antecedent condition. The values 
of condition variables govern the size of the impact that Independent Variables or Intervening Variables 
have on Dependent Variables and other Intervening Variables (Evvera, 1997: 11). Variable of 
`International system' in Figure 2-4 is an independent variable however plays a role as a conditional 
variable in the case study of Taiwan as it is a small player in the international system. 
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The analytic frameworks I have submitted will be tested by comparison of Mo 
historical sequences which is explained in more detail below. These comparisons will 
be used to infer a theoretical predictive model of how the developmental states might 
transform in the future. Therefore, this thesis comprises two research questions: one is 
expressed in the hypothesis; the other is a possible predictive model of the ideal-type 
state transformation. 
Hypotheses 
The EA developmental states are established on the presumptions of specific 
spatio-temporal fixes and geo-politics that include strong and autonomous state power 
with control over resources, a capital-starved private sector and weak civil society 
with no resources to resist state domination and `leadership'. Therefore, the relative 
autonomous power resources possessed by the resistant forces to resist the state's 
domination and constraints will impact on the scope of effective state management 
and intervention as usual, and will cause discontinuity in the EA developmental state 
model and strategies. The main theme of this hypothesis is established by 
macro-deductive reasoning that understands power operations in a distributive 
perspective. 
This is expressed in the following notation. 
Equation 1: 
The discontinuity of =a historical juncture +b the state 
Developmental state + cl the international system 
(D) + c2 capitalist periodisation and economic organizations + 
c3 civil society +c4 structural relations between b, cl, c2, 
c3and c4 
Possible Predictive Model 
If the hypothesis is successfully verified, I posit the following model to express the 
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ideal-typical state transformation and trajectories to justify the role and possible `hard 
core' of the state in the future. It is a purely theoretical and reflective causal inference 
model. 
Thus, the continuity of the EA developmental state or their ideal type will be justified 
and inferred by the inabilities of resistances, by passively maintaining its core 
autonomy and capacity in IEMP power networks and its resistance to resistant forces, 
and by actively transforming and reconstructing its autonomy and capacity with new 
state trajectories or new modes of governance. The more new autonomy or capacity 
they generate within the state, the more they are able to continue or refine their 
developmental state model and strategies. 
This is expressed in the following notation and Figure 2.4: 
Equation 2. 
The continuity of =a1 original developmental model+ (dl state resistance to 
Developmental state resistant forces +d2 incompetence of resistant forces) 
(C) -D the discontinuity of developmental state 
or more fully 
=a1 original developmental model+ (dl state resistance to 
resistant forces +d2 incompetence of resistant forces 
-D the discontinuity of developmental state 
(a historical 
juncture + bl the state 
+ cl the international system 
+c2 capitalist periodisation and economic organizations + 
c3 civil society +c4structural relations between b, cl, 











Figure- 2.4 Resistance to the resistance - the core capacities of the state versus the 
resistances in IEMP model. 
Note: Shadowed circles means the `hard core' of state autonomy and capacity. 
2.6.3 Research design 
Historical sequences comparisons 
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The hypothesis will be tested by comparisons of power configurations in terms of an 
expanded IEMP model (Figure 2.2) between two periodisations. The first period spans 
from the end of World War Two and the China Nationalist Party (KMT) retreat from 
Mainland China to Taiwan (1949) to the KMT government deregulation of Martial 
Law and the Emergent Mobilization Regulations in 1987. The second period spans 
from 1987 to 2000. In 2000, the KMT was defeated by the major opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the presidential election and lost its fifty 
years of domination of Taiwan. This peaceful transfer of power confirms the 
consolidation of a democratic polity in Taiwan. Furthermore, it symbolizes the decline 
of an authoritarian regime established on the basis of control of resources. It also 
demonstrates the emergence of a constitutional polity in which legitimacy now comes 
from the universal suffrage of citizens. Comparisons of the power configurations and 
tracing the intervening variables between these two periods could establish the 
validity of the hypothesis. 
The possibly predictive model will be theoretically inferred by reference to the power 
configurations between independent variables in 2000. I will interrogate the 
ideal-typical boundary and role of the state with reference to the state resistances to its 
resistant forces and debates in Taiwan from 2000 onwards. The outline of the 
historical sequences design is shown as Figure 2.5. 
I=ý= III 
1949-1986 1987-2000 2001- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Time 
Figure-2.5 The diachronic historical sequences of EA developmental state transformation in 
Taiwan (Sources: Modified from Hay, 2002: 149). 
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Independent Variables 
Mann's original TEMP model embodies his four major organizations by referring to 
transcending media, norms and value; capitalist development; militarism and the state 
in the modem world. Acknowledging the diffusion of power, this thesis will set out 
the IEMP power at different analytic levels. Each level will have it owns distinctive 
dynamisms and logics. These independent variables (as shown in Figure 2.2 and 
Figure 2.3) in this thesis will be further clarified into a three-level design according to 
the logic of Mann's original model. The first-level independent variables refer to four 
analytic levels (international system, the state, capitalist development and economic 
organization and the civil society) with their distinctive resources of autonomous 
powers and dynamics. The second-level independent variables are the resources of 
autonomous TEMP powers in each level. The third-level variables are clusters of 
criteria referring to IEMP power. The assessment results to test the resources of 
autonomous power at the third-level criteria will be deployed to reify the power 
configurations between first-level variables or second-level variables. More details are 
given in Table 2.1. Therefore, at the first- level, the framework has a four-variable 
design (international system, the state, capitalism development and economic 
organization, and civil society); and a 4x4 variable design at the second-level 
(first-level variables x IEMP). Variables at the third-level are an asymmetrical design 
developed on the specific spatio-temporal social fixes of Taiwan and correspond to 
the IEMP power frameworks. 
The analytic framework in Figure 2.2 and the ideal-type predictive model Figure 2.4 
will comprise three-level independent variables as shown in Table 2.1. The 
assessments of power configurations and institutional constellations between the four 
clusters of independent variables will be exemplified by the changing nature of 
resources of the autonomous power of independent variables and inferred according 
to the tests results from the second and third-level variables. 
In summary, the empirical embodiment of the analytical frameworks shown in Figure 
2.2 and Figure 2.4 will follow a causal-inference procedure shown in Figure 2.3 by 
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the four clusters of independent variables at the third-level in Table 2.1 (see 
below). These clusters of inferential criteria at the third-level design can be subsumed 
within the primary four analytic variables-the state; the global system; development of 
capitalism and economic organizations; and civil society. The theoretical foundations 
to construct inferential criteria in Table 2.1 are categorized in Appendix1 (p. 332). The 
application of these criteria to anatomize the EA developmental state in Taiwan in the 
empirical chapters will be done according to the expanded Mann's IEMP model. I will 
also apply some of the concerns of historical institutionalism to the analysis and apply 
the additional insights outlined in section 2.5.3. 
As Pierson and Skocpol point out, the operative variables in historical institutionalism 
may not be independent of e. "ach other at all "when it comes to analyzing the origins 
and impact of institutions, causally important variables are often bundled together in 
the real world..., and will be influenced by overarching cultural, institutional, or 
epochal contexts (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 711). The overarching context in this 
thesis will refer to the power configurations of the independent variables. As such, 
they could be the observations on nominal, ordinal indicators or mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements. Systematic observations of them will provide the empirical 
evidence which shows that these referents are indeed changing in the specific 
reconstruction. Furthermore, their intertwining interplays will show some co-variant 
relations that can be used to infer their direction in the future. 
While there are apparently many third-level observations suggested in Table 2.1, 
many are in fact interrelated and a simultaneous observation will suffice. For example, 
the military power at the international, domestic and civil society levels are 
intertwined and interrelated with each other. This will considerably simplify the data 
analysis. 
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Intervening variables (Causal Mechanisms) 
The intermediate variable will be the power configurations between the IVs inferred 
from observations of changes of the IVs' power resources, especially in terms of 
resistances to the state, and the state's resistance to its resistances. Mann's original 
IEMP model sets out from the power distribution perspective. The power 
configurations (causal mechanisms) in this thesis will be inferred by reference to the 
observations of the second level and third-level variables. According to Pierson and 
Skocpol, the causal configurations conceptualized at the organizational and 
institutional level and interaction effects of variables (identified by tracing the process) 
are the most important references in historical institutionalism (2002: 711). 
Independent variables at the third-level specify the empirical referents that will be 
used to make the judgment that profoundly configurative changes of powers are 
indeed taking place. Therefore, comparisons and contrasts in the power configurations 
of two historical sequences can provide sound evidence accounting for the 
differentiated resources state autonomous power and the scope and efficiency of state 
capacity. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this thesis is the continuity of the Taiwanese developmental 
state. By the end of the thesis the dependent variable will be located in an 
ideal-typical model. The changing character of the dependent variable will be inferred 
from the autonomous power resources of the state and state capacity to implement 
state policy as will become clear in the observations of the independent variables and 
intervening variables. Further, for re-defining the boundary of the state and refining 
the scope of effective state intervention, I will re justify the `hard core' of the state in 
the EA developmental states in terms of `resistance to the resistances' conception (as 
shown in Figure 2.4) by an ideal-type predictive model. According to Mann, on the 
one hand, state autonomy refers to the "despotic power" of the state; on the other hand, 
state capacity refers to state's "infrastructural power" to penetrate its territories and 
logistically implement decisions (Mann, 1986,1988,1993). However, state autonomy 
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and state capacity will be defined in a way that can be more plausibly operationalized 
in this thesis. State autonomy will be inferred from its resources of autonomous power 
by reference to the power configuration structured by the IVs and causal mechanisms 
within intervening variables. State capacity will be defined as measures of 
institutional capacity (management, regulation and coordination capacity); technical 
capacity (steering, innovation and R&D capacity); administrative capacity (extractii'e, 
mobilized, and distribution capacity), and political capacity (legitimization, coercive, 
conflict resolution and demand responsive capacities) (see Grindle 1996; Weiss, 
1998: 24-39; Wang & Hu, 1994: 5-6). These IVs will be flexibly inferred by reference 
to state's resources of autonomous power. 
2.6.4 Research methods 
Case selection 
In fifty years Taiwan experienced tremendous ideological, economical military and 
political changes. It is a remarkable and successful development state that has 
undergone, and continues to undergo, a number of transformations. Taiwan provides a 
good empirical laboratory to test the transformation of EA developmental states in an 
era of globalization, knowledge-driven capitalism, democracy and pluralism. It is a 
complex case which will provide a wealth of empirical observations that will enable 
me to test the expanded Mann's IEMP model. This revision of Mann's model, with its 
polycentric design, is more flexible and is better suited to studying the problem of 
transformation than the orthodox deductive EA developmental states model. Thus, the 
results of this thesis could also be applied in further related researches and interests in 
these issues. 
Data collection 
The thesis will rely heavily on four major resources. First, it employs the public and 
governmental documents and data published in Taiwan. Second, it utilizes the 
academic books, journals and periodicals published in English that include evidence 
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and theories of the EA developmental states model, their revisions and critical 
reflections. Third_ the Chinese books, newspapers. Journals. periodicals, theses, webs 
and biographies of economic leaders and politicians in the process of Taiwan's 
modernization, industrialization and democratization are also employed. In particular, 
I will also use the research outcomes and data in the existing empirical literature that 
set out different trends. Fourthly, I conduct interviews with relevant high-level 
governmental officials, state consultants, scholars and legislators. Further, I also rely 
on interviews with managers of advanced technology enterprises and electronic 
productions companies. These interviews provide first-hand information that goes 
beyond that which has been published. 
Data analysis 
In Mann's original model, he employs six forms or type of power (collective vs. 
distributive; extensive vs. intensive; authoritative vs. diffused) to operationalize the 
power networks. Mann deploys his "methodology to `quantify' power, to trace out its 
exact infrastructures, and it is immediately obvious that quantities of power have 
developed enormously throughout history" (1986: 30). As highlighted, Mann's 
approach tends towards rational materialism and structuralism. Mann's six forms of 
power do not provide an empirically picture of the process of change that captures the 
dynamisms of the variables and their interactions. For the purpose of this research and 
to compensate for this drawback of excessive materialism and rationalism, it is 
possible to develop a different conceptualization of the state analytic frameworks, 
synthesizing Mann's `IEMP' model with methods applied by historical 
institutionalists, to redefine and re-map the development in the EA developmental 
states. As Hay points out, the merits of methods applied by the historical 
institutionalists, can go beyond the structure and agency dichotomy and go beyond the 
inductive/deductive dilemma (see Hay, 1998,1999a, 2002). These diachronic methods 
allow us either "inductively and empirically to advance theoretical statements about 
the temporal aspects of the . process of change under consideration 
or to test 
deductively derived theoretical hypotheses about that process of change" (Hay, 2002: 
149). 
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According to Hall and Taylor (1996), there are four distinctive features of methods in 
historical institutionalism. First, they tend to conceptualize the relationship between 
institutions and individual behaviour in relatively board terms to use both a calculus 
and a cultural approach for going beyond structure and agency dichotomy. This 
attempt can remedy the failure of comparative historical research to "explicitly or 
fully develop choice-centric models using assumptions about actor rationality" 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 20). Second, "they emphasize the asymmetries of 
power associated with the operation and development of institutions" (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 938). Third, "they tend to have a view of institutional development that 
emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences (ibid). Thus, historical 
institutionalism concurs with Mann's model, with its characteristics of both path 
dependence and contingence (or open-endedness). Fourth, they are especially 
concerned to integrate institutional analyses with the contribution that other kinds of 
factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes" (ibid). 
These methods employed in the historical comparisons and institutionalism can take 
appropriate account of varied historical contexts and provide a combination of 
deductive and inductive reasoning more comparable to detective work than true 
experiments by ways of a dialogue between theory and evidence, and by process 
tracing and historical narrative (see Dimaggio, 1998; Goldstone, 1997; Hay, 2002; 
Hay & Wincott, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996,1998; Jessop, 2002; Katznelson, 1997; 
Mahoney, 1999,2003; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; Rueschemeyer & Stephens, 
1997; Thelen, 1999; Thelen &Steinmo, 1992; Zuckerman, 1997). They "refuse to 
foreclose or prejudge discussion of the temporality of change by fitting to it a more 
general covering law or model". On the contrary, they seek to "preserve and capture 
the complexity and specificity of the process of change under consideration, 
examining the interplay of actors, ideas and institutions and establishing the 
conditions of existence of the mechanisms of evolution and transformation described" 
(Hay, 2002: 47). Thus, justifications for these two models in this thesis are by no 
means founded merely on the deductive method as orthodox or revised models are. 
On the contrary, I will use a reflective approach (both inductive and descriptive) to 
test the possibility of yielding a more comprehensive and generalizable `model' to 
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interrogate transformations in EA developmental states. According to Hay, by so 
doing-, these efforts will be "invariably informed by abstract theoretical reflections and 
are thus far from purely inductive" (2002: 46). Therefore, the methods employed in 
this thesis also can satisfy the particular methodological concerns on the 
consequences and effects of ideational or ideological forces highlighted in 2.5.3. 
The major methods to test autonomous power resources at each level will rely on the 
nominal and ordinal comparison strategies and within-case analysis by employing 
`pattern matching', and `causal narrative' techniques (see Mahoney, 2003: 360-367), 
and by the `controlled procedures', `congruence procedure' and `process tracing' 
methods (see Evera, 1997: 56-67) on the independent and intervening variables 
described above. These will be applied to two historical sequences. From a macro 
perspective, the evidence will be established by inductive observations and 
complementarity of deductive evidence. From the micro perspective, the linear causal 
inference evidences will be tested by the deductive or inductive ordinal or nominal 
comparisons between variables (see Mahoney, 2003: 337-372). Table 2.2 shows the 
methods to operationalize variables and differentiated power configurations and 
mechanisms, and applied to make causal inferences of changes between two periods 
of time sequences in this thesis. 
Table- 2.2 Methods applied at different levels in this thesis 
Level of Variables Methods to operationalize variables 
The first-level a. Deductive and inductive reasoning. 
b. Configurations and event structures analysis. 
The second-level a. Processing tracing. 
b. Controlled and congruence procedures. 
c. Causal narratives (inductive or deductive). 
d. Configurations and event structures analysis . 
e. Nominal-ordinal-narrative combination. 
The third level a. Strategic-relational approach. 
b. Causal narrative. 
c. Nominal-ordinal-narrative combination. 
However, the causal inference will rely more on the inductive observations and 
evidences than deductive causal inferences. It will endeavor to go beyond inductive or 
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descriptive narratives and observations to yield a more comprehensive and 
generalizable `model' consistent with rationality and reflexivity to interrogate 
transformations in the EA developmental states. In empirical application, the 
deductive evidence generally needs to complement inductive inference. 
In sum, the employment of Mann's TEMP model and historical institutionalism 
approach in this thesis endeavors to shed light on the inherent complexity and 
contingency of processes of changes and transformations of the EA developmental 
states in which human subjects are involved. The model and methods in this thesis 
will process with merits of what Laitin refers to as "a tripartite methodology, 
including statistics, formalization and narrative" (Laitin, 2002: 630-59). At an abstract 
level, the models posited in this thesis could provide a more profound interrogation 
and plausibility on application to the transformation of the EA developmental states. 
Therefore, this thesis will also avoid falling into the trap predicated in deductive 
modeling. At the empirical level, it will produce more abundant investigations by 
referring to resistances in these EA developmental states with these models, and also 
practically posit the state resistance to these resistances. It will provide more helpful 
information to re-define the role of state and explore their continuity and 
discontinuity. 
It is important to emphasize, on probing the changing nature of the state in the EA 
developmental states, that this thesis disagrees with presuming the state-centered 
model is the presumed end of history of these EA developmental states. The 
assumptions on shifting changes between the state and resistant forces do not imply 
my approach will copy zero-sum relations between the independent variables in the 
status of counterparts; nor deny the possibility of state centrality in some realms. On 
the contrary, this thesis assumes the approach described above concerning power of 
the state and the resistant forces and aims to explore the changing nature of the EA 
developmental states. This thesis therefore endeavors to reconstruct and redefine the 
role and boundaries of the state according to its possible capacities, and investigate 
the core of its autonomy by examining how it has been influenced or superseded by 
the changing resistant powers. Such an approach will contribute to a reconstruction 
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and re-conceptualization of the state and the resistant powers from a relational 
perspective not just from top-down or bottom-up perspectives. By so doing. it could 
be a plausible way to probe what roles of the state have been strengthened or 
weakened according to its autonomous power resources; or on the contrary, to 
redefine the vulnerability and weakness of the economic organizations, civil society 
or international institutions as social control organizations. 
In summary, the basic analytic structure of this thesis is formed by bridging 
Mann's `IEMP model' and compensated research strategies used by historical 
institutionalist, constructivists and neo-Marxist, as presented in Table 2.1. Following 
these lines of the ideal typical frameworks, at the empirical level, as indicated in 
Figure 2.2, it shows what has been the role of the state by referring to resistances in 
present and in particular historical juncture and contexts. It will endeavor to probe the 
discontinuity in the developmental states. It aims to explore the contemporary visage 
of the state IEMP power networks in contrast to the orthodox EA `developmental state 
model' and its revisions. 
At the theoretical level, it is plausible to posit perspectives about what could be the 
normative or theoretical state roles and the core autonomy and capacities in these 
states in the future. In this argument, the second purpose will be concerned more with 
the continuity or their resistance of the EA developmental states to their resistant 
forces. This interest, as shown in Figure 2.4, will be presented in a more discursive 
and dialectical sense by conceptualizing the `resistance to resistances' model. By 
doing so, the ultimate concern with continuity and discontinuity of the EA 
developmental states will be investigated in a more nuanced and deliberate approach 






Figure 2.6 Galtung's integrated conception of social science. 
Source: Cited from Alker H. R., 1996: 797. 
At the methodological level, this thesis proposes to justify methodological pluralism 
and reflectivism, by going beyond deductive and inductive approaches and going 
beyond a structure-agency dichotomy, to reify models and analytic frameworks 
posited by in the opening chapters of this thesis. 
By doing so, it might offer a justification for the meta-theoretically constructed 
models and multi-causal analytic frameworks presented. It could also broaden and 
deepen their implications in relation to development researches and international 
relations of sociology as suggested in Galtung's trilateral conception of social science. 
Figure 2.6 Shows the ultimate purpose of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Antecedent Condition-a Specific Historical Juncture for Taiwan 
This chapter aims to provide a brief retrospective on Taiwan's history before 1949 as 
an antecedent condition for further investigations on continuity and discontinuity of 
the developmental state in Taiwan. In the theoretical arrow-diagram in 2.4, this 
specific historical juncture is "a picture of a particular configuration of forces" (Cox, 
1987: 217)42 that impacts on further development. The remainder of this chapter will 
engage to posit a preliminary power constellation among the four IVs in the 1950s by 
means of an expanded IEMP framework as a starting juncture for further 
investigation. 
By 1950, there were, two historical legacies having critical impacts on the political, 
economical and social development of Taiwan. First, marginalized geopolitics at the 
core of the Chinese authorities compounded a pervasive feeling of exile with the 
immigrants from mainland China. Second, the memory of colonization under the 
Japanese government confirmed for the immigrants an inherited conception that 
Taiwan was betrayed and sold out by the Chinese authorities. These historical 
contingences and the collective memory of suppression make the ethnic and identity 
issues still very complicated on this island. 
Back in 1895, the Quin government of China ceded its small southeast island frontier, 
Taiwan, to Japan after it was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 
1895(Shepherd, 1993; Zhang, 2003). 43 In the following fifty years, Japan ruled 
Taiwan directly by establishing a colonial government which adopted highly 
42 According to Cox this structure of forces should comprise the reciprocal relationships among 
material capacity, ideas and institutions and is not determined the direction of any of them above (Cox, 
1986: 218). 
43 Before this, Taiwan was occupied by different types of aboriginal people, landless adventurers, 
semi-retired pirates, male immigrants or criminals expelled from several south-eastern provinces of 
China and semi-retired pirates. It was also temporarily controlled by the Dutch East India Company 
from 1642-1662 as a foothold in the China market (see Shepherd, 1993; Zhang, 2003). 
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centralized control and dominance, making Taiwan an "agricultural colony to supply 
food and a market for Japanese economic products" (Zhang, 2003: 33). Taiw-an 
concurrently provided logistic supplements (mainly rice, sugar tea and bananas) for its 
Great Eastern Asia War. Japan's strategies for Taiwan based on the twin tactics of 
assimilation and selective warfare (Roy, 2003 ). 44 Therefore, the political, economic 
and social status of the Taiwanese remained inferior and marginalized just like other 
Asian colonies occupied by western states. As Maddison (1989) notes, even by the 
early 1960s, economic conditions and levels of income in Taiwan were not very 
different from those in African countries. 
In 1943 and 1945, China's wartime leader, Chiang Kai-shek, managed to persuade 
American president Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill 
at the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, that Taiwan, like other Chinese territories 
`stolen' by the Japanese in the previous 50 years, should be `restored' and returned to 
China after the defeat of Japan (see Hughes, 1997; Roy, 2003; Tsang, 2004; Zhang, 
2003). 45 However, this corrupt party, the Nationalist-Kuomintang (KMT), headed by 
Chiang himself plundered both mainland China and Taiwan which caused the civil 
war with the Chinese communists. The mainlander officials and their relatives who 
followed the ROC soldiers to Taiwan after this civil war were interested in extracting 
the island's wealth and resources in order to return to the comparatively poor and 
war-ravaged mainland (Roy, 2003). 
On 28th, February, 1947, the anti-KMT Taiwanese lashed out against the KMT and 
as As Japanese capitalists hesitated to invest in Taiwan because of limited resources or unfavorable 
conditions for investment, the infrastructures established by the Japanese government purported to 
extract agricultural resources as logistic war subsidy (Zhang, 2003). The colonial administration 
established cartelized sugar-refining and agricultural food-processing industries and transport systems 
around the rural areas (see Cheng, 2001; Roy, 2003 and Zhang, 2003). As a result, the domestic capital 
and civil society remained in poverty. 
45 "The initial response of many Taiwanese to the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan was 
high-spirited. For most Taiwanese, China was their ancestral home and source of culture.... They 
believed that various kinds of social, economic, and political discrimination against the Taiwanese 
(under the Japanese colonial rule) would be eliminated" (Zhang, 2003: 49). At the time, "only a small 
minority of Taiwanese favored independence or a United Nations trusteeship immediately after the 
war" (Roy, 2003: 58), and most Taiwanese had great enthusiasm for reunification with the 
motherland-China. 
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other immigrants from mainland and demanded fair treatment. The event quickly 
caused widespread rebellions all over the island. The Governor General of Taiwan, 
Chen Yi, regarded the event as a pro-communist rebellion, ordered 20,000 troops to 
suppress it, and enforced martial law on the island. "It was generally believed that 
over 20,000 people were killed, arrested or disappeared" (Zhang, 2003: 50) in the 
massacre, including mainly included landowners, doctors, lawyers, editors, teachers, 
professors, students and entrepreneurs. Many Taiwanese believe it was a deliberately 
planned conspiracy. 46 The suppression of the rebellion and the ensuing terror cowed 
the educated elite and populace into submission and silence. This event played a 
crucial role in the consolidation of the KMT's power in Taiwan until late 1980s 
(Rigger, 1999: 58; Zhang, 2003: 51). 47 
By the end of the 1940s, the KMT regime, led by Chiang, was finally defeated by the 
communists in the civil war, and Chiang's mainland supporters and troops retreated to 
Taiwan in 1949. "The initial reaction of the US government to the defeat of the KMT 
in the mainland was to distance itself completely from the ROC (Republic of China) 
and to remain indifferent to an expected imminent communist attack on Taiwan" 
(Zhang, 2003: 53). 48 However, the outbreak of the Korean War and consequently the 
formal partition of Vietnam in 1954 gave a dramatic boost to Taiwan and the KMT: 
the US Seventh Fleet was sent to patrol the Taiwan Strait to prevent a communist 
annihilation of the KMT forces and a takeover of Taiwan. The US and Taiwan signed 
the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and the security of Taiwan Strait was 
institutionalized into US defense networks in East Asia (see Roy, 2003; Chu & 
46 Through the decimation of elites incident, "Taiwan's intellectual and managerial elites who were 
educated and trained during the Japanese colonial period and might threaten the KMT's control of the 
island" (Zhang, 2003: 51) were wiped out. 
47 Under the inward military rule of the KMT government, few Taiwanese participated in political 
activities and withdrew from political arena until the 1980s, even though the population of Taiwanese 
far outnumbered the mainlanders. 
48 The US National Security Council decided that "no further action would be taken to assist the 
Chinese Nationalists to hold Formosa" (Bradley and Blair, 1983: 533 cited in Zhang, 2003: 53) and 
considered Taiwan to hold no special military significance to US security. President Truman and his 
administration anticipated Chiang's days in Taiwan were numbered and claimed the US would not 
provide military aid, supplies and advice to Chiang (see Chu &Lin, 2001; Lasater, 1993; Ravich, 2000; 
Roy, 2003; Zhang, 2003). 
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Lin2001; Zhang, 2003). 
The authoritarian strong state was able to continue to dominate the domestic capital 
and civil society had been weak during Japanese colonization. This specific historical 
scenario and legacy provided the starting point for Taiwan to develop into a 
developmental state with `a special relation' to China. The deep-rooted ethnic 
conflicts between mainlanders and Taiwanese were buried but still impacted on the 
further development of Taiwan. Figure 3.1 is the preliminary power configuration 
between IVs in the 1950s in Mann's IEMP model. It can clearly see the hierarchic 
power configuration from the international system, the state, the domestic capitalism 
to civil society. Variables of domestic capitalist and civil society were suppressed by 
the state and international environments. It also shows a typical power configuration 
and preconditions for developing a developmental state. This power configuration 
remained steady during at least the first two and a half decades after the KMT's 















Figure 3.1 The power constellation of IVs in 1950 
Note: 1. Shadowed circles means the `hard core' of state autonomy and capacity. 





The Independent Variables: to Forge a Developmental State (1950-1986) 
In this, and later chapters, I argue that the generic EA developmental states model was 
a product of the particular international governance regime of Atlantic Fordism and 
spatial-temporal geo-politics of post war contingences (see Evans, 1995; Jessop, 1999; 
Wang, 1999; Wu, 2004). In doing so, I reject explanations provided by the prevailing 
state-centric revisionists on taking the leading role of the state at the top of hierarchy. 
Under the international super-architecture of naturalizing links between the national 
economy and national state, the developmental state strategy provided a 
taken-for-granted spatio-territorial matrix based on the congruence between nation's 
internal and external security to close and control over the weak domestic economy 
and society (Jessop, 2000; Onis, 1991). Namely, the expansion and concealment of 
inward warfare strategy into economy and society in a Listian workfare state mode in 
these EA developmental states is/was legitimated by specific historical contingences. 
Both the external and internal prerequisites to construct a developmental state 
co-existed in Taiwan in 1950s. 
This thesis contends that the continuity and discontinuity of EA developmental states 
should be examined through the lens of poly-centric and meta-theoretical frameworks 
and made multi-causal inferences from a broader perspective as the external and 
internal perquisites have been changed. As such, this chapter and following two, aim 
to verify the theoretical arrow-diagram in Figure 2.3 (p. 75) and test the hypothesis 
equation by contrasting two sequences in Taiwan's history, and in doing so exploring 
the changes and power reconfiguration between the independent variables (IVs). The 
purpose of this chapter is to investigate the original power constellation (1950-1986) 
using an expanded IEMP model derived from Mann's work (Figure 2.2, p. 74) in order 
to elucidate the constructive prerequisites of the developmental state in Taiwan as 
independent variables. 
The chapter is organized into five sections. The first four sections in turn elucidate the 
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preconditions of developmental state in Taiwan by exploring how the IVs follow the 
expanded Mann's model from a perspective of post-war international hierarchic 
realities. A final section of the chapter will consider the relations which exist between 
the IVs and accord the preceding analyses as references to construct a power 
configuration during this historical sequence. 
Section 4.1 Changes in the international system 
Taiwan has long been a `unique actor' and a particularly pronounced security threat in 
terms of international politics (Mann, 2004). The historical contingency of the Korean 
War gave the KMT a second chance to consolidate a one-party authoritarian regime in 
Taiwan as one of America's anti-communist bastions and allies along the Asia Pacific 
Rim during the post-war era (Wang, 1999; Wu, 2004). During the Cold War, the 
combination of the Bretton Woods monetary agreement and the GATT trade regime 
ensured Atlantic Fordism, encouraged mass consumption and allowed state control 
over the national economy from using the pretext of possible warfare and the 
expansion of communism (Jessop, 2000). Taiwan benefited from these international 
circumstances. After the Korean War, even with the KMT's loss of China and retreat 
to Taiwan, it still had the support of most Western states in the anti-communist 
alliance. It continues to survive prosperously even after its subsequent loss of formal 
diplomatic relations with most of the states after it withdrew from the United Nations 
in 1971 and even with the normalization of relations between the PRC and the US in 
1979. 
Earlier in 1959, when Chiang Kai-shek had perceived that the US no longer supported 
the KMT's desire to `liberate and recover' China, he announced in his New Year 
speech that his mainland recovery policy would follow a 70 percent political and 30 
percent military strategy (Copper, 2003 ). 49 As such, Chiang Kai-shek and his son 
reformulated the outward political-military strategy by combining a submerged 
inward warfare with a nationalist economic strategy that mixed economic, political 
49 "Many thought this remark singled a change of policy and believed the plan to return to China 
would eventually be scrapped" (Copper, 2003: 188). 
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and social policies to consolidate the KMT's rule in Taiwan since up to the early 
1970s. Taiwan also adopted a less dogmatic policy of substantive and pragmatic 
diplomacy' by substituting commercial and other ties (e. g. cultural ties) for normal 
diplomatic relations since the 1980s. As such, even with its political isolation from 
most states, it still managed to successfully construct intensive economic relations 
with many countries by way of the international commercial and commodity chains. 50 
Following the internal warfare and Listian workfare state strategy in the 1970s, there 
are distinctive demarcations between the political, military and economic positions of 
Taiwan in the international community. At the political level, since Taiwan no longer 
had a seat in the UN, it was expelled from most of the UN related international 
governmental organizations (IGOs) (Ferdinand, 1996). 51 By 1990, only 31 countries 
had formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan and most of them are African, Latin American 
and South Pacific nations. The only formal diplomatic relation with a European 
country is with the Vatican (Ferdinand, 1996). 
At the military level, the political isolation in the international community was 
somewhat compensated by the military and defensive alliances with other countries. 
However, even Japan derecognized Taiwan in 1972 and when the US normalized its 
relation with the PRC in 1979, both of them recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate 
government of China. But Taiwan still maintains very intensive yet unofficial 
commercial and military relations with these two countries (Copper, 2003). 
52 Under 
the Japan-US security alliances, obviously Taiwan has benefited directly from their 
military concern about an attack from the PRC. And at the economic level, even 
so After losing the political and military support of the international community especially the US and 
confronting the consequent diplomatic setbacks with many countries under pressure from the PRC, 
the only way for Taiwan to survive was to develop its self-sufficient and export-led strategies to 
establish linkages with the international market and accumulate the sufficient foreign exchange to 
develop. 
sl Such as UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International 
Finance Committee (IFC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and another nine IGOs and 257 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (see Ferdinad, 1996). 
52 As being the regional and global hegemonic countries, Japan and the US as allies favored a 
containment policy to barrier the expansion of communism from the 1950s. 
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without official relations with most western countries. Taiwan has successful 
transformed itself, becoming an export-led state since the 1970s and now plays an 
important role in the international high-technology commodity chain and as a 
paradigmatic export-oriented developmental state (Dent, 2002). 
Hence, the specific spatial-temporal fixes that include the international political, 
military, economic forces and the split ideology that Taiwan faces is what makes 
Taiwan such a unique actor in the international society. The remainder of this section 
will unfold into two sub-sections to shed light on the changes of the international 
system at the political, military and economic levels and the substantial ideologies 
that constrained and enabled the development of Taiwan from the Post-War era to 
the end of the Cold War. 
4.1.1 International political and military forces--from the Korean War to the 
Post-Cold War Era 
4.1.1.1., The US policy of anti-communism and military containment 
The United State's China and East Asia policy are closely related to its global 
strategic concerns. In the1950, the Truman administration clearly announced that the 
US would eschew involvement in the Chinese civil war. 53 However, the outbreak of 
the Korean War changed the US's global and geo-regional strategies. After the Korean 
War, US-PRC relations descended into open hostilities and which extended into a cold 
peace. In this scenario, the US supported and recognized Taiwan (ROC) as having 
legitimate sovereignty over the mainland and preserved its permanent representative 
seat in the UN and as one of the `Big-Five' on the UN Security Council. 54 During the 
53 The Truman administration announced that Taiwan was a province of China and the United States 
prepared not to take any military action over a communist attack on Taiwan and would do nothing to 
prevent a communist takeover of the island. On the other side, the PRC's leader, Mao rejected 
overtures from both the US and Britain to develop a formal diplomatic relations unless they cut off the 
relations with KMT (ROC) (Hughes, 1997). 
54 As the PRC leader, Mao chose a policy of isolation from the West and depended on the communist 
bloc countries. 
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1950s, the US tried to "contain the spread of communism on a global basis by 
establishing a balance of power in key geopolitical regions'' (Myers, 1989,1 1). -- 
To this end, the US tried to isolate and contain the PRC and the expansion of 
communism through trade embargoes, building alliances and creating a hub-spokes 
security relationship in the Pacific Basin that still includes South Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand (Bush, 2004). Since then, 
the priority of Washington in East Asia has been to preserve the cold peace and 
stability of this region. "Specifically, the United States would deny dominance of the 
region to any hostile power, by deterrence if possible and by warfare if necessary" 
(Bush, 2004: 220), and this policy also reflected the US's hegemonic power in this 
area. As Hughes identifies from a wider geo-political strategic perspective, "the 
preservation of KMT regime in Taiwan could serve the interests of both Washington 
and Moscow"(Hughes, 1997: 17). 56 
In this context, the alliance between the US (Eisenhower administration) and Taiwan 
was further consolidated by the signings of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty after 
the PRC shelled Jinmen and Matzu, two offshore islands of Taiwan, in 1954 and a 
peace treaty between US and Japan in 1952 (Bush, 2004). 57 Moreover, as a political 
and military ally, Taiwan regularly supported US proposals and had the power of veto 
to use against the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council. Under these 
circumstances, the triangular relations among US-Taiwan, added Japan, were 
established on their reciprocal geo-political interests. This overarching international 
anti-communism structure gave the KMT government the legitimacy to discipline and 
ss In the US's perception, the Soviet Union in conjunction with allies like the PRC and North Korea 
provoked and promoted revolutions in regions just decolonized from Western states' rule (Myers, 
1989). 
56 "For Stalin, the existence of the KMT regime on Taiwan was useful in so far it ruled out improved 
relations between PRC and the United States. For Truman administration, on the other hand, 
supporting the KMT regime became part of a strategy of maintaining pressure on the PRC that force 
the new state to make increasingly high demands on its Soviet ally, thereby straining the Sino-Soviet 
alliance" (Hughes, 1997: 17). 
57 Taiwan accepted that the treaty area relevant to the US security guarantee was constrained within 
Taiwan and its offshore islands only, and committed that the KMT military would not undertake any 
offensive military action without the consent of the US. 
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control domestic enterprises and civil society and launch developmental strategies and 
economic nationalism. 
4.1.1.2 The US's `two Chinas' policy and PRC-US rapprochement 
In the late 1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles began to search for a better way to protect 
and ensure the US interests in the Far East after the Premier of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, 
revealed the possibility of open discussion with the US through negotiation rather 
than confrontation at the conference of Asian and African countries held in 1955 
(Bush, 2004; Roy, 2003). 58 Even the Soviet Union suggested that China should accept 
Taiwan's independence (Roy, 2003) and to avoid the Soviet Union "being drawn into 
a major war over an issue that to them was only peripheral interest" (Roy, 2003: 
122). 59 However, leaders on both sides, Mao and Chiang, opposed this proposal and 
insisted that their own government was the sole legitimate government of China. 
In the 1960s, after the Sino-Soviet split tension between the two powers increased and 
armed clashes broke out. There was no sign that the communist regime would 
collapse on the mainland (Copper, 2003). 60 The newly independent Third World 
nations allied with the PRC in the UN began to challenge the US's support of Taiwan 
as a legitimate representative of China in the UN, and cast doubts on the ROC's claim 
to represent China, calling it a fictional ideology (Tien, 1989). 61 The Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations did not give up Dulles's idea and went on to suggest 
two-China states with separate political entities, each controlling certain territory and 
58 In Dulles's proposal, the US would apply to China the same flexible approach for as Germany, Korea, 
and Vietnam, and the PRC can be accepted in the international community along with Taiwan, 
especially in UN. This proposal was also accepted by Britain, Canada and New Zealand (Bush, 2004). 
59 The strategy raised by Dulles was to leave the international position as of Taiwan to an undetermined 
status that can provide a more robust defense of the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself and follow a 
two-China policy in a divided-country model. 
60 As Nixon saw the Sino-Soviet relation crumble in the late 1960s and the rift between them ended 
Soviet military support on mainland and further caused some board clashes, Nixon decided to 
approach China (Copper, 2003). 
61 It made the US began to reconsider the possibility that Beijing might become part of the solution to 
tension in the Taiwan Strait and not simply as the source of problems and a troublemaker. 
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made numerous diplomatic efforts to persuade Chiang to accept their two-Chinas. two 
seats policy in the UN (Bush, 2004). 62 
But international setbacks for Taiwan consequently occurred when France recognized 
the PRC in 1964; then Canada did in 1970 (Hsieh, 1996) and Japan in 1972. In 1971, 
US national security advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing and met with 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Mao. 63 Kissinger also arranged Nixon's visit to China the 
next year (Hughes, 1997; Romberg, 2004; Roy, 2003). Taiwan was shocked and 
alarmed by this substantial transformation of US policy. Chiang claimed ROC decided 
to pre-empt losing the UN seat by walking out in 1971.64 As Hsieh comments, "such 
an uncompromising and emotional `one China' policy left other countries with little 
65 choice but to make a complete switch to the PRC (Hsieh, 1996: 69). 
Under domestic pressure to withdraw troops and getting blamed for the failure of the 
Vietnam War, Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine in 1969 and adopted a policy of 
reducing US forces and military commitment in Asia (Copper, 2003). Soothing 
Sino-American tension and helping the US end involvement in Vietnam (Green, 
2004), and also to play the `China card' against the Soviet Union all needed full 
engagement with the PRC (Cooper, 2003). As Roy puts it "Sino-American 
rapprochement resulted mainly from both countries seeking support against their 
common adversary the USSR. No matter how strongly Taiwan opposed it, this was an 
event stemming from global forces over which Taipei had little control" (Roy, 2003: 
130). 66 
62 What the US sought is to create a mechanism and theory that supported and facilitated the PRC's 
entry into the UN while preventing the ROC's exclusion for reasons of its national interest. 
63 Zhou and Mao pushed Washington for full normalization of relations which in short order switched 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 
64 When China (PRC) replaced ROC's seat in the UN, Taiwan chose an isolation policy as Mao had 
done in the early 1950s. 
65 Chiang announced there was no room for patriots and traitors to live together and insisted on his 
absolutist principle that the ROC to be the sole legitimate successor. 
66 Myers also agrees that "the new Nixon strategy called for detente with the Soviet Union and an 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. This strategy assumed that the United States 
might help the PRC to become a counterweight to Soviet expansionism throughout the world" 
(Myers, 1989: 12), and maximize American geopolitical advantages in the Asia Pacific area. 
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After Nixon's visit to China, the PRC and the US consequently signed three 
communiques (from 1972-1982) that outlined the fundamental principles both parties 
were to comply with: the Shanghai communique in 1972(Nixon): 67 the joint 
communique on the normalization of US-PRC relation in 1978(Carter) ; 68 the US-PRC 
communique on arms sale to Taiwan in 1982(Reagan). 69 The US Congress also passed 
the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979(TRA) to reaffirm the US's commitment to not 
jeopardize Taiwan's security and well-being'70 and to seek a peaceful resolution to the 
Taiwan question. 7' 
Since the Korean War, the US, as the unchallenged leader of the free world, has had a 
China policy that has profoundly impacted on the foreign policies of many 
non-communist countries, especially in Western Europe, Latin America and the 
Pacific region. This policy has offered their recognition of Taiwan as the sole 
legitimate government of China. However, with the normalizing of relations between 
the PRC and the US, many non-communist countries removed the diplomatic wall 
with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan (Ferdinand, 1996). By 1979, Taiwan had all 
but vanished from all major international communities and organizations. 72 
67 The US and Beijing signed the Shanghai joint communique in 1972 with both-sides issuing 
separated statements. On the China's side, it asserted the PRC is the sole government representing 
China, and Taiwan is a part of China. On the US's side, it acknowledged that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China (see Hughes, 
1997; Roy, 2003). 
68 The US and PRC established official relations and signed the Joint Communique in Dec, 1978. It 
contains a weak US affirmation of the one-China principle (see Hughes, 1997; Roy, 2003). 
69 The third US-PRC communique in 1982 concerns US arms sale to Taiwan. It provides an 
open-ended US commitment based solely on Taiwan's defensive needs. 
70 The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relation Act (TRC) in 1979. The provisions attempted to freeze 
Taiwan's status in an `intermediate state' between two possible statehoods. It treats the island as "a 
legal personality in US law", and "whenever laws of the US refer to foreign countries, nation states or 
governments or similar entities, they would also apply to Taiwan (Hughes, 1997: 31). 
71 One the one hand, under the three communiques, the US committed the `one-China' principle and 
recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China; one the other hand, under the US 
Congress TRC, the US provides Taiwan sufficient weapons to defense the security of Taiwan. Until 
2000s, these four documents signed in the 1970s-1982 still provided the fundamental guidelines for 
the relations between PRC-US -ROC. 
72 The PRC had won the diplomatic campaign and enjoyed relations with the world's major states; 
while only few states of relatively little consequence, most with relations being established on a 
`money diplomacy', recognize the ROC . 
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4.1.1.3 The second tier of power in the East Asia and Pacific Region v 
The Soviet Union and Japan were the two countries on the second tier of power in the 
Asia Pacific by the 1980s. The second tier of power compounded and intertwined 
with the hegemonic superpower-the US, and the regional hegemony of the PRC to 
together constrain and shape the international environment and space that Taiwan 
operated in. The KMT government struggled to survive in the interstice of these 
hegemonic and regional states. 
In the period of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s to 1970s, the strained relations 
between Moscow and Beijing made the Soviet leaders begin a political flirtation with 
Taiwan. The standpoint of Soviet Union toward the PRC and the ROC was that it 
verbally supported the PRC in public. However, it opposed the PRC's two attacks on 
Taiwan's small offshore islands in late the 1950s. 73 Moreover, from a geopolitical and 
militarily strategic perspective, the Soviet Union presumably wanted to see Taiwan 
remain outside the PRO's control, or as an independent nation, and actually benefited 
from the separation of the PRC and the ROC. "The Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet 
indeed benefited from the Taiwan Strait being an open international waterway" 
(Copper, 2003: 195). 74 Therefore, Soviet-ROC hostility decreased during the 1960s 
with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations especially after the Soviet claims that 
they would not support China's goal of reunification and reincorporation with 
Taiwan. 75 Thus, the geopolitical importance of the Taiwan Strait also enhances the 
73 According to Roy "Moscow was emphasizing peaceful coexistence with the United States and did 
not welcome Chinese action against Taiwan. Like the Americans, the Soviets feared being drawing 
into a major war over and issue that to them was of only peripheral interest"( Roy, 2003: 123). On the 
ROC side, the foreign affairs officials suggested to Chiang Ching-kuo who was a pro-Sovietist that 
"Taiwan might host Soviet military bases if the United States switched diplomatic relations from 
Taipei to Beijing". This proposal did contribute to "Washington's fear that the ROC might seek a 
separate peace with the Communists if pushed too hard" (Roy, 2003: 137). 
74 "Taiwan in ROC's hands forces the PRC to maintain a substantial military capability on the Chinese 
southeast coast, limiting the military resources available to deploy at the Sino-Soviet border" (Roy, 
2003: 136). Once Taiwan is integrated or unified with the PRC, the Taiwan Strait will be no more an 
open international waterway. 
75 The Soviets gave indications of accepting the idea that "the ROC on Taiwan was a state rather than a 
province of China" (Roy, 2003: 136). From this point can be seen the realist calculations of the 
Soviet's geo-political strategy that endeavor to expanding its influence in the Asia Pacific area. 
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strategic value of the ROC which helps it to prolong its survival in a very complicated 
international struggle for power (ibid; Roy, 2003). 
The other important player on the second tier power is Japan. During the Cold-War 
period, Japan's relations with the PRC and Taiwan assumed a `non-strategic' security 
orientation and were geared intensively to the US's foreign policy (Yoshihide, 
2001). 76 The post-war gradual dismantling of formal European colonialism in the 
Pacific region led to a number of structures and practices that were put in the place by 
the US in conjunction with the conservative elites who controlled the newly 
independent countries in Asia. 77 This purpose was firstly fulfilled by rebuilding Japan 
that was conceived as the industrial center of the recreated version of the very region 
it had just colonized and conq iered (Bernard, 1996: 660). 
However, as Yoshihide (2001) indicates, for Japan, the US policy of containing China 
and recognizing Taiwan (ROC) as the sole legitimate government of China did not 
serve the best interests of Japan (Yoshihide, 2001). 78 For the sake of `autonomous 
diplomacy' it established commercial and political links with China with Japanese 
interests in mind and normalized relations with Beijing and derecognized Taiwan in 
1972. However, Japan still kept non-official relations and commercial ties with 
Taiwan with the consent of Beijing. Copying this Japanese formula, many other 
countries began to establish normalized relations with the PRC and maintain 
non-official relations with Taiwan (Copper, 2003; Yoshihide, 2001). 79 
76 Post-war defeated Japan was " in no position to have an independent strategy , 
forcing it into the 
stance of non-commitment to any strategic urge represented by the United States and China" and to 
swim "along the tide of international strategic imperatives" (Yoshihide, 2001: 145). As such, "the 
choice of the US-Japan security relationship was fundamental for overall Japanese diplomacy, which 
made it inevitable for Japan to choose Taiwan over Beijing in 1952" (Yoshihide, 2001: 137). 
77 The US attempted to incorporate these non-communist Asia countries into a capitalist world order 
and a Cold War network of bilateral military alliances linked by a chain of US bases through bilateral 
and multi-lateral institutions. 
78 "The massive reorganization of the international environment since the late 1960s was perceived by 
most Japanese primarily as an opportunity to diversify its diplomatic horizon" (Yoshihide, 2001: 141) 
and not to blindly follow the US's strategy. 
79 Up to the 1990s, Japan had still been Taiwan's second largest trading partner after the US and as the 
largest foreign investment source. 
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In sum, as a small state that depended on US hegemony and protection, there was no 
space for Taiwan to choose its international status. When the US considered 
normalizing relations and shifting its recognition to the RPC, one of the reasons that 
Taiwan did not accept the US's suggestion of a `two-Chinas' policy was that once the 
KMT accepted the reality that the KMT no more was the sole legitimate government 
of China, it would also lose the legitimacy to govern Taiwan. Therefore, it chose the 
policy of isolation and still claimed its legitimacy over China and Taiwan. However, 
diplomatic isolation still seriously impacted on the legitimacy of KMT on Taiwan, 
especially after the US-Sino rapprochement in 1978. As the KMT lost its international 
political and military support, its legitimacy and authoritarian dominance over Taiwan 
began to be challenged by the domestic private sector and civil society. Consequently, 
these diplomatic frustrations forced the KMT to reformulate its political, economic 
and social policies. 
4.1.2 From Atlantic Fordism to post Fordism 
As Jessop points out post-war international institutions and regimes were mainly 
organized into with the aim of rescuing European nation-states and ensuring their 
recovery. Therefore, the strategies for revival were to naturalize the national economy 
and national states links and support the relative closure of postwar economies 
undergoing reconstruction on the basis of mass production and mass consumption 
(Jessop, 2000). The advanced industrialized countries overcame the interwar 
economic collapse by controlling and regulating market and the post-war primacy of 
politics provided the readjusted role for the states to invest and intervene in the 
macro-reestablishment policies such as monetary and financial control, industrial 
relation, public infrastructures and education (Boyer & Hollingsworth, 1997). 
Therefore, the doctrines of "Atlantic Fordism" (Jessop, 1999,2000) and "embedded 
liberalism" (Ruggie, 1983) ensured the circulation of free-floating international 
currencies did not disturb the stylized Kenyesian economy management through state 
control over the national monetary and financial system. That is to say, the Atlantic 
Fordist economies and the roles of the states in the territorial confined fixes were 
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themselves a product of a spatio-territorial matrix based on "the congruence between 
national economy, national state, national citizenship and national society, and from 
institutions relatively well-adapted to combining the tasks of securing full 
employment and economic growth and managing national electoral cycles" (Jessop, 
2000: 338). 
To sustain frontline states economically and politically and to prevent them from 
falling into the communist camp, the U. S. and Western Europe fought proxy wars by 
providing these states bilateral and multilateral credit and aid, by giving access to the 
U. S. and to a lesser extent European markets and absorbing their exported products 
(Winters, 2000). This combination also supported the EA developmental states in 
maintaining their authoritarian regimes that extensively controlled important 
resources as assets of national interests. This paralleled with their developmental 
states model since both sets of strategies were heavily weighted on the regulation of 
capital market and security calculations (Jayasuriya, 2000; Winters, 2000). These 
spatial-temporal fixes provided the particular external origins and international 
contexts for the emergence and consolidation of the EA developmental states. 
As such, post-war East Asia economic reorder was established by taking advantage of 
the subordination of US geo-economic policy to the Cold War-related geo-strategic 
priorities of the US foreign policy establishment. Under the buttress of US aid, 
Taiwanese capital and industries were "deeply connected to the production networks 
of Japanese industrial capital and buyer-driven networks of US retails and imports" 
(Bernard, 1996: 661). 80 Therefore, Japan and the US had the major impact and 
influence on Taiwan's economic and development and were the major 
technology-transferring sources and export resorts by 1990 (see Li, 2002 and also 
Appendix 4-1 & 4-2, pp. 333-4). 8' As the fourteenth largest exporting country in the 
80 As part of the geo-political and militaries alliance of the US anti-communist bloc in East Asia, the 
US urged Japan should take responsibility to facilitate the industrialization of the other allied 
countries by transferring capital and technology in a regional flying-geese model. 
81 By 1990, being having the US as the largest export market, Taiwan also maintained a steady 
relationship with other key trading partners including Japan, Hong-Kong, Singapore, German`!, 
Thailand, the Netherlands, Malaysia and the UK (see Li, 2002). 
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world (Dent, 2002), the economic ro«-th of Taiwan has relied much on the post war 
regime of "embedded liberalism'-. 
Supported by US aid, the KMT government stabilized the economic order and 
launched the land-reform (land to the tiller) program to improve agricultural 
productivity. The export of agricultural products to Japan was the major source of 
foreign exchange reserve that was used to import industrial raw materials and 
machinery in the 1950s. At this stage, the major economic systems were controlled by, 
and most capital was in the hands of, the government and the big private enterprises. 
Domestic consumptions were not sufficient to sustain an indigenous market 
mechanism (Hsueh, et at., 2001). As one of the US's anti-communist allies, the US 
did not request Taiwan to overly liberalize its domestic market through the 1970s. 82 In 
this sense, American hegemony did play an important role on the shape of the trade 
sector and internal resources allocation in the early stage (see Howe, 2001). Under the 
fear of communist expansion, the priority of the US policies in this area was to 
provide support for the governments to consolidate their regimes against the 
communist threat. 83 
As set out in the TRA of 1979, the US is bound to continue commercial and cultural 
relations with Taiwan. Taking advantage of this situation, Taiwan was "effectively 
independent of the Americans in economic management while still securing 
world-wide market access under the post-war international system" (Howe, 2001: 53). 
However, beginning in the second half of the 1980s, the economy came under the 
pressure of liberalization. The large trade surpluses with the Americans in these East 
Asia NIEs became a political issue in the US and it began to stir up powerful 
protectionist elements and fair trade controversies. Since Taiwan had maintained 
long-term trade surpluses with the US, the US requested Taiwan to eliminate its high 
import barriers, and bilateral trade negotiations focusing on textiles and service 
R2 What concerned the US was to get military expenditure down, enhance the investment rate and 
stabilize political, economic and social orders. 
83 This standpoint also can be applied to explain the US strategies in other East Asia NIEs such like 
South Korea, Singapore and Japan. 
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industries began (Cheng, 2001). Pressure from the US pushed and forced Taiwan 
toward a liberal market-oriented trade regime. Japan and Taiwan had great trade 
surpluses with the US and were demanded to reduce those surpluses by 10 percent per 
year. They were also and pressed more vigorously to allow appreciations of the 
Japanese Yen and the NT dollar (Hsueh, et al., 2001). 
By 1980, the US style of Fordist mass-production had brought many underdeveloped 
states into producing for its demand-driven commodity chain and which made them 
connected closely to the economic cycles of the US domestic market. As the world's 
biggest consumer, the US domestic market could absorb the labour-intensive and 
light-industrial products of these export-oriented countries, thereby successfully and 
efficiently dominating their regimes. As Taiwan was excluded from the international 
financial and monetary institutions that provide loans for development, this forced the 
government of Taiwan to assume a more cautious attitude of conservatism towards 
financial policy and go down a path of self-sufficiency and domestic saving (Cheng, 
2001). 84 Therefore, under the international pressure of liberalization, although the 
KMT government had begun to eliminate many import restrictions and barriers, and 
lifted many nominal restrictions on items of foreign direct investment, however they 
still kept tight restrictions on the operation of financial and monetary sectors until the 
1990s. 
To sum up, Taiwanese developmental state burgeoned in specific post-war spatio- 
temporal fixes in which international political, military and economic structures were 
subordinated under the ideological dogma of anti-communism. However, the realities 
at this level were incrementally shifting to reflect a new order of technology 
innovation, the risks of western style welfare states, the rise of knowledge-driven 
production systems, the vigorous autonomy of global capitalism and the end of Cold 
War rivalry between East and West (Jessop, 1999,2000). The global capitalism 
gradually accumulated with more autonomous power and operated following logics of 
84 After the experience of losing mainland due to by inflation and corruption, the KMT regime firmly 
believed in "fiscal and monetary conservatism, and the separation of technocrats from the political 
elite" (Cheng, 2001: 27). 
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market principles. By the collapse of East Europe communism, the international 
TEMP structures remained similar to that in the Cold War. Howevver, the inter-relations 
between IEMP powers at international level had substantially disparate from that in 
the Cold War. Figure 4.1 shows these aforementioned changes of IEMP power 
resources at the international level, from 1950-1986. It indicates that economic power 
resources mainly developed by following the interstates military, political power 
realities that under the ideology of anti-communism. However, even the power 
configuration at the international level did not change during the Cold War, the 
military, economic and political power networks gradually accumulated their 
distinctive power resources and dynamics in the same period. 
-------* 
1950 1970 1986 -------------- f 
Figure 4.1 Trajectory and Power Resources at International Level in IEMP Model, 
1950-1986. 
Section 4.2 The authoritarian state organizations-- from hard to soft one85 
The KMT comprehensively took over the political, military and economic power and 
resources in Taiwan from the Japanese colonial government after their surrender. 
Initially, "the KMT authoritarianism was constructed on a quadripartite foundation- an 
elaborate and centralized party apparatus, system of extra-constitutional legal 
85 I borrowed this concept from Edwin A. Winckler. See Edwin A. Winckler "Institutionalization and 
participation on Taiwan: from hard to soft authoritarianism? " The China Quarterly, No. 99 (Sep. 
1984). 
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arrangements and emergency decrees, a controlled electoral pluralism implemented at 
the local level, and the structural symbiosis between party and state'' (Chu &Lin. 
2001: 113). This authoritarian regime was buttressed by military and political power, 
large state-owned enterprises, and strong control over the financial sector and banks. 
This scenario of `strong state' vs. `weak society' is also the generalized description of 
the origin of the orthodox EA developmental states model in many existing literature 
(Onis, 1991). 
Politically, the new coming KMT government was mainly composed of Chinese 
mainlanders. As an `outsider', the KMT party-state was "built up before the 
multinational corporations and local capital developed" (Wu, 2004: 93). The arrivals 
of more than two million immigrants were mostly relocated in civil and military 
services and the key positions in most of the state apparatuses, armed forces and 
education system were held by them. As such, the bureaucrats in the government were 
comprehensively `isolated' from the civil society they dominated. 86 Economically, the 
KMT government controlled the state-owned enterprises, assets and finances 
resources as well as major infrastructures and the bank credit-system devised by the 
Japanese. It also inherited "494 major enterprises in heavy industry and 484 minor 
ones in light industry. Major enterprises instantly became state-owned enterprises, 
while minor enterprises were auctioned off' (Cheng, 2003: 24-5). Socially, the society 
was stratified into the dominant class -mainlanders who controlled all political, 
military and economic power resources, and the submissive Taiwanese who were 
comprised resourceless, capital-lacking peasants and unskilled labourers. The political, 
economic and social status of the Taiwanese was far inferior to that of the 
mainlanders. 
The remainder of this section will briefly explore the IEMP power resources and 
networks of the state from 1950 to 1986. However, the discussion of the ideological 
86 There were 7.8 state offices per thousand residents, and the ratio rose to 16 if counting the public 
school teachers and state enterprises employees. Rigger refers that among department-level officials 
in the provincial government, the mainlanders outnumbered Taiwanese nineteen to one (Rigger, 1999: 
56). The number of Taiwanese in the government sectors was even less than during the colonial 
period and with more marginalized and discriminated positions. 
112 
power of the state will overlap with the political, military and economic ones, due to 
the centralized power nature in the KMT state-party system. 
4.2.1 Ideological power resources of the state 
To consolidate the KMT's supreme dominance in Taiwan, "the type of administration 
that was developed had to be limited by the KMT's constitutional claim to legitimacy. 
This meant that the legality of the KMT regime in Taiwan would depend on an ROC 
constitution devised for the whole of China, with the addition of a number of 
emergency measures justified in terms of the Chinese nationalist revolution"(Hughes, 
1997: 26). Therefore, many of the constitution's democratic provisions were 
overridden by emergency decrees and provisions to legitimize Chinese nationalism 
and anti-communist ideology on Taiwan and support a series of repressive laws about 
Taiwanese rights of citizenship (see Pierson, 1991). These provisions included martial 
law, and a set of constitutional amendments called the Temporary Provisions Effective 
During the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellions gave the 
president unlimited power and wartime authority during the struggle against the 
87 communists. 
Under these emergency provisions, not only the formation of a new political party 
was forbidden but in the military, administrative, judicial and ideological organs of 
the state were employed to control civilian lives. Limitations on the right of assembly, 
the right of association, and the freedom of publication were put in place (Chen, 1998). 
These emergency decrees profoundly impacted on the different aspects development 
on Taiwan. To further root its legitimacy to rule Taiwan, the KMT regime established 
87 These emergency provisions, constitutional amendments and martial law provided the president 
"with extensive emergency powers, invalidated the two-term limit on presidency, suspended the 
re-election of the three national representative bodies- the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan 
and the Control Yuan- extend the tenure of their incumbent members for life, and deferred the election 
of provincial and municipal heads indefinitely" (Chu &Lin, 2001: 114). They also broadened 
presidential powers, gave the president an unlimited authority unintended by the original framers of 
the constitution, exempted President Chiang from a two-term limit until the `retake and return to 
China" and transferred the rights and powers normally reserved to other branches of government to 
the president. Thus, under such circumstances, the president "held the most powerful positions on 
Taiwan: ROC head of state, commander of the ROC military, and chairman of the ruling party" (Roy, 
2003: 82). 
113 
organizations and systems which comprehensively penetrated every level of society. 88 
The authority of the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) headquarters- a branch of the 
military- implemented Martial Law and maintained oversight of local government and 
law enforcement, detained political dissidents, disrupted opposition publications, and 
carried out censorship and surveillance of Taiwanese citizens. "Martial law also 
stipulated military trials for certain crimes, sharply limiting civil liberties and due 
process"(Rigger, 1999: 70-1). 89 Further more, the martial law also "restricted public 
gatherings and dissemination of ideas and information and criminalized dissident 
activity" (Rigger, 1999: 71). 90 
From an ideological perspective, the KMT regime "showed no hesitations in using the 
state repressive apparatuses to suppress popular participation and in using the state 
ideological apparatuses to depoliticize and demobilize the public sphere" (Lee 2000: 
125). The major contents of the KMT nationalist ideology were to foster civilians' 
absolute loyalties to the charismatic strongman and Chinese nationalism; and the 
88 As the founder of the Chinese Nationalist-KNIT, Sun organized KMT in a quasi-Leninist party style 
and relied on the `Three Principles of the People: Nationalism, Democracy and the People's 
Livelihood' as the theoretical basis and practical programs for China modernization. Chiang expanded 
Sun's thoughts and manipulated the cliques not only within the party and the military, but also within 
the civil service and the business community (see Cheng, 1989; Rigger, 1999; Zhang, 2003). As such, 
the KMT is quasi-Leninist and retains many structural similarities to the communist party of the 
Soviet Union. It is a centralized and disciplined party which emphasizes democratic centralism and 
nationalism, leadership by a professional political vanguard, and mobilization (see Hughes, 1997). 
The reasons why the KMT was organized in a Leninist model were: first, Dr. Sun had reorganized the 
party in 1924 on the model of the Soviet Communist Party with the assistance of Soviet advisors; the 
second is, according to Duverger (1950), many political parties commonly adopted the organizational 
structural of their opponents to compete more effectively against them; and the third, the style of a 
Leninist party, emphasizing on a centralized hierarchy, penetration of government and society, and 
concentration of all decision-making within party committees suited both Chiang Kai-shek's 
leadership style and the tasks facing the KMT (Tien, 1996: 46). However, the emphasis on democracy 
conflicts with its Leninist organizational model and its authoritarian history. "Sun called for 
rejuvenation of China in three stages: (1) reunification of China through a military campaign; (2) a 
period of `tutelage' under the dictatorship of the Kuomintang; and (3) the institution of constitutional 
government" (Roy, 2003: 55). Therefore, "the contradiction between democracy and authoritarianism 
is partially resolved in Sun Yat-Sen's idea of political tutelage--a temporary party dictatorship during 
which the nation is prepared for full democracy" (Rigger, 1999: 65). 
89 Rigger also indicates that the KMT did not rely on negative measures alone. For securing Taiwanese 
compliance, the KMT used a lot of positive incentives to win Taiwanese people's support such like 
economic growth with low employment, rising living standards, and ensuring private property. These 
all facilitated the KMT's effective control on Taiwan. 
90 According to Tien, it is estimated that over ten thousand cases involving civilians were decided in 
military trials form 1950-1986 (see Tien, 1989). While most civilians who "faced prosecution under 
the emergency rules remain anonymous thousands suffered years of imprisonment for their political 
ideas, or for associating with other whose politics were suspect" (Rigger, 1999: 71). 
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purpose was to establish Taiwan as a logistic base for KMT's returning to China and 
as an ideal-type model for the other provinces of China to imitate. This ideological 
dominance depended on controls on the mass-media, educational system, universities 
and other censorship mechanisms. First, the KMT took control of important means of 
communication with an ideological value. "The mass media-newspapers, magazines, 
television and radio-were among the KMT's regime's most powerful propaganda 
tools" (Rigger, 1999: 73) just as in many dictatorial and authoritarian states. The legal 
control of the media was directly administered by political and military authorities 
rather than judicial agencies (Chen, 1998: 16). Also enacted were the Publication Law 
and Detailed Regulations for Implementing the Publication Law by two agencies-the 
TGC and the Information Bureau of the Executive Yuan. The press and other 
publishers were strictly regulated and press censorship by the government was carried 
out by the banning or confiscation of a single issue of a magazine or the suspension of 
publication (Tien, 1989; Zhang, 2003). Moreover, the scripts of television and radio 
programs, and even of the commercials, were under the same censorship mechanism. 
These temporary provision and martial law "froze the number of newspaper licenses 
at thirty-one and ensured that the KMT and it allies would control the press" (Rigger, 
1999: 71). "No additional licenses were issued until 1988" and even number of pages 
of newspapers were required to register with the authority (Rigger, 1999: 73). 91 In the 
1950s an 1960s, the government intervened by means of fiscal advantages and 
subsidies92 that offered to promote better economic conditions for newspapers. 
Therefore, the party-state run papers accounted for 80 percent of newspapers 
circulated in Taiwan before 1980. By 1988, the 134,748 heads of neighbourhood and 
community associations had their newspaper subscriptions subsidized by subscribing 
to the KMT-owned newspapers (See Chen, 1998; Lee, 1993). The leading media 
companies, the United Daily Group and China Times Group, both cooperated with the 
91 "The central government and KMT owned about a third of the thirty-one licensed papers, and they 
supervised the rest, making sure that the licenses did not fall into the hands of their opponents and 
keeping close tab even on their friends"(Rigger, 1999: 73). The privately run papers survived with the 
help of government advertising and grants. 
92 Those means included concessions on transportation and telecommunication rate, reduction of duties 
on imported newsprint and ink and exemptions from sales tax. 
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KMT regime and their owners were recruited into the Standing Committee of the 
KMT' Central Committee (see Rigger, 1999). 9' 
Furthermore, the broadcasting frequencies for radio and television were restricted to 
public ownership and cooperatives, and controlled directly by the KMT government 
to ensure national security. Before 1996, the three TV stations were established by 
Taiwan's provincial government (in 1962), KMT party (in 1969) and the ministries of 
defense and education (in 1970) (see Rigger, 1999; Tien, 1989). "Of the 33 licensed 
radio networks and 177 local broadcasting stations, most were owned by the 
government, ruling party or military, or were affiliated with the KMT "(Rigger, 1999: 
74). The KMT regime tolerated limited pluralism that the media were politically 
subservient but had considerable autonomy in non-political areas (Lee, 2000). 94 
However, under intensive political socialization, the space for non-political areas was 
very limited. 95 These inward military measures and censorships on mass media were 
used for securing compliance and justified for ensuring national security and 
deterring hostile economic publications. 
Second, the KMT government established a top-down hierarchic system in education 
from central government to local authorities, and decided all aspects of the curriculum. 
Only Mandarin was allowed to be spoken in schools96 and administration of schools, 
93 The KMT "sought to maintain a patron-client relationship with the media through a policy of 
incorporation marked by a simultaneous and intermittent interplay of repression and cooperation" 
(Lee, 2000: 125). 
94 "The KMT-controlled Broadcasting Cooperation of China (BCC) alone accounted for 32 percent of 
total transmitters and 43 percent of radio power on the island. Then came the six military stations, 
which controlled 41 percent of the transmitters and 52 percent of radio power. A large number of 
small private stations (twenty)-owned by the proteges of the security apparatuses, religious groups, 
and wealthy family-could only share the remainder (15 percent of the transmitters and less than 2 
percent of radio power" (Lee, 2000: 125), and were intensely monitored under the supervision of the 
TGC. 
95 "The journalists were sent to prison for writing treasonous publications, or giving comfort to the 
enemy" (Rigger, 1999: 74), and later in 1970s, were `advised' to cancel or modify their reports on 
politic comments. Large numbers of Taiwanese, and even mainlanders were executed or sent to 
be 
imprisoned without trial on small offshore island for essentially political offenses or suspected 
un-patriotism (see Roy, 2003). 
96 For promoting Mandarin as the 'national language', the Taiwanese 
dialect was discouraged and sadi 
to be second-rate, primitive ugly and low class. Students were punished or 
fined if they spoke 
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even private ones was tightly controlled. The educational system was utilized for the 
purposes of socialization, political indoctrination of Chinese nationalism, mobilization 
and channeling of human capital resources. 97 "The KMT monopolized the role of the 
normal education system in training teachers for elementary and secondary (junior & 
senior) schools" to consolidate the citizen's loyalty (Zhang, 2003: 93). 98 
Third, there was no freedom of speech within university campuses even for academic 
discussion. In the universities, the scholars and intellectuals were not allowed to 
promote or distribute any anti-KMT thought or literature, or cast doubts on the 
`extraordinary leadership' of the `charismatic strongman'. Professors and students 
alike were subject to be arrested for dissent and their behavior was also monitored by 
the TGC or cells of KMT students. Assemblies on campus had to be pre-requested and 
all written material and speech had to be previewed. Any violation of martial law (as 
defined by the TGC), could see the dissenter sent to trial by military court and put into 
prison or forced into exile overseas (Rigger, 1999; Zhang, 2003). 99 
In a nutshell, the KMT regime dominated Taiwan not only by controlling material and 
physical resources, it also desperately attempted to consolidate its dominance by 
intensely imposing anti-communist and patriotic nationalist ideologies in preparation 
to retake China. Impose ideological nationalism through the tightly controlled media, 
educational system and inward military censorship mechanisms, anti-communism and 
Taiwanese at schools. The Government also regulated the mass media reduced the amount of time 
allotted to Taiwanese-dialect programming on TV or radio (see Zhang, 2003). 
97 The central government (Ministry of Education) not only monopolized the resources for the 
educational system, it also controlled the organizations, staff, budget, and even `visions' of the future. 
Universities and colleges had especially low autonomy. They could not establish a new department or 
research units, increase student and class numbers, change curriculum without the permission of the 
Ministry. As such, it was an efficient way to channel high-educated human resources based on 
national industrial and economic interests. 
98 It required teachers to be proficient in their professional subject and be able to teach military 
knowledge, act as political models to students and behave in the way expected by society, loyal to 
KMT ideology and policy against the communists (Zhang, 2003). 
99 Repression and the White Terror under the martial law forced many Taiwanese political activists and 
intellectuals to flee to overseas. However, the government also spied on intellectuals, state activists 
and students studying overseas and some were punished on their return to Taiwan for antigovernment 
statements made while they were abroad (see Roy, 2003). 
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nationalism had effectively shaped a collective and unified ideology in Taiwan by 
1970. It also provided a strong backup for the legitimacy of the KMT one-party 
dictatorship and authoritarian rule, and ostensibly maintained social stability aided by 
a comprehensive political and economic mobilization for development. 
In Reus-Smit's terms (2002), the Chinese Nationalist identity in Taiwan was 
deliberately manipulated by the imagination, communication and constraint 
mechanisms that confined the people's imagination to the norm, principle, rule and 
expectation of what a state and party should be. The extensively controlled media and 
educational system provided an effective communication mechanism to shape 
people's normative norms, rules and principles constrained under the ideologies of 
Chinese nationalism and anti-communism, and translated these ideologies into beliefs 
and patriotic social mobilization. 
4.2.2 Political power resources of the state 
The state-party body of the KMT in Taiwan rooted its legitimacy to rule Taiwan in 
terms of Chinese nationalism and identity not only at the domestic level but also for 
itself as the political legitimate representative of China with the ROC National 
Assembly elected in 1948, and in international organizations, especially the UN. This 
rationale was built on the US's doctrine of `rolling back' of communism in the Cold 
War and the ROC was expected to eventually return to the mainland that was stolen 
and occupied illegally by the communists (see Hughes, 1997). 100 
As the KMT regime viewed itself as the government which represented all of China, 
it needed representatives from all of Chinese provinces in its legislature. The 
mainlanders claimed the legitimacy to represent the whole of China, in order to deter 
and retard inter-mainlander democratic challenges and those coming from native 
100 For the mission to re-take and return to the mainland, the state remained in a permanent state of 
emergency, and the original provisions of the constitution were replaced or superseded by emergency 
decrees which frozen the sitting members, i. e. mainland-elected legislators, in office (until 1991). 
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Taiwanese. 1° It was until not 1969, under the pressures of international (US) and 
domestic forces. the KMT government began to allow the first supplementary 
elections of candidates (11 in Legislative Yuan &8 to the National Assembly) and 
Taiwanese were able to compete for posts in the central political institutions. By 1988, 
those frozen "senior parliamentarians constituted 91 percent of the National Assembly 
and 76 percent of the Legislative Yuan. Eighty-six percent of Assembly members 
belonged to the KMT, while the opposition-linked representatives held only about 5 
percent of the seats in the Legislative Yuan" (Rigger, 2003: 63). Some of the senior 
parliamentarians were over 90 years old. 102 
The KMT's strategy was clearly to monopolize the political institutions by an 
ostensible form of `democracy'. 103 Moreover, the ROC government in Taiwan was 
established on a symbiosis relationship with the KMT. "Hierarchical party organs 
were installed at all levels of state apparatus and representative bodies. Party cells 
reached into organized social sectors, such as labour unions, youth groups, religious 
groups, professional associations, business associations, farmers' associations, 
women's associations, schools and mass media" (Chu &Lin, 2001: 113-114).. "The 
legitimacy of one-party authoritarianism was ultimately tied to the legitimacy of the 
state structure" (Chu &Lin, 2001: 117). 
From the perspective of revenue, the bureaucratic system was organized in a 
centralized form so that the central government controlled most of the share of 
revenue and major tax . 
incomes, and then re-distributed to the local governments 
according to its policy preferences. The central government also controlled the 
state-owned enterprises and physical resources such as the important raw materials. 
Table 4.1 shows the percentage distribution of revenues and expenditures by level of 
101 When their terms expired, and the mainland had still not been recovered, these legislators should be 
remained in office for justifying the legitimacy of the regime (Hughes, 19999Rigger, 2003; Roy, 
2003). 
102 As the sitting members died, the government appointed in their place candidates who had finished 
second or the third in the 1947-1948 elections. That is, the mainlanders held the political power by 
filling seats with the losers of the elections in China. 
103 In practice, these representatives play little role on policy formation and were compliant captives of 
the KMT leadership, guaranteeing passage of any bill the KMT leadership proposed (see Rigger, 2003). 
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government in 1984. Table 4.2 shows the sources of county and city revenue from 
1965 to 1985. It can be seen that the autonomy of local governments was limited by 
its economic resources. The central government could effectively implement its 
economic policies at the local level without resistance. Decisions made by central 
bureaucrats were not made in terms of rational institutionalization: they were 
implemented in despotic and political arbitrariness. 104 
Table-4.1 Percentage Distribution of Revenue and Expenditures by Level of 
Government, 1984 
Central Taipei and County 
Government Province Kaohsiung and City Subcounty 
Revenues 57.8 17.4 12.1 9.8 2.9 
Expenditures 56.3 16.0 11.2 13 3.5 
Source: Tien, 1989: 133. 
Note: The Taipei and Kaohsiung cities are municipal ones as Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Table- 4.2 Sources of County and City Revenue (as percentage of total revenue) 
Year Local tax income Subsidies from revenue of Central Government 
1965 45 41 
1970 47 38 
1975 39 45 
1980 37 50 
1985 45 39 
Source: Huang-Shih-hsin (1990) cited in Rigger, 1999: 49. 
From the perspective administration, the KMT deployed governing strategies 
combining two complementary elements: an authoritarian administration and political 
coordination based on popular mobilization. It successfully consolidated a strong state 
with high autonomy at every level. Table 4.5 clearly shows that the KMT's strategies 
for choosing the candidates for the administrative and representative systems were 
different. The percentage of candidates with factional backgrounds who campaigned 
for administrative authorities was almost only a half of those who ran 
for 
104 As Tien identifies "there are no detailed guidelines for the allocation of these subsidies; the amount 
received by local governments depends as much on politics and favoritism as on merit and need" 
(Tien, 1989,132). 
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representative elections. These political power distribution strategies coincide with the 
institutional core of capacity-directed bureaucracy in the developmental state model. 
It implies that the K1VIT tightly controlled administrative resources, but retained 
limited access for citizens to present their interests at the local level. 
At the national level, the KMT constrained the political participation of Taiwanese 
and the major positions in government were all occupied by the mainlanders for the 
first three decades. At the local level, it carefully institutionalized local elections that 
permitted the native Taiwanese to take part in and controlled the limited popular 
electoral process by employing a `divide-and-rule' trick that kept at least two 
competing local factions striving for public offices and other electoral offices by 
establishing `patron-client networks' (see Chu &Lin, 2001). 105 Through personnel 
appointments and veto actions that violated its own policies, the KMT could 
effectively penetrate the society. On the other hand, the KMT allowed "elections for 
township head, county/city magistrate, and popular election for Taiwan Provincial 
Assembly to incorporate diversified local elites into the process of party-building and 
provide the authoritarian system with a modicum of democratic facade" (Chu & Lin, 
2001: 114). 106 As the government, the KMT party controlled most of Taiwan's mass 
media and had vast wealth which gave KMT candidates extensive and positive 
coverage (Roy, 2003). Table 4.3 given the number of members elected to the 
Legislative Yuan from 1972-1986. Table 4.4 shows the results of elections of 
mayors and magistrates from 1950 to 1986. Table 4.5 reveals the KMT shares of votes 
and seats in the different local elections. 
105 The smoothing function of the vote-buying mechanism, irregular campaign practices and the local 
spoils system depended on the indulgence of various state regulatory and law enforcement agencies, 
which were under the influence of the party. The patron-client networks helped the party to extend its 
reach into local communities. The patron-client networks are most important in local elections 
because Taiwan's single, non-transferable voting electoral system. (Rigger, 2001: 949). 
106 Thus, the KMT developed a mutual dependence relationship between the central party leadership 
and local factions in patron-client networks to consolidate its dominance. By the late 1980s, "the 
combined mobilized strength of the KMT party and the local factions virtually with exception 
delivered more than two-third of popular votes and three-quarters of seats in all elections, especially 
the more significant country magistrate and Provincial Assembly elections" (Chu &Lm, 2001: 115). 
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Table-4.3 Number of Members Elected to the Legislative Yuan (With Percentage of 
Votes). 1972-1986 (seati'%) 
KMT NON-KMT 
Nonparty CYP DSP Subtotal Total 
1972 22(74%) 4(20%) 2(6%) 0(0%) 6(26%) 28 
1975 23(79%) 5(17%) 1(4%) 0(0%) 6(21%) 29 
1980 41(73%) 11(26%) 0(0.7%) 0(0.1%) 11(27%) 52 
1983 44(71%) 9(29%) 0(0.4%) 0(0%) 9(29%) 53 
1987 41(67%) 14(33%) 0(0.8%) 0(0.2%) 14(33%) 55 
Source: Tien, 1989: 183. 
CYP means China Youth Party; DSP means Democratic Socialist Party. Non-party includes the independence 
candidates and tangwai (the opposition group that were not allowed to organize the new formal party). 
Representative of overseas Chinese communities and vocational groups are excluded. 
However, it can still clearly be seen from Table 4.3 to Table 4.5, that there was an 
average about a 30% share of the vote for the non-KMT candidates (factional or 
non-factional) that competed as independent candidates or for opposition groups in 
the campaigns. Therefore, on the one hand, despite the KMT regime's mobilizing 
rural supporters and penetrating society with various local cells, vote-buying 
mechanisms, and patron-client networks, in the process of campaigning and voting, at 
least it reserved some space for the unsatisfied people to present their political 
requests, self-interests and even concealed resistance to the KMT regime. And even 
though, `winner takes all' was the rule for elections at different levels and the KMT 
took most of the offices and seats for representatives, there was still about a steady 
one-third of the population who voted for the non-KMT or opposition candidates. 
Under the intensive suppressions, the significance of this latent but radical resistance 
to the KMT dominance had profound meaning. 
Table- 4.4 Elections of Mayors and Magistrates, 1950-1986 
KMT NON-KMT 
Percentages of Percentages of 
Total Posts Posts popular vote Posts popular vote 
1950 21 17(81%) ----- 4(19%) ------ 
1954 21 19(90%) 72 2(10%) 18 
1957 21 20(95%) 65 1(5%) 35 
1960 21 19(90%) 72 2(10%) 28 
1964 21 17(81%) 73 4(19%) 27 
1968 20 17(85%) 72 3(15%) 28 
1972 20 20(100%) 79 0 21 
1977 20 16(80%) 70 4(20%) 30 
1981 19 15(79%) 59 4(21%) 41 
1986 21 17(81%) 62 4(19%) 38 
Source: Tien, 1989: 187. 
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Table-4.5 Local Faction and KMT Shares of Votes and Seats in Provincial Assembly 
and County Magistrate/City Mayor Elections 1954-1989) 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly Elections County Magistrate/ City Mayor election 
KMT's KMT's KMT's KMT's 
Share local share local 
of faction's KMT's of faction's KMT's 
votes share of share f Total votes share of share f Total 
Year (%) seats seats seats (%) seats seats seats 
1954 68.8 27 48 57 71.8 17 19 21 
1957 67.8 28 53 66 65 16 20 21 
1960 65.4 29 58 73 72 16 20 21 
1963 68 32 61 74 -- -- -- -- 1964 -- -- -- -- 73.1 16 17 21 
1968 75.5 27 60 71 72.4 15 17 21 
1972 68.9 23 58 73 78.6 9 20 21 
1977 64 32 56 77 70.4 7 16 21 
1981 70.3 25 59 77 59.4 12 15 21 
1985 69.8 34 59 77 62.6 13 17 21 
1989 64 30 55 77 56.1 14 14 21 
Source: Modified from Chu& Lin (2001): 116, Table 1. The original data provided by the Political 
System and Change Workshop, department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. 
In much of the existing literature, the dictatorial authoritarianism of KMT regime is 
an overemphasized generalization, in fact it mobilized civil society through the 
different means of political coercion, cooperation and social mobilizations (Chu & 
Tien, 1997; Rigger, 1999). However, the evidence here demonstrates that it tolerated 
the voices of those who voted for the non-KMT or independent candidates, and 
maintained some degree of freedom and space for limited democratic campaigns at 
different electoral levels. Obviously, the strategies of the KMT to keep limited 
competitive situations for presenting interests or channeling rent-seeking 
opportunities at the local level maintained a stable and steady social order in the first 
three decades of its dominance. Furthermore, effectively weakening the finances and 
resources controlled by the local governments also enhanced the power and autonomy 
of the central government. 
4.2.3 Military power and resources of the state 
Military and security forces reinforced the KMT's authoritative rule on Taiwan. After 
retreating to Taiwan, the KMT regime established control over the military with the 
creation of a military commissar system under Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang also 
123 
comprehensively controlled the administrative, party systems and even the 
educational system, and endowed himself with the political, military and economic 
power and resources. 107 After his death in 1977, his son China Ching-kuo inherited 
these dictatorial powers from him in 1978. This subordination of the military to the 
political system dominated by the KMT depended on the unified leadership of the 
velvet transfer of power from one mainlander strongman to another (Tsang & Tien, 
1999). The military's discipline and loyalty to the KMT party state and its supreme 
leader was ensured (Tsang & Tien, 1999: 30). However, Taiwan was never a state that 
was controlled under militarists even though Chiang himself was a militarist on the 
mainland. 108 
Under the emergency provisions, the roles of the military were not only confined to 
its defensive and security functions but expanded to involve value integration and 
elite-mass integration which were not generally the province of the military (Bullard, 
1997). This was an inward warfare strategy that targeted the civilians within its 
territory. 109 Even the process of territorial integration to China was never completed 
by the KMT leaders. They were, however, able to establish effective control over one 
part of what they claimed was their national territory and that part was Taiwan. They 
were thus able to begin to consolidate their efforts to accomplish the other integration 
tasks. 
At the international level, Taiwan's military status was dependent and marginalized. 
However, at the domestic level, as the emergency provisions created outgrowth 
institutions that were designed to broaden presidential power and not be constrained 
by the framers of the constitution, the inward warfare strategy contributed a lot 
towards effectively controlling domestic stability. The most important institutions 
107 Chiang established himself as the charismatic leader of a triple alliance of the government, the ruling 
Nationalist (KMT) Party, and the military connected the twin missions of regaining of China and 
anti-communism. 
108 Unlike in many South East Asia, Africa and South American countries, the military have been 
tightly controlled by the president and ruling party supremacy and have not caused any domestic 
turmoil or political interference since 1949. 
109 The primary effort of this allegiance warfare is "the struggle for the heart and minds or loyalties 
(allegiance) of all citizens, military and civilian". 
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were the creations of the TCG and National Security Council (NSC). 110 Under these 
emergency provisions, "practically, any major external policy and internal securit`' 
matters may be declared a national security issue and thus may fall within the NSC's 
jurisdiction" (Tsang & Tien, 1999: 109). 
Therefore, the most important military mission on Taiwan from the 1950s was to 
engage in the value creation part of allegiance warfare, to create citizens' patriotism 
and civic consciousness of anti-communism under the leadership of strongman. As 
noted, the tasks of national, value and elite-mass integration describe the political 
socialization process necessary to achieve citizen support for or allegiance to the 
political community (KMT), the regime and the government" (Bullard, 1997: 15), 
however, under the preposition of territorial integration of China. As Taiwan's 
international status and legitimacy confronted hardships, however the inward warfare 
strategy and legitimacy were inevitably to be challenged by domestic resistance. 
4.2.4 The economic power and resources of the state 
As the KMT retreated to Taiwan, it faced problems of capital shortages, international 
deficits, insufficient production, high inflation (an average 922% each year from 
1946-1949) and unemployment ratio (10%) (Yeh, 2001). As result of the Japanese 
construction of an agricultural economy, industrialization in the processing of 
agricultural products was the major resource of foreign exchange and the main 
locomotive force for economic recovery. ill The economic blueprint was mainly 
developed from Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thoughts and the much earlier essays of Confucian 
and Legalist Scholars from ancient China. 112 As such, the original scheme of the 
110 The purpose of the former was to maintain oversight of local government, detained political 
dissidents, disrupted opposition publication and movements, carry out censorship and surveillance of 
Taiwanese citizens and stipulate military trials without the due process of judicial trial (Tien, 1989). 
The latter was established "at the order of the president to make policy decisions regarding `national 
mobilization and suppression of the communist rebellion"' 
111 The agricultural commodities during the Japanese colonial period included various tropical 
foodstuffs (sugar, tea, canned pineapple, mushrooms, asparagus, banana) which along with rice were 
exported to Japan as the major resource of foreign exchange reserves for imports of industrial raw 
materials and machinery. 
112 Setting out from these thoughts inherited from imperial China and reconstructed along authoritarian 
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KMT's planned economy emphasized that "state power in the management of the 
economy had clear priority over the private autonomy of a market-based economic 
system" (Hsueh, et al., 2001: 12). 113 This autonomy also facilitated the KMT's 
implementing an unprecedented land reform in Taiwan for extracting more supporting 
capital for industrial sectors. ' 14 
The scheme of a planned economy is a form of `nationalist economy' and `Listian 
workfare regime' in practice. "5 In the case of Taiwan, the economic activities were 
under the disciplines of political and military purposes. The shortage of natural 
resources and insufficiencies on institutional arrangements were mitigated by the 
legitimacy of the inward warfare strategy that could effectively mobilize and control 
the economic and extra-economic resources and systems. Moreover, the weakness of 
domestic private sectors and civil society enabled the state to operate the policy tools 
without resistance. Taiwan economic development went through four distinct stages 
up to the late 1980s. 1952 to 1960 was a period strongly focused on post-war 
reconstruction and export promotion. From 1960-1970, there was a period of 
import-substitution. In late 1960s to 1980s, the emphasis was placed upon import 
substitution and export expansion (Yeh, 2001). Last, the economic and industrial 
structures were transformed into reformulated `strategic trade policies' by exporting 
high value-added (capital-intensive) and high-technology (skill-intensive) products 
since the late 1980s. 
4.2.4.1 From stabilizing economic order to the first-wave import substitution 
Leninist lines, the legacy that the government (or the state) should intervene in the economy and is 
responsible for livelihood of the people was accepted by many Asian states and their people that have 
been influenced by Confucian thought for centuries. This Confucian thought and principles on the 
relations between the state, business and people are a very traditional legacy that seldom seems to 
be doubted by the Asian states (both political elites and their people) even until very recently. 
113 The KMT government's initial approach to the macro-structure adjustment problems was heavily 
influenced by the ideological baggage and legacy that it brought with it from the Chinese mainland. 
114 The post-war land reform suggested by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction led to the redistribution of nearly one-fourth of Taiwan's cultivated land to tenant 
farmers and landowners. 
1'5 However, the resources and power controlled by the planned economic blueprint of the KMT are far 
beyond that Jessop describes in Listian workfare state strategies of NICs (see Jessop, 1999). 
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In the first decade of the KMT's arrival, major enterprises and economic resources 
from the Japanese and US aid provided firm foundations for its centralized economic 
structure and social stability 116 As the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and US 
were not as smooth as taken for granted after their disagreements on grand strategy 
against the PRC (see Roy: 113), ' 17 the KMT government encouraged the first-\vave 
import-substitution industries (1952-1960) to avoid over-dependence on the US. The 
state-owned enterprises were designed to control key industries and monopolize 
important resources and raw materials for the mission of returning to China (McBeath, 
1997). As McBeath identifies, the economic strategies of the KMT government 
"controlled over strategic materials, assisted industrial upgrading and development, 
aided implementation of counter-cyclical and supply-side management policies, 
provided economic security for regime supporters, provided a training base for the 
state economic bureaucracy, and extended the arms of the state through linkages with 
satellite suppliers and downstream firms" (McBeath, 2001: 1149). They contributed to 
stabilizing the economic order and adding the governmental revenues rather than 
depleting state resources and exploiting society. As such, the functions of the state 
enterprises were not constrained to maintaining economic stability, but also political 
and societal stability. 
The purposes of these policies were not different from those in other underdeveloped 
countries scattered across East and South Asia, South American and Africa which at 
that time set out with strong nationalist ideas for reducing dependence on the 
advanced countries and regaining economic autonomy of the state within its own 
territory. In this period, the industrial and agricultural policies were developed in 
tandem. The economic policies were "designed to promote industry to fit readily 
within a fairly strong version of the import substitution approach. " "The basic goal of 
116 US aid helped to construct a stabilized secure environment, and eventually was withdrawn in 1966 
(Yeh, 2001). The arrival of US aid helped to stabilize the economic order, offset the fiscal deficit by 
selling the US-aid materials to use for loans for investment in infrastructures. However, the 
reconstruction of the economy also facilitated the import of daily necessities, capital equipment and 
raw materials (Yeh, 2001). 
117 Chiang was unhappy the US did not support his projects to invade the mainland during Mao's Great 
Leap Forward (1958) and during the Cultural Revolution. He also opposed the US's `two Chinas' 
policy. 
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industrial policy was to develop domestic industries that could produce basic 
necessities to replace the dependence on imports evident at that time" (Yeh, 2001: 15). 
In the KMT's scheme of things, the main economic actors on this stage «viere public 
enterprises and the state itself. 118 The major governmental measures to back up these 
industries included outright import bans and restrictions on luxury goods and goods 
already produced domestically; high nominal import tariff rates (average rate 38.2%) 
especially for the protection of domestically produced goods; intensive control on the 
foreign exchange rate by the Central Bank; and restrictions on new industrial plants 
(Hsueh, et al. 2001; Wade, 1990; Yeh, 2001). These policy tools are also some of the 
orthodox prescriptions in the statist developmental model (Johnson, 1999; Wade, 
1990). 
The public enterprises invested in chemicals, mining, metals, fuels, and food 
processing that gave the state the ability to monopolize upstream raw materials for 
downstream private small and medium enterprises (SME). These downstream SMEs 
were almost always owned by the mainlanders or Taiwanese landlords who had 
capital to run businesses such as plastics, basic metals, synthetic fibers, and advanced 
electronics. Moreover, "centralized management of railroads, other transportation 
linkages, and the telephone, telegraph, and the postal service gave the KMT 
government the ability to monitor the population's movements and communication. 
Control over the banking and financial sector allow the government to stabilize 
economic fluctuations, particularly inflation; capture scarce foreign exchange; and 
direct economic growth. Control over food processing, textile production, and trading 
in rice, salt, and oil completed the regime's administration of the basic necessities of 
life" (McBeath, 2001: 1162). 
118 "The government's approach to achieving import substitution was interventionist to an extreme 
degree. To begin with, the government identified promising investment opportunities, drew up plans, 
and invited particular private entrepreneurs to carry them out, arranging low-interest loans and foreign 
aid funds for those who did. Since goverrunent owned the banks and directly controlled the 
allocations of aid fiends, directing resources to the favored sectors and firms was easily managed" 
(Hsueh, Hsu & Perkins 2001: 1 5). 
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Table 4.6 shows the distribution of industry by private and public ownership before 
1993. Table 4.7 gives the production and ownership structure in post-«-ar Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector, 1952-1998. Table 4.8 shows the public-private share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) before 1991. Appendix 2-1 is the public and private shares in 
GDP by Industry. 
Table-4.6 Distribution of Industrial Outputs by Private and Public Ownership before 
1993 























Source: Zhang, 2003: 126; Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Economic Planning Council, 1976. 
Table-4.7 Production and Ownership Structure in Post-War Taiwan's Manufacturing 
Sector, 1952-1990 
Light Heavy& chemical Private State-Own 
1952 n. a. n. a 43.8 56.2 
1960 76 24 56.2 43.8 
1970 65.7 34.3 72.3 27 
1980 53.8 46.2 85.5 14.5 
1990 33.6 66.4 89.7 10.6 
Source: Modified from Cheng, 2001: 30 
Table- 4.8 The Public-Private Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) before 1987 
(%) 










1951 100.0 10.9 17.4 NA NA 
1956 100.0 10.7 15.0 48.8 25.5 
1961 100.0 11.3 16.7 46.5 25.5 
1966 100.0 11.0 16.1 50.4 25.5 
1971 100.0 11.5 16.8 58.7 13.1 
1976 100.0 9.8 16.8 62.0 11.4 
1981 100.0 10.4 16.0 66.3 7.3 
1986 100.0 9.4 14.3 70.7 5.5 
Source: Modified from Hsueh, et al., 2001: 104. 
It can be seen that the state-owned enterprises had at least close to a fifty percent 
share of ownership in the industrial and manufacturing sectors by 1960. However, 
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their contributions to GDP were far lower than private enterprises and even lowlier 
than those of the agricultural sector by 1966. This could be explained by the 
value-added productivity of the private enterprises being greater than those of public 
enterprises from the late 1950s. Also the purpose of these enterprises was more 
politically directed than purely economic-efficiency directed. 119 As such, their 
functions on stabilizing social and economic orders and maintaining market 
price-mechanisms were significant. 120 Appendix 2-1(p. 329) shows the public-owned 
enterprises still have large shares of infrastructural sectors such as electricity, oil and 
water supply and in the financial and monetary sectors even until 1990s. 
4.2.4.2 From import-substitute nationalism to export-expansion developmentalism 
The import substitution policies created problems however, the small scale domestic 
market of Taiwan became saturated with domestic products by 1960.121 Under 
pressure from the US for a more liberalized market mechanism in exchange for a 
mutual defense agreement, the government launched the '19-point economic reform' 
122and introduced the Statute for Encouragement of Investment in 1960.123 The 
119 From the state side, as Mcbeath identifies the state-owned enterprises had both economic and 
political functions. "They allowed state control over strategic materials, assisted industrial upgrading 
and development, aided implementation of counter-cyclical and supply-side management policies, 
provided economic security for regime supporters, provided a training base for the state economic 
bureaucracy, and extended the arms of the state through linkages with satellite suppliers and 
downstream firms. Their indirect effects have been to check conglomerate and multinational control 
of Taiwan's political economy (McBeath, 1997: 1149). 
120 The public enterprises are the main source of employment opportunities for the KMT's political 
allies in the mainlander communities. 
121 In an absence of potential large markets the industries could not survive or expand to create 
sufficient new jobs to solve the unemployment problem. In the second four-year plan (1957-1960), it 
had shifted the emphasis upon the export promotion as a means of replacing import-substitution. 
122 The Nineteen-Point Program focused on economic reform with more market-oriented policies and 
export-led growth strategies. It made clear that the private sector was to be the leading edge of the 
overall economic development program, and led to better transparency and control over the 
government's budget and a reformed bank system. The context for the drawing and promulgating of 
the Nineteen-Point Program has two facets. Internationally, the US promised to send the Seventh Fleet 
to patrol the Tai,, van Strait and ensure Taiwan would not be attacked by the Chinese communists, 
however, the US did not support President Chiang's goal to recover the Chinese mainland from the 
onset. However, in the 1950s, most of the US aid was spent on defense expenditure and the import 
substitution did not resolve the economic problems and bring in any progress for Taiwan's private 
sector. In 1958, John Foster Dulles signed a mutual defense agreement with Taiwan and pushed 
President Chiang to "change his policy for recovery of the mainland from one stressing the military to 
an approach based on developing Taiwan's economy" (Hsueh, et al., 2001: 20). Therefore, under the 
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practical side of these policies included import tax rebates, the establishment of a 
developmental fund to provide low-interest rate bank loans and three export 
processing zones (Kaohsuing, 1966; Tantse and Nantze, 1971) with greater tax 
incentives and more efficient ways to export (see Hsueh, et al., 2001; Yeh, 2001). 
Economic activities were the earliest systems modernized administratively in Taiwan, 
even if still under the auspices of the government. 
In order to encourage exports, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) not in these 
export processing zones also enjoyed the same advantages and incentives for 
exporting products. Under these encouragements (savings, investment, exports), there 
were numerous SME scattered everywhere in Taiwan supported by family factories. 
From the late 1960s onward to 1980, Taiwan was an extreme example of an 
economic mobilization state. Besides formal labour, old people, women and children 
were all involved in producing labour-intensive and downstream products in the 
living-rooms of homes. 124 By 1971, Taiwan had accomplished the transition from an 
agrarian economy to a primitive Fordism with labor-intensive manufacturing of light 
consumer products including leather, wood products, consumer plastics, electrical 
machinery and apparatus, garments and shoes. Industrial employment rose steeply and 
`suggestion' (eight point proposal) of the US, the economic policies changed to accordance with the 
mutual defense agreement that requested Taiwan should get the government military expenditures 
down and the investment rate up. At the domestic aspect, the local market was saturated with products 
produced by the import-substituting industries, however the shortage of foreign exchange and 
inflation still caused serious economic problems and unemployment. Moreover, President Chiang was 
concerned that his government had become too dependent on USAID. Therefore, `self-sufficiency' by 
reducing dependence on USAID and foreign grants and seeking an alternative source of foreign 
exchange became impeding for the Taiwan government. Hence, under external and internal pressures, 
the government adjusted the import-substituting strategy to an export-led strategy. 
123 The purpose of the these policies were posited under the suggestions of mainland economic 
bureaucrats trusted by Chiang, to establish a more modernizing fiscal and economic administration 
and pro-market investment environment for attracting private investment, especially foreign capital, 
joint ventures & overseas Chinese capital. 
12 4 "`Living Rooms as Factories' program and `Mother Workshops' were two major community 
development campaigns. "The `living rooms as factories' program, referred to as the `family 
subsidiary employment program', was design to bring the surplus labour of communities and families 
into productive work". These programs were established on "the outgrowth of patriarchal capitalism, 
in which the interests of the capitalists, the state, and the international market are all served". They 
laid out the KMT's plan to incorporate women into productive labour while instructing them to fulfill 
their moral obligation to promote Taiwan's economic development", and futher, "the program was 
initially designed to remedy the social unrest and disorder presumed to have been created by 
economic development" (Ping-Chun Hsiung, 1995). 
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jobs declined sharply in agriculture (Mai & Shih. 2001). Table 4.8 and Appendix 2-? 
(p. 330) clearly indicates how the amculmral contribution to GDP dramatically 
declined since the 1970s. 125 Taiwan transformed it into a `developmental state' at this 
stage. 
At the macro level, the trend from a warfare state to a more Listian workfare state can 
clearly be seen in Appendix 3-1(p. 332). In 1975, the expenditure for economic 
development (30.3%) exceeded that of national defense (24.5%). This implies that the 
KMT government began to seriously consider the reality that its sovereignty was 
confined to Taiwan. The ratio for national defense rapidly declined from 1974 and the 
ratio for economic development climbed high since 1975. However, the ratio of social 
security remained low and mostly confined to social provisions for civil servants and 
the military. 
At the societal level, the national savings ratio increased to over 30% before 1970 and 
became the major source of funds for economic development, enough to offset the 
withdrawal of US aid (Yeh, 2001: 11). As such, the self-help development strategies 
through exporting brought Taiwan a self-funded economy that had the capacity to 
pursue an upgraded and capital-intensive production model. The private enterprises 
(especially Taiwanese SME) accumulated sufficient capital to form a more efficient 
production model with better linkage to the global market. 
4.2.4.3 The emergence of high value-added and high technology-intensive industries 
The oil crises in 1973 and 1978-9 plagued the economy with stagflation and 
recessions. In addition, severing diplomatic with the US after its normalization of 
relations with the PRC all forced the new president Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang 
Kai-she, to reconsider and face these extreme challenges to Taiwan. Concerns about 
security and long-term economic development became the prior and prominent issues 
1 25 "(T)he agricultural sector had lost its leading economic role due to the loss of land and labour to the 
industrial sector and the resultant rising wages" (Yeh, 2001: 10). 
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for the government rather than the protection of US troops. Chiang Chiang-kuo had 
faith in supporting public enterprises and launched the Ten Major Development 
Projects. 126 Unlike South Korea's policy of subsidizing targeted and strategic sectors 
(chaebols), Taiwan's government was unwilling to subsidize private businesses owned 
by Taiwanese who had weak ties with the KMT government. The KMT regime sought 
to prevent the emergence of huge conglomerates that could potentially challenge its 
hegemony over Taiwanese society (Zhang, 2002). Hence, the insulated, politically 
appointed bureaucrats from the mainland under the protection of president retained 
full autonomy and power regarding decision-making and were relatively free to do 
whatever they thought was best for the economy from a macro perspective. This 
bureaucratic autonomy depended more on the indication of the strongman, however 
far less on institutionalization of their institutional, administrative and political 
capacities. 
In order to maintain the international competitiveness of Taiwan's businesses, Chiang 
Ching-kuo began to accept the shift from heavy industries toward oil-saving 
technology intensive and capital-intensive industries. 127 These technician 
bureaucrats, 128 particularly Dr. Sun Yun-hsuan who was appointed as premier in 1978 
and who was also an excellent engineer from the mainland, created the Industry 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and began to promote the establishment of 
Hsin-chu Science-based Industrial Park in 1980. The original idea behind establishing 
this park was to create a high-technology version of an export processing zone that 
could attract foreign enterprises to invest. However, it surprisingly attracted many 
individuals or groups of brain-drains talents that had gone abroad for training and 
126 The Ten Major Development Projects that focused on heavy industries such as steel, petrochemicals, 
shipbuilding and transport infrastructure investments (super highways, railroads, international 
harbours and airports). The later projects comprised to develop a domestic automobiles industry and a 
nuclear power plant. 
12' Chiang Ching-kuo preferred projects that developed the heavy industries and public enterprises. 
However these industries were major consumers of energy and hence made Taiwan even more 
dependent on the increasingly highly-priced oil that was controlled by the OPEC and prone to the 
impact of world economic cycles. 
128 The technical bureaucrats were the institutional core of the Taiwanese developmental state. Most of 
them were well-educated engineers who retreated to Taiwan with the KNIT. Without them, it would 
have been impossible to launch the high-tech industries. 
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educating and had stayed to work (mainly to the US), in such places as Silicon Valley 
(Hsueh, et al., 2001; Li. 2004). 
Another significant and famous contributor to Taiwan's technological advancement 
was Li Kuo-Ting (K. T. Li) who was known as the `father of technology' in Taiwan 
and who pushed to establish an economic structure based on high value-added and 
advanced technology industries. 129Under Li's guidance, this holistic project kicked 
off a tremendous structural transformation in Taiwan's technological industries. It 
supported the infrastructures required with broad-based scientific and technological 
plans which not only allocated material resources but also intervened into human 
resources. That is, not only in the economic sector but also in the educational and 
other related sectors, were the limited resources constrained and channeled into 
developing this macro technology-related development project (Li, 1995). 
The term strategic industries began to appear in the government's economic six-year 
plans in 1978 and were targeted in the following ten-year economic development plan 
(1980-1989) that focused on the development of high value-added and low 
energy-intensive products such as of machinery, information, electronic, electrical and 
transportation equipments. These export-purposed strategic industries were defined by 
six criteria and received tax rebates, and other forms of special treatment. The criteria 
were referred to as "two bigs, two highs, and two lows": "(1) big linkage effects to 
other sectors, (2) large market potential, (3) high-technology intensity, (4) high valued 
added, (5) low energy intensity, and (6) low pollution intensity" (Hsueh, et al., 2001: 
63; Li, 2004). 130 This heavy investment in high technology sectors is a classical model 
129 Li was the chairman of the Coordinating Committee for the Application of Science and Technology 
to National Objectives and drew up the Science and Technology Development Program in 1979. Li 
had serious conflicts with Chiang Ching-kuo on the implementation of heavy industries projects and 
preferred a more liberalized economy. This demonstrated that even in the bureaucratic system, the 
unity was only an ostensible image. There were serious power struggles and resistant voice in the 
alliance of mainlanders. 
130 The practical means included to heavy investments in R&D activities in the state laboratories, and 
channeling students and funds in the universities and research units into technological-related fields 
for providing sufficient human capital resources for the development of technological industries. 
There was also an emphasis on training and recruitment of high-level science and technology 
personnel and encouraging foreign-educated technological scholars and experts back to Taiwan, 
mainly from the US. 
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of a Listian workfare state in Evans's (1995) and Weiss's (1999,2000) descriptions 
By 1980, Taiwan began running large trade surpluses with large surpluses of saving 
over domestic investment and became a capital-exporting state investing in some 
South-east Asian countries using its successful export-driven model (see Appendix 
7-1). More importantly, under the leadership of the politically protected technician 
bureaucrats, the Electronic Research and Service Organization under ITRI set up a 
prototype plant for wafer fabrication and signed a technology transfer contract with 
the U. S. firm RCA (Hsueh, et al., 2001; Li, 1995; Sun et al., 2001). "Based on this 
technology and in order to commercialize this effort, the United Microelectronics 
Cooperation (UMC) was founded in 1979 with 40 percent of its equity capital from 
the government and the remainder from private firms. UMC became the center for 
developing and diffusing integrated circuit technology... " (Hsueh, et al., 2001: 60). 
Following this, Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) was established in 1987 for 
developing very large scale integrated circuit production. Until the 2000s, clusters of 
electronic and high-technology enterprises in the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial 
Park still accounted over 70 percent of the paid-in capital and over 80 percent of total 
sales on GDP. The two government induced semiconductor enterprises produce over 
seven percent of world total production (the fourth-largest behind US, Japan and 
Korea) and contribute large amounts of revenue for Taiwan government (Mathews & 
Cho, 2000; Rosecrance, 1999). Moreover, their backward and cluster effects on the IT 
related and knowledge-based industries (IC & notebook production, package, wafer 
supply, design and foundry work) are immeasurable (Rosecrance, 1999). 
The government of Taiwan did play the "midwifery" and "husbandery" roles as 
suggested by Evans (1995) to initiate, cajole, induce and assist the private enterprises 
to venture into high-technological and high value-added production and promote their 
competitive abilities in the global market. However, once the government-sponsored 
research institutions (such as ITRI) transferred their skills and patents to the private 
sector, they left operations of the individual firms to a free market mechanism even 
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though the government has a share of these enterprises (Mathews & Cho. X000; 
Rosecrance, 1999). The government does not and actually can not intervene in the 
processes and strategies that the private sector employs in the international market. 
This was particularly evident in the government's incapacity to intervene in the 
competitive price war for micro-chips, D-RAMs and LCD monitors between 
Taiwanese companies in the global market in the 1990s. 
Being a small state, the capacity of the state to absorb targeted private sector or 
industries risk was not as easy as the descriptions in much of the existing literature 
(Weiss, 1998; Thurbon & Weiss, 2001; 2006), and the government's role in targeting 
specific industries and firms was on the way out by the late 1980s. 13' As a whole, the 
industrial giants and their global operations had become too large and complex to be 
governed by bureaucrats, administrative or technical. Moreover, there are too many 
conflicting interests for the government to play an active sector-by-sector leadership 
role (Hsueh, et at., 2001; Wu, 2004). It seems that the technical capacity of the state 
seems to confront inevitable shrinkage once the fostered industries become mature 
and autonomous in the market. 
- ---------- º 
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Figure- 4.2 Trajectory and Power Resources of the State in IEMP Model, 1950-1986. 
131 "New private firms in a wide range of new high-technology industries from telecommunication to 
opto-electronics and precision machinery were starting up in increasing numbers, sometimes relying 
on the work of government-supported research, but not directly initiated or 
heavily subsidized by 
government" (Hsueh, et al., 2001: 65). 
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Overall, up to the late 1980s the state did play a decisive role in the economic 
development in Taiwan since it controlled resources, access, finance and different 
policy instruments to allocate and mobilize resources that the private sector needed, 
especially in the name of nationalism. By intensively transforming and upgrading its 
export items from labour-intensive products to capital and technology-intensive 
products, Taiwan advanced from being the 24th largest trading nation in the world in 
1979 to the 12th largest by 1992 (Ravich, 2000). Figure 4.2 shows the state trajectory 
and its power resources in IEMP model from 1950-1986. It suggests that the 
ideological and military power resources of the state still remained strong through to 
1986; however state's political and economic power resources had begun to decline as 
the concealed but resistant political and economic power resources of domestic capital 
developed along side the international and domestic challenges to the KMT's 
legitimacy. 
Section 4.3 Development of domestic capitalism 
In the orthodox developmental states model, the domestic economic institutions and 
markets in the EANICs are controlled, dominated and piloted by the governments. 
The major assumptions include the hierarchic state-business relationship in that the 
dynamics of domestic enterprises were steered by the states and insulated, possibly, 
from the development and the dynamics of global capitalism. In other words, the 
operational logics and criteria of these markets are taken as divergent forms from the 
liberalist convergence mode. To further investigate these propositions, this section 
will unfold into three subsections to shed light on the state-business relationship and 
economic organizations; the characteristics of small and medium enterprises; and the 
development of domestic market and capitalism in Taiwan by 1986. By so doing, 
more empirical evidence will come forth to examine the propositions previously 
posited. 
4.3.1 The state-business relations and economic organizations 
The economic organizations and structures in Taiwan were complex and linked 
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parallel (or dual) and hierarchic economic systems. There was division between 
public and private enterprises. This demarcation coincided with the division between 
large-scale import-substituting heavy industries and small-scale export-onented light 
industries. The leadership of state-owner or big enterprises were in the hands of 
Chinese mainlanders or those who had close relations and common interests with 
mainlanders; and the owners of private firms were mainly the native Taiwanese 
(Hamilton, 1997; McBeath, 1998; Wu, 2004). 132 From a commodity chain perspective, 
these two systems formed a hierarchic relationship that produced upstream 
(intermediate) and downstream products in the early decades. 133 
However, it should be emphasized that the state-owned enterprises and big private 
conglomerates did not export their products but remained domestic-market oriented. 
Some of these public enterprises ventured into import substitution, producing 
commodities and services for the domestic economy; some were designed to provide 
upstream products or infrastructural demands; and some were involved in heavy and 
military industries for developing defensive capacities. To some degree, the private 
sector, especially the SMEs benefited from the state-owned enterprises subsidizing the 
economy by maintaining low prices on upstream goods and services and supplying 
basic commodities and infrastructural services (Hamilton, 1997; McBeeth, 2001; Wu, 
2004). 
It is obvious that if there were any industrial policies, they were not designed to 
intervene in the market order and processes of production, but to support the upstream 
components of industries, monopolize the raw materials and keep the rent-seeking 
132 For exchanging reformed lands owned by the former landlords and compensating their `cooperation 
to governmental policy', the KMT government gave these landlords many shares and bonds in four 
government enterprises that included Taiwan Cement, Taiwan Pulp and Paper, Taiwan Agricultural 
and Forest, and Taiwan Industry and Mining Cooperation (see McBeeth, 2001; Hamilton, 1997). 
Therefore, the KMT government and these landlords were the only existent capital owners before the 
1970s and the later, some of them who had the capital from the land-reformed compensation to run 
new enterprises became the only big private conglomerates before the 1980s. 
133 Except for communist countries, the KNIT government monopolized the biggest share of economic 
resources and had the largest public sector and state-owned enterprises in the world. These were 
pivotal for stabilizing the domestic economy and providing the upstream and basic raw materials 
for 
the downstream and private sector by 1980 (>\ZcBeath, 1997) . 
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advantages of specific sectors under the government control. The state-owned 
enterprises were organizationally decoupled from the private sector but responded to 
the market demands generated by the private economy (Hamilton, 1997). Any sector 
that enjoyed substantial economies of scale was in public hands. It is evident that the 
strong state which controlled resources and the resourceless private sector, especially' 
the SMEs, developed from asymmetric starting points and distinctive directions. 
By doing this, there were two advantages for the KMT to help legitimate their regime. 
One was that the state-owned enterprises served the private sector by undertaking 
research and development tasks and capital-intensive and economy-of-scale activities 
that were beyond the capacities of private firms. This effectively expanded the 
diffusion of technology and enhanced the efficiency of resource allocation. The other 
was that the non-profit oriented state-owned enterprises prevent the production of 
essential goods and services from being monopolized by private interests in order to 
preserve them as public goods. These two functions of the state-owned enterprises did 
help to stabilize the economic and social order and brought some release some of 
domestic political pressure and social tension in the first three decades after the KMT 
arrived on Taiwan. 
On the other hand, unlike the biggest enterprises in South Korea and Japan which 
controlled the production and distribution of final export products and dominated the 
export sectors, the biggest businesses of Taiwan, just like the state-owned enterprises, 
aimed to produce intermediate goods sold domestically and be the major supplier of 
local services (Hamilton, Zeile & Kim, 1990; Hamilton, 1997; Wu, 2004). 134 Several 
CEOs of these enterprises represented their related businesses organizations as the 
members on the KMT General Committee and reflected suggestions of the businesses 
to the government. However, unlike the state-owned enterprises which were 
non-profit-oriented and established with a top-down structure, the big firms in Taiwan 
14 "Those private businesses normally connected closely to the government in patron-client relations 
and had grown large relative to other businesses and were upstream producers for the tens of 
thousands of small and medium-sized firms that are downstream consumers of these intermediate 
goods and export-oriented (Hamilton, 1997). 
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were a kind of product of market forces and of the demand created by the other firms. 
Therefore- when the state-owned enterprises began to shrink in the 1980s, these 
market-oriented big firms became even stronger and more internationalized, and 
becoming bigger conglomerates by 1990. However, even though these large business 
groups created market institutions and controlled economic resources, they were not 
the main organizational force to propel the Taiwanese economy (Hamilton, 1997). 
From a more general perspective, as the domestic-oriented or import-substitution- 
oriented enterprises were dependent on patriarchic-relations under the protection of 
the state, the insulated and political-appointed economic bureaucrats found easier to 
enact industrial and economic strategies without domestic resistance. These policies 
targeted strategic industries and created an `equitable' environment for the 
capital-lacking and resource-poor SMEs to compete in the market-oriented sectors 
and finally be internationalized in the global market. Therefore, the KMT industrial 
strategies at this stage could be justified by the international difficulties and domestic 
pressure it confronted. However, these policies brought unexpected and contingent 
results in the 1980s that the KMT could not prevent. 
4.3.2 The export-oriented small and medium enterprises 
As another facet of Taiwan's dual economic system, the Taiwanese SMEs are 
characterized by their loose, flexible and fragmented organizations. SMEs generally 
run in owner-operator modes and are owned by the indigenous Taiwanese who were 
excluded from the KMT position of authority (Thompson, 1996). 
135 For the SMEs, 
the advantages of the state-business hierarchic relationship were that they could get 
some raw materials and resource at a more stabilized and lower price than on 
international markets. This enhanced their competitiveness in the global market. 
However, it also meant that the KMT's policies toward Taiwanese SMEs were totally 
different from those towards state-owned, big private-owned industries in strategic 
1-`-s "Given the character of Chinese-Taiwanese capital formation, there were few large industrial 
firms, meaning that the country's bourgeoisie was relative fragmented and wealth dispersed" 
(Thompson, 1996: 636). 
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Sectors. 
"In the 1960s and 1970s, under pressure from state monopolies and big firms 
supported by high import tariffs, small enterprises could not survive in the domestic 
market" (Zhang, 2003: 139). The export-oriented policy provided the SMEs families 
owned little capital opportunities to pull themselves out of the morass of chaos and 
poverty (Woronoff, 1986). However, development of SMEs contributed profoundly 
stabilizing the economy and social order as SMEs accounted for more than 50% of 
total employment in 1960s and this share rose to 64% - 70% by 1990 (Ravich, 2000; 
Shive & Hu, 1997). These SMEs eventually also accounted for about 80% (1972) and 
then nearly 90% by the mid-1980s of Taiwan total exports, 65% of export earning and 
65% of total business revenue (Cooper, 2003; Kubek, 1987; Ravich, 2000; Zhang, 
2004). Owners of SMEs are generally Taiwanese who are sympathetic to opposition 
movements (Cheng, 2001). Increasing economic power raised the new emerging 
middle-class, giving them with more economic resources to oppose to the KMT 
regime. 
There are four main characteristics of Taiwanese SMEs. First, Taiwanese SMEs are 
based on a network of personal relationships and are usually in private hands meaning 
management and ownership is by members from the same extended family ties. 
Therefore, the proprietary assets of family-owned firms are personalized. Second, 
these SMEs gain the access to international markets based on their competitive prices 
resulting from flexible networks, product combinations, methods, scale, location and 
efficient labour-division. However, their managerial, capital, technological resource 
and economic scales are limited (Orru, 1997; Wu, 2004). 
Third, the government gave tax benefits to export firms in all almost sectors however 
it did not support the SMEs with major capital. After being expelled from most 
international momentary organizations, it was difficult for Tai« an to have access to 
international loans and aid. The government controlled the banking system and 
mainly allocated industrial credit and loans for the public sector and military-related 
agents (Smith, 2000; Yeh, 2001). Even the FDI was channeled into target sectors (see 
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Appendix 6-1 & 6-2. pp. 336-8). Private firms had to resort to the informal credit 
market, inter-firm loans or support from family savings. "By 1987, individual savings 
stood at 40%- the highest of any nation in the world" (Copper, 2003: 159). These 
individual savings through family ties or inter-firms relations provided the funds for 
capital investment and contributed to the economic success of the SMEs in Taiwan 
that create both backward and forward linkages and effects (see Luo, 1998). 
However, the SMEs greatly benefited from the infrastructures, export-tax exemption 
and well-educated and low-waged human resources provided by the educational 
system. The well-educated human capital, especially science graduates channeled and 
encouraged by the government, is one of the major resources that make rapid 
economic growth possible (Copper, 2003; Mai &Shih, 2001). However, except for 
those by Evans (1995) and Pack (1992), few existing EANICs developmental studies 
focus on this point. 
Fourth, the SMEs are distributed at low levels of industrial concentration but have 
specialized flexible dynamic and cooperative networks that enable them to efficiently 
produce diversified products needed by global buyers in a very short time. 
Cooperative ties are stably established on particularly Chinese style inter-personal 
trust relationships (Hsiung, 1994; Hsueh, et al., 2001; Orru, 1997; Park, 2001; Schive 
& Hu, 2001; Wu, 2004; Zhang, 2002,2003). The advantages of the SMEs are that 
they can pool the limited resources and capital of each firm to accomplish larges-scale 
production for export. They might be weak individually, but can have strong and 
stable operations through the cooperative networks. 
Organizationally, the SMEs structure can be seen as a system of myriad pyramid 
networks that intertwine with horizontal and vertical networks. Variations and 
cooperation between different firms and networks could be flexible vertically or 
horizontally reorganized case-by-case or time-by-time (ibid). 
' 36 Relations between 
136 From the vertical and hierarchic aspect, at the base of the pyramid were a large number of family, 
firms and cottage firms or living-room factories that employing fewer than ten people or composed of 
family members, if even only the single housewife (see Hsiung, 1994; Hsueh, et al., 2001; Schive & 
Hu, 2001; Zhang, 2003) that were involved in one step of the production process and utilized 
relatively simple technologies. The upper-level of these base lines were firms that might produce 
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Taiwanese SMEs networks are generally both cooperative and competitive in the 
global market, and sometimes they get involved in 'cutthroat' competitiveness over 
price. 137 However, the cooperation and competitiveness between SMEs is actually a 
little different from the kind described in many studies in Taiwan that overvalue the 
role of government in steering, directing, piloting and negotiating in the development 
of national economy (ibid). 
In fact, there was more a sense of spontaneous cooperation initiated by related SMEs 
according to the laws of the market, the dynamics of capitalism and the need for 
efficiency brought on by the changing global market (ibid). The competitiveness of 
Taiwanese SMEs is rooted in their ability to meet demand efficiently, operate with all 
the requisite flexibility and overcome the limits of scale efficiency by adjusting their 
methods, scales and locations. These are reflected in a number of indicators, including 
the high entry and exit rates and the high elasticity of factor substitution (Shive& Hu, 
1997). Any mechanisms or procedures introduced by the government will find 
difficult to substitute for these flexible spatial-temporal relations more effectively and 
efficiently than the SMEs themselves. Table 4.8 evidences the vigorous productivity 
of the SMEs by comparing them to state-owned enterprises. Appendix 2-2(p. 330) 
demonstrates how Taiwan had transformed from an agrarian economy into an 
industrialized one by the 1980s. 
In summary, the case of SMEs in Taiwan does not exactly fit in the ideal-type 
developmental model. However, the state did still have an important role in 
supporting their development. These supports were "devised to be consistent with the 
more than a single component of a large product or final production of a simple design and are that 
generally composed of ten to thirty members. Next followed SMEs, with thirty to one hundreds 
employees that produced final products and could passively be the receiver of subcontracts and 
directly be involved in exporting. At the top of the pyramid were the central SMEs that employed 
more than one hundred people and could produce finished products and deal directly with foreign 
buyers. These central firms also play a role in coordination, quality control, and dissemination of new 
information and technology to partner SMEs via external or internal subcontract relations (see Hsueh, 
c't al., 2001; Zhang, 2003). 
137 From the horizontal aspect, different sizes of firms can also cooperate to produce a part or a final 
product through subcontract relations. When one company receives an order that exceeded its capacity, 
it subcontracts part of the order to other firms in the same business. 
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principles of a market economy along with respect for private ownership. The 
government intervention was intended solely to make up for the inadequacies in the 
market mechanism" and to construct "the effective management of economic 
conditions and the development of more favorable conditions" (Yeh, 2001: 42). The 
effective implementations of these measures (state capacity) depended on the 
resources that the state controlled. In these circumstances, the Taiwanese SMEs grow 
rapidly and connected closely with the global market. 
From political and ideological power resources perspectives, there was a corollary of 
the industrial fragmentation in SMEs faced high collective action barriers in their 
effort to achieve sectoral policy goals. The SMEs were also fragmented on 
macro-economic policies and deficient in policy-related information (Chu, 1994). 
"The structural and cognitive handicaps hindered collective organization in the 
corporate sector and undermined coherent interest formation and articulation on 
financial policy and liberalization"(Zhang, 2002: 429). As such, the owners of SMEs 
were generally the financial supporters of opposition movements. Ostensibly, the kept 
away from the authoritarian state and engaged in businesses; however substantially 
they financially support the rising oppositions as a way in advancing their interests. 
4.3.3 The developments of domestic market and capitalism 
When the KMT retreated to Taiwan, bringing with them a belief in charismatic 
dictatorship and authoritarianism, the politically protected technician-bureaucrats 
began to have the opportunities to test whether Dr. Sun's doctrines could work well in 
practise to bring about the modernization and industrialization of China. ' 38 Because of 
its outsider status, the KMT state was highly autonomous of demands of submissive 
from industrialists and civil society, «-hich enabled to implement land-reform and 
138 The KMT's economic principles based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's market socialism which is composed of 
"state ownership in key sectors, private ownership of land but not landlordism, development of 
national capital with limited private involvement in infrastructure and manufacturing" (Li, 2002: 185) 
and the allowance of the existence of small enterprises. Also, "there are basic three elements in Mr. 
Sun's doctrine: socialism, a planned industrialization, and statism, which is based on traditional 
legalistic Confucianism" (Li, 2002: 185). 
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strategic policies effectively by tightly controlling and monopolizing on key economic 
resources. This form of socialist capitalism and economic nationalism was generally 
self-closured to focus on coordination of domestic market, whereas not on the 
competitiveness in the global market. 
Therefore, two forms of capitalism developed along with two distinctive trajectories 
and logics in Taiwan by the 1980s. Socialist capitalism and statism dualistic also 
coexisted with the export-oriented sectors that were influenced more by global 
liberalism and were intimately connected with the dynamics of international 
commodity chains, especially US Fordist production mode. As Pack empirically 
evidences the entrepreneurship in a small-firm economy is the source of Taiwan's 
dynamic form of capitalism (Pack, 1992; Hamilton, 1997). The asymmetrical 
resources distribution between the public and private sectors brought in contrary 
consequences and their positions have reserved since the 1980s (Zhang, 2002). When 
the export-oriented private sectors gradually continued to accumulate capital and 
expand their internationalized investments, the performances of the public-owned and 
KMT party-owned enterprises did not have the same growth as the private sectors and 
began to decline in the 1980s. 
-------* 
1950 1986 ------ * 
Figure-4.3 Trajectory and Power Resource of Domestic Capitalism in IEMP Model, 
1950-1986. 
In sum, the development of the dual capitalist system in Taiwan brought an 
unexpected dilemma for the KMT government in the 1980s. During the Cold-War 
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period, the international, geopolitical and domestic environments all provided the 
prerequisites for supporting the regulations and limitations set by the KMT 
government to constrain and govern the private sector. However, the global free-trade 
mechanism forced upon them by international economic organizations and US request 
deprived or prohibited many means usually used by developing states. Once domestic 
capital binds inextricably to global capital in a more free and unlimited situation, how 
socialist capitalism in developmental states continues to survive will need further 
examination. Figure 4.3 presents the trajectory and power resource of domestic capital, 
1950-1986. It suggests there was increasing political, economic and ideological power 
resources of the private sector; however, they were still extensively constrained by the 
state's macro-economic policies of nationalist economy. 
Section 4.4 The weak and submissive civil society and its latent resistance 
4.4.1 A weak civil society under the linkage between the strong state and enterprises 
After the 2-28 Incident in 1947, for most Taiwanese, "political action became a 
life-threatening endeavor, one in which few Taiwanese chose to participate" (Ravich, 
2000: 100). Most of the populace were uneducated peasants, unskilled labourers, 
small business men those generally without much land or capital. However, they were 
still spied upon by different groups and cells in KMT-controlled associations. 
However, power of civil society symbiotically accumulated with the economic growth. 
As Cheng (2001) refers the development of civil society to have the power of checks 
and balances in the 1980s was a reflection of a sequence of organized reactions to the 
dominance of economic and political forces over the previous thirty years, and to the 
subsequent distortions produced by link between economics and politics. Ostensibly, 
it was not until the Martial Law was lifted in 1987, that `civil society' began to be 
formed into more organized social groups and organizations. However, before this 
deregulation civil society was far weaker than the state institutions and capitalist 
forces; it had long existed in the "interstitial gaps" (Mann, 1986,1993) within the 
strong state and in domestic enterprises. 
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KMT's strategies towards civil society, its ideological political, military and economic 
purposes were conflated into a compounded policy package with complicated 
mechanisms. However, there existed interstitial gaps for resistant forces to burgeon. 
Politically, various elections benefited the KMT regime internationally and 
domestically. Continuing limited local elections provided the KMT's legitimacy 
claims to the whole of China and built its international democratic reputation to could 
retain support from its western partners, especially the US. The local-level elections 
also created a system of highly-loyal grass-roots organizations throughout the country 
that drew some Taiwanese into the political system without handing over power. ' 39 
Furthermore, promoting competition between the interest-seeking local factions 
distracted their focus to localized agendas, transformed the energy of grassroots 
conflict which facilitated to stabilization of the authoritarian regime. 140 
However, as emphasized, there were steady 25%-30% voters who voted for the 
non-KMT candidates or `the opposition group' in the various polls. Thus, it would not 
be right to say that the political forces of civil society or democracy in Taiwan had 
just begun to burgeon after the lifting of the Martial Law in 1987 (see Chu, 1989; 
1995; 1996). It would be more adequate to say that the political resistant force of the 
civil society continued to exist in a latent, underground and informal way at the 
grassroots level but was not developed or organized strongly enough to threaten or 
resist the dominance of the KMT regime. 
Economically, as the state depended heavily on the capital that capitalists accumulated, 
the state's policies were prone to suppress wages in g enterprises and SMEs. The 
139 These strategies did work well: since martial law prohibited any new party to be legally registered, 
most of the local factions chose to cooperate with the KMT to pursue limited localized interests and 
gain access to resources 
140 The local factions are motivated by their owned interests and conflict fiercely for power, interests 
and influence in local affairs. According to Chu Yun-han (1992), the KMT used four types of 
economic privileges to manage the local factions (1), regional economic activities, such as banking, 
credit and transport; (2), provincial-level lending activity; (3), provincial and county procurement and 
contracting; (4) various local level interest exchanges, from zoning manipulation to protecting 
underground businesses. In an agrarian society with limited information from outside, the local 
factions are the major controller of local-related resources and interests. Through distribution of these 
resources to their clients, the leaders of factions can consolidate their leading positions at the 
local 
level and retain loyalty and supports from their clients in the next elections. 
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low-wage policy contributed a lot to the competitiveness of Taiwanese 
labour-intensive products in the global market. As the private sector successfully 
transformed into export-oriented industries, they became sufficiently strong and 
autonomous enough to contend with the state and to request sharing political and 
economic power. As such, Taiwan is the only country in the world to experience 
increased economic growth after the termination of US aid (Copper, 2003). 
In this scenario, civil society became more suppressed by the economic-political 
linkage. By the 1980s most of the employed population was engaged in export-related 
economic activities and rural population and households were prospered in the 
cottage-economy (living-room as factory) that produced the primary or intermediate 
products for the export-oriented factories. The boom in manufactured exports largely 
accounted for the acceleration in the growth rate of GNP. In the 1950s, the GNP 
increased at average 7.6% annually; then followed 9.6% in the 1960s; 9.7% in the 
1970s and 8.7% in the 1980s (Mai & Shih, 2001). Appendix 3-2(p. 337) profiles the 
important indicates of the Taiwanese economy, 1952-1986. 
Along with economic growth, the per capita GNP dramatically leaped from US $ 50 
in 1950 to US $ 3993 in 1986 and US $ 7954 in 1990 (Zhang, 2003). Under the 
high-interest policy, the individual saving ratio (contribution to GNP) was between 
28%-40% from the 1970s to the 1990s. Recursively, the capital accumulated by civil 
society provided the capital resources for the private SMEs-through the informal curb 
market of finance (and through family-ties or networks). Therefore, the economic 
relationship between the SMEs and civil society make them survive symbiotically and 
resist linkage between the state and big enterprises. As such, the networks between the 
state and domestic enterprises in Taiwan, especially SMEs, were not as profound as is 
thought to be in the case of South Korea. 
To maintain comparative advantages and construct an attractive investment 
environment, labour movements, labour unions, strikes were prohibited, wage-levels 
were kept low and other forms of social movement and assembly were heavily 
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suppressed (Bush, 2004, Chu, 1996; Huang, 1995; Roy, 2003). 1" The owner-operator 
mode of SMEs also made labour movements difficult to be organized. As such, the 
KMT regime supported the exclusion of organized labour from the policy-making 
process and prohibited any form of labour protests (Chu, 1996; Huang, 1995). Further, 
any dissatisfaction with the government from the mass was also prohibited. Any 
offense could be labeled as a variety of crimes under the headings `anti-government' 
or `alliance of communists' and sentences of around ten years from a military court 
were not uncommon (Bush, 2004, Roy, 2003). 142 
In this sense, the labouring and non-capitalist classes were politically, economically 
and socially exploited by the state apparatus and big private groups for the purpose of 
economic nationalism by depriving them of their basic rights of citizenship. Any 
social movements were strictly constrained under national security and ideological 
concerns. Moreover, the inferiority of the labourers' status intertwined with the ethnic 
conflicts between the mainlanders and Taiwanese. This deprivation doomed the 
integration of labour and opposition movements against the KMT dominance on the 
island and abroad (Chu, 1996; Huang, 1995). 
Furthermore, the suppression of human rights evoked criticism from reformists within 
the KMT, the DangWai (opposition groups) and concerns from the US Congress (see 
Bush, 2004: 179-218). In fact, to consolidate the legitimacy and dominance of the 
KMT party-state on Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo chose a strategy of broadening the 
political status and space for Taiwanese elites and used a localized recruitment policy 
that brought some Taiwanese political elites important positions in the Central 
Governments or Provincial Government after 1972. The intention of the KMT to 
block the Taiwanese resistance through sharing more political power and space with 
the assimilated Taiwanese was quietly obvious (Roy, 2003). 
1a' The strategy that KMT assumed to consolidate its legitimacy after losing the diplomatic support of 
the US and international communities was to establish cooperation with the large private groups and 
expanded the political power of these capitalists in the decision-making process. 
142 Civil society was also closely monitored by secret military agents of the TGC under Martial Law 
and the threat of White Terror. 
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However, the overseas Taiwanese, especially those who emigrated to the US and 
Japan after the KMT arrived on Taiwan, were unsatisfied with the situation in Taiwan. 
They organized into various radical political groups and did not pass up any chance to 
lobby on issues of human rights and the independence of Taiwan. 143 That strategy of 
extending the domestic affairs of Taiwan into the international arena was particularly 
prominent when the Taiwan Relations Act was drafted in the US Congress (Bush, 
2004; Hughes, 1997; Roy, 2003). 144 However, for the US Administration the priority 
of geopolitical security and stability, consolidation of the anti-communist alliance and 
maintenance of the US's interests in the East Asia were far more important than 
concerns on the human rights and democracy issues in this region (Bush, 2004; Roy, 
2003). 145 
The Dangwai emerged in the late 1960s when they began campaign for the 
supplementary election for the Legislative Yuan and Provincial Assembly. 146 Since the 
KMT controlled most of mass media and published press to propagate its nationalist 
ideology, Chinese nationalism was the only `legal and correct' ideological choice for 
the people by the 1970s. However, the DangWai activists posed an alternative- loyalty 
toward an ethnic community-to replace the KMT nationalist patriotism (Hughes, 
1997). More appropriately, the DangWai provided a forum to express dissatisfactions 
about the KMT's authoritarianism. Therefore, the major themes of the opposition 
143 These overseas Taiwanese groups were explicitly connected with the political opposition group in 
Taiwan. At the early stage, their strategies in the US or Japan were to lobby senates of congressmen or 
agitate public opinion through the mass media to put pressure on the respective governments to force 
political liberalization in Taiwan. 
144 It should be noted the purpose of Taiwanese immigrants in the US was to utilize political freedom as 
a means to the end of self-determination and independence of Taiwan. However, what the members in 
the US Congress were concerned about was the democratic mechanism that could ensure and improve 
standards of human rights in Taiwan (see Bush, 2004). 
145 Further, the human rights issue in Taiwan was not a severe case than the other authoritative 
countries, e. g. South Korea and Singapore, in this area. Therefore, there was no particular reason for 
the US Administration to intervene in the KMT's human rights policy, pressure on its political 
liberalization or suspend arms sales to Taiwan (Bush, 2004; Roy, 2003). 
146 The Dangwai originated in an alliance between various types of oppositional activists: the first was 
local politicians strongly dissatisfied with how the KMT distributed local resources and power; the 
second type was dissident intellectuals and university students who were dissatisfied with the 
authoritarian dominance of the KMT; the third was activists of social movements such as advocates of 
environmentalism, feminism, socialism, and human rights; and the fourth was the secessionists. 
150 
groups resonated strongly with the disparate forces devoted to self-determination. 
democracy, human rights, national identity, justice and equity and social «-elfare. 
Nonetheless, the opposition groups did not prominently pose the independence of 
Taiwan as a public issue at first. This implies that these opposition groups were 
substantially fragmented in their approaches, agendas and purposes. "The lowest 
common denominator uniting the old DangWai movement had in fact been no more 
than a shared commitment to democratic reform"(ibid: 41). 
Ideologically, the KMT intensively concentrated the force of its control on its 
monopoly of the mass-media. 147 However, it paid little attention to the potential 
power of the little media such as magazines, videotapes and short factual 
documentaries recorded by camcorders, coaxial cable services and crude moveable 
transmission equipment (Chen, 1998; Lee, 2000; Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2001). This 
policy effectively blocked any information became the government did not want the 
people to know any anti-government critics. 148 Any violations of the government 
regulations under the censorship laws resulted in banning or confiscating of the 
publications and printing equipment fines, and possible trial for the owners in a 
military court without legal representation. Therefore, "the opposition forces 
challenged the extra-legal character of the state-media clientelistic relationship as 
anti-constitutional" (Lee, 2000: 131). 
These anti-KMT ideas were mainly spread by the underground (illegal) radio stations 
and magazines between Taiwanese and won many advocates who were eager to 
instigate political, economic and social reforms. In the early years (before the 1970s), 
the opposition magazines were mainly operated by mainlanders who were dissatisfied 
with the KMT's authoritarian rule and the indigenous Taiwanese political elites as the 
147 The KMT party-state had an "`illusion of high technology"' that assumes technological 
sophistication as a direct measure, if not the main source, of its ideological power and social 
impact' 
(Lee, 1999; 2000: 130). 
148 The TCG and Government Information Office (GIO) regularly checked the contents of the 
legal 
newspapers and TV programs, and suppressed illegal publications (especially magazines) which with 
came close to the boundaries of regulations by seizing them in the printing shops, typesetters, 
binders 
and the newspaper stands, and forbidding their distribution through the black market 
(Lee, 2000). 
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centers of organized intelligence for the opposition movement (Chen. 1998). Until the 
early 1980s. these magazines were organized as the major propaganda organs for the 
opposition and "their local distribution centers served as `party' branches and 
subscribers were treated as potential members" (Chen, 1998: 23). These magazines 
circulated not only in intellectual circles, but "reached downward to attract a sizable 
middle-class and grass-root following that yearned for more equitable power sharing 
and greater political participation" (Lee, 2000: 131). 
Yet due to the shortage of financial support for these underground magazines, 
videotapes, documentaries, and illegal radio and TV stations gradually became the 
new alternatives of the opposition forces by the late 1980s. These illegal stations were 
generally equipped with inexpensive US made portable low-power transmitters with a 
short distance broadcasting radius and were mounted on a moving lorry in order to 
play hide and seek with the government and military censors. 149 Through these media 
alternatives, the opposition forces effectively sabotaged the state monopoly on media 
by waging electronic guerrilla war. As such, these alternative media served as a 
platform for the grassroots movements and purveyed anti-KMT information to the 
people (Lee, 2000, Roy, 2003). 150 
In Reus-Smit's term (2002), the efforts made by the resistance and opposition forces 
re-conceptualized a vision of how a state should be and what rights people should 
have to the submissive civil society in Taiwan. The value of democracy and human 
rights incrementally became rooted in the hearts of people who were eager to be 
emancipated from authoritarianism. The information put out by the resistant forces 
broadened imagination of civil society of how `an ideal and democratic state' should 
be had impressed the people likely to pursue. Further, through the attempt to utilize 
149 Those stations were generally guarded by the volunteers for preventing police and censors break-ins. 
Furthermore, not only the opposition groups with definite political purposes employed with these 
illegal strategies, some commercial oriented private owners who wanted to break the media monopoly 
of KMT and preferred a Taiwanese dialect play the same games with the government too. 
150 They also provided a public sphere where the resistance voiced their opinions and dissatisfactions 
with the government, preached the ideas of democracy and welfare, and encouraged the people to 
resist the dominance of the KMT. 
1-52 
diversified communication instruments and improve the alternative media. even under 
the intensive censorship of the KMT government, the strategies of publishing 
underground magazines and waging electronic guerrilla war contributed a lot to 
spreading ideas of democracy and liberation to people. And last, these beliefs 
translated into practical actions in civil society in more organized movements and 
protests for more human rights (welfare and democracy). Hence, a new identity 
appealed to a new democratic state was bourgeoning in the early 1980s. 
4.4.2 The growing resistances in political combats 
When Chiang Ching-kuo assumed office as the new president in 1975, he began to 
understand the ROC in Taiwan faced a legitimacy crisis domestically and 
internationally. In order to secure the dominant position of the KMT on Taiwan, the 
political reform to generate a sense of progress toward democratization and the 
economic growth to facilitate more development and maintain full employment were 
impending. Chiang initiated the necessary political reforms by three major 
strategies. '51 These serial strategies aimed to promote Taiwanization (indigenization) 
of the KMT by sharing more power and resources with native assimilated Taiwanese 
than in the 1970s (Chu & Lin, 2001b). These strategies were still elite-oriented 
(political and economic) but not populace-oriented. Therefore, it can be inferred that, 
at least at that stage, the purpose of the reform strategies was flexible concession to 
the opposition forces to consolidate the leading position of the KMT regime but not to 
establish a democratic state and an institutional normalized government that should 
yield the ruling power of the KMT. 
By the late 1970s, the opposition (DangWai) forces were divided into various 
factions. 152 The radical DangWai factions organized into the Campaign Assistance 
151 The first was to hold supplementary elections for the National Assembly and Legislative 
Yuan; the 
second was to reform the party; and the third was to recruit more Taiwanese political elite 
into 
important parts into the central government. 
152 "One of the more important schisms was that between moderates who sought political change 
by 
working within the system (gaining access to power through winning political office) and radicals 
who advocated forcing the government to reform through large-scale protests and civil 
disobedience" 
(Roy, 2003: 159). 
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Corps in 1977, published the Formosa Magazine to preach their radical thought on 
re-construction of a new independent state in 1979, and established the Dangßai 
Research Association for Public Policy in 1983.153 The DangWai activists «von some 
seats in different supplementary elections, but still had few seats compared to the 
KMT. One reason for this was that the KMT candidates benefited from structural 
advantages and "enjoyed the support, collective strength and coordination provided 
by a legal political party" (Roy, 2003: 160). The second reason was as many 
middle-class Taiwanese were benefiting from economic prosperity, they were prone to 
ensure stable political and economic environments to protect their interests. They 
were conservative toward radical reforms posed by the DangWai activists that might 
have brought political disorder and threatened the economic stability (see Copper, 
2003; Roy, 2003). Those who voted for opposition groups were generally supporters 
of seeking a more innovative bureaucracy and political reform but not radicals for 
independence. Lastly, the opposition forces use of street demonstrations, disruptive 
tactics and violence hurt its image and made most Taiwanese anxious that supporting 
the DangWai would cause instability in society. 
However, the legitimacy of the KMT was incrementally weakened due to the 
international difficulties. Some KMT local factions even began to convert into local 
organized forums of the DangWai. In 1977, some leaders of these factions and 
DangWai candidates gained posts (a total of over a 30% share of votes) in elections 
and won four municipal executiveships. The first campaign violence broke out in a 
northern county-Taoyuan when the KMT was suspected of fraud and manipulating the 
polls by the supporters of the independent candidate Hsu Hsin-liang in the magisterial 
elections. The not erupted when the mass of protesters swelled to a ten thousand, and 
they began to burn the police station and police cars. This was and the first significant 
political noting after the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. The KMT was forced to announce 
the victory of Hsu (Chu & Lin, 2001b; Copper, 2003; Rigger, 1999; Roy, 2003). 
153 The radicals and activists were particularly connected with and supported by the foreign 
independence organizations, yet they were still purpose-diversified. 
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Therefore, the bottom-up strategy of winning local elections to `isolate' KMT's 
central government became the common acceptable option by diversified factions of 
the DangWai. 
In December of 1978, there were due to be supplementary elections for the National 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan. However, just a few days before the elections were to 
be held, Jimmy Carter announced the normalization of relations with the PRC and 
withdrew the US's diplomatic relations with Taiwan. People on the island were 
shocked by this abandonment and felt betrayed by their trusted and powerful ally. 
"Chiang Ching-kuo cancelled the elections and placed the ROC military on a 
heightened state of alert" (Roy, 2003: 166) for fending off a possible invasion by the 
PRC. Some radical factions of the DangWai argued the postponement of election was 
unconstitutional and accused that the KMT of exploiting the crisis (Chu & Lin, 2001; 
Copper, 2003; Rigger, 1999,2001; Roy, 2003). They further attempted to mobilize the 
public into more antigovernment street demonstrations and insisted it was a great 
chance for the Taiwanese to overthrow the KMT regime (ibid). 154 
The Kaohsuing Incident in 1979 was an important milestone for Taiwanese 
democratization. The organizers of Formosa Magazine planned a street rally in the 
biggest city in the southern Taiwan-Kaohsuing on the 10th of December of 1979 
(International Human Rights Day). The TCG rejected their application and announced 
it was an illegal event. 155 Hundreds of policemen and civilians were injured in what 
came to be called the Kaohsiung Incident (or Formosa Incident). The government 
arrested eight leaders of the rally (the Kaohsiung Eight), charged them with the crime 
of sedition and sentenced them ranging from ten months to life imprisonment (ibid). 
After that, the KMT regime continued to negotiate with the other opposition leaders 
154 These activists published the Formosa Magazine and established branches around the island for 
their `quasi-party' and propagate antigovernment thought, denounced the government's emphasis on 
economic growth over social justice and human rights, and request democratic reform in the political 
system (Chu & Linb, 2001; Copper, 2003; Rigger, 1999,200 1; Roy, 2003). 
iss The rally continued the crowd grew to over thirty thousand. Scuffles and riots broke out between the 
participants and public security (policy and military) when the marching crowd was blocked off on the 
street. 
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and supporters and promised political and democratic reform. 6 But except for 
releasing more important positions for Taiwanese, the ritiiT did not respond to these 
challenges with immediate political reforms. It chose an alternative strategy of a more 
liberalized economic structure to mitigate domestic pressure. This might be part of the 
explanation why economic regulations were so swiftly changed in the early 1980s. 
In 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo instigated three major reforms in government. The first 
was the reconstruction of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan by holding 
orderly elections; the second was the abolishment of martial law which had a salutary 
effect on the exercise of civil and political rights and made Taiwan's media free from 
military oversight and censorship; the third was permission to establish new political 
parties with full legality (ibid). In spite of the reasons that pushed the KMT regime 
into making these concessions to the opposition forces, it was undeniable that the 
following elections held in the 1980s furthered Taiwan's political evolution. The 
nation crept from an authoritarian party-state regime toward a plural party democracy. 
It also evidenced that the developments of domestic capitalism and civil society had 
been strong and autonomous enough to resist or challenge the dominance of a 
monopolizing party-state. 
4.4.3 The, implication of resistance for civil society 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the specific spatio-temporal fixes integrated political, 
ideological, military and economic contingences that intertwined with various issues 
and appeals into a pluralistic civil society. Civil society requested more 
innovative 
reformations and emancipations. The opposition movement closely integrated with 
labour movements, human rights and social welfare arguments by appealing 
for a 
more just society without unbalanced development, bureaucratic corruption and 
inequality. Regretfully, these issues were finally simplified into an ethnic identity 
issue. Following the reasoning of the oppositions, the injustice and inequality of 
Taiwan originated in the illegal intrusion of the KMT and mainlanders. 
However. as 
156 Chang Ching-kuo ordered to the initiation of reforms toward a more democratic mechanism and 
law 
system in order to regulate and hold orderly national elections. 
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Chen identifies, "ethnic conflict was a medium for the extension of civil rights. rather 
than for a creation of a Taiwanese state" (Chen, 1998: 15). It is exaggerated to say 
these resistances of civil society purported to establish an alternative Taiwanese state 
and identity, at least at the early stage (Roy, 2003). 
At a practical level, from the support for civil society and domestic enterprises to 
opposition movements it can not be inferred that those concerned with human rights, 
democracy and social welfare provisions were also keen to propagate and accept the 
idea that Taiwan should be independent. It was undeniable that the opposition groups 
initiated these concerns about the rights of citizenship (see Pierson, 1991), and 
brought them into the public arena. However, the opposition groups also took 
advantage of this stand point to bracket all the preferences of civil society and 
dissatisfactions toward the KMT regime to render an ideal vision of future. From a 
democratic perspective, the KMT government mainly composed of mainlanders and 
long-standing representatives in the Legislative Yuan and Parliamentary did have the 
legitimacy problems. The Taiwanese inferior status in every aspect was enough to 
induce a forged `ethnic conflict' between mainlanders and Taiwanese. But, this is not 
sufficient to infer that those who were dissatisfied with or opposed to the KMT's 
social and human rights policies and authoritarianism were all supporters of 
independence of Taiwan. Therefore, the correlation between democracy and 
separatism needs more cautious examination and justification. 
The historical contingence that brought on these phenomenan happened 
simultaneously. Resistance from domestic enterprises, civil society or middle class 
could also happened in other countries at the same stage of development. Some of 
salient reasons for conflicts that happened in Taiwan could be also seen in other Asian 
countries like South Korea, the Philippines and Japan where there were not any ethnic 
problems at that approximate time. At the empirical level, intermarriage between the 
two ethnic groups and economic success had both contributed to ameliorate 
Taiwanese resentment of mainlanders by 1970 (Roy, 2003). However, the 
spatial-temporal fixes of Taiwan allowed them to be feasibly bracketed together and 
to be strategically manipulated and simplified for political purpose. 
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At a more profound level, I will argue that phenomenon can be more adequately 
investigated as one of the relations between the development of capitalism and 
democratization in the late developing states. The dissatisfactions about the state 
might be a reflective convergence of resistance within society. As such, I keep a 
conservative perspective on many existing texts that bracket the dilemma caused by 
democratization and modernization with ethnic or identity issues (Chu & Lin, 1998a; 
Chu & Lin, 2001; Dent, 2002). The KMT did have a bad reputation on human rights, 
however the excellent and loyal technician bureaucrats also contributed immeasurably 
to Taiwan's development into a workfare state. However, history does not allow us the 
chance to examine what Taiwan would have been like if the KMT had not retreated to 
Taiwan in 1949. 
Figure 4.4 epitomes the development and trajectory of IEMP power resources at the 
civil society level from 1950-1986. It can clearly show that civil society had 
accumulated far greater economic and political power in 1980s than they had in the 
1950s. It implies that state's developmental strategies did contribute to improve the 
economic power resources of the civil society. These improvements on economic 
growth also enable the civil society with more power resources to support the 
opposition movements and bargain with the authoritarian state for more political 
power resources even these power resources were still confined at the local level. It 
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As noted in the literature review, the superiority of Weberian bureaucracy might be 
caused by information asymmetry and can be seen as a management issue. The flaws 
of bureaucracy or human rights issues in an authoritarian state could happen or have 
had happened contingently in any advanced or developing countries at a similar stage 
as Taiwan. However, resistance and reflexivity from civil society or domestic 
capitalism should not be simplified into an oppositional movement to the incumbent 
government. The expectation of emancipation in civil society should be more 
objectively observed from a multi-causal and multi-dimensional perspective. From the 
perspective of an IEMP framework, the origins of these conflicts will be more 
adequately explained by the reflections and reflexivity from domestic enterprises and 
civil society along with their increasing autonomous power resources. 
Section 4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter investigates changes in power resources of IVs from 1950-1986 in IEMP 
frameworks. The evidence justifies saying that the developmental state on Taiwan was 
constructed on the bases of predominant controls on TEMP power resources, and the 
weakness of domestic private sectors and civil society. Moreover, the post war 
anti-communist structure provided an overarching shell to foster exportism in the EA 
developmental states. Therefore, the power resources of state autonomy were mainly 
derived from controls both on material and ideational resources. As Wu identifies it, 
the economic bureaucracy in Taiwan is "a world of bureaucratic politics rather than a 
range of monolithic institutions" (2004: 99). In this sense, the autonomy of 
bureaucracy was mainly endorsed by the dictatorial strongman, not from 
institutionalized power of administrative, judicial and political systems. With this 
characteristic resource of autonomy, the power origins and capacities (institutional, 
administrative, technical and political) of the state or bureaucrats were vulnerable. 
Their capacities could be efficient in a despotic environment while were not 
well-institutionalized and infrastructural ones. 
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Figure- 4.5 Power Constellation of Four IVs in Taiwan in 1986 
Note: 1. Shadowed circles means the `hard core' of state autonomy and capacity. 





Hence, as the power resources in private sectors and civil society accumulated with 
autonomous strength coupled with changes of the conditional variable (diplomatic 
isolation and the end of Bretton Wood System), the ecological power structures had to 
be re-constellated. Figure 4.5 presents how the power resources of IVs changed and 
how the power constellation transformed from 1950-1986. Comparing to Figure 3.1 
(p. 96), at the international level, the power networks constellation remained similar 
to that of post war era. However, the military, political and economic power networks 
began to strengthen with their distinctive resources. At the state level, the 
anti-communist and nationalist ideologies enforced by internal military controls had 
decreased and challenged by the opposition groups. The political and economic power 
also weakened as the local factions requested to share more power with the central 
authority and the domestic SMEs were not as disciplined as usual. At civil society 
level, the economic and political power resources have nurtured by the economic 
growth and limited local elections. The rise of opposition groups also brought a 
concealed developing ideology for emancipation from constraints of the authoritarian 
state, however it still intensively restrained under the martial law. It shows the 
hierarchic constellation between IVs did not change. However, the accumulated 
autonomous power resources of domestic capitalists and civil society began to 
develop their own trajectories and dynamic to resist the authoritarian state. It also 
means that the transformation of Taiwanese developmental state at this stage followed 
an incremental and cumulative trajectory, however not a revolutionary one. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Changing Causal Mechanisms for a Developmental State (I )- 
Resistances to the State (1987-2000) 
Drawing on the proposition that the changing distribution of autonomous power 
resources among the IVs in Figure 2.3 (p. 75) will cause a re-constellated power 
configuration with important implications for the EA developmental states, the 
following two chapters aim to trace changes in the power resources of the IVs and 
investigate the new shaping power configurations from 1987 to 2000. These 
observations will be investigated to establish the causal mechanisms (intervening 
variables) and thus infer the continuity and discontinuity of the developmental state 
model in Taiwan. Comparisons of the two historical sequences will be also utilized to 
provide more evidence for testing the hypothesis and verifying the validity of 
theoretical arrow-diagram. 
This chapter will unfold in three sections to analyze the conditional variable- 
international system and an independent variable-development of domestic capitalism, 
from 1987 to 2000. The other two IVs (civil society and the state) will be analyzed in 
the following chapter. This analysis will enable me to infer the new power 
configuration and construct a more concrete profile of the contemporary Taiwanese 
developmental state. The first two sections of this chapter will in turn investigate 
these two variables, the international system and domestic capitalism, by providing 
comparable evidence comparable with that arrayed in Chapter Four. The final section 
of this chapter will briefly explain the multiplex IEMP powers evident in the 
international system and domestic capitalism and will assess impact on the 
developmental state of Taiwan. 
Section 5.1: The age of `the end of history' as a macro condition variable 
This section is divided into three subsections to explore how the post Cold War 
international system changes in the expanded IEMP model in a brief overlook; to 
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investigate the implications of these changes to the EA developmental state of Taiwan; 
and concludes with remarks on their interactions and intersections. 
5.1.1. The `turbulence'of informational globalization and the collapse of communism 
There were four ostensibly paralleled, but actually intertwined trends in the late 1980s 
that brought the world into a new era. First, was the end of the Bretton Woods System 
and the rise of the `Washington Consensus' and the WTO regime; second, the post 
Cold War structure established after the collapse of the Soviet Union; third, the 
emergence of regionalized political-economic organizations; and the Information Age, 
quickened by the invention of microchip technology. These four trends have 
drastically transformed the TEMP power networks at the international level, and 
further forged a new, overarching context that impacts on the traditional boundaries of 
state systems. This subsection will be divided into five parts to briefly shed light on 
these four trends and their influences. The last part will recapitulate how the new 
forged international IEMP power architecture impacted on the EA developmental 
states as a renewed macro conditional variable. 
5.1.1.1. The emergences of the Washington Consensus and WTO regime 
As indicated, the post-war economic collapse of advanced countries and alliances in 
the anti-communism bloc meant that three interdependent and interpenetrated modes 
of governance existed simultaneously: the mass-production and mass-consumption 
mode of accumulation of Atlantic Fordism; the Keynesian welfare national states of 
advanced countries; and the partisan democracy as an ideal type in the Western 
alliance. Contrasting with the communist bloc led by the former Soviet Union, these 
three modes constructed a post-war international `embedded liberalism regime' 
(Ruggie, 1983). These preconditions at the international level had also provided the 
`greenhouse' for the EA developmental states model to burgeon divergently and 
enabled these states to create their export-oriented mercantilist regimes. 
As the advanced states recovered from post-war recessions the free flowed of capital 
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began to be deregulated from the government-imposed barriers. When the Bretton 
Woods system during the `Golden Age' of post-war expansion ended, it was replaced 
by the new `Washington Consensus' regime (see Jayasuriya, 2000; Jessop, 2000; 
Mastanduno, 2000; Naim, 2000). 157 The renewed modes on accumulation, production 
and free-floated financial capital facilitated by informational technology, have 
gradually developed beyond parameters that the state can comprehensively control 
(Jessop, 1999,2000). Moreover, the Washington Consensus was embodied through 
various `one size fits all' strategies and prescriptions, and enshrined and enforced 
simultaneously by the IMF, World Bank and WTO organizations and various U. S. 
dominated regional trade and investment groupings such as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
The four Asian developmental states were excluded from the generalized system of 
preference (GSP) treatment by developed countries in 1989. Consequently, the `super 
301' clause in the US Trade Act of 1988 forced them to liberalize their domestic 
market and fair trade relations. Their halcyon days were over (Li, 2002). Henceforth, 
MNEs and cross border capital mainly based in advanced economies began to be 
deregulated from the constraints and disciplines of national security concerns and 
began to pursue interests of their own. Under these contextual changes, the scope for 
small-size EA developmental states to control and allocate resources shrunk greatly. 
5.1.1.2 US politico-military unilateralism in Asia Pacific and the rise of China 
The end of the Cold War made a sound claim for the death of communism and 
supported the ideological triumph of democracy and capitalism claimed by the US for 
decades. As the U. S. become free from the bipolar struggle and military rivalry with 
the former Soviet Union, it was transformed into sole superpower in the world and 
began to enjoy a much larger margin of unilateral superiority and hegemony, 
157 The so-called Washington Consensus appealed to `facilitate and improve' fairness and the 
well-being of the whole human-race and the full benefits of integration for the global economy (see 
Jayasuriya, 2000; Jessop, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000; Naim, 2000). 
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politico-militarily and to a lesser degree economically, all the other powers than any 
leading state in the last two centuries (Mastanduno. 2000, «-ohlforth, 1999. '58 The 
goal of preventing other states from challenging the preeminent position of the US 
was embodied by a series of policies of `collective self-defense, engagement and 
enlargement, and multilateral security' equipped and directed by the ideological 
idealism of `three pillars of economy, security and democracy' during the 1990s, or at 
least, during the Clinton Administration (Nye, 1995). 159 
To preserve its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region and to play the unipolar 
role of preserve of the status quo, the optimal interest of the US in this region is to 
avoid any military conflict or economic instability. It attempted to convince or `temp' 
its `offshore balancers' e. g. China, Japan and South Korea to accept its dominance and 
then give the US a prominent role as a Pacific power (Mastanduno, 2000). 160 Hence, 
the US's core strategy around this region is to ensure and consolidate the maintenance 
and management of the "fan spread wide architecture of security alliances" (Baker, 
1991: 11) established in the Cold War; further it attempted to engage and integrate 
Russia and China into the practices and institutions of a U. S. -centered international 
order. 
In this new order, the U. S. began to sensitize the threat that the rise of China could 
challenge to its status quo power and privileges as a unipolar actor in this region since 
158 As Mastanduno indicates that the "US preponderance in military and economic capabilities has been 
complemented by a hegemonic grand strategy after the Cold War" (Mastanduno, 2000: 505). 
159 The priority of US post-Cold War diplomacy and strategy was dedicated to preservation of 
its 
preeminent power position as a center of international order, and to preclude the emergence of any 
future global competitor (New York Times, 1992 cited in Mastanduno, 2000). 
160 The US grand strategies in the Asia Pacific region are to foster and maintain its status quo power 
through various bilateral agreements and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) for 
maintenance of its security commitments and shared economic interests. The "fan spread wide" 
(Baker, 1991: 4) architecture, based in North America and radiating across the Pacific has constituted 
an informal but highly effective security structure. According to Baker, the former secretary of the 
state, the central support of this architecture is the U. S. -Japan alliance and extends 
from north to south 
and includes alliances with South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASEAN) countries, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia (Baker, 1991). The security strategies also extended more 
southeast forward to lie in a special relationship to deal with conflict between India and 
Pakistan and 
instability in Indonesia (Mastanduno, 2000), and are also involved in Taiwan/Tiber/Xinjing issues that 
caused intension between the U. S. and China. 
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the second half of the 1980s (see Qinggruo, 2005 ). 161 Hence, for constraining threats 
from the rise of China. the US's China polic}" developed into one of twofold 
"constrainment" (Gaddis, 1982; Segal, 1995). On the one hand, it broadens the scope 
of full engagement with China in various arenas according to the `three pillars' 
dedication; on the other hand, it attempts to integrate China as a member of 
international organizations in order to contain the behavior of China under the 
regulations and limitations of various international regimes (ibid). Hence, the 
Clinton's Administration attempt to divide the ideology-politico-military and 
economic contacts with China. Their attempts to construct a comprehensive 
relationship with China all evidenced disparate trends in the global economy and 
politico- military-ideology (ibid). 
The rise of China makes it no more an `uncertain or undecided' state in terms of the 
status quo of international relations but gives it the role of revisionist, at least from the 
US's perspective. 162 Furthermore, the US often acts with the perceived arrogance of a 
status quo power which it demonstrates by dictating policies rather than consulting 
and its habit of imposing its values and preaching its virtues in this region have 
created some backlashes and anti-American sentiment and tension especially after the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Sum, 2003). 163 Therefore, the quadrangular relations 
between the US, China, Japan and ASEAN have become pivotal to the security and 
economic stability in the Asian-Pacific region. Hence, the relationship between the 
global economy and politico-military-ideology at the international level seem to 
follow disparate trajectories. The global economy is no more subordinated to 
trajectories of ideological and politic-military power as in Cold War. This suggests 
that the US divergent on economic and politico-military policies were seated more in 
realist calculations than in ideological flexibility. 
161 Even though it had placed itself squarely at the centers of the search for solutions to stabilize the 
security and economic orders that fit in its interests, however the sense of threat from China is 
stronger than ever before. 
162 For preventing the challenges from China, the US attempted to consolidate its predominance 
through various alliances (economy, political or military) or renew the established ones. 
163 These anti-American sentiments also encourage more new emerging regional organizations to gather 
into various forms of blocs according to their geo-economic interests. 
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5.1.1.3 The coupling of globalization and regionalization 
The changing nature of the global economy provides the structural context for 
proximate states to solve the common problems they confront by collection action 
(Bernard, 1996; Higgott, 1999). 164 The emerging regionalization is seen "as an 
integral part of the broader globalization of production structures" (Bernard, 1996: 
653). 165 However, the newly forming regional organizations are generally geo- 
economy directed and engage in dealing with economic activities and cooperation 
compared to the politico-security directed ones established during the Cold War. This 
implies that the considerations of geo-economic interests have gradually overrun 
those stably established geo-political ones in the post Cold War era, at least within the 
largest three trade pillars-North America, European region and the East Asian NIEs 
(see Bernard, 1996). Despite disparities between the historical origins and motivations 
of their members, agreements to forge a `closed or open regionalism' to enhance 
economic interests or national security are common visions (Higgott, 1999). 
As Higgott indicates, the Asian NIEs will benefit from the `opened' type regionalism 
rather than the `closed' one of the European Single Market Programme (Higgott, 
1999). 166 In addition, as the Asian states developed in a product cycle the flying geese 
model, the integration of their hierarchic labour divisions not only complement each 
other but also maximize their world market share (Bernard, 1996). Moreover, the 
states in the East Asia are also competitors for the flows of FDI from the advanced 
countries, and simultaneously are the donors of intra-regional outward FDI (see 
Higgot, 1999; Dicken & Yeung, 1999). Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in particular 
164 Hence, it is the historicity and spaciality that brought the states with diverse social forms and 
divergent political economies into a variegated region where all the members can benefit from 
regional economic integration and cooperation (Bernard, 1996; Higgott, 1999). 
165 The emerging importance of regional organizations e. g. the European Union, EAEC (ASEAN plus 
Japan, South Korea and the PRC), APEC, NAFTA gradually became a salient by-product of 
globalized economy. 
166 Since the production regimes and developmental strategies of Asian countries generally diverged 
from the liberal market mode and followed a similar path-dependent export-directed approach 
compounded with convergences of their policies, institutions and state-society networks (Higgott, 
1999). 
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contributed more than 40 percent of the total outward FDI stocks and became the 
major FDI source in the Southeast Asian region by the mid-1990s (HigQot. 1999. 
Dicken & Yeung, 1999). Even though globalization is a stronger structural force than 
regionalization is the Asian firms are generally more regionalizing compared to the 
globalizing firms in western countries (Diken & Yeung, 1999). 167 Hence, a policy 
commitment to market-led open regionalism and interests is a widely accepted 
ideology among the policy making elites and actors who engaged in the definition of 
regional identities and make proposals for solutions (Bernard, 1996; Higgott, 1999). 
5.1.1.4 The Information Age and IT revolution 
The coming of the Information Age and the related inventions of the microchip and 
information high technology has brought enormous challenges to the traditional roles 
and boundaries of Westernphlia states. The spread of the Internet and the 
world-wide-web makes transmission of large amount of information and knowledge 
to any place or country possible in seconds. The rise of NGOs, international civil 
society and movements, and growing access to communication technology, 
information and knowledge (especial through the Internet) all help to emancipate 
behavior, and even the ideology of human beings (Orits & Evans, 2003). As the 
dominant logic of informationalism has penetrated life styles of our ordinary lives, 
ideological pluralism become an imperative consequence. 
As Castells asserts, the mother of all networks-the global financial network facilitated 
by the informationalism has formed an era of informational capitalism with free flows 
of information and capital which impact drastically on the orthodox roles and 
boundaries of the state (Castells, 1996,1997,1998). 168 Therefore, it could be possible 
167 The internationalization experiences and capacities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the 
Western countries to organize production networks are far beyond the Asian ones. Further, more Asian 
firms are used to operating in a regional scale and are more embedded in the social and institutional 
contexts of the Asian regional economy (Diken & Yeung, 1999). 
168 The dual-use technologies associated with the information revolution and Revolution in Military 
Affairs were also led and dominated by the U. S. for preserving its both military and economic 
pre-eminences in the world (Mastanduno, 2000; Nye& Owens, 1996). However, as an emancipatory 
power of freeing from constrains on human behavior and societies, the development of 
informationalism could be propelling us toward a contingent approach that no one can predict. 
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for IT inform ationalism. to become a new `religious' force that can concurrently 
operate with intangible. diffusive and collective powers to alter the forms of the 
tangible or intangible institutions of the military, politics and economy in every 
society. 
The information age facilitate ideological pluralism and emancipation in the 
developmental states. Communications between domestic agencies and international 
agencies are extensively liberalized by technology. Domestic capitalist and civil 
society are no longer confined within a nationalist enclave. Therefore, it also 
transforms the self-closured modes of developmental states into a more pluralistic 
society. 
5.1.1.5 Recapitulating the post-Cold War international IEMP power networks 
In sum, by recapitulating the macro trends at the international level, it can be seen that 
the collapse of `embedded liberalism' constructed by the combinations of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system and the GATT trade regime preceded the collapse of 
communist bloc since 1989. Further, more Atlantic Fordism and Keynesian capitalism 
also yielded positions to a post- Fordism productions mode. However, the GATT trade 
regime was preserved and further expanded. Particularly, prior to the `formally' rise of 
the Washington Consensus and WTO regime in 1990s followed a chronological 
sequence of discoveries on economic orthodoxy, institutions, globalization and the 
rediscovery of underdevelopment (see Ham, 2000). 169 That implies the accumulation 
model and production mode of capitalism had gone beyond the concern of 
geopolitical strategies (Jessop, 2000). 
The post-war East-West bilateral rivalry provided the origins to facilitate the 
export-led EA developmental states to stay in the capitalist camp. The growth of this 
productive model fell in with excess investment to create excess capacity in a 
169 With the GATT regime, the capitalist countries actively pursued a more liberal trade regime by 
various bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
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divergent mode of capitalism that depends on an enormous market to absorb exports. 
However, since the 1980s the manufacturing output in this region has grown too large 
for the US to possibly absorb and the door of opportunity gradually closed when GSP 
was cancelled (Li, 2002). 170 In the second half of 1980s, politico-military stability in 
the Pacific region provided the US the chance to impose less constrains on U. S. 
economic policy and afforded it more room to request access to domestic markets in 
these East Asian economies. 171 Accordingly, the US post-Cold War security and 
economic strategies diverged (Mastanduno, 1997,2000). 172 
Therefore, deregulations on flow of capital and information cast more challenges on 
the EA developmental states than on Western advanced countries in three ways. 
Firstly, the major strategies and policies of the EA developmental states heavily 
depended on resource control and various means of policies and institutions that 
strictly regulated capital flows and tariffs. However, under WTO regulations, these 
barriers all have to be gradually lifted. The sharp claws of these export-oriented 
`tigers' were being pared. Secondly, following the deregulations of capital, materials 
and technology, the states no longer monopolize these resource but the outward 
private companies that have developed and organized according to market dictums are 
no longer subject to strict discipline by the state. Thirdly, social mobilization and 
nationalist ideology in the EA developmental states were constructed through the 
monopoly and dominance of the mass media that controlled flows of information and 
knowledge. In other words, free trade regimes, deregulations on capital flows and 
information facilitated by IT made the implementation of the developmental strategies 
increasingly problematic. As a condition variable of the EA developmental states 
170 Under pressures from long-standing demands of its home-based firms, the US is no more willing to 
act as the guarantor of the region's economic system and as the last `voluntary' destination of their 
productions. Furthermore, the US budget deficits and trade imbalances with East Asia countries led to 
domestic pressure within the U. S. for a more `fair' trade and `symmetrical' market relationships with 
the Asian countries. 
171 However, the rise of China has provoked the US to place greater weight on traditional security 
concerns and the overall stability of the world economy in the second half of the 1990s. 
172 According to Mastanduno, US security strategies mainly followed the principles of 
balance-of-threat theory by strengthening and expanding security alliances, while economic strategy 
has followed the disciplines of balance-of-power theory to ensure the fairness, benefits and 
competitiveness of American enterprises (see Mastanduno, 1997,2000) in the global market. 
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model, changes at international level have clashed with their external (international) 
prerequisites. 
At a more profound level, the IEMP power networks at the international level have 
drastically transformed under the new global trends. The ideological and capitalist 
powers are no more subordinated to the political and military forces as during the 
Cold War period. Furthermore, with emancipation from constraints structured by 
international political and military rivalries led by the states system, capitalist 
development and pluralistic ideologies have gained gown. 173 From a power resources 
distribution perspective we can see that economic and ideological forces are no longer 
closely controlled in an inter-state system. Instead we can see an emerging global 
economy marked by partially autonomous power resources that follow their own 
distinctive dynamics in more contingent trajectories than in Cold War. 
5.1.2. Locating Taiwan in the Post-Cold War International Order 
The new Post-Cold War international contexts impact on the original prerequisites of 
the state-centered EA developmental states. The remaining of this subsection aims to 
explore how changes at the international level impact on the Taiwanese 
developmental state and how Taiwan reflects these changes. 
5.1.2.1. Challenges from liberalization on trade and finance sectors 
Benefiting from embedded liberalism and state protectionism, Taiwan has prospered 
becoming the world's seventeenth largest economy in 2000 (Dent, 2002). The growth 
in the economy the advanced an industrial structure that produces high-technology 
and high-valued products and is integrated extensively with the global 
knowledge-driven production networks (see Henderson et al, 2002). 
174 In the newly 
173 Hence, even though the concurrent prevailing idealism and values concerning the global liberalized 
economy, democracy and informationalism were mainly propagated and dominated by the Western 
countries, especially the US, however trends developed far beyond the predictions and controls of 
these countries. 
"' There are far greater complexities and geographical variations in the contemporary global 
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forming production system, "the flows of materials, semi-finished products, design 
production, financial and marketing services are organized vertically. horizontally and 
diagonally in complex and dynamic configurations" (Henderson et al, 2002: 444 ). 
Table 5.1 presents a brief summary on Taiwan's national production frontiers and the 
global trade and financial regimes from 1970-2000. 
Table 5.1 clearly shows that the goods, mostly produced by the SMEs, are closely 
integrated with the evolution of informationalism and the global knowledge-driven 
economy. Except for TFT-LCD monitor and IT micro-chip (include submicron chips) 
technology which were initiated and funded by state laboratories and then transferred 
to private hands for mass production, none of the other items were researched, 
pioneered, directed by the government (Hsueh, et al., 2001; Li, 2001). 175 This 
achievement demonstrates that Taiwan was able to adapt, in some areas thrive, in a 
more liberalized global trade regime. 
From the trade policy perspective, both of global market and domestic production 
networks are essentially dynamic but not static. The government of Taiwan did well to 
utilize international pressure as a means to liberalize its industrialized sectors with 
confidence in a gradual way in early the 1980s. Under the pressure from the US, the 
KMT promised to liberalize Taiwan's domestic market (include the service sectors) 
through various means of tariff deductions, cancel import barriers. Exposures in the 
competitive international market without specific subsidies and protections have 
effectively enhanced the robustness of the export sectors since the 1980s (Hsu & 
Perkins, 2001; Li, 2001). 
production networks than vertical or linear ones in the Fordist assemblies. 
175 There are some empirical studies focus that on the IT and semi-conductor industries of Taiwan as 
followed: Ki, K-T., 1995; Rosecrance R., 1999; Hong, S., 1997; Poon T., 2002; Chen T., & Lee J. (ed. ). 
2004; Braudo, R. & MacIntosh J., 1999; Addison C., 2000; Pietrobelli C.. & Guerrieri P., 2001; Tsai 
K., & Wang J., 2002, Mathew J., & Cho D., 2000. 
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Table-5.1 National production frontiers, finance and global regimes or regulation 
Period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
International Embedded Embedded Washington WTO/ The rise Regime/ Mode liberalism-Post liberalism-Post Consensus/ of China 
of capitalism Bretton Woods / Bretton Woods / GATT/Post Cold 
Fordist capitalism Fordist capitalism War/ 
/Cold War /Cold War Regionalization/ 
Informalism 
Mode of Scarce domestic Scarce domestic Limited Liberalization 
financial capital regulated capital regulated liberalization on of both 
resources and controlled by the and controlled by the international international 
(Taiwan) state state/ Began capital financial resources/ and domestic 
outward investment/ FDI in specific capital flows 
liberalize the stock productions/ except to 
market for domestic limited China 
capital deregulation of 
domestic bank 
system 
Major Policies Tariff protectionism Tariff protectionism 1. R&D supports 1. R&D 
Exported-oriented Export-oriented supports 
Key resources Key resources 2. Liberalized most 2. Liberalized 
controlled by state controlled by state domestic market to most domestic 
enterprises enterprises global market, market to 
except China. global market, 
except China. 
Items of 1. Shoeware 1. Shoeware 1. Cap Screws 1. CapScrews 
Largest 2. Lampdecoration 2. cap screws 2. Bicycles 2. Bicycles 
production in 3. Fans 3. Bicycles 3. Personal PCs 3. Micro- 
the global 4. Ship dismantling 4. Sewingmachines 4. Scanners Chips 
market 5. Umbrellas 5. PC Monitors 4. Silicon 
6. Caps 6. CPUs Wafers 
7. Tennis equipment 7. Mouse & Key 5. Appliances 
boards for wireless 
8. Electrical network 





Locations of Taiwan (diffusive Factories clustered in Designed in Semi-finished 
productions factories allied with definite areas in Taiwan/ Made in or finished in 
made family factories. Taiwan China or China/ 
South-east Asia designed and 
finished in 
Taiwan 
Source: Trade Statistic, various issues. Static bureau of roreign iraae, 1V1lJriH kl I1G GRjJVI Lullt 11G111b). 
Interestingly, in different surveys conducted by two international organizations, the 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Lausanne and The 
World Economic Forum (WEF), that evaluated national competitiveness and indicated 
the competitiveness of Taiwanese private sector and non-government categories 
in the 
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1990s was lauded. However. government-related categories such as state capacit}y. 
institutions and infrastructure were not rated particularly «well or were even worse 
compared to advanced states or other East Asian states. 176 However, Taiwan prospered 
as a result of high economic growth (approx 6-7% annually) through the whole 1990s. 
The overall competitiveness of Taiwan in the global market was ranked as 4th (see 
WEF, 1999) and 18th (see IMD, 1999) (Hsiao &Hsiao, 2002). For the Taiwanese 
developmental state, there are three profound implications in the WEF and IMD 
reports. First, as a whole, Taiwan has benefited from the increasing liberal global 
economy. The forces of the global production regime did not cause too much trouble 
to Taiwan's advanced and competitive private sectors. The competitiveness of the 
export sector allowed it to still survive robustly without any tariff protections in the 
global market. Second, the performance of the state bureaucracy and institutions did 
not yield much positive contribution to the private sector and their global 
competitiveness. Third, the presumption about the superiority of bureaucracy as the 
major dynamic resource of the EA developmental states model seems has become less 
valid since the 1990s (Riain, 2000). 
From the financial regulations perspective, the strategies Taiwan chose seem to have 
been more conservative than the trade strategy. The government still held a tightly 
grip and intervened in the financial sectors until the early 1990s. Many revisionists of 
statism credit the state's strict monitoring and regulating of financial and monetary 
sectors as being what steered Taiwan to paddle safely through the Asian crisis in 
1997 (Chu, 1999; Schive, 1999; Weiss, 2000). They also argued the importance of 
financial control and dominance for Taiwan to transform itself into an `interdependent 
governance' model (Thurbon, 2001; Thurbon & Weiss, 2006; Weiss, 2000). However, 
I uphold it was the political concern for consolidating the interests and power of the 
ruling KMT that led to the divergent policies for the trade and financial sectors. 
176 Available on http: '/\v, Nv-Nv,. erforum. org. /en'index. hmi; and 
http: // NN, \N, \ý,. iind ch-research, publicatioiiý. N, ý-vc'competiti% eness scoreboard. 
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In the late 1990s, the high ratio of non-performing loans caused by low transparency 
in the local financial institutions undermined the state's capacities to maintain even 
ordinary operations (Kong, 2004; Underhill & Zhang, 2005). 177 This demonstrates 
that the domestic financial mechanisms in Taiwan were not well institutionalized in its 
state-centric legacy. 178 Moreover, controls over capital resources were aimed to 
prolong the state's (party-led) domestic dominance. As such, the financial 
conservatism of the 1990s should be observed as a form of political calculation. The 
real reasons why Taiwan could tide over the financial crisis in 1997 were more to do 
with its abundant foreign exchange reserves, its large current account surplus and the 
robust competitiveness of export-directed SMEs than to do with any legacy of state 
management of its financial system (Hsueh et al, 2001; Underhill & Zhang, 2005). 
Without these backup resources in the private sectors, it would have been 
impossible for the state to effectively paddle through this crisis only by means of 
policy regulations (re-regulations). 
Hence, the liberalization of the trade and financial sectors to the EA developmental 
states are trade-off options. In the case of Taiwan, I argue that insufficient 
infrastructure, immature institutional arrangement and a shortage of informational 
transparency in the financial sectors all allowed the state to continue its `heavy hand' 
in the financial sector. Furthermore the intention to prolong control over the domestic 
financial market as means for elections and private interests postponed the KMT 
government's liberalization of its financial sector. However, Taiwan's entry to the 
WTO at the end of 2000 demanded more deregulation and liberalization of capital and 
trade barriers. In both trade and financial realms, the performance of the private sector 
demonstrates its higher efficiency in term of globalization than the state. 
177 Moreover, the privately owned credits cooperative and various farmers and fishermen's associations 
at the local level were periodically used to finance local elections and businesses of personal 
kinship or 
organized crime ties for their power expansion after the second half of the 1980s. 
178 Hence, it will be risky to the openness of financial market that may cause their 
bankruptcies which 
might cause social instability. 
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5.1.2.2. An attempt to invigorate 'economic nationalism' in cross-strait rivalry 
After China announced its `open door' policy in 1979, geo-politics and 
geo-economics in the Pacific Region ostensibly began to follow disparate trajectories 
than under US leadership. From a geo-economic perspective, the emergence of 
`Triangle Economies' (Greater China Circle Economies) composed of China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan have turned this into one of the most economically flourishing 
regions on the globe. As we shall see the forces and interests of these economic 
integrations are far beyond what any of the governments involved can control alone, 
especially the government of Taiwan, which is excluded from most international and 
regional organizations (Cheng, 2005; Leng, 2002; Lin & Lin, 2001). 179 Efficiency and 
strategies employing cooperation and competition between enterprises in the global 
market are the forte of the private sector. However, the special relationship between 
Taiwan and China make their economic integration a particularly salient case to 
evidence the disparate dynamics between socio-economic and political forces. 
In the first half of the 1980s, as with the other EANICs, Taiwan had been a 
capital-outward state as the SMEs began to establish their overseas offshore plants in 
other Asian states as wages and costs rose in Taiwan. However, investments in 
mainland China were inhibited until 1991 (Cheng, 2005; Leng, 2002; Thurbon & 
Weiss, 2006). Even when the outward FDI constraints were consequently lifted in 
1991, to ensure both economic and political security and prevent the `hollowing out 
effect', 180 the government of Taiwan strictly regulated private FDI to China (Cheng, 
2005; Leng, 2002; Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). 181 As such, an increasing number of 
179 The Triangle Economies are different in their stages of economic development, governance modes 
and political systems. The main forces of their economic integrations are based on reciprocal, 
complementary resources and production modes unlike the European Monetary Union 
formed 
originally by members with geographical proximity, similar stages of economic 
development and 
substantial volume of inter-regional trade. Moreover, they all purported to enlarge market size. 
enhance economic efficiency and economies of scale by means of policy coordination and political 
commitment (Lin & Lin, 2002). 
180 In this thesis, the term 'hollowing out effect' does not set out from any academic definition. It 
is an 
official term used in many official documents and speeches of 
President Lee. It is cited as a practical 
description by the government of Taiwan. 
181 Taiwan government set a ceiling of US$ 50million FDI per project and put sanctions on 
indirect 
investment in China. However, Taiwanese investments have not been affected by the present ceiling 
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SMEs and big enterprises registered their firms in tax-free zones such as Hong Kona. 
the US. Virgins Island. Cayman Islands and British tax-free zones as a third party to 
facilitate indirectly investing and conducting business in mainland China (see 
Appendix 7-2, p346 and Cheng, 2005; Leng, 2004). 
Entry into the WTO made the capital flow of any particular enterprise or individual 
more difficult to macro-manage and control. The attempt to limit high-tech and 
infrastructure investments in mainland China seemed in vain. Taiwan's trade surplus 
with mainland China as a ratio of its global trade surplus increased significantly, from 
3% in 1982,5% in 1987,100% in 1992 to 226% in 2000(Cheng, 2005; Chu, 1999; 
Leng, 2002; Tung, 2002). By 1993, China had replaced the US as being Taiwan's 
biggest export destination (see Appendix 4-1 & 4-2, pp. 338-9). This also meant that 
without the huge trade surplus with Mainland China, Taiwan's international trade 
balance would have been in deficit. ' 82 Obviously, the economic interdependence and 
integration of Taiwan and mainland China was too large to be neglected or 
constrained by both governments, even taking into account the politico-military 
hostility. In the particular case of Taiwan, even counter to the policies of the state, 
many private sectors expanded their offshore plants in China and made still greater 
profits. 183 State intervention was no more an effective means to constrain enterprises. 
From the perspective of geo-politics, the US interests in Asia Pacific are best served if 
the status quo is not disturbed. 184 The US `three pillars policy' in the Clinton 
and various sanctions at all. 
182 A significant amount of this bilateral trade (through Hong Kong) was contributed by the `inter-and 
intra-industry firm' trade that resulted from Taiwanese FDI in Mainland China rather than true 
commodity trade. Taiwanese exports of equipment, semi-finished materials, skills, technology and 
management personnel support their own enterprises or partners on mainland China, hence, they also 
contribute a large part of China's trade surplus with the US, Japan and European countries. 
183 According to a survey conducted by Zhongguo Shibao on 3 Dec. 2000 that 57.5% of Taiwanese 
firms on mainland China are profitable, and only 8.6% of those anticipate a loss in 2001. Only 4.2% 
of Taiwanese enterprises considered decreasing or withdrawing investments from mainland China. 
184 China, as one of the permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power that has long 
rejected the use of force in international affairs and as it has vast potential markets for US businesses, 
the most vital strategic interests for the US are to ensure China's cooperation with top US priorities 
and to keep of its market open. 
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Administration failed to link trade with human right issues. g' For the Clinton 
Administration the best way to promote American values in China was to regard it as 
"a constructive strategic partnership" and "increase contacts, promote trade, enhance 
international cooperation and seek extensive and frequently dialogues on question of 
human rights" (Qingguo, 2005: 399). Even though Taiwan's politically independent 
status quo and economic capacities also serve US interests, however, risking a 
military confrontation with China over the Taiwan problem is no small concern to the 
US. Hence, the status quo policy of strategic ambiguity regarding both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits seemed to serve this purpose well in the mid-1990s (Qingguo, 
2005). 186 
As Taiwan's democratization in 1990s gave rise to the increasing assertiveness of 
Taiwan's independence movement in the Lee Teng-hui Administration (1986-2000), 
Taiwan was no longer satisfied merely to play the role of a US proxy against China. ' 87 
Therefore, the international support (mainly from the US) that ensured toleration of 
the authoritarian regime and economic mode of developmentalism for regional 
stability during the Cold War was `revived' by the Taiwan authorities in the 1990s. 
This is due to concerns that political and economic security should be prior to the 
interests of the private sector. Despite WTO regulations, these security concerns were 
further concretized into special unilateral policies for restricting cross-Straits 
economic transition, and were utilized as a policy tool to cool down domestic pressure 
for further openness on cross-straits economic transactions (Leng, 2002). 
Thus, anti-communist nationalism was reinvigorated into a new movement led by the 
185 The communist collapse in the Soviet Union and East European countries had produced great 
confidence among Americans that they would able to change the rest of world into democratic places 
with liberalized market. 
186 The security provisions that US Congress placed in the TRA (1979) promised to provide sufficient 
amount of defensive weapons to Taiwan (see Adelman, 1997), however, the US never commit itself to 
protect Taiwan no matter what Taiwan does. 
187 During the 1995-1996 missile crisis, the US aircraft carrier groups were dispatched to the Taiwan 
Strait. This event was manipulated by the leader of Taiwan, President Lee, to strengthen and 
consolidate Taiwanese confidence that US troops will come to help even if they claim the 
independence of Taiwan. 
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political authorities by appealing to `secure the national economy' (Dent. 2002). What 
deserves to be highlighted is that it could have been a concealed strate v for the 
authorities in Taiwan to use `the rivalry between Taiwan and China' and `national 
identity' issues as political tools for domestic consumption and as strategies to 
prolong state controls on materials and resources that should have been earlier 
liberalized (Leng, 2002; Roy, 2003). As Leng indicates "the Taiwanese government 
reiterates that `national security' is the priority before economic benefits across the 
Taiwan Straits. However, the contents of `national security' and `economic security' 
issues have never been made clear" (Leng, 2002: 264). 188 
5.1.3. Conclusion-remarks on the struggle of a developmental state in globalization 
In sum, the case of Taiwan evidences that capital and knowledge flows across 
boundaries are no longer easily constrained. The divergent aims of the state and 
private sector as a result of globalization have seriously shrunk the scope that state 
can effectively control. The complex vertical and horizontal integrations between the 
Triangle Economies are the typical mode of what is called "alliance capitalism" (see 
Dunning, 1997a, 1997b). Enterprises with self-sufficient capital and technology are 
no more necessarily subordinated to the piloting and coordination of the state, and the 
links between the state and private sector have been weakened. For market-profit- 
oriented enterprises, the capacity to integrate global resources for an enterprise is 
extremely important for its survival in the global market. Their intentions and 
capacities are far beyond what the state can control, predict or dominate. International 
integrations initiated by the private sector are not a unique problem to any particular 
state. The hollowing out effect of globalization leads to social anxiety that has 
appeared in many advanced states, not only in Taiwan. 
Figure 5.1 shows the IEMP trajectories at the international level from 1987-2000. The 
post-War anti-communist structure provided the historical specifities for the EA 
188 As such, the security issues could be the last instrumental tools for state elites to legalize their 
private interests or ideology. The points of my argument is not to cast doubt on the importance of 
national security and the legitimate power of the state leader in a national crisis; but on how `the 
scope of economy security and national interests' to be identified in globalization and democracy. 
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developmental state model to burgeon in Taiwan. The coming of globalization and 
political-military threats from China yield a similar international context for the 
government of Taiwan to invigorate economic nationalism by constructing a ne«w 
national identity. That is, when there are divergent trends in politico-military and 
ideology-economy communications at the international level, what the government of 
Taiwan attempts to do is to bracket their TEMP power together as they did in past 
decades. 
------ 
1987 1990 --------- 2000- 2001 -f 
Figure-5.1 Trajectory and power resources at the international level in IEMP model, 
1987-2000 
Section 5.2: The developments of capitalist duality in globalization and 
democracy 
According to the neo-statist models (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1998; 2002), the private 
sector was presumed to be subordinated to (or disciplined by) and piloted by of the 
state. They presume both parties will share in unified action to pursue maximal 
national interests. Therefore, the domestic capitalism modes in these countries are 
assumed to develop divergently from the liberal-market ones. However, many 
scholars have recently emphasized the periodization of capitalism or divergence on 
capitalism and share the common perspective that the various processes and 
institutional arrangements could lead to a predestined convergent destination-market 
capitalism (see Coates, 2000; Hollingsworth & Boyers, 1997; Jessop, 2000; Kitschelt 
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et al. 1999). 189 As such, the Asian developmental states provide good cases to evaluate 
whether their divergent governance modes from liberal capitalism in western 
countries can continue to survive when external and internal contexts have been 
drastically changed. 
5.2.1 seeks to examine the development of domestic capitalism in Taiwan from 1987 
to 2000 in light of the same criteria reviewed in Chapter Four in order to provide 
comparable evidence for inferring developments in domestic capitalism. After 
reviewing each of. the criteria in 5.2.2,5.2.3 will indicate reactions in the private 
sector to the state related policy. This part of discussion will partly overlap with 
investigations of the state in the next chapter. However, it will focus on resistance of 
private sector to state policy. 
5.2.1 The development of dual capitalism in globalization and democracy 
Section 4.2 has indicated that the duality of domestic capitalism by 1990 was mainly 
in line with the division between public owned enterprises and SMEs in the private 
sector. This demarcation shifted between export-oriented and domestic-market- 
oriented sectors in the 1990s. Therefore, dualistic capitalism continued as the 
structural characteristic of Taiwan's economy by 2000s. Furthermore, it diverged on 
the degrees openness of trade and financial sectors to the international market. Trade 
liberalization happened in the early 1980s. However, financial liberalization was 
postponed until the late 1990s. 
By 2000, the major economic strategies of government were still conducted by two 
major instruments. First, the state was active in assisting and promoting new 
industries for the export market by providing technology diffusion (R &D resources), 
tax incentives and human resources. Second, FDI was directed to be invested in 
189 According to them, as one of the social control organizations (in Mann's term), capitalism seems to 
develop with distinctive dynamics and trajectories from those of the state and civil society. Hence, the 
global economy becomes an imperative convergence for the state system to operate. 
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strategic industries for promoting their competitiveness in the global market. The 
legacy of the state remained the technical capacity to pick the 'winner' industries by 
1990(Hsueh, et al, 2001; Kwong, et al, 2001, Mai & Shih, 2001). Hence, the real 
beneficiaries of various instruments of protectionism were not in every industry but 
limited to within the state-public enterprises and targeted industries. The exclusive 
effects of a pick the winner strategy on the weak working classes and uncompetitive 
sectors were imperative. 
To compensate for the deficits of economic policy on resource exclusions, the 
government assumed a conservative approach to finance control as a way of 
prolonging domestic power and mitigating the international pressure. 190 Control on 
finance resources and access to them is also the lowest-cost policy instrument for the 
state to stabilize domestic economic and social order. Further consolidation of the 
power of a political regime can be hard by courting the interest groups and political 
factions with financial resources or rents in exchange for their loyalties. Moreover, the 
overarching fiscal and financial conservatism constrained investments in Taiwan 
which prevented overheating and the formation of a bubble of economy (Li, 2002; 
Thurbon, 2001, Weiss, 2000; Yang, 2001). 191 
Safely passing through the Asian financial crisis in 1997 demonstrated that Taiwan 
had had more than sufficient capabilities to liberalize its financial sector in the late 
1980s. However, even when real economy and manufacturing industries suffered a 
great pressure of appreciation because of high foreign exchange accumulated through 
190 There were two merits for the KMT government to do this. The first was to consolidate its power 
resources by maintaining its dominance on some economic rents distribution and sharing these rents 
with its clients and patrons; the second was by appeal to ensure national economy security it would 
both mitigate the speedy pace of capital flow directed to Mainland China and encourage a timing gap 
for domestic enterprises to upgrade. 
191 Unlike the capital-short South East Asian countries which were forced to expose themselves in the 
global free-floating financial market, Taiwan was free from foreign debt and budget deficit had 
high 
domestic savings and a foreign reserve surplus, and so Taiwanese enterprises kept growing during the 
crisis (see Table 5.2). I have argued, the KMT intended to preserve the lack of sufficient transparency 
in the financial sector, especially at the local level, not only for reasons of domestic financial stability, 
but for consolidating its power by means of monopoly on financial resources and accesses. There was 
a common feature that economic processes to industrialization in the EA developmental states 
followed a quite similar trajectories-the development of the real economy preceded the development 
of the financial sector since they all lacked sufficient capital to develop decades ago (Li, 
2002). 
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exporting, the government of Taiwan still tightly controlled its domestic capital flow 
during the 1990s. Particularly, when large amounts of capital fletiv to mainland China 
via various routes in the late 1990s, the state still attempted re-regulating the financial 
market (Cheng, 2005, Weiss, 2000). Control over financial resources allowed the 
KMT more advantage in elections in the 1990s. However, these circumstances 
encourage corruption with the ranks of the KMT. As such, what was once an essential 
pillar to facilitate the economic growth of Taiwan and contribute to its 
developmentalism may now have become a source of its weakness (Cheng& Chu, 
2002; Chin, 2003; Kong, 2004). 
Generally speaking, following the free market disciplines the export-oriented sector, 
whether big enterprises or SMEs, were exposed to the competitive international 
market and intensively integrated into global commodity chains. Some big enterprises 
particularly had been sheltered by state protection for decades turned into supporters 
of liberalism and free markets since they were upstream raw materials producers or in 
alliances with the downstream SMEs (e. g. petrol-chemical producers., international 
shipping transportation and steel-fining producers)(Hsueh et al, 2001). These 
upstream industries included most of the labour-intensive, consumer goods 
manufacturing industries and high-tech electronic producers. In alliances with 
downstream SMEs, their survivals began to intensively rely on the global market. 
Moreover, even domestic market is competitive, too. 
The owners of these export-related industries (upstream and downstream) are 
advocates of liberalism because their operationalizations and profits deeply depend on 
their comparative advantages in the global commodity chains. The export-oriented 
SMEs sector benefited most from infrastructures provided by the government 
(tangible or intangible) and tax rebate, however they got few privileges and incentives, 
especially in terms of the financial resources from the government (see Hsueh et al., 
2001; Mai & Shih, 2001; Park, 2001). The driving forces behind the export sector are 
the motivation to maximize their profits in the long run, whereas the state reflected 
more `national interest and security' concerns. 
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The self-funded SMEs and advanced technology sector in Taiwan are less cohesive 
and more diversified than in Japan and South Korea. Especially, the nominally leading 
organization-the National Association of Small & Medium Enterprises (NASME) 
contained only 14 associations and less than 2000 member companies, while the total 
of registered companies was over 700,000 in the 1990s, excluding those that did not 
have licenses to operate (Cheng & Chu, 2002; Hamilton, 1997). As Cheng & Chu 
identify numerous SMEs enterprises remained `at large' beyond the reach of state 
control (Cheng &Chu, 2002). The neo-statists' claims that the well-organized and 
well-functioning state-business relationship was mediated through the business 
associations only refers to limited targeted sectors which had political cooperation 
(Thurbon & Weiss, 2006; Weiss, 2000). Moreover, similar Taiwanese producers of 
anything from textiles to electronics often get involved in the cut-throat price wars in 
the global market (e. g. with micro-chips, DVDs & TFT-LCD monitors). Hence, there 
was not much room for the state to coordinate or steer the export sector. 
As such, it would be far-fetched to say that the economic success of Taiwan was built 
on state-business relationships or phrase it as a kind of stylized economic corporatism. 
The relations between the state and the IT electronics industry (or other strategic 
industries) have been over-generalized as a stylish mode of Taiwan's economic 
structure in many studies and used to evidence successful state intervention in 
economic activities. 192 However, the ideal partnerships model between the state and 
these sectors as described by the neo-statists actually were not actually as they 
claimed (Evans, 1995; Thurbon & Weiss, 2006; Weiss, 2000). It's an illusive 
misunderstood image of Taiwan's economic structure. 
By 2000, the government shared the contributions and efforts to provide, transfer and 
initiate R&D works, raise capital by joint venture, train personnel for the advanced 
technology sector. These achievements were real and have been lauded. 
1 93 However, 
19' Fven in the most advanced technology sector initiated by the government industrial policy during 
the 1980s, the role of the government has been restricted to providing R&D studies diffusion and 
training personnel. 
193 These projects launched in the 1980s were initiated by some excellent technological bureaucrats 
authorized by the ex-President. 
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the successful infrastructural projects that include establishment of Hsin-chu 
Science-Based Industrial Park and related R&D institutions were modeled after the 
Stanford Industrial Park (Silicon Valley), and so were obviously not a unique strategy 
utilized by Taiwanese state or other Asian developmental states. Moreover, the state 
can not take too much credit for the ongoing successive success of the IT electronics 
industries since the 1990s as these industries are operated in the hands of private 
sector. Furthermore, the government got involved in less-successful or failed cases 
such as the automotive industry, aircraft industry, shipbuilding and other heavy 
industries that are all evidence that the strategies chose by the `competent bureaucrats' 
were a series of `trial and error' strategies based on economic nationalism. No one 
could ensure their definite success and no governmental bureaucrats have taken 
responsibility for the failure (Li, 2002). 
By contrast, the domestic market-oriented enterprises sheltered by various means of 
state protection have moved into more rent-seeking behavior as their self-closured 
orientation in domestic market. Generally, they are less competitive than 
export-oriented enterprises and political-patron relations mean more to their survivals. 
They have become closely connected with the political monopolies of public 
enterprises, local political factions, patron interest groups and electoral polls since the 
second half of the 1980s (Cheng & Chu, 2002; Kong, 2004). These sectors 
particularly included the monetary, service and infrastructural constructions sectors 
and some governmental monopolized sectors such as steel-refining, petroleum- 
refining, raw materials, transportation, telecommunication, construction and 
agricultural goods (McBeath, 1997). 194 Insufficient transparency was the common 
feature of these sectors. As the government owning greatest share of public sector in 
the capitalist world, the KMT was unwilling to allow these sectors and enterprises to 
be privatized until 1993 (McBeath, 1997). 195 In the 1990s, with the arrival of 
194 Some of these were operated under the agreements of the WTO, some of them the state struggled to 
resist and were intended to prolong the state's `heavy hand' in them for ensuring state dominance and 
providing rents for its political clients. 
195 The government chose an incremental strategy to revise a draft and a time table for privatization and 
it was not until 1993 that this revised law was enacted. 
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democracy coupled with various reorganizations of electoral polls and power, 
interests groups and local factions began to share more power to bargain with the 
KMT central authority in pork-barrel politics (Cheng, 2001; Chin, 2003; Chow, 2002; 
Kong, 2004). 196 Therefore, the gap between state intention and capacity was enlarged. 
Many industry policies and regulations posted in the 1990s had been no more capable 
of achieving goals set than their original prescriptions. 
In a nutshell, in the international free trade system, as a small player with limited 
natural resources, the government of Taiwan had lost the power of resource allocation 
and mobilization to discipline the expansion and internationalization of private sectors 
that have with sufficient autonomy. Furthermore, democracy's arrival in the late 1980s 
caused the diffusion of political and economic power resources that were dominated 
by the KMT authoritarian before. To consolidate political power, the KMT (Lee's 
Administration, 1987-2000) chose a strategy of sharing political and economic 
resources with the local factions, interests group, and even gangsters in exchange for 
their loyalties in ensuring its continuing dominance over Taiwan. Hence, the 
economic structure of Taiwan kept the duality of its capitalist development. ' 97 
The divergent policies between the trade and financial sectors, by and large, were in 
line with the divergence between export-oriented sectors and domestic 
market-oriented ones by the late 1990s. As such, the dualities of the mid-1980s and in 
the 1990s were characteristically different. The former was deliberately designed by 
insulated technician-bureaucrats for economic nationalism in an authoritarian regime; 
196 The inevitable diffusion of political power resources and `pork-barrel' budget-making politics, 
which occurs in many democracies, led the shift in power away from the single-party authority of the 
KMT as the provider of political finance and rents for their domestic alliances. The intensified 
political competition was also consistent with the explanation of KMT corruption and the drastic 
increase of the amount of non-performing loans of the public-owned banks and various local financial 
associations (see Cheng, 2001; Chin, 2003; Chow, 2002; Kong, 2004). More details in Chapter Six. 
197 On the one hand, the export-oriented sector had extensively integrated with other countries to 
expand their market share in the early 1980s and increased dramatically through whole 1990s; on the 
other hand, protectionism, particularly toward the financial sector, still prevailed through the 1990s. 
Some protectionist measures were set to stabilize social order, provide externalities of market failures 
(education, personnel training, and infrastructure), some for shelling weak and uncompetitive classes 
or public enterprises, and some for keeping domestic rents. Many protectionist means were introduced 
for on the political considerations not for economic efficiency. Hence, duality capitalism "-as 
preserved in Taiwan's economy through the 1990s. 
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the latter was put forward by political leaders to preserve their dominance on 
economic resources to consolidate their political power and interests in a democratic 
regime. 
5.2.2 The dynamic and trajectories of the private sector 
The purpose of this subsection aims to demonstrate that the internationalization or 
regionalization strategies of the private sector in Taiwan were conducted under the 
principles of international labour division and the dynamic of comparative advantage, 
not withstanding the cross-Straits political hostility. The major point here is to argue 
that in a liberal global market, if the state's unilateral policy counters the trajectory 
and logic of capitalism, it will result in an enlarged gap between state intention and 
capacity. Furthermore, it suggests even under a politically hostile status as in 
cross-Straits relations, the developmental strategies and control means used 
previously could not be as effective in resolving the domestic economic problems. 
What the state needs is a new mode of governance and renewed thinking on, and 
definitions of national economic security. 
The first part of this subsection will attempt to explain that the overseas reallocations 
of investments and capital made by the private sectors are spontaneous reflections of 
their international comparative advantages and are a result of a normalized adjustment, 
upgrade and transformation of the economic structure in Taiwan. In the second part, I 
will further identity the hollowing out effect that has been labeled by the KMT 
government a crisis for Taiwan. I argue that if the government has lost most of the 
available power resources and means to control the private sector and civil society, the 
last strategy for the political authority might deploy security related issues to dwell 
attention from its incompetence of resolving problems. In a democracy, the ultimate 
autonomy and capacity of the state to overcome its resistance can still be centered in 
military (security) power that originates in the ideology and interests of political 
authority. In these scenarios, politicalized or militarized economics might be a useful 
strategy to maximize benefits of state elites. Hence, it will be an ethical issue to 
identify who has the power to define the scope of national (economic) security? ' and 
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`who's interest is interest? ' in a democracy. 198 In the last part of this subsection I will 
explore the capital resources of the private sector in Taiwan since 1987 and justify 
why capital accumulation is difficult for the state to control or direct during 
globalization in a brief conclusion. . 
5.2.2.1 The internationalization (regionalization) of Taiwan exporting sectors in 1990s 
Trade protectionism that gathered momentum in the 1970s-80s forced industries in 
Taiwan to diversify their products and markets. Under international and domestic 
pressures the Taiwan government began to deregulate its limitation of outward-flow 
capital and investment in 1989 (Dwyer, et al, 2002; Hsueh, et al, 2001). 199 There were 
three favorable strategies and patterns for Taiwanese enterprises processing their 
internationalization. The first pattern was to shift the manufacturing plants or 
subsidiaries to ASEAN and China in forms of intra-industry hierarchies. The second 
pattern was to comprehensively close down the original production assembly lines 
and found a new enterprise in the host country. The last pattern- was to establish the 
strategic alliances and cooperative relations with MNEs in the US, Japan and Europe 
in forms of OEM (original equipment manufacture), ODM (own-design and 
manufacture) or OBM (own-brand manufacture), preserve the upstream assembly 
lines or departments in Taiwan and operate downstream production lines in mainland 
China (Hobay, 1995; Veselka, 2005). 
The first stage of outward FDI happened in the mid-1980s. As result of the New 
Taiwan Dollar (NT$) appreciation, the gradually rising costs of wage, materials and 
lands coupled with numerous environmental and labour disputes forced that 
manufacturing industries that had begun to move to ASEAN countries, and a few to 
198 As reiterated, I do not aim to cast doubts on the legitimacy or morality of national security and 
militarism of a Westphalia state. Ho\\-ever, I contend it could become the last instrumental measure for 
the state elites that can be used to manipulate civil society or to distract preferences of a society when 
the government considers itself is unsafe, threatened or purports to expand 'its interests. 
199 Through the 1980s export success, high foreign reserves, high national saving ratio and decline in 
the domestic demand market all facilitated the inevitable loose money supply in the domestic 
financial market since domestic saving were far greater than domestic investment. 
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China to find more pro-productive environments to enhance their international 
comparative advantages., `'`) The operational patterns of this investment stage mainly 
integrated the domestic and overseas plants by vertical production designs; but some 
of these enterprises simply implanted the whole enterprise overseas (Cheng, 2005: 
Howe, 2001; Lee, 1996; Lin &Lin, 2001; Mai & Shih, 2001). 201 When outward 
investment caused a slowdown in productivity growth on a manufacturing-wide basis, 
profits in the public owned sectors were reduced significantly. At this stage, capital 
outward strategies coupled with domestic industrial upgrading and reconstructing 
policies were encouraged and approved by the government and processed basically in 
line with Taiwan's international comparative advantages (Cheng, 2005; Howe, 2001; 
Lee, 1996; Lin & Lin, 2001; Mai & Shih, 2001). 
The announcement of the `open door policy' in China in 1978, limited deregulations 
of overseas investment in Taiwan, and the removal of foreign exchange control 
accompanied by the government's removal of restriction on travel to mainland China 
in 1987, resulted in a dramatic surge of Taiwanese SMEs moving to south-eastern 
China. One such place is the Pearl River District where Beijing encourages overseas 
investments. Beijing attempted to attract FDI by means of low labour cost, basic 
infrastructure, and tax incentives, just as Taiwan did in the 1970s. Geo-political 
factors and sharing the same ethnic background and language made China the first 
priority in line for overseas investment by Taiwanese SMEs. 
The Taiwan FDI in mainland China can be divided into and identified as three waves 
200 The locations of these investments are scattered everywhere in Southest East Asian countries where 
the economic structures are mostly Chinese-based and Chinese-dominant - the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia (Hsueh, et al, 2001; Mai & Shih, 2001).. 
201 As SMEs of Taiwan were masters of the labour-intensive industries, the competitiveness from the 
other developing countries e. g. Latin America countries and South-East Asian countries forced SMEs 
in Taiwan to move overseas based on defensive considerations to restore their competitiveness and 
market share. During this period, agricultural production, food processing production and primary 
light industries were the major investments. This stage of overseas investments was in the form of 
diffusive or individual action that could connect with family or kinship ties and personal motivations. 
These industries included agricultural and food processing products, papers and plastics, leather goods, 
wood and bamboo products, rubber products, basic metals, textiles and garments making and other 
hand-made or labour intensive industries (Hsueh, et al, 2001: Mai & Shih, 2001). 
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(Cheng. 2005; Howe, 2001; Lee, 1996; Lin & Lin, 2001). By the mid-1980s, the first 
wave Taiwanese FDI in mainland China was similar to that in ASEAN countries 
during the same period: small-scale firms that attempted to reallocate labour-intensive 
production of exports (see Tien, 2002). 202 However, with a ceiling on the total amount 
of remitted capital to China per case, it is believed that many companies exceeded this 
limitation by registering in a third place or remaining unregistered with the 
government (see Appendix 7-1& 7-2, pp. 344-6). 
In the first half of the 1990s, the second wave of FDI toward China rushed in after the 
first cross-Strait talks (the Koo-Wang meeting) in 1993. Large scale, domestic- 
oriented enterprises which were publicly listed companies in Taiwan joined the march 
as well. Most large enterprises went to China to provide logistic materials and 
intermediate goods to SMEs in the proximity of their downstream enterprises that had 
moved to China in the first wave. Moreover, the second wave of enterprises clustered 
and acted collectively. That is to say this wave of investment was in forms of 
hierarchic vertical and horizontal clusters, and organized in a more collective 
strategy-from upstream logistics to downstream operations (Cheng, 2005; Howe, 
2001; Lee, 1996; Leng, 2004; Lin &Lin, 2001). 203 The biggest private petrochemical 
enterprise fostered by the Taiwanese government-Formosa Petrochemical Co. was 
welcomed by Beijing and approved by the Taiwanese government to invest in 
petrochemical materials in Southeast China (Hai-chang Petrochemical Complex) to 
serve the increasing demands of Chinese domestic market in 1988 (Tu, 2001). Some 
food-processing industries also began to capture a share of the Chinese domestic 
market. Lowering costs to enhance market competitiveness still was the major 
strategy used by the investors in this wave of migration (Cheng, 2005; Howe, 2001; 
Lee, 1996; Leng, 2002; Lin &Lin, 2001). 204 
202 This wave of investment included such products as textile, shoes, travel accessories and electronics, 
few (3.5-5% of total FDI) included basic agricultural and food-processing products (see Tien, 2002). 
203 The whole production assemblies and networks (include upstream, midstream and downstream) 
positioned themselves in the commodity chain not only to keep export share but also to seek markst 
expansion, penetrate China's market and getting behind China's tariff and non-tariff vv all. 
204 In the meantime, since the labour and land cost began to rise in South-eastern China, some 
Taiwanese owned labour-intensive or light industries chose to shift their productions assemblies and 
plants again to the new FDI paradises of Vietnam, Malaysia or mid-west China (Cheng, 2005; Howe, 
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In the early 1995-96, firms manufacturing computers and peripherals began to venture 
into the Guangzhou and Shanghai areas organizing and operating in multiple flexible 
forms. These information technology firms with MNEs characteristics sought to 
reallocate the manufacture of their lower end product range to China, while 
maintaining service functions, R&D and a market presence in Taiwan. They 
established strategic alliances with Western companies in the forms of OEM, OBM or 
subcontractors. 205 This was conductive with the offshore sourcing strategies of 
Western MNEs in Taiwan since the Pacific Triangle Economies and South Korea are 
the major supply source regions of their international procurement offices (IPOs). 
This international commodity hierarchy and labour division has been well organized 
in the global market since the 1990s (Chen and Ku, 2002). In the late 1990s, the 
Taiwanese FDI investment expanded to consolidate cement, real estate, banking, 
finance, chemicals, high-tech electronic products and components but also broadened 
into other local market-oriented industries and service sectors. Looking at a 
production and investment profile, the changing composition of Taiwan's investment 
in China obviously shows a swift upgrade and change in production. In the late 1990s, 
China leaped forward to become a significant export country in the world and over 
60% of its exports had the contribution of Taiwanese FDI. The Triangle Three 
integration targeted the US, Japan and Europe as their major trading destinations and 
performed well since the 1990s and the market shares of the Triangle Economies in 
US, Japan and Europe expanded in this period, too (see Appendix 5, p340). This 
cross-Straits integration also resulted in growing exports of machinery, electrical and 
IT electronic products for Taiwan (see Cheng, 2005; Howe, 2001; Lee, 1996; Leng, 
2002; Lin &Lin, 2001). 
Therefore, the integration of the Pacific Triangle Economies was basically driven by 
private initiatives and market forces rather than being piloted by schemes planned by 
the states since the inter-governmental coordination was weak (Lin & Lin, 2001). As 
2001; Lee, 1996; Leng, 2002; Lin &Lin, 2001). 
205 Some of these ventures were conducted under the request of strategic alliances from Western 
countries and Japan since the enormous domestic market of China was expected to 
be gradually 
opened after it became a member of the WTO by 2000 (Chen and Ku, 2002) 
191 
suggested by Cheng (2005) the result of structural change was entirely expected as all 
mature economies in the West have gone through the similar trajectories. If simply 
observed from an international labour division perspective, the cross-Straits 
integrations or the China Triangle integrations are successful regional integrations and 
interdependence cases in the global market. 206 Hence, the government claim on the 
hollowing out effect caused by FDI to China needs deliberated explorations. Table 5.2 
is the GDP related index and unemployment ratio from 1987-2000; Table 5.3 shows 
changes in Taiwan's economic structure since 1980s. 
Compared to Taiwan's industrial structure in the mid-1980s, the industrial structure of 
Taiwan as a whole transformed smoothly. The ratio of Taiwan manufacturing sectors 
declined from an average 36.7% of GDP in the second half of 1980s to one of 30.5% 
in the first half of 1990s and a average of 26.9% in the second half of 1990s (Chen. 
1999; Cheng, 2005; Li, 2002), however, the ratio of high value-added service sectors 
in GDP simultaneously increased from 47.9% (1985), 54.6% (1990) to 60.2% (1995) 
(Appendix 2-3, p. 336). In Appendix 2-2and 2-3 (pp. 335-6), it clearly shows the 
products of light industry decreased from 52.6% (1985) to 28.5% (1998) in their share 
of manufacturing outputs, showing that light industry in Taiwan did decline in the past 
one and a half decades. However, the weight of heavy and chemical industries 
increased from 47.4% (1985) to 71.5% (1998) in manufacturing output and the share 
of service sector increased in the same period, too. Appendix 2-2,2-3 also proves this 
argument. 
206 As an expansive type of FDI, capital-intensive and high-tech sectors moved to 
China to exploit their 
technological edge when a product is maturing and the patent is ending. The service sectors provided 
by Hong Kong. the capital, management and skill provided by Taiwan and the manufacturing sectors 
provided by China have integrated to complement each other and create niches 
for their healthy 
economic survival. 
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Table-5.2 Key economic indications, Taiwan, 1987-2000 








Gross nat, ana, 
Saving (GNP%) 
ra Capn G.? 
(US5) 
Lnemp sxn 
Average Rate sector GDP°o) Reserves((_ SS m) 
1987 12.74 57.3 17.3 40.0 38.52 5,298 1.97 
. 
30 76,7 8 
1988 7.84 54.3 10.7 43.6 34.48 6,379 1.69 5.03 73,879 
1989 8.23 49.6 7.5 42.1 31.10 7,626 1.57 4.90 73,224 
1990 5.39 46.8 5.0 41.8 29.33 8,111 1.67 4.17 72.441 
1991 7.55 47.4 4.5 42.9 29.40 8,932 1.51 3.79 82,405 
1992 7.49 43.4 2.1 41.3 28.99 10,470 1.51 3.45 82,306 
1993 7.01 44.2 1.9 42.4 28.81 10,582 1.45 3.42 83,573 
1994 7.11 44.1 1.9 42.2 27.62 11,579 1.56 3.07 92,454 
1995 6.42 48.8 2.0 46.8 27.04 12,686 1.79 2.32 90,301 
1996 6.10 48.6 3.8 44.7 26.73 13,363 2.60 2.17 88,083 
1997 6.68 49.4 2.7 46.7 26.23 13,592 2.72 2.02 83,502 
1998 4.57 48.9 2.0 46.9 25.99 12,361 2.69 1.77 92,810 
1999 5.42 41.3 4.0 37.3 25.95 12,325 2.92 1.77 106,235 
2000 5.86 47.1 2.3 43.8 25.37 14,214 2.99 1.65 106,712 
Sources: 1. Calculated from http: //www. stat. gov. tw/public., attachment, http: //ww . coa. ov. tw; 
http: // 
www. dgbas. gov. tw and http:! /w-ww. gov. tw/EBOOKS/ . 2. Also in Cheng, 2005; Chou, 2001: 50; Dent, 2002: 209; Li, 2002: 28; Yu, 1999: 145. 
As Table 5.2 and Appendix 2-1 (p. 334) show, from 1987-2000, the agricultural sector 
slid from 5.3% to 1.65% of GDP and its employment ratio was reduced from 17.5% 
to 8.8% in the same period. However, the unemployment ratio as a whole kept steady 
at an average of 2% from 1987 to 2000. From this we can infer that human resources 
squeezed from light industries were absorbed by the newly emerging services sector. 
The ratio of unemployment began to climb from 2.6% to 2.99% in the second half of 
the 1990s, but the ratio was still kept low if compared to the other EANIEs. However, 
there was a nearly triple growth in the per capita GNP in the same period. Moreover, 
the GDP growth rate and foreign exchange reserves remained high from 1987 to 2000. 
This further evidences that Taiwan's economy benefited from shifting offshore 
labour-intensive industries to China or ASEAN countries. The export and import 
contributions to GDP evidence that the economy as a whole was in a styled 
value-added exporting mode. 
If economic developmentalism is accepted as the common vision of the state, there is 
no reason for panic over the declining share of the manufacturing sector in Taiwan's 
GDP since the share of the service sectors increased in the same period. This reflects 
the realities of a `normalized' economic structural change and upgrade. Hence, if 
observed simply from the perspective of dynamic comparative advantage, it is a 
virtuous circle of economic developments since both home and host states both 
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benefited from this industrial migration and integration. Obviously, there must be 
some other reason for the alarm of the Taiwanese government toward outward FDI to 
China. Therefore, Taiwan again is a very unique case that a strong developmental 
state seeks to saliently parcel national identity with the economy. 207 
5.2.2.2 Identifying the realities of hollowing out effect in Taiwan 
As Cheng argues by examining economic related data from mid-1980 to 2000, the 
integration across-Straits is a virtuous one. Accordingly, he further contends that the 
hollowing out effect proved to be a false alarm sounded for political reason (Cheng, 
2005). 1 agree with Cheng's points according to four aspects as below. 
First, the outward FDI to China brought Taiwan a significant positive economic 
growth and an upgrading of industrial structure between 1989 and 2000. There was no 
sign of a hollowing out effect. Second, according to surveys of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs on Taiwanese enterprises, most medium and large firms that were 
active in outward FDI to China have continued to expand and invest in Taiwan as 
their production end locations. Table 5.4 analyzes Taiwan's export commodities by 
intensity of input factors and provides a profile on changes in industrial export items. 
It can also be seen as cross-section of an economic structure composed of labour, 
capital and technology intensities. Between 1982 and 2001, high labour intensity 
products declined from 47.2% to 34.4%, while high capital intensity increased slightly 
from 26.9% to 29.6%; however middle capital intensity rose from 45.4% to 62.6%. 
High technology intensity jumped drastically from 18.3% to 45.5; whereas low 
technology intensity slumped from 49.5% to 13.8%. Table 5.5 shows Taiwan's 
prominent presence in the production of PCs and peripherals. Actually, the world 
market share in Table 5.5 does not account for the share directly exported from China 
in plants built with Taiwanese FDI. This proves that the primary IT technology 
production sector benefited from relocating their operation and production facilities 
207 As there are still many independence movements in the world by appealing to forge a new national 
identity such as Quebec in Canada and some small states in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union. 
However few of them bind the identity issue with their economies in a package. 
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abroad through outward FD. 208 I 
Third, while most SMEs reduced or terminated their production assemblies in Taiwan, 
their overseas operations did lead them to procure intermediate and capital goods 
from big enterprises in Taiwan. There is abundant evidence on the effects of 
hierarchic cross-Straits integrations and the changing trade patterns between both 
sides (see Appendix2-2,2-3 and Table 5.3). Fourth, the technology intensity of 
Taiwan's exports drastically rose from 1985 to 2000(see Table 5.3) signifying that the 
upgrading effect did happen in the domestic manufacturing sector, at least in the IT 
electronic industries. The input factor intensity in the export structure in Taiwan did 
shift, however the ratio stuck on medium labour-capital-technology intensity 
remained high and the ratio of high capital remained quite steady after 1982. This 
highlights that although the SMEs are still the major contributors of exports and 
imports, their technology intensity (R&D) needs to be improved. The profiles imply 
that what needs to be improved is more to do with R&D diffusions and capital 
intensity, if a service and knowledge-driven economy is the desired goal in the future. 
As Krueger (1995) and Fu et al (1999) identify the EANICs' economic growth 
followed a trajectory that developed factor accumulation sectors with exogenous 
factors investment (tangible capital, labour) in the first stage by 1985. However, these 
EANICs began to diverge on their trajectories in the early 1980s (Fu et al., 1999; Lau, 
1999; Li, 2002). 209 Fu et al (1999) further indicate that the gap between factor 
accumulation and factor productivity was smaller in Taiwan (58% vs. 42%) and Hong 
Kong (44% vs. 56%) than in Singapore (65% vs. 35%) and Korea (37%). This implies 
that the former two countries transformed themselves into service economies more 
208 See Appendix 5 (p. 336). Over 70% of electronics exported from China are made by Taiwanese 
enterprises. 
209 An this stage, development in the real economy has served as a firm base to sustain growth in the 
nominal economy. However, when these states proceeded into service and the tertiary sectors (e. g. 
banking and finance, insurance, real estate, and personal service industries), endogenous growth 
factors and factor productivity such as the qualitative factors, education, technology, information, 
environment and intangible infrastructures became the necessary preconditions for the second stage 
development (Fu et al., 1999; Lau, 1999; Li, 2002). 
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than the latter ones. 210 
Table-5.3 Taiwan's export structure by intensity of input factor, 1982-2001(selected 
years) 









High Mid Low High Mid Low High Mid Low High Mid Low 
1982 47.2 30.8 21.9 26.9 45.4 27.6 18.3 32.6 49.1 
1985 45.9 35.6 18.5 24.5 48.7 26.8 18.75 33.62 47.63 18.8 33.6 47.6 
1989 43.45 37.75 18.8 26.59 50.73 22.68 24.25 38.10 37.65 
1990 41.0 38.3 20.7 28.9 50.5 20.5 26.73 38.57 34.7 26.7 38.6 34.7 
1991 40.10 36.87 18.0 29.82 50.98 19.2 27.23 38.52 34.25 
1995 36.4 40.6 23.0 31.9 56.5 11.6 36.5 41.4 22.0 
1996 36.37 41.78 21.84 31.20 58.39 10.42 37.99 40.88 21.13 
1997 34.9 43.10 22.1 30.3 60.6 9.1 39.7 41.1 19.2 
2000 37.6 41.2 21.2 28.1 64.4 7.5 42.5 43.2 14.3 
2001 34.4 42.8 22.8 29.6 62.6 7.9 45.5 40.7 13.8 
Sources: Modify from `Council on Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistic Data Book, 
2002' cited in Cheng, 2005: 113; Chen, 1999: 237; San, 2001: 279. 









Notebooks 49 3.3 1,901 
Monitors 58 73.3 1,589 
Desktop PCs 19 86.0 369.4 
Master-boards 64 40.5 75.4 
Switches 70 94.0 21.7 
PC Cases 75 78.0 18.8 
CD/DVD Drives 34 80.5 357 
Scanners 91 58.5 422 
Graphic Cards 31 63.0 45.6 
Keyboards 68 57.0 64 
Source: www. mic. iii. org. týýý cited in Cheng, 2005: 117. 
As a whole, adding the growth in the services sector, the economic and industrial 
210 The growth unfolded in the real sectors in the forms of industrial output, trade, and tangible 
infrastructure construction (Lau, 1999; Li, 2002). Krueger (1995) and Fu et al (1999) point out that 
the average percentage GDP growth rates (6" per ann. ) of the four EANICs were similar between 
1960 and 1985. However, as Lau refers the economic growth of Taiwan should be attributed to 
tangible capital investment (85%) and labour (15%) from 1960 to 1990. with technical progress taking 
no credit in this process. The only exceptional case in Asia is Japan, where technical progress 
attributed for 39% of investment in its economic growth(see Lau, 1999). 
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structures of Taiwan transformed from one based on a low capital-technology 
intensity and high labour intensity model into a more advanced structure that 
specialized in products of high to medium capital and technology intensity with 
medium-low labour intensity. There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that the 
knowledge-driven, technology and services sectors have become the major sources of 
capitalist dynamic and growth in Taiwan (also see Appendix 2-1& 2-2, pp. 334-5). 
These trends meet the state's commitments and policy guidelines on economic 
liberalization, internationalization and institutionalization by promoting industries 
meeting criteria of "two bigs, two highs and two lows" promulgated in 1984. 
Hence, the most significant characteristics and comparative advantages of Taiwanese 
SMEs are their flexible manufacturing efficiency and management capacities with 
flexibility. This has concerns more to do with factor productivity rather than factor 
input or factor accumulation; and concerns improvement in the quality of human 
resources and R& D technology rather than government efforts to keep this 
comparative advantage static by blocking them going abroad. Comparative 
advantages in the global market are dynamic, not static. At the domestic level, 
statistics suggest that what needs to be improved is the quality of skilled labour and 
capital and technological intensity in order to enlarge the technological gap with 
later-comers and capture more of the markets in advanced countries. 21 
From a macro perspective, the upgrade and offshore strategies initiated by the private 
sector initiated a virtuous industrial transformation since the total share of China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong in the American, Japanese and European Union markets 
increased by 2000.212 Moreover, from the second half of the 1990s, semi-finished and 
labor-intensive products have replaced agricultural goods as the major imports from 
China to Taiwan, indicating that the division of labour in across-Straits production is 
211 Hence, this evidences what endogenous growth factors theory posits that the growth dynamic of the 
second stage development is due more to improvements in qualitative and intangible factors and 
efficiency in factor productivity. 
212 As Taiwanese FDI is the major source of the manufacture industries clustered along the 
south-eastern and Shanghai areas, Taiwanese enterprises benefited by this integration since the foreign 
reserves climbed higher than before. 
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improving (Cheng. 2005). Taiwan preserved the R& D technology end and exported 
the final products to the world market. This actually is a game with no losers. 
However, the neo-realist zero-sum calculations influenced by the cross-Straits rivalry 
limited fully comprehensive economic integration and contacts. Hence, there must be 
some residual or non-economic factors accounting for Taiwan's horrified evaluation 
the hollowing out effect. Political and military rivalry must be the only answer. 
Taiwan, again, is a particular case in that its trajectories on development of capitalism 
and politico-military strategy diverged from the international ones. 
In sum, I argue that the alarm over the hollowing out effect of Taiwanese industry and 
a series of industrial policies since 1990 unfolded from politico-military concerns 
rather than purely economic ones. There are two politico-military concealed purposes 
packed in the economic strategies. One is to release domestic economic and social 
pressure; the other is to consolidate political power and forge a new national identity 
by packing the economic problem with diplomatic crisis and national security issues. 
However, I contend that the hollowing out effect will not be mitigated even if Taiwan 
becomes an independent state. Diversifying market access and supply source, 
ensuring financial-credit stability to reduce the risks of being overtly dependent on 
any state are common goals in any capitalist states. However, shouldn't this parceled 
policy process follow the dynamics of capitalism? As such, I argue there are at least 
two economic dilemmas that the state is incapable of managing if globalization is 
concealed under a national security umbrella. 
First, the industrial upgrade policy pushed by the state succeeded due to being 
confined within limited areas since 1997,97.9% of the manufactured export items of 
Taiwan were concentrated in a few industrial products areas such as electronics, 
information and communications products, chemicals, textile products and basic 
metals and articles in 1997 (Li, 2002). The industrial upgrade policy doesn't promise 
a comprehensive upgrade and transformation of whole economic structure that can 
apply to every sector. The successes and expansions of these `wvinner' sectors can not 
possibly absorb the unemployment population left by industries moved overseas. 
That's why Evans (1995) can not find any justification to defend the possibility of 
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expansion in his "embedded autonomy" model when applied to the other sector in the 
same cases he studies. The state has limited resources to pick the Winners (and losers), 
therefore the exclusion of some sectors are inevitable. 
Hence, some marginalized industries or weak sectors e. g. traditional agriculture and 
labour-intensive industries unavoidably have to confront the risk of diminishing 
during globalization. The only exits for these industries to survive are to move to 
countries with lower labour and land costs to keep their competitive advantage or to 
upgrade with advanced technology and innovation. In the case of Taiwan, when the 
state was incapable of successfully facilitating to upgrade these left-behind sectors, its 
particular politico-military matrix seems to provide an exit for the state to divert 
domestic pressures into the diplomatic and security arenas. 
Second, the squeezed human resources in the agricultural sector coupled with the 
laying off of unskilled or low-skilled human resources in labour-intensive industries 
that had closed down and moved to China or ASEAN countries were the major 
sources of unemployment, although some were able to find lower income jobs. 
Moreover, the import of cheaper labour from Southeast Asian countries since the early 
1990s exacerbated the unemployment problem (Mai & Shih, 2001). Being a common 
dilemma, this structural unemployment bias happened during the process of economic 
transformation in many advanced countries. From a theoretical perspective, these 
unemployed populations are `losers' in globalization. These problems could not be 
painlessly resolved even if Taiwan becomes independent from China since they are 
concerned more with complex projects of domestic re-distribution, labour and social 
welfare and how the state acts to upgrade the competitive capacities of these weak 
sectors. However, the KMT authorities utilized them as a convenient tool to distract 
from rising unemployment by packing them into the national identity and separatism 
parcel. 213 What really horrified the KMT is the thought of China peacefully reunifying 
with Taiwan by a strategy of economic waifare. 
2 13 However, the high ratio of unemployment coupled with lower income, marginalized social status 
and low education levels caused dissatisfaction with the KMT government which are pro-capitalist 
class and corruptive. 
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The political rivalry and fear of China's ambition of reunification with Taiwan made 
the government of Taiwan assume a negative attitude toward the FDI in China and 
treated it as a political and security concern rather than a purely economic issue. Lee 
Teng-hui attempted to stir up Taiwanese resentment to China by forging a new 
national identity and a strong aspiration of independence by playing up the hollowing 
out risk. 214 From Lee's perspective, investing in China was no different from 
strengthening an enemy with capital nutrition and was sure to undermine the 
competitiveness of Taiwanese industry. Consequently, he further established an 
overarching cause-effect linkage between the hollowing out effect, China's hegemony 
and Taiwan's diplomatic isolation to justify the importance of Taiwan's independence. 
As such, I argue the hollowing effect was an over-exaggerated and misleading issue 
that attempted to conceal the state's inability to deal with globalization and 
democratization. 
5.2.2.3 Capital, technological and human resources of the private sector 
Capital resources 
In the early stages, as the supply of capital was insufficient to meet domestic demand, 
it was reasonable to understand why the state enterprises and big private corporations 
could secure bank loans since the state was the largest shareholder of the banks. 
However, the SMEs often found they were denied access to credit (Chen, 2001). Until 
the early 1990s, the share of loans granted to the exporters still remained less than 0.5 
% of total loans in the banking system (Hsueh et al, 2001; Mai & Shih, 2001). 
Fortunately, loose domestic money supply contributed by individual and private 
savings compensated that capital-shortage problem of the SMEs with the informal 
214 The major calculations of Lee were based on the inferential causal-consequence logics between the 
hollowing out effect and the rise of the domestic unemployment ratio. For Lee Teng-hui, inducing 
resentment over China's diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and blaming the rise a hegemonic China could 
be simultaneously used as means to consolidate the Taiwanese national identity and independence 
ideology, to exclude the KMT mainlanders from power, to distract the domestic economic and social 
pressures into nationalism, and to prevent China's unification pressure by economic integration and 
interdependence. 
200 
financial markets as the main source of capital and industrial development. Most 
investment capital of SMEs in Taiwan by 1990 was from the curb market (about 301, o 
to 40%), personal family ties and informal finance market at about 20% (Park, 2001). 
That is to say the SMEs in Taiwan were actually nurtured by the informal 
underground market (Hsueh, et al, 2001; Kwong, et al, 2001, Mai & Shih, 2001). 215 
As the outward remittance limitation was relinquished and the exchange rate began to 
float in 1987, the domestic saving ratio began to decline slightly coupled with an 
increase in outward FDI and the booming of the stock market. 
As the stock market was deregulated and institutionalized as a formal mechanism of 
domestic investment in the late 1980s, the private savings began to be vigorously 
injected into it. These vitalized private savings become the major capital resource of 
the companies listing on the stock market and the over the counter (OTC) exchange 
(Hsueh, et al, 2001; Kwong, et al, 2001, Mai & Shih, 2001). Furthermore, foreign 
portfolio investments also injected capital into Taiwanese stock market, even though 
the proportion was still low by 2000. As such, from any aspect, there was no sign of a 
shortage of capital resources bothering Taiwanese enterprises after the late 1980s. 
Table 5.5 displays the number of companies issuing stocks from 1980-1998. During 
2 this period, the domestic saving ratio declined. 
16 
Coupled with the imposition of the revised Banking Law in 1989, the leading private 
business groups were permitted to establish new banks that were monopolized by 
state banks with free interest rate permission. Intermediary bill finance companies 
were deregulated in 1995, too. Ministry of Finance opted to approve licenses 
for 15 
new banks after 1990 and privatized the three-leading state-run commercial 
banks 
though share releases on the stock market. Table 5.6 shows the number of state/private 
banks and branches, from 1962-1998. As result of financial liberalization, the 
SMEs 
215 Under the regulatory financial regime by the late 1980s, domestic saving were 
far beyond the 
investment ratio; and the private enterprises and households were the major contributors of 
the 
external and internal surpluses of saving. 
216 The reduction of the private saving ratio evidenced household savings and 
informal financial 
markets had flowed from the informal capital market into the 
formal one. However the informal 
market still remained as the major capital source of 
SMEs even in 1990s. 
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could raise funds more easily from capital markets. In the money market, bank loans 
were replaced by the use of short-term funds like commercial papers and corporate 
bonds (Wang & Mai, 2001). 
Table-5.5 Number of Companies issuing Stocks, 1980-1998 
Year No. of Stock Exchange 
Listed Companies 
No. of OCT 
Listed Companies 
No. of Unlisted 
Companies 
1980 102 - 25 1981 107 - 54 1982 113 - 116 1983 119 - 130 1984 123 - 157 1985 127 - 169 1986 130 - 182 1987 141 - 198 1988 163 - 226 1989 181 1 318 
1990 199 4 567 
1991 221 9 717 
1992 256 11 803 
1993 285 11 852 
1994 313 14 917 
1995 347 41 999 
1996 382 79 1,110 
1997 404 114 1,501 
1998 437 176 1,810 
1999 462 264 2,018 
2000 531 300 2,257 
Sources: 1. Chen, 2001: 362. 
2. http: //www. tse. com/ch/statistics/ 










of Foreign Banks 
No. of No of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of 
Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
1962 5 - 4 - 1 - 1 1 
1965 5 - 4 - 2 - 4 4 
1970 6 - 5 - 2 - 6 6 
1975 6 - 5 - 4 - 12 12 
1978 6 198 5 340 9 105 13 13 
1979 7 207 5 346 11 112 13 13 
1980 7 216 5 347 11 115 21 21 
1981 7 230 5 363 11 121 24 24 
1982 7 242 6 366 11 128 25 25 
1983 7 243 6 370 11 133 28 28 
1984 7 243 6 371 11 145 31 31 
1985 7 248 6 386 11 154 32 32 
1986 7 257 6 389 11 167 32 32 
1987 7 282 6 391 11 196 32 33 
1988 7 293 6 406 11 204 32 35 
1989 7 301 6 424 11 228 33 38 
1990 7 312 6 430 11 254 35 43 
1991 7 316 6 443 12 287 36 47 
1992 7 333 6 463 27 416 36 50 
1993 7 361 6 489 28 532 37 55 
1994 7 384 6 431 29 762 37 57 
1995 7 425 6 555 29 827 38 58 
1996 7 443 6 581 29 912 41 65 
1997 7 459 6 597 34 1120 45 69 
1998 7 475 3 198 38 1609 46 72 
Source: Chen, 2001: 356. 
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As Chen indicates, following the liberalization of the financial sector, the 
profit-oriented private financial institutions have enjoyed greater autonomy and 
resources that far exceed the government's capacity to exercise control and 
supervision. Consequently, the capacity of the government to provide capital 
provision for a variety of policy-oriented and low- interest loans for strategic 
industries and state enterprises was commensurately reduced (Chen, 2001). Moreover, 
the Central Bank found could not implement monetary policy as effectively as usual 
since the exchange rate and capital were floating freely. 
Overall, the state economic power resources were consequently shrunk during the 
liberalization of the trade and financial sectors from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. 
From the onset, state-business relations and cooperation in Taiwan were established 
on the prerequisites of state monopoly on material and capital resources control. From 
the developmental stage perspective, the EA developmental strategies can fit the first 
stage of development since they depend heavily on tangible exogenous factors and 
capital accumulation to create the economic growth on labour-intensive industrial 
economy. As such, the efficiency of resource and capital allocations became the most 
important variable in their encapsulated environment during the Cold-War period, as 
domestic cohesion was easier to achieve in an authoritarian regime. Hence, the role of 
the state in resource allocation and reducing transaction costs was be prompted as the 
resource of private sector was weak and institutions of market was still not 
well-developed. 
However, for progressing into an opened globalized market, factor productivity is far 
more important than factor accumulations on competitiveness. The momentum of 
growth shifts to depend heavily on intangible, qualitative and endogenous factors. 
Moreover, as domestic fragmented interests cause less cohesion in a democracy. the 
role of the state is inevitably changed. Hence, I argue, in the case of Taiwan, the 
strategies used in the closed economy are no longer effective for disciplining the 
private sector since they were originally for controlling tangible and exogenous 
factors not for managing intangible, endogenous factors. In next subsection I will 
briefly post three prompted cases to evidence this argument. 
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5.2.3 The private sectors reflections and resistances to the state 
Taiwan's booming trade surplus with China after 1990 caused Lee's Administration to 
worry about the asymmetric cross-Straits economic dependence that might increase 
Taiwan's vulnerability and sensibility caused Taiwan to be `trapped' by China's 
ambition for peaceful reunification by economic integration. Hence, there were a 
series of policies of blocking and guiding Taiwanese FDI investment in mainland 
China to prevent the hollowing out effect and to protect the national economy. The 
cases posted below in turn justify the argument that the developmental strategies used 
in the Cold-War were unable to discipline the free-floating intangible assets and 
capital that are the major resources of factor productivity. Hence, I argue, the major 
purpose of these strategies was political and designed for domestic consumption, not 
for the long-term interests of the private export-oriented sectors. 
5.2.3.1 Failures on `Go South' and `No haste, be patient' FDI policies 
The major two policies for governing cross-Straits relations in the 1990s were the `Go 
South' policy in 1994 and the `No haste, be patient' policy in 1996 (Chan 1996; Chen, 
1993; Chen, 2005; Cheng, 2005; Dent, 2002; Leng, 2002; Lin & Lin, 2001; Yahuda, 
1998). 217 The first was intended to divert Taiwanese FDI away from China and toward 
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand. This policy was also coupled with 
one of encouraging the private sector to invest in some small counties in South 
America. The framework was extended to incorporate Australia and New Zealand in 
1997. However, except for the original investors who had already moved before 1990, 
the policy package failed and only accomplished to `persuade' some KMT 
state-owned or party-owned enterprises to invest in these countries. In addition, some 
domestic-market oriented companies verbally cooperated with the government in the 
name of joint venture with the purpose to gain domestic rent. However, the export 
217 As Yahuda indicates the calculation behind `southward policy' was not merely to encourage 
Taiwanese enterprises to invest in these countries but also geo-political purported to consolidate its 
relations with them. It expects the South Asian countries respond favourably to the establishment of 
`second track' networks with Taiwan (Yahuda, 1998: 293). 
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ratios to China still swelled and dwarfed those with Southeast Asian countries by four 
to one in the mid-1990s (Chen, 2005). 218 
In 1996, just after China's missile diplomacy toward Taiwan, Lee's Administration 
forbade Taiwanese capital outward flow to China by various regulations and 
promulgated a policy of `no haste, be patient' in late August of the same year. The 
packaged policies include sanctions on unregistered `indirect' trade and investment in 
China; limitations on the single project investment ceiling which could not exceed 
US$50 million; limitations on investment in high-tech and infrastructure such as 
power plants, railroads and airports (Leng, 2002; Lin & Lin, 2001). The inhibitions on 
cross-Straits direct trade mean that direct transportation, commercial and posted links 
must go through operated the third-parties. However, during the 1990s, the 
asymmetrical cross-straits trade balance drastically reflected Taiwan's dependence (or 
interdependence) with China. It evidenced the blocking on FDI toward China as a 
total failure since there had been a sudden rise of Taiwanese FDI going to China via 
British territories in the Caribbean region, Hong-Kong and other third parties as 
capital transfer stations (see Appendix 7-2, p. 346). Unless government of Taiwan can 
concurrently prohibit FDI toward other countries and re-constrain the financial sector 
it has liberalized, it will be impossible for it to forbid bypassed capital flow toward 
China. 
5.2.3.2 Failure of project of `Asia Pacific Operation Center' 
Knowing that Hong Kong would be transferred to China in 1997, Premier Lien Chan 
in 1995 announced an ambitious project to establish Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific 
Operation Center that aimed to transform the Taiwan economic structure into a 
service and technology directed economy (Lee, 1994; Klintworth, 1994; Rimmer, 
1994). That meant the initial policy content was focused on the liberalization of the 
218 The calculated attempt of the Taiwan government to launch a `Go South' policy -, vas not simply just 
confined to promoting economic interdependence between Taiwan and the region. It was coupled 
intensively with `mutual diplomatic reciprocity' for exchanging `holiday diplomacy' trips of President 
Lee and Premier Lien with official development assistance after Taiwan's isolation in the international 
community (Chen, 2005). 
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service sectors, including telecommunications, shipping and finance to grasp the right 
time to replace Hong Kong as the main service, finance and manufacturing center in 
East Asia. From the comparative advantage perspective, Taiwan did have the most 
favorable conditions and qualifications to do that at the transition point if it could 
have spilt the economy from politico-military control. Whereas, the limitations on 
cross-Straits direct links and worries on the increasing economic dependency forged 
an abnormal alliance between Beijing and Taiwanese enterprises, and further led to 
loss of bargaining power in the face of the mainland's unification policy, the Asia 
Pacific Operation Center faced setbacks under the unfavorable domestic political 
situation (Hsiao, 2001; Leng, 2001). However, as Hughes identifies, "if the Taiwan 
business community in the mainland is to have any role in cross-Straits political 
relations it may just as well be one constraining Beijing as one encouraging Taipei to 
develop direct links" (Hughes, 2001: 115). 
From the perspective of foreign MNEs attracted by China's comparative advantages 
or enormous domestic market, why should they bother to locate in Taiwan if 
limitations on cross-Straits direct links have not been lifted (Hughes, 1997; 2001). As 
such, there was few inward FDI flowed into Taiwan, and more have transferred their 
local branches from Taiwan to Hong Kong or Shanghai since 1990. As the 
government of Taiwan took concrete restrictive measures on outward FDI in mainland, 
confusion arose not only in the foreign MNEs but also within Taiwanese business 
circle. The project was doomed to fail from the onset. 
Ostensibly, the government of Taiwan believed a conservative and precautionary 
strategy by blocking cross-Straits direct links could work well to ensure and protect 
Taiwan's economic, political and social security. However, as Hughes refers Lee's 
Administration "had accepted fairly early on that it would be impossible, and 
probably economically undesirable, to stop trade and investment in the mainland" 
(Hughes, 1997: 114). However, as for the reason why Lee's Administration still 
backtracked to a conservative strategy, as I have argued only domestic consumption 
can provide the explanation. Lee always disciplined his advocates with the notion that, 
in a democracy, loss in elections means loss of power and loss of everything. As such, 
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to win over electoral polls seemed to be the first priority of Lee's optimal strategy to 
ensure his continuing reign. The fears that political spill-over forces would result in 
political integration with China led to Lee's choice of forging a new nationalism 
(Bush, 2005; Hughes, 1997; 2001), even at the risk of a possibly weakened and 
marginalized economy. 
5.2.3.3 The case of He-Jian semiconductor investment by UMC in Suzhou 
When the `No haste, be patient' policy was announced, Taiwanese big conglomerates 
such as Formosa Plastics United Enterprises, and Evergreen International Shipping 
Enterprises began to publicly press the government not to prohibit cross-Straits direct 
links. They warned to reduce transaction costs and position Taiwanese enterprises in 
China to expand market share. The Formosa conglomerate even signed contracts with 
Beijing to construct electricity power plants and petrochemical factories in a 
southeastern Chinese province. Moreover, Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc, 
the world's number two packing and number one test company of semiconductors and 
leader of TSMC that was fostered by the state in 1980s, also called for a new open 
policy and direct links with China. Hence, generally, the private sector was prone to 
support a direct links policy. 
For Taiwan, the semiconductor industry symbolizes national pride, epitomizing the 
success of its high-tech strategy and state intervention, and this success has been used 
to exemplify and justify the active (positive) role of the state by numerous 
development-related or statist works (Addison, 2000). As Cheng indicates, "TSMC 
and UMC changed the structure of the world's semiconductor industry, captured 
around 70percent of the foundry market, and spawned a significant number of 
Taiwanese chip designers and developers as well as IC testing and packaging 
companies" (Cheng, 2005: 116-7). Crowned by TSMC and UMC, the IT industry 
accounts for one-third of total manufacturing outputs and 50 percent of export (15% 
of GDP) by mid-1990s (Addison, 2000; Cheng, 2005). By 2000, low-end, 
labour-intensive manufactures and PC producers also shifted their production 
assembly lines to the mainland to reduce costs since similar products made by other 
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Asian countries, especially productions of Singapore and South Korea are very 
competitive on global market. Moreover, the burst of the dotcom bubble in the late 
1990s exposed an overcapacity problem and reduced the utilization rate of TSMC and 
UMC. Hence, the only market left with potential demand that was still not contracting 
and could absorb the full production facilities was China. The leader of TSMC, 
Morris Chang argued a delay of two years would mean the loss of the China market 
since Japan and South Korea had desperately raced to engage in establishing 
semiconductor foundries in China (ibid). 
TSMC and UMC argue confidently that the technology gap between Taiwan and 
Mainland is large enough to prevent China becoming a competitor in the global 
market for at least in two decades. Their purported investments are 8-inch wafer 
foundries (0.25 micron technique) which they hope will facilitate foundries making 
12-inch wafer in Taiwan more efficient and develop 0.1 to 0.09 micron techniques. 
Moreover, South Korea and Japan are also interested in similar investments in China, 
which show that 8-inch wafer fabrication is not considered to be high-level 
technology (Chang & Cheng, 2002; Cheng, 2005, Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). However, 
again, for reason of national economic security, the government of Taiwan rejected 
their request and still prohibited investment by the end of 2006. The argument here is 
not to debate whether the 8-inch wafer investment will cause a risk to national 
economy, the point is that under the government restrictions would it be possible for 
TSMC or UMC to invest in China without reporting to the government. The answer is 
definitely yes (ibid). 
As indicated, UMC was the first wafer fabrication foundry initiated by the 
government they signed a technology transfer contract with the US firm RCA in 1979. 
The government not only funded it with a capitalization of NT$ 500 million (40% of 
its equity capital) but also in 1976 dispatched a group of 37 engineers to undergoing 
training in the US. UMC was also the first private company in Taiwan with 4-inch IC 
production process technology for commercial use. One of their engineers, Tsao 
Hsing-cheng, succeeded after Morris Cheng as the CEO in 1990. Since UMC and 
TSMC have been very law-abiding firms due to the government shareholding, Tsao 
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has sensitized the importance of the China market since the very early 1990s. 
In 2000, UMC began an unauthorized investment project-He-Jian wafer fabrication 
foundry located in Suzhou, south China. However the leading figures in UMC denied 
any relations between UMC and He-Jian. UMC claimed it is unnecessary for them to 
take responsibility for the individual behavior of any laid-off employers or engineers 
of UMC now employed by He-Jian. Moreover, since UMC (as a subsidiary) has been 
a listed company on the board of New York stock market and as a foreign company 
registered in British tax-free zone, it has also established many related 
subsidiary-companies with multiple-mutual cross- shareholding relations. Hence, the 
capital owned by UMC is weaved in a complex web and difficult to track. 
For UMC, confronting threats from South Korea, Japan and China, the optimal 
strategies for continuing its leading role in the global market are reduction of its 
transaction costs and expansion of its market share (ibid). For the state, "economic 
globalization and internet-related technologies were rendering obsolete many 
traditional national security protection methods, and that Taiwan looked to develop 
technology-based security strategies based on existing strength in semiconductor 
production and informational warfare" (Dent, 2002: 230). Whether an 8-inch wafer 
fabrication investment will cause risks on national security is not the point here. The 
point is even it does, and the UMC still builds up its foundry to China, presence can 
the `strong developmental state' in a democracy and with globalization do anything to 
effectively block the brain-drain technology diffusion and capital flow of any private 
enterprises? The case of UMC suggests that states cannot. 
Section 5.3 Concluding remarks-capitalist resistance to the state in IEMP 
This chapter has utilized investigations on the IVs of the international system and the 
development of domestic capitalism of Taiwan from 1987 to 2000 to contrast with 
what was presented in Chapter Four. By applying concepts of `resources of 
autonomous power in IEMP model' to examining the changing power resources both 
at the international level and at the domestic capitalism level a more vivid profile on 
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how these changing powers reshape the `developmental state' in the post Cold War 
era. 
This chapter produces evidence that suggests a divergence between state objectives 
informed by political and military concerns and the objectives informed by economic 
concerns. Institutions like the WTO put pressure on states to conform to liberal 
economic ideas. The room for subordinating national economies to the military 
objective is more limited now than when the Bretton Wood, and the Cold War, shaped 
the international system. 
However, in the case of Taiwan, the state seems still to follow the strategies utilized 
during the Cold War, desperately attempting to link politico-military concerns and the 
economy by imposing ideologies of anti-communism and national security. The 
investigations in this chapter argue there are at least two difficulties in continuing with 
these strategies which will inevitably enlarge the gap between the intention and 
capacity of the state. First, the autonomous power and power resources of the 
government during the Cold War were largely dependent on the control of tangible 
assets and material. State-business relations were asymmetric ones, 219 and the 
autonomous power of economic bureaucrats originated largely from political 
protection regarding controlling and allocating material, capital and technology 
resources. However, except for infrastructural resources, the state injected few 
resources and capital into SMEs that provide the momentum for economic growth. 
Hence, there were no consolidated relations between the state and SMEs from the 
onset. When the state strategy violates the disciplines of free market, the resistance of 
the capitalist and their embrace of liberalism is to be expected. As a consequence of 
liberalizations of trade and finance in the 1980s and the 1990s, the economic 
resources and capital of the state shrank significantly which weakened the economic 
autonomous power of the state and the state-business relationship was slowly 
dismantled. 
`19 The major agencies engaged in this relation were the state, the public enterprises or the big 
enterprises with a special patron relation with the state. 
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Second, as Taiwan's economic structure has stepped up to the second stage of 
development and is aiming to becoming a knowledge-service-driven economy, factor 
productivity becomes more important than factor or capital accumulation. These 
changes are not merely limited to materialized and quantified resources, more 
important are changes on how the products are organized, transmit, and produced 
through intangible ways. Hence, the strategies employed effectively to regulate the 
tangible and static resource in a closed territory become problematical when 
regulating intangible resources and migratory human resources in a globalized 
informational economy. 
-------* 
Figure-5.2 Trajectory and power resources of domestic capitalism in IEMP model, 
1987-2000. 
Figure 5.2 epitomizes the development of domestic capitalism from 1987-2000 in 
Taiwan in IEMP model. It indicates the power resources of domestic capitalism and 
private sector. It shows the ideological, economic and political power resources of 
domestic capitalists, export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented, have greatly 
enhanced through the democratization and globalization. However, the capitalists are 
still constrained by the politico-military strategies of the state in some degrees. . 
In summary, as emphasized, the continuity of the developmental state depends on its 
institutional, administrative and political capacities to invigorate innovations and 
construct new modes of governance to conform globalization and information age, not 
just to revive the legacies of economic warfare and technical strategy. In most of the 
developmental states research, the common emphasis is the impressive image on ho«- 
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these states create their competitive advantages. in the IT sector. As the external and 
internal prerequisites of the developmental state are dynamic. there are no reasons to 




The Changing Causal Mechanisms for a Developmental State (H)- 
Resistance of Civil society and State's Resistance to Resistances (1987-2000) 
This chapter continues to explore the causal mechanisms in the original theoretical 
`arrow-diagram' (Figure2.3, p. 75 ) by delving into changes in the autonomous power 
resources of the other two intervening variables: civil society and the state. Basing on 
the overall analysis of changes in the character of the four IVs, it will establish the 
power constellation among the IVs. The new power configuration will be deployed as 
causal mechanisms to infer the continuity and discontinuity of the developmental state 
in Taiwan. As I have emphasized, sober scrutiny of the redistribution of power 
resources among the IVs, will enable me to redefine the boundaries and roles of the 
developmental state. I will also able me to comment authoritatively on the gap 
between the intention and capacity of the state in the new contest of globalization and 
democracy. 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first two sections will analyze 
changes in variables of civil society and the state by delving into their IEMP power 
resources. The last section will shed light on how changes on the IVs have created 
new causal mechanisms that enable and constrain the developmental state in Taiwan. 
Section 6.1: The compartmentalized liberalization and emancipation of civil 
Society 
Most research date the process of Taiwanese democratization and liberalization, 
especially referring to the rise of civil society, to the day in 1987 when martial law 
was lifted (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003; Chu, 1996; Teng & Chu, 1996; Thompson, 
1996). This thesis assumes the same timing demarcation as with other related 
research. 220 Generally speaking, the economic power resources of domestic business 
220 That economic power of civil society has incrementally developed and progressed along with the 
economic growth since early 1970s was a common given accepted in most of the existing 
literature. 
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and civil society were incrementally accumulated in more contingent and natured 
circumstances than their political, ideological and military power resources. However. 
that is not to say the latter in Taiwan abruptly emerged in a revolutionary sense. It 
would be more appropriate to say that these power resources accumulated in more 
concealed strategies than the economic ones under the specific spatio-temporal 
context. Therefore, the timing demarcation in 1987 will be viewed as a culminating 
peak of a process of emancipation in civil society that had begun in the late 1970s and 
that did not end at that point. Furthermore, from the IEMP power networks 
perspective, the liberalization and emancipation of civil society by no means 
developed at a unified pace for every aspect. Hence, the IEMP power resources of 
civil society may progress along intertwined and compartmentalized trajectories even 
in the same field. 
Table 6.1 chronologically synthesizes the formal deregulations and re-regulations of 
the state policies that had constrained IEMP power resources, citizenship rights and 
liberties by the mid-1980s and how they had changed during 1986 to 1997. Hence, the 
remaining part of this section will shed light on how the causes-consequences of these 
important events reconstructed the IEMP power resources of civil society, and how 
these changes impacted on the developmental state model in Taiwan. 
Table-6.1. Chronological deregulations and re-regulation concerning civil society 
from 1986-1997 
Year Deregulations and re-regulations of related policies Practical meanings 
1986 Constitutional reforms Restored civil liberties 
specified in the Constitution 
(1928). 
1987 The lifting of martial law Allowing freedom of assembly, 
association and press. 
Replaced by the new National 
Security Law and moved the 
adjudication process from 




Removed restrictions and 
censorship on the press, 
expanded publication licenses 







A new Civic Organization Law Grar:; ed 1e ai sti of n:: 
political pa_T-iies 
The permission of election campaign advertising in Allowed public political 
newspaper. propaganda of the opposition 
parties. 
The Council of Grand Justice judged that the Terminated the mainlanders' 
mainland-elected members in the National Assembly political privileges on 
and Legislative Yuan should be forced to retired by Taiwanese. 
the end of 1991. 
The abolition of the "Temporary Provisions" and the Moved Taiwan toward 
termination of the "Period of National Mobilization becoming a normalized 
for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion". democratic- constitutional 
country. 
The open of election campaign advertisements on TV The election campaign was 
and Cable program. allowed to advertise in 
electronic mass media. The 
KMT accepted the political 
challenge in public. 
The stipulation of Occupational Law, Health Law and Setting standards for working 
the Labour Insurance Act conditions and practices for 
secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Providing medical, injury, 
disability, maternity, and life 
insurance coverage for workers. 
The Abolition of Taiwan Garrison Command Replaced the internal use of 
military power and censorship 
on civilians and society with 
normalized institutions and 
laws. e. g. set up the Coastal 
Patrol Command to assume the 
duty of protecting Taiwan's 
coast; passed the other internal 
security responsibilities to 
National Police Administration 
under the supervision of the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
A rewriting of Article 100 of the Criminal Code Changed the stringent measures 
and laws to define sedition and 
treason. 
Released political prisoners and 
granted the return of exiled 
activists who advocated 
independence of Taiwan. 
Allowed more of speech 
freedom within university 
campuses. 
The National Assembly adopted a constitutional 
article stipulating the president election should be Expanded Taiwanese 
elected by the entire electorate in Taiwan area. sovereignty. 
(To be continued) 
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The first popular suffrage of Assemblymen and 
Legislators at the central level by the inhabitants in 
Taiwan area. 
Ratification the Cable TV Law 
The temunation of the Publication Law 
The introduction of `National Health Care Insurance' 
policy 
Revised the Labor Standard Law 
Provided the iegaiization of 
cross-Strait intercourse_ The 
various C-ros5-s_iLS 
communications began to be 
institutionalized. 
Freed up additional broadcast 
frequencies. 
Legalized most of the 
illegal-pirate radio and TV 
broadcasters. 
Publications and press are 
totally free from censorship. 
Expanded welfare provisions 
policies to those civilians 
excluded before. 
From state corporatism to a 
more flexible pluralism 
following market principles. 
The major opposition party (DPP) was allowed to 
launch the fourth broadcast network. Formosa TV. 
The political coverage to the 
opposition, Darty was leizalized. 
6.1.1 The liberalization of the media and the emancipation of ideology 
When Martial Law was lifted in 1987, civil liberties were reassured by the 
constitution and the civil rights of assembly, association and freedom of press were 
restored. Consequently, the TGC was abolished and inward military intervention in 
domestic regulations was ended by 1992. Within five years, the regulations on civil 
rights were reallocated to the hands of civilian courts and institutionalized offices. 
These deregulations impacted tremendously on the democratization of Taiwan. Based 
on these deregulations, the liberalization of the media and various social movements 
become possible and further encouraged the rise of a vigorous civil society that had 
been suppressed for decades. 
In 1987, the KMT government agreed to remove most of the restrictions and 
censorships on the press, continued to keep a tight rein on broadcasting and wireless 
TV channels since the audiences and influence of broadcast and TV programs were 
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far beyond those of the press and magazines. The reduced market for opposition 
magazines and press, which suffered financial shortages in the late 1980s, made the 
government was more confident to deregulate the limitations on publications (Chen, 
1998). As the press ban policy was abolished, there were at least 25 dailies rushed into 
the market, however only the `big two' (China Times, United Daily News) and two 
new dailies (Independence Evening Post, Liberty Times) associated with the DPP 
survived through the `suicidal price wars' during the early 1990s (Lee, 2001). Hence, 
the media market was liberalized following market principles. Without sufficient 
financials resources, it was difficult for any new entrants to maneuver. However, 
lacking economies of scale, the media market in Taiwan does not actually have 
enough advertising revenue to sustain all of the new and old participants. From this 
perspective, the KMT dominated media still had the privileges to compete and sustain 
at the beginning of deregul-+lon (1987-1992). It gradually lost its control however in 
the late 1990s after the decline of KMT party-state economic dominance (Lee, 2001, 
2004; Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2001).. 
There were at least three aspects to the pressure that forced the KMT government to 
relax its dominance of big media (TV & broadcasting) and other communication 
means. First, the improvements of communication technology and information 
transmission, such as to satellite transponders, radio transmitters, cable networks and 
the internet web, all added to the KMT government being no longer capable of 
monopolizing the media and blocking the guerrilla political campaigns of the 
opposition party. Second, since the cable operators and many stations were still illegal 
in 1992, they were accused of infringing the intellectual property rights of US film, 
music and video makers by the US government. The US threatened to apply trade 
sanctions against Taiwan's imports if Taiwan did not stop its underground cable 
stations from `stealing' and `abusing' US intellectual property (Lee, 2001,2004). 
Under US pressure, the Cable TV Law was expeditiously passed in 1993 legalized the 
illegal operations (Chen, 1998). 
Finally, the domestic cross-pressure from opposition parties, interest groups, 
intellectuals and civil society all reflected the public outcry for open and impartial 
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information freedom as democracy gradually consolidated during the early 1990s. 
The media monopoly became a battlefield where the state fiercely confronted 
opposition parties and mass in turn challenged by various social movements. 
Moreover, as the alternatives to TV were empowered by new technology, the political 
effects of media monopoly decreased tremendously (Rawnsley& Rawnsley 200; Lee, 
2004). The authoritarian developmental state that had been established on a unified 
ideology through media dominance finally yielded its monopoly on communication 
means to a combination of technology and external politico-economic pressure from 
the US and domestic pressures. Political censorship was replaced by market 
censorship. 
As Lee notes "... the struggle for democratic transformation has brought more 
complicated and contingent dimensions to the interplay of the state and capital in the 
media field" (Lee, 2001: 14) and "power and capital have developed a new dialectical 
relationship" (Lee, 2004: 133). Since the lifting of martial law and the termination of 
the Publication Law, the mass media (electronic and printed) has experienced 
spectacular growth. There were 110 cable system operators legally registered in the 
Government Information Office (GIO) in 1998. The number of cable channels has 
shot up to over 100 channels, including ten Taiwan-based 24-hour news channel with 
live broadcasting (Fell, 2005). The cable penetration rate had skyrocketed from 16.1 
percent in 1990 to over 80 percent by 2000, the highest in Asia (see Chiu& 
Chan-Olmsted, 1999; Copper, 2003; Fell, 2005). Internet penetration reached 36% of 
the population (53% household) by mid-2002.221 Moreover, there were only 33 radio 
stations in 1993, which increased to 142 by 2000. "In 2001, there were 454 
newspapers, 7,236 magazines, and 7,810 publishing companies in Taiwan, all 
statistics nearly double those of a decade earlier" (Copper, 2003: 24). 
This data is evidence that there is sufficient freedom of information flow and media 
liberalization in Taiwan. There is no particular ideology that can't be discussed in the 
mass media-even separatism or communism. Hence, the media freedom has reached a 
similar standard to the advanced western countries. Cable subscribers can receive 
221 See http: // \v xy\y-. blue. line s. flu. edu. t«v 
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national news programs from at least 17 different channels, that still have not include 
local news channels and foreign news from CNN. CBS, IBC, NHK and the BBC 
(Chiu & Chan-Olmsted, 1999). Furthermore, under market principles, the mass media 
(electronic or printed) in Taiwan have been forced to operate following a more neutral 
standpoint and have ceased to be mouthpieces for the state or any particular party. The 
mass media have learned to specialize in providing in-depth political coverage, and to 
report the political speeches, activities and agendas of all political persuasions (Fell, 
2005). The best example of this market-led principle working was evidenced by 
several cases of political parties failed attempts to establish affiliation and host 
themselves with some cable businesses. 222 However, Taiwanese "are highly 
suspicious of the media content when there is an ownership interest" (Chiu & 
Chan-Olmsted, 1999: 504) due to the historical consequential bias of the media in the 
authoritarian era. 
As a result, the effect of such expanded airtime and more balanced reporting on 
political campaigns was a more balanced amount of coverage and airtime to different 
parties. Political call-in talk shows and candidate debates on numerous cable channels 
in particular enjoyed widespread popularity and impacted on the results of various 
elections. Hence, cable TV networks made themselves into not only alternatives to the 
traditional TV stations but also demonstrated the power to inform the public (Chiu & 
Chan-Olmsted, 1999; Fell, 2005). As a conduit of a power structure for social control, 
the monopoly on communication resources used by the pre-democratic state had 
obviously eroded and weakened in the force of media pluralism. Moreover, the mass 
media did not only confine themselves to political issues. The programs provided by 
the electronic media were quite internationalized. 223 These multiple-cultures programs 
broadened the Taiwanese world view, and also reshaped their self-image and identity. 
2" These failed cases included the KNIT-operated cable news network, Po-Hsin Channel (1997); the 
DPP's Democratic Cable television system (1997); and some pro-DPP small- capital TV networks. 
Too salient or radical political positions caused the loss of viewers, and consequently loss of 
advertising income that finally led to withdrawal from the market. Hence, even a party-run channel 
has to filter out content that may be a liability in the viewers' eyes in order to survive (Chiu & 
Chan-Olmsted, 1999). 
223 The programs on Cable TV mainly include those received as spillover signals from Japanese, 
Indonesian, Hong-Kong, Chinese and other satellite broadcasters, and American pay channels (see 
Lee, 2004). 
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The media in Taiwan has confirmed itself as a market-driven industry since the late 
1990s. 
In sum, in the process of ideological emancipation and democratization, the 
liberalization of the media and communication means has contributed to and 
facilitated changing the political landscape. Lee argues that Taiwanese media 
discourse "have been narrowly confined to electoral politics, faction fights, ethnic 
conflict and anti-China sentiments" (Lee, 2001: 13) rather than other issues. Some 
scholars are even pessimistic on the pluralistic media will lead to fragmented attitudes 
on national identity (Lee, 2001; Rawnsley, 2000; Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2001,2003). 
However, I see media liberalization from a more optimistic point of view. Democracy 
needs a long road of initiation to consolidate itself The fragmented debates and 
pluralism reveal that Taiwanese civil society has developed growing capacity and 
sober reflexivity to reflect on difficult situations, international or domestic, it 
confronts. The disappearance of overly pro-party cable channels demonstrates this 
point. 
From political and social perspectives, up to the first suffrage election of the president 
in 1996, the major agendas of social movements and media liberalization were 
confined to debates within institutionalized struggles. In this early period, after 
martial law, the communication means and accesses were gradually freed from the 
hands of the government. Critics in the various social movements rose together to 
challenge the political, economical and social injustices and inequities carries out by 
the authoritarian single-party state regime that had suppressed civil society for four 
decades. Democracy and justice were the highlighted goals. However, social stability 
and political security were still the major concerns of civil society. Hence, these 
movements were confined within a controllable range with a progressive pace 
towards innovations on related policy. 
However, in the later period (1996-2000), after the first president was elected through 
inclusive suffrage in 1996, democracy was gradually consolidated and 
institutionalized. The first presidential election provoked pervasive discussions on 
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soverei dtv and Taiwan's international status. The competitions between political 
parties become fiercely intensive: the interest groups began the omnifarious lobbying 
common to representative democracies (Cheng & Chu, 1999). To consolidate its 
leading position, the KMT government got involved in numerous corruption scandals 
including illegal sharing of interests with its clients, pork-barrel politics, vote buying, 
rent-seeking activities and gangsters-related crimes. These scandals eventually 
incurred the resentment of civil society and this sentiment reached a head in 2000.2 '4 
As Roy (2003) indicates it was domestic issues such as social welfare, corruption and 
law and order, not cross-strait relations that led to the defeat of the KMT in 2000 and 
the handover of power to the DPP. 
From the perspective of civil society, the transition of authority power also 
demonstrated that ideological emancipation empowered by the media liberalization 
coupled with the growing autonomous power of political (military) and economic 
power resources all contributed giving Taiwanese civil society the reflexivity to 
decide its future. Media pluralism contributed to the emancipation from an 
authoritarian ideology; and media liberalization builds up civil society with power of 
reflexivity to resist the penetration and intervention of the KMT. Both of them 
empower civil society with more autonomous power and reflexive dynamic in the 
process of democracy consolidation. 
6.1.2 The glorious economic growth coupled with inequity and unbalance 
224 Several horrified politician-gangster-related crimes happened after 1994: One gangster leader was 
shot, in front of his mother, by the Pingtung County Council speaker, Cheng Tai-chi (KMT), for being 
unable to hand over a `protection fee' for his illegal casino in 1994. The worst gang related political 
assassination and mass-murder in Taiwan history occurred in 1996. The magistrate of Tao-yuan 
County, Liu Pang-yu (KMT) and eight associates were shot in their head in Liu's home. Following 
this case was the rape and murder of a prominent feminist Peng Wan-Ju in the same year. These two 
cases remain unclosed up tp today. A gang's spiritual adviser Luo Fu-tsu won a position as 
as-chairman of the Legislative Yuan's judicial committee, 1997. Legislator Liao Hsueh-kuang was 
kidnapped and imprisoned in a dog cage in a remote mountain area after he publicly criticized gangs 
leaders and harmed gang interest in 1997. In 1999, in the tremendous 921 earthquake, over 3000 
people died at the moment of earthquake which property damage of million of people. The KMT 
government was seen as being unable to handle the disaster and incapable of rescuing people 
from 
homelessness and hunger. The KMT lost power in Mar. 2000 (see Fell, 2005; Roy, 2003). 
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This subsection will be divided into two parts to elucidate two main pre-setting 
criteria in Table 2.1 (p. 82-3) to evaluate the economic power resources of civil 
society. One concerns income levels; the other is educational levels. In the first part, I 
will explore the income-related problems not simply from the ostensible meaning of 
statistic-generalized data, e. g. GNP or economic growth rates; rather I will delve into 
other social or income related index and data to uncover the deepened reality that lay 
behind the surfaced economic data. According to the first part analysis, the second 
part of this subsection, I will expatiate how education and economic prosperity 
combined to strength elements of civil society and raised expectations on the part of 
citizens, and how they facilitate resistance of civil society to the state in the late 
1990s. 
6.1.2.1 The social welfare demands arose after the democratization and 
industrialization 
As highlighted in the Table 5.2 (p. 192), Taiwan maintained impressive economic 
growth through the last two decades of the 20th century. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, the KMT government did well in providing the private sectors with a 
sustainable business environment and infrastructures for competing in the global 
market. This economic prosperity and low unemployment rate continued to be 
maintained through the whole of the 1990s. However, these pro-market prerequisites 
were established on institutional distortions that inhibited organized labour unions, 
suppressed civil rights and sacrificed civil welfare rights in a package of 
development-purported policies (Chu, 1996; Huang, 1995a, 1995b, 2002). Therefore, 
Taiwanese economic growth was based on a symbiosis and co-alliance relationship 
between the state and capitalists, although this relationship was "vertical- 
asymmetrically interdependent" and "unequal" (Huang, 2002: 3), since the state 
played a decisive and leading role over the private sector. In the hierarchic 
constellation in Figure 4.5 (p. 160), the state-party and domestic enterprises squeezed 
civil society and the labouring classes to impose their intended policies for economic 
development. 
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Consequently. economic growth enriched civil society and it fed back political 
legitimacy to the state. Social policy was subordinated to supply-side considerations 
and it was taken for granted that social risks were supposed to be absorbed by 
households (family). As such, even though these weak actors were excluded from the 
state-capital symbiosis, they still formed a broad distributional coalition and firm 
social base that benefited from the state-capital symbiosis and supported the KMT 
regime. The peasants were gratified by land-reform and the agricultural subsidy policy, 
and workers were satisfied with full employment and increasing wages. 225 Warfare 
and international support provided legitimacy for the state to develop into a "Listian 
workfare state" by 1980 (Jessop, 1999: 32). Therefore, distribution problems and civil 
social rights were minimized and repressed `smoothly' under the overarching 
developmentalism. However, as the democratization was conductive to the political 
participation of actors that had previously been excluded from state-capital symbiosis, 
the distribution and urbanized problems became catalysts to challenge the KMT's 
accumulation and social policy (Bosco, 1998). 
During the period of export-oriented industrialization, domestic consumptions were 
suppressed by high-interest and low-wage policies. The state encouraged investment 
and reinvestment activities for furthering capital accumulation, but strictly limited 
domestic consumption (Sum, 2002). Hence, the high saving rates and high foreign 
exchange reserves by 1990 were unsurprising. As indicated in Table 5.2 (p. 192), there 
was a tripling in the growth of Taiwanese per capita GNP from 1987 (5,298 US $) to 
2000 (14,214 US $ ); the GDP growth rate kept climbing steadily and the 
unemployment average remained low during the same period. 
However, what these statistics do not show is the dark side of this egalitarian and 
wealthy developmental state. As democratization speeded in the late 1980s, the 
distribution issue became more vital for the legitimation of the KMT regime. Coupled 
with the rapid economic growth, the gaps between income levels enlarged and the 
redistribution problem was exacerbated. Demands on social welfare and income 
225 That's why Evans refers that economic growth is far more than welfare and distribution 
in the 
developing countries (Evans, 1995). 
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distribution problems forced the KMT party-state to change its pro-capitalist and 
low-wage policy. 
Table 6.2 synthesizes indexes related to civil society from 1987-2000. Urbanization 
and distribution problems became compounded into more difficult situations for the 
KMT government to confront after political liberalization (Bosco, 1998). Some 
difficulties began to emerge that could not be resolved by the workfare developmental 
legacies in a democracy. As investigated in 5.2.2.2 (p. 194), the agricultural sector 
share in GDP decreased sharply from 5.5% in1987 to near 2.0% in 2000, and the ratio 
of the agricultural sector in employment remained stable from 8.5% to 7% 2000; the 
agricultural population was over 17% in 2000 (Li, 2004). Hence, the agricultural 
population can play a decisive role in various elections. On the other hand, the 
increase in the urban population and low-waged manufacturing workers also became 
an important base for the KMT to maintain its legitimation in a transformative 
democratic regime during the same period. Hence, both of these groups that were 
excluded from the KMT's state-capital symbiosis before began to be empowered with 
bargaining capacities vis-a-vis the government. 
Therefore, the KMT government was forced to compromise with these formerly weak 
groups in society and promised to expand welfare and social security policies to these 
constituencies in exchange for their loyalty. However, the strategies KMT chose were 
not to transfer these welfare costs to the capitalists or increase the tax burden on the 
bourgeoisie and middle class. In order to win elections, "the state has fluctuated 
openly back and forth from the capital's demand for a growth-oriented productivist 
state to labour's welfare state" (Huang, 2002: 16). Obviously, it attempted to assume a 
taking all in strategy that could simultaneously satisfy both capitalists and the weak 
classes (Huang, 2002a, 2002b). 226 
226 The KMT party-state began to "be caught in and oscillated between pro-capital and pro-labour 
policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s". (Huang, 2002: 16). 
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all level of Government GDP 







1987 20.8 16.1 1.29 2.28 15.59 4.69 8.76 
1988 20.3 18.2 5.36 4.11 17.11 4.85 8.34 
1989 17.0 12.7 -23.67 5.10 18.28 4.95 7.98 
1990 20.7 18.6 -0.47 4.83 19.04 5.18 7.59 
1991 22.6 18.8 -17.69 5.84 17.76 4.97 7.15 
1992 20.8 18.8 -19.49 11.14 18.83 5.24 6.84 
1993 19.9 18.2 -19.36 14.22 17.81 5.42 6.59 
1994 20.9 19.2 -17.72 14.79 17.98 5.38 6.26 
1995 18.7 21.7 -18.36 16.38 17.00 5.34 5.99 
1996 20.3 26.9 -13.00 16.71 15.30 5.38 5.68 
1997 20.0 28.9 -9.26 17.35 16.24 5.41 5.34 
1998 20.7 27.4 3.05 15.95 15.24 5.51 5.08 
1999 20.9 26.9 -2.22 14.61 14.19 5.50 4.72 
2000 20.9 28.7 -11.34 25.64 13.76 5.55 4.45 
Sources: http: //www. dcbas. 
gov. 
tw 
Note: The distribution of income is calculated by the ratio of the highest fifth's household incomes to 
the lowest fifth's household incomes. 
Table 6.2 clearly indicates, even though the social security expenditure almost 
doubled from 16.1% (1987) to 28.7% (2000); the tax burden share in GDP remained 
at the same level during the whole 1990s. By the eve of the presidential election in 
2000, tax revenue and the tax ratio was even reduced to 13.76% to please the voters. 
As Huang further identifies, not only did the revenue extraction capacity of the 
Taiwanese state obviously declined after 1987, the ratio of tax to GNP was much 
lower than other developing countries. Moreover, the tax resource enjoyed by levying 
on monopoly goods gradually slumped from 7.1 % to 2.8% in the same period (Huang, 
2002; 2003). Further, in order to survive in the competitive global market, reductions 
on custom duties and indirect taxes were indispensable policy tools for Taiwanese 
national developmentalism. 227 In sum, the state capacities for resource extraction and 
227 The tax resource share from direct taxes was 26.8% in 1987, and it climbed to 
37.6% in 2000. The 
share of income tax was 19.8% in 1987, and increased to 31.6% in 2000. 
However, the income tax 
rate remained stable across the 1990s and even was reduced from 
1997 to 2000. Hence, tax bases 
shrank from both indirect and direct taxes. However, the scale of the revenue pie was enlarged 
in the 
same period for welfare policy and infrastructural construction. 
That's why Taiwan turned itself from 
a revenue surplus state to a debited state with high revenue 
deficit within a decade. See http: // 
Nv ýý ýý. gbas. gov. tw ; The statistic data of Ministry of Finance, 
2003. 
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materials mobilization and accumulation decreased tremendously during 
democratization and globalization- That is to say the Taiwanese developmental state 
failed to continue in its most important capacity of implementing revenue extraction 
by any measures. 
In this situation, the increased spending for these social security expenditures and 
other supply-side policies were confined two financial resources. One was to increase 
the budget deficit; the other was to request the private sector, mostly SMEs, to 
contribute to insurance and pension funds for labour (see Bosco, 1998). In Table 6.2, 
there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate how the Taiwanese developmental state 
with an abundant capital surplus in the 1980s turned into a `welfare state' with 
increasing deficits due to expenditure and outstanding debt since its democratization. 
In sum, from a macro-economic perspective, the economic growth rate and increase 
of GNP demonstrate that the economy as a whole performed well during 1987-2000. 
The economic growth of the Taiwanese developmental state was impressive on the 
surface. However, capital accumulation was mainly centralized into the hands of the 
capitalists and middle class. However, democracy -inevitably coupled with demands 
for redistribution and expansion on social welfare (see Olson, 2006). What the state 
just simply repressed and ignored during the authoritarian regime began to challenge 
the legitimation of the KMT party-state. 
6.1.2.2 The rising demands of civil welfare rights and the consolidation of democracy 
The expansions of social security and welfare did not resolve but merely mitigated 
social tension caused by the marginalization of the agricultural sector and the growing 
unemployment in labour-intensive sectors that had gradually lost competitive 
advantages in the global market. Table 6.3 profiles the distribution by district of 
elderly pension receivers from 1998-2001. It provides a generalized demographic 
profile of Taiwanese agriculture. As indicated, the more the district engaged in 
agricultural activities the percentage of elderly «who benefited from the pension 
226 
project increase in the same district. 228 As emphasized in Chapter Four. the 
mass-media did not have much influence on ideology at the grassroots level since 
most of them were illiterate or not well-educated. However, they were loyal audiences 
for the illegal short-range radio stations that generally ran medical business services 
and broadcasted anti-KMT propaganda during their working hours on air. 229 Most of 
these illegal stations were supporters of the DDP (Lee, 2000). Hence, the DDP were 
able to take credit for `accomplishments of various opposition movements' including 
pension projects. Most of the peasants believe it is the DPP who take care of them 
(Rigger, 1999; Roy 2003). They deeply believe that without the DPP the struggle to 
launch the welfare agenda, would have been impossible for the KMT to compromise 
on their welfare-expansion policy. 
Seen from a generalized profile, the average pensioner ratio fluctuated approximately 
from 39% to 43% (about 2 million) of the elderly during 1994-2000. Table 6.3 also 
presents the ratio of pensioners by districts. It clearly shows that the ratio of 
pensioners in agricultural districts was far more than those in northern district. 
However, the population of the northern districts was far beyond the other districts. 230 
The statistic data also reveals that household income level of northern districts is 
higher than other districts. The northern population centralization is caused by the 
Taipei metropolitan and area some industrialized cities clustered there. These cities 
are mainly engaged in commercial, service, light and high-technology industries that 
attract highly educated people to stay. 
By contrast, agricultural activities, labour-intensive industries and SMEs are centered 
mainly in the south and central districts or the margins of northern districts. These 
`"g The Taiwanese pensioners project (including elderly peasants) here indicates those were excluded 
from the `national civil service pensioners project' and `military pensioners project', e. g. peasants, 
temporary and unskilled labour, and the unemployed population. Hence, it is a pervasive civil 
pensioner project. 
229 By the end of 1997, there were still an estimated 80-90 underground illegal radio stations that defied 
state policy. Most of them were in the southern and central districts (see Rawnsley & Ra vnsley, 2000, 
2001). Technically, it was difficult to deter them from operating on illegal frequencies. 
230 The major dwellers in the East district are aborigines and retired KMT soldiers from mainland 
China. 
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areas were particularly vulnerable to SMEs pollution because the government did not 
monitor the sitiuation in the countryside (Tang & Tang. 1997). Further, the level of 
human resources in these districts was obviously lower than those in the north district. 
In 1988, more than four thousand farmers from southern and central districts gathered 
for a street demonstration in Taipei. They requested health insurance, the lowering of 
prices of government-supplied fertilizer and protested about the KMT's compromise 
over the US dumping agricultural products (Roy, 2003). The asymmetric development 
between rural and urban districts had led to different demands on social welfare 
provisions and feelings of being excluded among the weak classes. It can be definitely 
inferred that welfare provisions mean more to the southerners than to the northerners. 
This also can be used to explain why the DPP have won a lot more local authority 
elections in the southern and central districts than in northern since 1990. 
The illiteracy ratio, as shown in Table 5.2 (p. 192), had been reduced from 9.18% in 
1987 to 4.52% in 2000. Moreover, the percentage of students in higher education had 
increased from 86.02% in 1991 to 98.32% in 2000. That means that teenagers who 
have not had a higher education (college, university and above) degree are 
exceptional since 1990. Having a well-educated populace not only contributes to the 
economic system but also consolidates democracy. Moreover, the pluralistic media 
and new communication technology accelerated the spread of democratic ideas. Civil 
society had progressed from requesting expansion of their political rights to 
demanding welfare rights. Table 6.4 shows the number of strikes in Taiwan from 1984 
to 1998. As a result of upgraded educational levels, secondary and tertiary workers 
were no more satisfied with repressed wages that did not reflect the real economic 
growth of Taiwan. They saw no reason to suppress wage levels for capitalist interests. 
As Chu argues "democratization, in conferring on workers the formal prerogative of 
pursuing their rights, open a Pandora's box of labour conflicts that confronted the 
state and capital directly"(Chu, 1996: 506-7). The purposes of most strikes or disputes 
were demands for wage increase and end-of-year bonuses (Buchanan & Nicholls, 
2003; Chu, 1996). 
Just as SMEs were forced to move overseas massively for cost considerations, Taiwan 
228 
Rot entrance into GATT in 1992. This impacted tremendously on the export sectors 
and domestic market. For most SMEs, cost reduction is the most important 
competitive strategy for their survival in the global market . 
231 The owners of SMEs in 
Taiwan are generally categorized as middle class in civil society and are generally 
well-educated. As analyzed in Chapter Five, as the investment environment in Taiwan 
became no longer stable, low-cost or secure for the SMEs, they voted with their feet, 
resisting the state constraints on investing in China. This shoes that the sound 
socio-economic base provided by the KMT developmental regime helped forge their 
autonomous strategies according to their own interests and benefits. As SMEs moved 
overseas, a rising ratio on unemployment in labour-intensive industries was inevitable 
and severely struck the economic base of rural districts, especially the southern and 
central districts. The struggles between capitalists and labour also meant one of the 
most important prerequisites of a developmental model had eroded or weakened at 
least, due to globalization. 
As Hsiao and Winckler point out the most notable feature of Taiwan are the 
differences between the rural and urban systems rather than the class division within 
theme; as class consciousness had not yet developed by the end of the 1980s (Hsiao, 
1990; Winckler, 1992). From the data shown in Table 6.3, it is reasonable to infer the 
unbalanced (asymmetrical) development and urbanization problems such as the 
marginalization, unemployment, redistribution or social- welfare provisions coupled 
along with modernization might encourage a strong desire for increased domestic 
consumption. The parallels are just like the `hollowing out effect' for business 
discussed in 5.2.2.2 (p. 194). Depending on various measures of social welfare, the 
weakest classes (labour and peasants) in the southern and central districts might easily 
be propagandized or manipulated by a partisan `inseparable preference package'232 
that attempts to bracket welfare provisions with other political purposes. 
23' The owner-operators business mode of SMEs means the Taiwanese private sectors are decentralized 
and also implies they are flexible on entrance or exit in markets and find it easier to reallocate their 
plants overseas. 
232 I should thank my Ph. D. colleague Dr. Min Sue for discussing the concept of `inseparable 
preferences package' with me. 
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There is a lot of research on the Taiwanese labour movements that posits that the class 
stratification effect in Taiwan was not significant since labour unions and 
organizations were and are still not well organized. The weak labour unions were 
excluded from the decision-making process even after the lifting of martial law 
(Huang, 1995,2002). 233 Hence, low-skilled or unskilled labour in Taiwan has played 
only a marginal, insignificant role in the political and social processes (Chu, 1996). 
The only avenue for them to press for their interests was through the universal 
suffrage of a democracy. Table 6.4 shows number of strikes from 1984 to 1998, and it 
can be seen that from the numbers of strikes and workers involved increased 
dramatically. However, the causes of most labour strikes were wage disputes, not 
issues of class struggle (Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003, Huang, 2002). 
Table-6.3 The ratio of aged pensioner, population and household income level by 
districts, 1998-2000.234 
Year District Ratio of 
Aged Pensioners 
Vs. Aged Dwelle 
Household Income(NT$) 
(District Ave. per Year) 
rs(%) 
The populace ratio 
of district (%)_ 
1998 North 15.72% 1,387,287 44.77% 
Middle 49.12% 1,000,364 22.06% 
South 42.34% 931,033 30.25% 
East 48.17% 816,447 2.89% 
1999 North 27.78% 1,229,092 43.22% 
Middle 57.19% 1,037,709 25.45% 
South 49.06% 933,248 28.57% 
East 52.93% 835,295 2.74% 
2000 North 30.14% 1,260,108 43.24% 
Middle 60.30% 968,878 25.41% 
South 51.06% 977,874 28.59% 
East 56.87% 884,611 2.75% 
Source: Calculated from http: //www. dgbas. gov. tw 
233 As the special flexibility and production mode of SMEs, most of the labour in these 
businesses are 
in temporary-offered positions and can not to organize or mobilize themselves, especially women 
without special skills. 
234 The aged began to be included in formal governmental statistical data after 1998. see 
http: // 
wwwv. dgbas. gov. tw/dgbas03/bs8/city/Citylnside 1. asp 
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Table-6.4 Strikes in Taiwan, 1984-1998 
Year Number of strikes Number of workers involved 
1984 907 9,000 
1985 1,443 15,000 
1986 1,485 11,000 
1987 1,609 16,000 
1988 1,314 24.000 
1989 1,943 62,000 
1990 1,860 34,000 
1991 1,810 13,000 
1992 1,803 12,000 
1993 1,878 38,000 
1994 2,061 31,000 
1995 2,271 27,000 
1996 2,659 22,000 
1997 2,600 81,000 
1998 4,138 104,000 
Source: Jooueon Jeong, Foreign Labour Statistical Figures, South Korean Labour 
Institute, 2000: 108-9, cited in Buchanan & Nicholls, 2003: 227. 
However, following Lee Teng-hui's, leader of the KMT, line of reasoning, the 
difficulties and miseries that Taiwanese confronted were mostly due to mainlanders' 
suppression or the diplomatic isolation by China's bullying (Hughes, 1997). The 
Taiwanese collective memories of exploitation and deprivation by mainland intruders 
and dissatisfactions with being marginalized from the `northern politico-economic 
center' controlled by mainlanders were enough for peasants and workers in southern 
districts to accept the `national security and Taiwanese identity' package posed by the 
KMT (late Lee Teng-hui Administration, 1995-2000) or the anti-KMT and anti-China 
strategy by the DPP. Hence, Taiwanese national identity was an artificial construct 
that embedded a number of contradictions. It attempted to suppress class and ethnic 
differences by emphasizing national unity around the cause of Taiwanese sovereignty 
(Hughes, 1997). 
The Taiwanese identity issue has provoked many academic and practical discussions, 
however few of them to reveal the realities on how it was forged within a decade 
(1992-2000). Too much of them draw attention to the "inherited rivalry" (see Cheng, 
Huang and Wu, 1995) between Taiwan and China and the significance of the new 
emerging Taiwanese identity (Hughes, 1997). However, the debate is difficult to map, 
as overlapping positions conceal a clear divide between the protagonists 
in the debate. 
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To these contributors, the focus on `high politics' seem to provide more persuasive 
answers to apply to the newly emerging issue of Taiwanese identity and reflect the 
hostile cross-straits situation. However, I do not agree with this simplification of the 
Taiwanese identity issue by confining it with discussion on high politics, especially 
those with an international slant. As Lee and Hsu point out, there was no significant 
evidence of the rise of southern politic in Taiwan (Lee &Hsu, 2001). It would be more 
appropriate to suggest that southern constituencies might swing more in various 
elections according to their preferences and interests. The growing support for 
opposition parties does not equate to support of independence. As such, it is the 
expectations on `equity', `equality' and `autonomy' and feeling of marginalization, but 
not Taiwanese national identity that brought the labour and peasants onto the same 
road to against the KMT or China. 
As mentioned earlier, the cross-straits and Taiwanese identity issues are not the major 
points in this thesis. I do not downplay the importance of these discussions. I am 
attempting to provide a more deliberated insight on how the primary developmental 
model and its constructive prerequisites had incurred the unintended and unpredicted 
consequence of developing the lower social classes. This can alter the orientation of a 
representative democracy. It also can change the domestic constituency for a state's 
foreign policy (Putnam, 1988). 
One facet of the authoritarian developmental state was suppression on various civil 
rights, especially those of labour and peasants for social mobilization under 
nationalism. However, in a representative democracy, these mass social constituents 
are vital for the legitimation of the state especially on the redistribution issue. 
However, redistribution by means of transfer or welfare policies was not the panacea 
for resolving the problem of social resistance. The failure of the KMT in 2000 
demonstrates this point. Therefore, if the government can not resolve the 
contradictions between development and democracy and between accumulation and 
redistribution, there will be no reason to believe the developmental state model can 
continue. That is to say the points are how the state can rejuvenate its economic 
strategy and whether it can forge a new mode of governance. As said, national 
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security and welfare policy might probably mitigate social risks however they are not 
antidotes to the substantial crises the developmental state faces. 
6.1.3 The emancipation of civil society from military and political dominance 
The lifting of martial law signified that Taiwanese had made positive progress 
towards civil political, ideological and economic autonomous powers that were free 
from any inward military censorship and oppression. Before the deregulation, there 
were some spontaneous and de-politicized social movements that kept the distance 
from the DPP in the mid-1980s. However, the booming social movements and street 
demonstrations were inevitably aligned with DPP strategies in the 1990s since they 
shared a common target-the authoritative KMT regime. Covered with "the political 
opposition movement, the social movement aimed to transform authoritarian rule and 
its policies" (Shiau, 1999: 109). However, it was not until the rewriting of Article 100 
of the Criminal Code and the abolition of the TGC in 1992 that ordinary civilians and 
intellectuals began to be confident of their own safety and citizenship rights in 
participation in the street demonstrations. As such, street demonstrations and social 
movements began to flourishing and pluralistically develop in the 1990s. 
As mentioned previously the purported objectives of most social movements were 
confined to their requests within the institutional arrangements. "There was a dividing 
line between the political and social protest movements" (Fulda, 2002: 376). Civil 
society chose an incremental strategy of involution but not revolution (Hsiao, 1990). 
Hsiao further identifies this as "the most significant collective sentiment expressed in 
most of the emerging social movements has been a feeling of `victim consciousness', 
the `feeling of being ignored and excluded"' (Hsiao, 1990: 178). Investigations of the 
agendas of various social movements from the mid-1980s to 2000, revealed that civil 
society was concerned more with social security issues than political ones. The most 
significant cases were those that concerned to environmental pollution, nuclear power, 
labour rights, aboriginal rights, farmers rights and `anti-black-money politics" (gang, 
crime and corruption) movements. Some significant cases are discussed below. 
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6.1.3.1 Anti-pollution movements 
Along with economic growth, Taiwan suffered from serious environmental 
degradation from the 1970s. However, the degradation did not get much attention in 
the initial years since local residents were benefiting from the fast pace of 
industrialization. Protecting the environment had been a low priority during the early 
decades of KMT rule. The construction of large, polluting factories gave the 
inhabitants around them more stable opportunities of employment. Residents in rural 
or less developed districts welcomed and celebrated these constructions in their local 
communities without resistance. It was not until the early 1980s, that widespread 
dissatisfaction with environmental degradation began to surface (Roy, 2003; Tang & 
Tang, 1997). From 1986 to 2000, large scale anti-pollution protest movements came 
up against state economic policy. In the era of martial law, it was impossible for 
citizens to initiate protest movements against the government; any protest resulted in 
prosecution on charge of sedition or violation of national security. 
In 1986, the environmental protest movement began to emerge when the citizens in 
Lukang (central Taiwan) protested that their hometown would be degraded by the 
construction of DuPont petrochemical plant. The result of a DuPont incident was 
DuPont's voluntary withdrawal of construction plans. Taiwanese began to learn that if 
citizens are determined and well-organized, they can achieve their collective 
objectives (Tang & Tang, 1997). However, it also signified that the KMT 
gover ment's authority had been challenged by the citizen's autonomous will. There 
was vigorous resistance to the construction of the fifth naphtha cracker in the southern 
city of Kaohsiung in 1988; the construction of the sixth naphtha cracker invested in by 
Formosa Plastic and Petrochemical Group in I-lan (east-north district) in 1986, the 
local anti-nuclear referendums on the forth nuclear power plant in Taipei and Ilan 
counties in 1994; and the construction of an upstream chemical materials plant by 
Bayer in 1997 in Tai-chung County (Ho, 2003; Roy, 2003; Tang & Tang, 1997; Wright, 
1999). In all these cases, the citizens won. As a result of confronting frustration to 
construct the naphtha cracker, Formosa Plastic and Petrochemical Group moved the 
new plant project to southeastern China, 
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The successes of these cases depended on cooperation between local government, 
opposition parties and citizens. As such, these cases presented severe challenges to 
KMT authority because the protests were all directed at major industrial projects 
supported by all major economic ministries. The targets of these protests were 
state-owned enterprises or big private enterprises supported by the KMT regime. 235 
The success of these movements explicitly signified that the KMT had begun to lose 
`deposit' power on controlling economic policy, materials mobilization, local 
authority, and civil society. Democratization opened access to formal processes, such 
as participating in electoral politics and directly lobbying legislators who represent 
local interests. Moreover, the implicit meaning of the state's defeat in these cases was 
that the penetration of KMT's Leninist organization was waning in the new 
democracy. The absolute vertically hierarchic authority of the KMT also began to 
dismantle. In this sense, it deserves to be asked: if a developmental state loses its 
capacity to implement its major economic or industrial policies, is it still a 
developmental state? 
6.1.3.2 The student `Month of March movement' in 1990 
The Tiananmen Square incident in mainland China in1989 cast a heavy stone into the 
political pond in Taipei. As Lee Teng-hui assumed post as president, he confronted 
with a power struggle between intra-party factions. Since most seats in the Legislative 
Yuan and National Assembly had long been occupied by the mainland-elected senior 
legislators, their hostility toward the native Taiwanese president was to be expected. 
As they voted to give the members in both institutions a substantial raise236 and 
elected a ninety-three-year-old chairman in 1990, the anger and 
fear of civil society 
came to a head (Roy, 2003). Images of these senior legislators and parliamentarians 
235 As usual, the original plan of the KMT was to control the upstream petrochemical material, 
however 
the failure of these constructions caused great impact and challenge on 
KNIT's authority. These 
long-seated members "met only once every six years unless called 
for a special sessions. However, 
they collected an annual salary equivalent to US $43,000, plus up to 
$250 per diem «hile the assembly 
was in session" (Roy, 2003: 190). 
'36 These long-seated members "met only once every six years unless called 
for a special sessions. 
However, they collected an annual salary equivalent to US S43,000, plus up to 
$250 per diem while the 
assembly was in session" (Roy, 2003: 190). 
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carrying breathing inhalers or syringes (most over 90 year-old) preparing to revive the 
constitution and getting involved in fierce verbal or even physical clashes with 
opposition partisans were repeatedly broadcast on TV. Many citizens were horrified 
and it engendered great anger and hatred in society. Concerned with the possibility of 
KMT domination by conservative mainlanders with military backgrounds and fears of 
returning to military authoritarianism, university students donned headbands carrying 
political slogan and began to occupy the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park and went on 
hunger strikes and sit-ins (Roy, 2003; Wright, 1999). 
It was estimated that over thirty thousand students participated in the Month of March 
movement, from both senior high schools and universities. They demanded the 
abolition of the National Assembly, the Temporary Provisions, the retirement of the 
mainlander parliamentarians elected for life, constitutional reforms and a schedule for 
political liberalization and a national affairs conference (Hughes, 1997; Roy, 2003). 
The movement supported by numerous citizens, journalists, the mass media, 
celebrities, professors, the DPP, and even the young reformers in the KMT (Roy, 
2003). 
The student movement inspired widespread imitation in society. Finally, the Council 
of Grand Justices sealed the seats of the mainland-elected members of the National 
Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan in 1990 and forced them to retire by the 
end of 1991. The Constitutional Temporary Provision was abolished in 1991. 
Members of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan were directly elected by 
residents of Taiwan area in 1991-2, and the first direct presidential election was held 
in March of 1996 (Hughes, 1997; Roy, 2003; Wright, 1999). 
6.1.3.3 Protests against crime and the anti-gangsters movement 
The resentment toward the KMT in society culminated when a famous TV show 
hostess's seventeen-year-old daughter was kidnapped and murdered by a gang in 1996 
(Roy, 2003). As most of the police budget went toward not control and protection of 
officials rather than preventing crimes against ordinary civilians, added to the 
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increasing rate of child kidnappings (just behind the Philippines as highest in the 
world) and `black-money' corruption the public's fear, anger and outrage was 
understandable. President Lee responded to this by saying "the ROC's foreign 
relations were more important than the death of a schoolgirl" to the KMT's Central 
Standing Committee. What seemed important to Lee was how to consolidate his own 
political power and how to forge a new Taiwanese identity (Roy, 2003). 237 Lee's 
statement evoked fury in society. 
At the end of 1996, ten of thousands of citizens took part in a spontaneous and 
un-mobilized street protest in Taipei. The dissatisfaction toward Lee's Administration 
caused upheaval. The Justice Minister, Ma Ying-juo (the current KMT chairman since 
2005), resigned his cabinet post and said he felt ashamed to a part of a government 
that can not protect civilians from crime and fear (see Roy, 2003). In 2000, the KMT 
was defeated in a presidential election by the DPP. The reflective democracy was 
consolidated with full civil and political, and limited welfare rights for civil society. 
6.1.4 Conclusion-the compartmented trajectories of IEMP power networks in civil 
society 
Democratization is an inclusive process in which various social forces are integrated 
into the political process in their spatio-temporal contexts. The compartmented 
trajectories inside civil society in Taiwan were evidence that state-society relations are 
dynamic; however the relations of power resources of social actors are contingently 
established on unintended or unpredictable intervening effects (Bosco, 1998). The 
evidence presented in the former sections shows that citizen rights in Taiwan did not 
develop following a similar pace to Pierson's trajectories (Pierson, 1991). As a late 
developing state, citizen rights in Taiwan seemed to unfold in more compartmented 
trajectories. 
Reviewing these compartmentalized trajectories we can clearly see the evolution of 
237 Historical stature and consolidated political power were (are) Lee Teng-huff's greatest concerns, 
even his retire from president in 2000. 
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Taiwanese citizenship from limited citizenship based on constrained civil rights and 
the protection of private property in the 1950s. These constrained civil rights 
simultaneously were coupled with limited political rights (voting rights for local 
authorities and representatives) and social rights (labour and public employers' 
welfare). Under the commitment to developmentalism, social rights and welfare were 
reduced to a minimum. However, the earliest prevailing social right in Taiwan still 
remained compulsory free primary education launched by the Japanese colonized 
government, which the KMT government later expanded to the secondary high school 
(1968) and senior junior school (1988). The reason for heavy investment in social 
measures such as education and human resource training were the potential payback 
in terms of for economic productivity. As a whole, citizen rights were weakest in the 
1950s due to the strong party-state and limited capitalist class. This situation 
constructed a hierarchic power constellation that enabled the state to occupy a 
dominant position over private sector and civil society. 
Civil society, nurtured by the economic growth, began to become dissatisfies with 
limitations on civil and political rights, especially the Taiwanese inferior position to 
the mainlanders. These dissatisfactions were encouraged and stirred up by the 
underground guerrilla media and press in the late 1970s. Therefore, the struggle for 
more civil and political rights was concealed under a process of stable and speedy 
capital accumulation from vigorous exporting through the whole 1980s. However, as 
the movement against constrained political rights was precipitated by improvements 
in communicative technology and more economic autonomous power in late 1980s, 
the focus inevitably turned to calling for comprehensive political liberalization and 
freedom from inward military suppression. In this sense, the democratization of 
Taiwan was accomplished under pressure from both globalization and civil society. 
Under these circumstances, the political liberalization further brought in another wave 
of demands for the expansion of citizen rights from political and civil rights to the 
inclusion of welfare provisions and social security in the 1990s. 
As a whole, the development of Taiwanese citizenship rights progressed in segmented 
compartmentalized trajectories according to its specific spatio-temporal fixes. 
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However, in these compartmentalized trajectories, the destination of a capitalist 
democracy can be identified. In a capitalist democracy, without welfare provisions 
and security, citizen rights are not comprehensive. In the trajectories of Taiwanese 
citizenship, we can discern that civil society has fully fledged power resources in 
terms of ideological emancipation and political liberalization. However, it is still 
moderately weak against internal-military policies of the state and capitalist 
`exploitation' through globalization. These weaknesses give a chance for the state to 
implicitly bracket social preferences into other policy packages for political purposes 
or national security. Hence, the mission for continuing the developmental state model 
needs not only to resolve the economic problems (accumulation) but also should not 
exclude the redistribution problems concerning the legitimation of the state. 
limited limited 
-------* 
1987 2000 2001 0- 
Figure 6.1 Trajectory of Civil Society in IEMP, 1987-2000. 
Figure 6.1 shows the compartmentalized trajectories of Taiwanese civil society 
in 
IEMP model. In the IEMP power trajectories of civil society, civil society unfolded 
with limited political and economic power resources in the 1950s, 
but was without 
military- resistant power in the martial law era. As such, its 
ideological power was 
developed in a concealed approach hidden in growing economic power and the 
underground media. However, the economic power resources nurtured 
by the 
economic growth and the political power resources strengthened 
by the 





furthering ideological, political and economic liberalization and emancipation of civil 
society. The internal military intervention of the state is reduced but concealed within 
the normalized policy. The major economic power resources transferred from the state 
to the private sector that intensively integrates with the global market. 
Section 6.2: Resistance of the state to resistances 
Based on investigations of the changing power resources of resistance to the state (the 
international system, development of domestic capitalism and civil society), this 
section will set out to investigate the state's IEMP power resources and state 
resistance to social forces of resistances in the double squeezes of globalization and 
democracy. Both of them have cast challenges to the boundaries of the state in the 
orthodox developmental state model. 
As posed in Figure 2.3 (p. 75), there are four criteria for assessing state resistance: 
institutional inertia, path dependence, new trajectories and new mode of governance. 
The resistance of the state will be explored by delving into its IEMP power resources 
in terms of these criteria and the strategies the state deployed. As an active agent, the 
politicians are generally constrained by autonomous power resources and the capacity 
to implement their policies; however the state authorities and state strategies are 
improbably confined within these constraints since they might have other calculus and 
purposes beyond the visible intentions. 238 As such, from investigation of state's power 
resources we can infer the state's capacities and the scope of its resistance to its 
resistances. Moreover, the intentions of those in power can be discerned and identified 
through the preceding established criteria. As a whole, by scrutinizing power 
resources of the state and the criteria of its resistance, we can infer elements of 
continuity and discontinuity in the strategies of the developmental state. 
This section will proceed in five subsections. The first four subsections will in turn 
238 There are also gap between the intentions and capacities of state agency. The consequences of state 
strategies are generally contingent, unpredictable and unintended ones that 
beyond the control of the 
state (see Hay, 2002). 
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analyze the IEMP power resources and strategies of the state in responding to its 
resistance. The last subsection will posit a brief conclusion and delineate the 
trajectory of Taiwanese developmental state in IEMP model. 
6.2.1 The displacement of national developmentalism by ideological pluralism 
The dominant ideology of nationalism and developmentalism in Taiwan were eroded 
by double squeezes of international liberalism and democratization from the 
mid-1980. However, the hostile rivalry between Taiwan and China made rooms for 
warfare economic nationalism and provided a window of opportunity to forge a new 
national identity to `unify' a political coalition against countervailing domestic 
contradictions and power struggles. However, these intentions of the KMT authorities 
were challenged by the domestic enterprises, civil society and even those state 
bureaucrats who do not conform to stat imperatives. 
As mentioned earlier, the pluralistic mass media and alternative media gradually 
replaced the KMT party-state dominated media in the late 1980s. During the fierce 
KMT intra-party power struggle from 1990-1993, it can generally be seen that the 
state-party controlled big media-TV stations and newspapers affiliated with particular 
factions and reported their agendas favourably. By 1996, Lee's administration 
successfully deployed a `consolidation of democracy agenda' to challenge the 
mainlanders' advantageous political status by appealing to the Taiwanese collective 
memory of suppression (Leng, 2002; Roy, 2003). As such, the democratic innovations 
in reality bracketed concealed purposes to reduce the mainlanders' political, economic 
and military power resources. Moreover, these KMT strategies advocated by Lee 
generally aligned with the DPP's position and were repeatedly broadcast on state- 
owned or party-owned TV channels to mobilize wider spread social support. 
However, as Rawnsley & Raxvnsley identify that media liberalization since 1987 "has 
contributed more to the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan than to democracy 
itself' (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2001: 80). Media pluralism opens a public 
forum that 
encourages civic participation and nourishes a popular understanding of 
democratic 
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practice (Rawnsley & Rawnsley, 2001). Under competitive market-directed principles, 
technology facilitates the liberalization of media and communication means. A 
pluralistic media promotes individual freedom of choice on sources of information. 
Consolidation of democracy is also a process of constructing citizens' reflexivity that 
can reflect and scrutinize state's strategies and the intentions of leading statesmen. 
Hence, an ideological bracketing strategy will possibly not work well every time. 
Moreover, not only the KMT can propagate its policy but also the opposition parties, 
too: under the liberalization of media, ideological pluralism is expected. 
In a nutshell, the KMT's major political and ideological strategies in 1990s set out 
from a renewed overarching economic nationalism and national identity issues. Both 
of them were relied on legacies that tried to parcel the domestic process together with 
the threat of war and security concerns. However, as the KMT party-state was no 
longer able to monopolize resources of communication means (media), the state's 
capacity to control ideology was weakened. Based on evidence in the former section 
and preceding chapter, this shows it was not possible for the KMT to effectively 
mobilize (or demobilize) domestic enterprises and civil society as they did in the 
authoritative era, at the ideological level. On the contrary, the state policy-making 
process and politicians' behaviours were put under scrutiny by the mass media, press 
and civil society. 
6.2.2 The retrenchment of the developmental strategies in globalization and 
democracy 
The major instrumental tools of the developmental state are material-based. 
These 
material mobilization measures include effective capacities 
for tax extraction, 
monopolies of important and upstream materials, centralized monetary authority with 
extensive regulatory and power, and supervision of state-business associations 
(Doner 
et al., 2005; McBeath, 1998). The warfare and workfare oriented centralization on 
resources (capital and materials) allowed the government with capacities 
to launch 
investments in high-tech industry, `winner sectors' and R&D activities. Hence, the 
measures were strategically and selectively applied to specific sectors or 
industries. 
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To reassess the state's economic capacities to continuing its developmental model. 
this subsection in turn investigates changes in economic prerequisites and strategies to 
elaborate how the state combats resistant forces. 
Firstly, the state capacity for material mobilization gradually weakened and fiscal 
structure degenerated during globalization and democratization. As Taiwan entered 
global and regional free trade organizations in the late 1980s, the major tax resources 
from tariffs and monopoly taxes were reduced radically. From the fiscal perspective, 
the new demands of social welfare provision inevitably caused a knock on effect on 
other expenditures. Moreover, the low tax burden legacy left the state no space to 
raise taxes. Consequently, the resources invested in workfare and warfare strategies 
were excluded by demands on welfare policy. Moreover, the state did not assume a 
retrenchment policy for its revenues since infrastructural projects were important 
measures for strengthening the KMT's patron-client networks in various electoral 
polls. In this sense, the expansion of expenditure was inevitable and the only strategy 
rendered to sustain the new demands was to raise debts (see Huang, 2003). As shown 
in Table 6.2, the deficit of governmental expenditure and the outstanding debt 
percentage in GDP climbed to unprecedented highs in the 1990s. Therefore, the 
Taiwanese developmental state transformed itself from a tax-abundant warfare- 
workfare state with high revenue surplus into a welfare state with high deficits in a 
decade. 
Table 6.5 is the distribution of governmental expenditures according to purposes, 
1987-2000. There were obviously decreases in defense and economic development 
expenditure, and increases in the outlay for social security. 
239 This demonstrates 
transformation from a warfare and workfare state into a welfare one within the 
governmental financial structure. 
Second, the financial controllability of the Central Bank and financial bureaucrats was 
greatly weakened under the double-edged sword of globalization and democracy 
239 In 1991, the expenditure of social security exceeded that for national defense; and again in 1995, it 
exceeded the ratio of economic development. 
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(R. iain. 2000). Some evidence revealed in Table 5.6(p. 202) proves that the state 
capacity for capital provisions and allocation was in the wane. As deregulation in the 
financial sector and liberalization on the trade sector are prerequisites to engage in a 
global trade regime, the incremental liberalizations began in the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, the intensified competition from opposition parties forced the KMT to 
become more dependent on indigenized social forces that had previously been 
excluded in the authoritarian regime to re-construct mechanisms for sharing more 
interests with local factions or business groups. 













Obligations Others Total 
1987 11.2 23.2 20.8 26.7 14.1 1.1 0.9 100.0% 
1988 11.0 22.1 20.3 29.5 18.2 1.1 0.8 100.0% 
1989 8.1 15.6 17.0 44.8 12.7 0.9 1.0 100.0% 
1990 11.5 19.2 20.7 27.5 18.6 1.5 1.0 100.0% 
1991 12.0 17.8 22.6 25.2 18.8 2.6 1.0 100.0% 
1992 12.7 15.3 20.8 29.6 18.8 2.2 0.7 100.0% 
1993 11.9 14.4 19.9 31.1 18.2 3.6 0.8 100.0% 
1994 11.8 17.6 20.9 25.6 19.2 4.1 0.6 100.0% 
1995 11.6 14.1 18.7 22.9 21.7 10.2 0.6 100.0% 
1996 13.2 15.5 20.3 17.9 26.9 5.8 0.5 100.0% 
1997 13.0 15.5 20.0 15.7 28.9 6.2 0.7 100.0% 
1998 12.9 15.7 20.7 16.8 27.4 5.8 0.8 100.0% 
1999 13.6 14.0 20.9 17.1 26.9 6.9 0.6 100.0% 
2000 14.9 11.4 20.9 15.1 28.7 8.6 8.6 100.0% 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2001, Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2001. 
Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development. 
Table 6.6 shows the non-performing loans in the Taiwanese banking system from 
1993 to 2001. State-owned commercial banks and credit associations were all allowed 
to offer an implicit quota of soft loans to representatives or assemblymen at different 
levels (Cheng & Chu, 1999; Gobel, 2001). The causal effect between democratization 
and bad debt belonging to the fishermen' and farmers' associations can be clearly 
identified (Kong, 2004). It demonstrates that the efficiency of the banking system was 
eroded by democratization as the KMT began to operate bank credit and capital 
resources, especially those public ones, according to political considerations but not 
economic ones. 
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Table-6.6 Non-Performing Loans in Taiwan. 1993-2001 
10/-% 
Year Total Domestic Foreign Credit Farmer' Fishermen's 
NPIJloans Taiwan Banks Banks cooperatives associations associations 
1993 1.14 1.17 0.38 1.17 1.70 2.90 
1994 1.82 1.85 0.45 2.15 2.87 2.55 
1995 2.85 2.92 0.82 3.14 5.24 5.02 
1996 3.68 3.68 0.97 6.11 8.46 6.21 
1997 3.70 3.70 1.00 6.44 10.83 9.21 
1998 4.36 4.36 1.60 7.58 13.18 11.32 
1999 4.88 4.88 3.20 10.44 16.10 12.99 
2000 5.34 5.34 3.22 12.44 17.97 14.11 
2001 7.79 8.26 3.59 11.89 19.44 15.19 
source: Modiiiecl trom Kong, 2004: 357 
Note: the ratio are calculated from non-performing loans /the total lending of banks 
In the neo-statist works, competent bureaucrats insulated from business groups and 
civil society and acting autonomously are the institutional core of the EA 
developmental state (Evans, 1995; Riain, 2000; Wade, 1990; Weiss, 2000). However, 
in the case of Taiwan, the evidence has shown that the strong economic resources of 
bureaucrats have decreased since 1990. As argued in Chapter Five, Taiwan sailed 
through the 1997 Asian crisis due to the robust backup from the private sector (Hsueh, 
et al., 2001; Zhang, 2002). As Huang identifies, democratization rendered the state 
increasing porous, more attentive to interests groups and more democratically 
accountable (Huang, 2002: 16). As the politically discreet economic bureaucrats 
became alert to the fact that they were no more insulated from the pressures of interest 
groups, and as they sensed the policy implications of the political ascent of business 
groups and local factions, they started to choose liberalization strategies (Cheng & 
Chu, 1999). As such, "between 1988 and 1993 the state economic bureaucracy made 
more deregulations decisions than it had done for the last two decades" (Cheng & Chu, 
1999: 38). In this sense, there are profound political implications in the process of 
liberalization. For preventing the interventions of local factions and business groups, 
the "most competent economic bureaucrats" (see Wade, 1990; Weiss. 2000.2001; \Vu. 
2004) phrased by numerous neo-statists rather to embraced liberal thinking than 
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continuing to try and discipline the private sector (Cheng & Chu, 1999; Hsueh, et al., 
2001). 
Third, rapid economic growth weakened the role of public enterprises in the macro 
economy. This was due to pressure from three sides: international free trade regime, 
domestic enterprises and opposition parties. By the late 1980s, the state-owned 
enterprises had vigilantly pre-empted private capital participation in the financial 
sector, public utility sector and most capital-intensive industries to prevent the 
emergence of political rivals. The functions of these public enterprises were to control 
the key upstream materials, provide a reliable revenue base for an over-sized state 
apparatus and a source of high-level employment opportunities for the KMT's 
political allies who had retreated to Taiwan in 1949 (Cheng & Chu, 1999; Hsueh, et 
al., 2001; Wu, 2004). Therefore, with such abundant resources, these state-owned 
enterprises were abled to stabilize the economic, social and financial orders in the 
early post-war decades. However, as the privatization of state enterprises were 
launched due to external pressures in the early 1990, state's capacities to mobilize and 
control materials was undermined and downsized. 
In Table 4.7 (p. 129), the ownership distributions of state-owned and private sectors in 
1952 and 1960 were 56.2% vs. 43.8% and 43.8% to 56.2%. In 1970 and 1980, the 
" equations were turned into 27% vs. 72.3% and 14.5 vs. 85.5. There was also a similar 
trend in the industry distribution in Table 4.6 (p. 129). However, from Table 4.8(p. 130), 
it can be seen that public and private shares of GDP were maintained at the same ratio 
from the 1950s to 2000. The public sector share fluctuated minimally between 17.3% 
(1996) to 20.8% (1981); and the private sector share also shifted slightly between 79.2 
% (1981) to 83.3% (1956). This demonstrates that the productivity of the private 
sector was far beyond that of the public sector from 1950s to 2000. However, the 
economic externalities of the public sector contributed to social capital used 
by the 
private sector. 
Therefore, we can infer that the existence of the big share in public sector % vas 
for 
political and social purposes as its productivity and purely economic cost-benefits 
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were far lower than that of the private sector. Hence, the K_ IT's strategy was not 
efficiency-directed but effectiveness-directed for material mobilization. effective 
dominance and social stability. As such, this orientation was reflected in the dual 
economic structure and "tripartite market structure" (Wu, 2004: 105) in which the 
public enterprises lay on top to monopolize upstream goods, the large private 
enterprises played an intermediate role and the SMEs focused on the export market. 
As Taiwan moved towards internationalized markets and democratization, the less 
productive public enterprises in the red began to struggle and become a heavy burden 
on state fiscal deficits. The enacting of the `Statute for Transfer of Public Enterprise to 
Private Ownership' in 1993 under the pressure from three sides ended the 
government's domestic monopoly (Wu, 2004), and the state was undermined in its 
capacity to discipline the systems of production. 
Lastly, the dual economic structure led to diversity in the nature of the export-and 
import-oriented sectors in their strategies and the dismantling of state-business 
networks established by 1990. In the authoritarian period, "the government-initiated 
contacts with business group in the forms of licensing requirements, economic data 
collection, representational opportunities, monitoring of association activities and 
election of association officers" (McBeath, 1998: 6). Since the dynamics of export- 
oriented industries depended on how they geared into competitive global commodity 
chains, the declining influences of old policies and state intervention via 
state-business networks is predictable during globalization. However, as the 
inward-looking diversified business groups, local factions and crime organizations are 
more inclined to rent-seeking activities, their intensively integration into pork-barrel 
and rent-seeking activities increased swiftly as Taiwan stepped into the process of 
democratization (Chin 2003). 
These new alliances sought extralegal economic prerogatives and exclusive rights 
such as bid rigging for government procurement orders and 
infrastructural 
constructions, joint-ventures or unreasonable concession 
loans from state-owned 
banks or local financial associations. 
240 In a representative democracy. Taiwans state 
240 According to Chin, there are five major areas of black-gold politics. They are 
bid riggin`g, vote 
247 
economic projects or rents were captured by elected representatives at different levels 
(Cheng & Chu, 1999; Chin, 2003; Kau. 1996; Tsai, 2001). Through compromises and 
concessions in exchange for their support, the old institutional insulation between the 
state and business sector began to melt down. Hence, the selection of strategic sectors 
and infrastructural constructions developed more from political considerations than 
from economic ones. As such, the efficiency of resource utilization becomes difficult 
to be balanced, and substantially enhances domestic transaction costs. 
The economic dynamics in Taiwan's development mainly originated from SMEs and 
high-tech enterprises. These enterprises are generally mini-multinational (regional) or 
international in operations. Their overseas expansion "grew largely outside the 
established state-sponsored, KMT-directed corporatist framework" (Cheng & Chu, 
1999: 38). The hierarchic state-business networks utilized as an institutional base for 
organizing cooperative activities and pioneering signals by 1980s were replaced by 
self-governed polymorphous networks that were organized by the private sector (Orru, 
1995). As such, the three national organizations-the Federation of Industry, the 
Federation of Commerce and the National Council of Industry and Commerce were 
gradually superseded in their immediate roles of implementing state policy and 
employing sanctions. As a result, the capacity of the state to `steer' the economy 
waned. 
In a nutshell, the economic resources of the Taiwanese developmental state underwent 
a radical transformation due to globalization and democratization. Changes from 
globalization and democratization have driven a wedge between the state and private 
sectors. Moreover, sound state-business relations have eroded under the dualistic 
development of the private sector. The state capacity for material and capital resources 
mobilization has degenerated as a result of new demands for welfare provisions, the 
regime of representative democracy and financial liberalizations. The economic 
decision-making processes have become politicized and are in the hands of legislators 
buying, election violence, mafia politics and corruption of officials. For realigning the new 
indigenized alliance, the KMT (Lee Teng-hui Administration) began to consolidate a power 
realignment between the mainstream KMT partisans, Taiwanese 
business elites and local factions 
(Chin, 2003). 
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and politicians at different levels in the political system. 
As for the central government, the cabinet can no longer force the Legislative Yuan to 
follow its discipline. As the state (bureaucrats) is captured by the elected politicians 
and could no long effectively formulate and implement its policies, the political 
process became a horse-trading arena for economic bureaucrats, political partisans, 
lawmakers (legislators) who generally act as surrogates of special interests of business 
groups or local interests (Cheng & Chu, 1999; Kau, 1996; Tsai, 2001). The 
institutional core of the `ideal bureaucracy' with controls over centralized economic 
resources and unified national interests were undermined by the new power 
constellation that engaged in sharing interests. By re-examining the cases posited in 
Chapter Five the evidence of how domestic enterprises resisted the state's policy, and 
in Section 6.1 on how local governments and citizens organized to resist important 
industrial projects, we can see that political-economic power resources of domestic 
enterprises and civil society have greatly increased enough to allow them to resist 
state policy. 
Partnerships between state technical bureaucrats and the high-tech private sector still 
performed significantly well in the 1990s. However, successes in advanced sectors are 
not enough to resolve distribution and accumulation problems. Moreover, all 
high-tech sectors as well as SMEs were well self-governed in accordance with to the 
market principles in the global market. As described in many neo-statists works, the 
successful cases in Taiwan are all sector-specific, and do not belong to a generalized 
development across all sectors (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 2000; 2002). As a democratic and 
industrialized state, it is impossible for the KMT party-state to shun the problems that 
have arisen with income inequity and demands for welfare provisions (especially in 
the rural districts). 
On the one hand, the Taiwanese case still shows a prominent legacy of technical 
capacity for supporting R&D activities and providing excellent human resources. 
However, there is no evidence to show the state has reconstructed any new trajectory 
or initiated a new mode of governance to resolve challenges 
from globalization, 
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domestic capitals and civil society. On the other hand, institutional inertia and inward 
military strategies (national security) also remain strong and the state cannot 
adequately resolve the contradictions between welfare and workfare policies. The 
developmental state mode is discontinued as it fails to conform to changes of its 
constructive agencies. As Weiss identifies domestic institutions matter (Weiss, 2003). 
However, the reinvigoration of the developmental state should not freeze the 
success of specific-sector or industry and their institutional networks with the state. It 
will be more important to replenish flexible institutional mechanisms and reengineer 
state capacity to condition warfare, workfare and welfare politics. 
6.2.3 The decentralized state in a fully-fledged democracy and the resurrection of 
concealed inward military strategies 
6.2.3.1 The alliance of the KMT, local factions and big business 
Before the 2000 president election, there were few academics who precisely predicted 
the electoral defeat of the KMT. On the contrary, most researchers set out from a 
material resources control perspective, and believed there was no reason to infer that 
the KMT with its excellent credit and dominance of the macro-economy would lose 
the political authority to an immature and relative weak oppositional party (Chu & 
Lin 1889; Tang et al, 1996; Weiss, 1999,2000). Hence, the defeat of the KMT in the 
presidential election can not be simply explained by economic factors. There were 
residual factors not included in the developmental strategies that caused the KMT's 
loss of authority. 
As emphasized the asymmetrical distribution of political and economic power made 
bottom-up institutional innovation within bureaucracy almost impossible before 1990. 
However, constitutional amendments strengthened the autonomy of local 
governments in 1992 and the National Assembly drastically shrank the Taiwan 
Provincial Government and Provincial Assembly in 1997-8 which made the local 
counties into the most important agent able to challenge the central government 
authority. The DPP victory in the elections for local magistrates in 1993 and 1997 
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encouraged the DPP's to believe that control over local politics would lead to running 
the national government (Copper, 2003). As indicated in Section 6.1.2, there were 
several cases in which local authorities and inhabitants opposed major industrial and 
economic projects for environmental reasons in the 1990s. Every case was located in 
a DPP controlled county. This implied that resistance to local authority became 
possible since the magistrates were elected by local citizens. At a deeper level, it 
alerted the KMT (Lee's Administration) to the importance of elections in democracy, 
and the suggestion that in a presidential election the KMT might lose its political 
authority to an opposition party. 
Under the motto of `winning is everything' by Lee Teng-hui, loss in elections (local or 
national) meant loss of everything (Roy, 2003). The advances of democracy 
intensified competition from the opposition rivals, and the weak social forces 
formerly excluded from power became vital for winning in elections. So it was that 
"the KMT conscientiously and systematically recruited a large number of local and 
national politicians who were underworld figures, greedy businessmen, and 
self-serving local faction leaders" as their candidates in campaigns (Chin, 2003: 125). 
However, it is worth enquiring as a developmental state with excellent reputation for 
bureaucratic and economic efficiency why the KMT chose a strategy of allying with 
the black-gold interests in the 1990s? 
As Chin identifies "the KMT desperate to hold onto power under the internal and 
external pressures, had no choice but to accept politicians with dubious backgrounds 
as long as these politicians were willing to identify with the KMT and had money and 
power to be elected" (Chin, 2003: 125). The reason Chin posits this is that the KMT 
feared those factions would be absorbed and integrated into the DPP (Chin, 2003; 
Wang, 1997). However, it still cannot provide a persuasive answer why the KMT with 
the excellent reputation of its competent bureaucrats needed to desperately cooperate 
with factions of dubious backgrounds and create a `black-gold' alliance. Observing 
the results of local elections up to 1987, we can see that the candidates nominated by 
the KMT fi-equently won the majority of seats in the local representative and 
magistrates elections and performed well. 
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There is a more profound reason to explain the strategy that the KMT had chosen. As 
Lee Teng-hui is a native Taiwanese successor to Chiang Ching-kuo, his power base 
was challenged by his colleagues within the KMT party, both Taiwanese and 
mainlanders. As the old institutional insulation between the party-state center and 
business sector was gradually broken down by the growing autonomy of private 
sector, especially those export-oriented, the need to reestablish new allies (mainstream 
faction) outside to compete with the non-mainstream faction and marginalize the 
mainlanders in the KMT became imperative for Lee. Lee called his strategies of the 
`Taiwanese indigenization alignment' and `Taiwan first', and they were intended to 
marginalize the mainlanders and Lee's Taiwanese opponents in the KMT. Lee's 
strategy was to establish a conservative indigenous alliance among the KMT 
mainstream faction, big business (domestic market oriented) and local factions. 
Moreover, even the indigenous opposition party the DPP was implicitly encouraged 
and supported by Lee (Cheng & Chu, 1999; Kau, 1996; Kong, 2004; Lee, 2002; Roy, 
2003). 
Therefore, supporting on popular suffrage at every level by appearing to consolidate 
democracy and forging a new nationalist identity (see Hughes, 1997) became very 
effective tools for Lee since more numbers Taiwanese population was encouraged to 
criticize KMT's authoritarianism. Allying with existing local factions, crime 
organizations and businesses was also a quick and easy way to mobilize an `organized 
social base' to combat mainlanders and non-mainstream members in intra-party power 
struggles. However, despite being named advocates of democracy, Lee and his allies 
opposed an open ballot in primary elections for all members within the KMT to elect 
the party's chairman and rejected the democratization of all of the important posts in 
the party. Obviously, consolidation of personal power took precedence over Lee's 
ideological commitment (Roy, 2003). Table 6.7 shows the share of KMT nominated 
legislators who possessed a local factional background from 1969-1998. It clearly 
demonstrates how the local faction became the major player in the KMT's power 
structure. 
The alliances among the KMT politicians, faction leaders and big businesses 
began to 
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deteriorate the developmental foundations and capture every rent they could reach. As 
Lee identifies as the "distribution coalitions sprang up and the economic bureaucracy 
often stood at the sidelines" (Lee, 2002: 21). The economic bureaucracy was no more 
insulated from or embedded with social forces and enterprises but was being captured 
in the process of democratization. Financial credits, major infrastructural 
constructions and public procurement became the prizes that the KMT rewarded its 
allied factions and businesses with sine the 1990s. Furthermore, "seeing the 
advantages of legislative incumbency, local faction leader, like business tycoons, also 
sought legislative office for themselves instead of working through intermediaries" 
(Kong, 2004: 356). The KMT's black-gold politics was forged, and corruption and bid 
rigging activities became very pervasive in Taiwan's politics (Chin, 2003). 
Table-6.7 The share of KMT Legislators in the Legislative Yuan who Possess a Local 
Faction Background 




1969 8 4 (50%) 4(50%) 
1972 30 5 (16.7%) 25(83.3%) 
1975 30 6 (20%) 24(80%) 
1980 57 18 (31.6%) 39(68.4%) 
1983 62 30(48.4%) 32(51.6%) 
1986 58 31(53.5%) 27(46.6%) 
1989 72 42 (58.3%) 30(41.7%) 
1992 71 42 (59.2%) 29(40.9%) 
1995 63 41(65.1%) 22(34.9%) 
1998 90 56 (62.2%) 34(37.8%) 
Source: Cited from Chen, 2001: 75. 
As the power of crime organizations, mafia politics and local factions strengthened at 
every election, the social and economic order began to decline since the mid-1990s. 
Most civilians believed Lee Teng-hui was more interested in enlarging his presidential 
power by revising the constitution rather than the public's greatest domestic concern, 
crime and corruption. Those domestic political and social pressures 
forced Lee to 
deliberately employ a concealed inward military strategy for raising his own historical 
stature and insulating himself from the general public disgust with perceived 
KMT 











Figure- 6.2 The Nexus Between Gangsters, Businessmen, and Politicians 
Source: Chin, 2003: 17. 
In the preceding sections and Chapter Five, I have argued the discontinuity of the 
Taiwanese developmental state came from unbalanced coordination among the 
warfare, workfare and welfare policies. The KMT's political strategy, which 
attempted to develop the theme of security and welfare into a workfare-warfare model, 
had a number of contradictions. It provides a costly and risky strategy. The Taiwan 
case suggests it is difficult to mobilize a society on the basis of national security 
concerns over a long period of time. In the short term, a security oriented regime that 
turns to welfare might be able to mitigate or release some domestic pressures. 
However the Taiwan case shows that ultimately the `low' politics of welfare takes 
priority over the `high' politics of security especially in democratic political system 
where civil society is developing a capacity for reflexivity. The issue of political 
corruption is particularly sensitive when civil society considers that its priorities are 
being overlooked. The reflexivity of civil society has progressed with its political 
autonomy and ideological pluralism in democratization. Table 6.8 reveals the 
percentage of votes won by each political party from 1989 to 2001. It clearly 
identifies that the share of the KMT votes decreased from 1989 in every election, 
especially the presidential election in 2000. 
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Table-6.8 Major Election Results in Taiwan since 1987: Percentage of Votes Won by 
KMT DPP NP PFP TSU Others 
County magistrates and city 
mayors 
1989 52.67 38.34 8.99 
1993 47.47 41.03 3.07 8.43 
1997 42.12 43.32 1.42 13.14 
2001 39.13 39.13 4.35 8.70 8.70 
Members of Kaohsiung 
City Council 
1989 62.60 21.00 16.40 
1994 46.22 24.91 4.83 24.04 
Kaohsiung City Mayor 
1994 54.46 39.29 3.45 2.80 
1998 48.13 48.71 2.35 
Members of Taipei City 
Council 
1989 69.20 23.40 7.40 
1994 39.06 30.12 21.72 9.10 
Taipei City Mayor 
1994 25.89 43.67 30.17 0.28 
1998 51.13 45.90 2.97 
Members of Taiwan 
Provincial Assembly 
1989 62.10 25.60 12.20 
1994 49.06 31.67 6.22 13.02 
National Assembly 
delegates 
1991 71.17 23.94 4.89 
1996 49.68 29.93 13.59 6.80 
Legislative Yuan members 
1989 60.10 28.20 
- 
11.70 
1992 61.67 36.09 - 
2.24 
1995 46.07 33.17 12.59 8.17 
1998 46.43 29.56 7.06 - - 
16.95 
2001 31.28 36.57 2.86 20.34 8.50 0.45 
Presidential election 
1996 54.00 21.13 12.59 - 
24.87 
- 
2000 23.10 39.30 0.13 37.47 
Note: 
A. New Party (NP) was formed mainly by the second generation of mainlander who did not aligned with 
Lee Teng-hui and left 
KMT in 1992. 
B. PFP (People First Party) was formed by James Soong after the 2000 presidential election. 
C. After Lee Teng-hui was forced out of the KMT after the 2000 presidential election, his supporters split 
from the KMT and 
established the TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) party. 
Source: Cited from Chin, 2003: 129. 
Wade and Weiss insist that crises of EA developmental states come 
from "departing 
from the Asia model" and the "inner wheels of national politics and class" 
(Wade, 
2000: 108) or the "domestic-politic in origins" (Weiss, 2000: 22) should not comprised 
in their ideal deductive formula. However, these states did not exist 
in a vacuum but 
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in their particular spatio-temporal fixes. As authoritarian regimes transformed into 
democracies, the prerequisites for existing institutional legacies varied. The case of 
Taiwan demonstrates that the inner wheels of domestic politics matter. On exploring 
the issue of continuity and discontinuity of the developmental states, there is no 
reason to presume their external and internal prerequisites can be frozen in a snapshot. 
In summary, the positive effects of state capacity and autonomy have sound 
foundations in many orthodox developmental studies. However, from a historical 
perspective, the state is but one of a number of social control organizations and 
governance models. The case of Taiwan from 1987 to 2000 provides good 
exemplification to remind us that the role and the boundaries of the state need sober 
reconsideration; the relations among warfare, workfare and welfare politics needs 
more deliberate identification. Synthesizing the preceding investigations in this 
section, Figure 6.3 is the trajectory of IEMP power networks of the state from 1987 to 
2000. It shows the retrenchment of state political and economic power resources 
during globalization and democratization. The internal military and ideological power 
resources of the state remained strongly concealed in more substantial strategies of 
self-referential national interests or national identity (security) posited by state 
authorities. However, media pluralism and ideological emancipation will provoke 
reflections and resistances from civil society or private sectors to countervail the 
state's (politicians') intention. 
----------- 10. 
1987 2000 2001 ----------- 0. 
Figure- 6.3 Trajectory and power resources of the state in IEMP model from 
1987-2000. 
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Section 6.3: Concluding remarks: the reconstructed IEIN1P power constellation in 
globalization and democracy 
Figure 6.4 is built from a power reconfiguration of Figure 5.1(p. 180), Figure 
5.2(p. 211), Figure 6.1(p. 238) and Figure 6.3 (p. 255). It shows the changes of power 




The State in 2000 
Development of Domestic 
capitalism in 2000 
Figure 6.3 The power re-constellation evident by 2000 
Note: 1. Shadowed circles means the `hard core' of state autonomy and capacity. 
2. Dashed arrows mean `indirect' influence; solid arrows mean `direct' influence. 
level 
Civil society in 2000 
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As an intervening variable (causal mechanism) in the theoretical arrow diagram 
(Figure 2.4), the new constructed power constellation is pivotal for inferring the 
continuity or discontinuity of the developmental state model in Taiwan. It clearly 
shows that identify the original hierarchic configuration in Figure 4.1 has transformed 
into a more paralleled one. There have been disparate developments in geo-politics 
and geo-economics at the international level since the end of the Cold War. However, 
ideological and military power resources in Taiwan still remain as the `core' of the 
state power resources and cast impact on the domestic capitalism and society and 
state's foreign policy. 
At the state level, the empirical investigations demonstrate failures of the state were 
mainly caused by the dismantlement of bureaucratic infrastructural (administrative, 
institutional and political) power and increasing corruption due to new black-gold 
alliances (Beeson, 2003; Chin, 2003). They resulted less from pervasive international 
regulatory standards, pluralistic civil society, and liberalization of domestic economy. 
As such, the internal military power resource of the state survived strong legacy in 
contrast to its other power resources. As a core legacy of the KMT nationalism, the 
overarching warfare strategy was submerged into a workfare and welfare policy. This 
suggests that the KMT party-state did not develop any new mode of governance or 
new trajectories to accommodate the rise in power of civil society and domestic 
enterprises. It also implies that the government intended to cover its incompetence by 
initiating a new trajectory which conflated the boundaries of warfare, workfare and 
welfare politics. National security and national identity were deployed as convenient 
tools to decorate over the state's inability and power struggles between "barracuda 
elites" (Hilgers, 2005). However, the rising power resources of internationalized 
domestic enterprises and pluralistic civil society have empowered them with more 
autonomy and reflexivity to establish their own trajectories and resistance to the state. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Dependent Variable: an Open-ended Future and Conclusion 
This thesis aims to construct an ideal analytic framework of theoretical polycentricism 
based on methodological pluralism and reflectivism that can be applied to investigate 
transformation of the EA developmental states in a globalized economy and a 
democracy context. The ambition of this thesis is to present a more comprehensive 
account than those in reductionist (state or society centric) paradigms (see Table 1.6, p. 
46). In the theoretical chapters (Chapter One to Two), this purpose was approached by 
expanding Mann's IEMP model into two meta-theoretical and multi-causal analytic 
frameworks presented in Figure 2.2 (p. 74), Figure 2.4 (p. 78), and a theoretical 
arrow-diagram in Figure 2.3 (p. 75) and Table 2.1 (pp. 82-3). Following this, the 
empirical chapters (Chapters Three to Six) attempted to verify the theoretical 
arrow-diagram by utilizing the real world laboratory, the case of Taiwan, and to test 
the validity of the hypotheses for inferring elements of continuity and discontinuity in 
the EA developmental states. Figure 3.1 (p. 96), Figure 4.5 (p. 160) and Figure 6.4 
(p. 256) have in turn presented the power configuration and reconfiguration of Ns in 
two historical sequences. 
This chapter will complete three tasks. The first sc "tion will follow the proceeding 
'investigations to delve into the debated issues in Taiwan. This will be an open-ended 
exploration, since the conception of `historical contingence' is one of the major 
ontological stances in establishing the theoretical arrow-diagram of this thesis. This 
will be followed by Section 7.2 in which I verify the validity of the hypothesis and 
predictive model by reexamining the power configurations and reconfigurations in 
Chapter Four to Chapter Six. By applying the expanding IEMP models to canvass the 
power constellations in two historical sequences, the empirical evidences can account 
for the power reconfigurations among IVs by means of comparisons. The 
transformation of state autonomy and capacity in globalization and democracy will 
build up an ideal power constellation model by referring to analyses in former 
chapters and debate issues in section 7.1. These results are used to posit an ideal 
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power constellation for redefining the boundaries and scopes of the developmental 
state, simultaneously concern warfare, workfare and welfare politics, in globalization 
and democratization. Moreover, it can utilize to demonstrate the validity of theoretical 
arrow-diagram and analytic frameworks on interrogating the continuity and 
discontinuity of the EA developmental states. This thesis will conclude with section 
7.3 in which I will outline my contribution to theories of international relations and 
developmental states theories at theoretical, epistemological and methodological 
levels. 
Section 7.1.: The debate issues in Taiwan: the open-ended future of the 
developmental state 
7.1.1 Workfare vs. welfare: contradictions between accumulation and redistribution 
Encouraging investments in high add-valued industries and advanced technology by 
means of R&D supports are adopted by many states, especially developing states, in 
the context of globalization. Moreover, this strategy is also one of the prescriptions for 
constructing a `competitive state' in a global economy (Cerny, 1995; Hay, 2004; 
Jessop, 2002, Mann, 1997; Sum, 1998). The emphases on competitiveness and 
innovation capacities of the state are standards accepted by various global or regional 
organizations (see Jessop, 2001). Jessop further concretizes the structural 
competitiveness of state into the concept of the `Schumpeterian workfare 
post-national regime' (SVWPR). 241 As such, transforming into a SWPR is an 
24' Jessop's Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (SWPR) is an ideal typical mode of 
governance with competitiveness in globalization. According to Jessop, this competitiveness depends 
on "developing the individual and collective capacities to engage in permanent innovation-whether 
in sorcing, technologies, products, organization or marketing. These capacities extend beyond the 
narrow economy to include a wide range of extra-economic factors" (Jessop, 2002: 121). The 
economic policies in SWPR are focused on innovation and competitiveness in open economies with 
increasing stress on supply side to promote knowledge-driven enterprises. It subordinates social 
policy to an expanded notion of economic policy and downward pressure on social wage and attack 
on welfare right. As such, the governance mode in SWPR is self-organized ones to correct both for 
market and state failures (Jessop, 2002: 252). Jessop defines SWPR as alternatives strategies to adjust 
or promote global neo-liberalism by four dimension strategies: neo-liberalism, neo-corporatism, 
neo-statism and neo-communitarianism (Jessop, 2002: 262). According to Sum (1998), the 
characteristics of LWNR and SWPR as followed: 
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ideal-typical vision for many advanced Western states for resolving the deficits in 
their welfare regimes. However, strategic policy is not only concerned with 
reallocation of available resources; at a more profound level, it is concerned with 
reconstructions of economic and extra-economic structures, domestically or 
internationally. 
Under the overarching hierarchy of a production system, some `weak' and `sunset' 
industries and sectors will be inevitably marginalized. And there will be more 
structural unemployment in these `left behind' industries and sectors. The populations 
engaged in these sectors might never develop an advanced skills base. Hence, 
strategic trade policy and global competitiveness create the risks of social 
marginalization of weak sectors and the elements of society dependent on them. 
However, this problem is not unique to Taiwan. The WTO 2006 Summit held in 
Hong-Kong demonstrated this point. The incremental and increased exploitations of 
farmers and low-waged labour by capitalist states or classes are common situations in 
many developed and developing countries. 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.5 evidence the exclusion using the proxy of increased social 
security expenditures that competes with spending on economic development and 
national defense, since resources of the state are limited and generally occur at the 
expense of the other. The increased social security expenditure also caused high and 
unprecedented government deficits in the 1990s. Moreover, the outflows of 
labour-intensive industries and capital, to generate cost-saving for capital, increased 
Listian workfare national regiem Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
Market follower/imitator Market antic i ator/leader 
Low/Standardized technology High technology 
Factor-driven form of competitiveness Innovation-driven form of competitiveness 
Low-cost workforce and production 
Turnover-time competition 
Flexibility and process/product innovations 
Compressed-time competition 
Flexi-wage, flexi-time, and flexi-space Fast-in-time, fast-in-space, lead-time, 
transit-time 
Importance of social space Im ortance of social and cyberspace 
Residual state spending on workfare shelters State and corporate spending on re-skilling and 
retraining. 
Economic processing zones Learning/technological regions within and across 
borders/ 
Source: Sum, 1998: 14. 
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the severity of structural unemployment. As Ku (2001) argues no state can escape its 
welfare responsibility as it develops into a democracy. However, states also have an 
interest in maintaining domestic accumulation in the context of globalization. Chapter 
Six argues that welfare (redistribution) is not the antidote to resolve the deficits 
caused by the developmentalism or globalization; and it also is not a route to widen 
equality. I argued that the seventies Taiwan confronts are caused more by institutional 
incapability of the state but less from globalization. In terms of macroeconomic 
growth of Taiwan performed quite well in the 1990s. However there remains a 
question about the reconstructions of more deliberate mechanisms to coordinate 
distribution and accumulation. 242 
Returning to the investigations on Taiwan's developments since 1970s, I established a 
discernable legacy from a Listian workfare state. Therefore, it might be easier for 
Taiwan to transform itself into a SWPR based on its Listian workfare state legacy than 
its emergent welfare state model. As shown in Table 5.3 (p. 196) and Appendix 2-2 
(p. 332), Taiwan as a whole has transformed itself into a service and knowledge-driven 
economy. However, Chapter Six also indicates the severities Taiwan confronts mainly 
derived from the extra-economic institutions rather than within the economic 
production system. 
Empirical research in Chapter Five shows that the spillover effects of Taiwan's 
advanced technology sectors and SMEs provide a significantly positive benefit to 
wider society. Moreover, the internationalization of SMEs and advanced technology 
sectors has provided justifications for them to be as alternatives vehicles of a state 
macro-economic project. The analysis in Chapter Five suggests that the problems in 
the workfare strategies cannot be simply resolved by increased welfare and social 
security provisions. The cases analyzed in 5.2.3 have proved the incapability of the 
state and the autonomy of the private sector in a globalized economy. Therefore, 
whether Taiwan can transform itself from a warfare-oriented Listian workfare state 
242 As suggested in Jessop's blueprint of SWPR, the successful social reproduction relations are 
established on well-coordinated mechanisms between economic and extra-economic systems (Jessop, 
2000; 2002). 
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into a SWPR depends on whether the state can play an active and positive role in 
reconstructing its administrative, institutional and political capacities (following 
Grindle's (1996) typology). The challenge for Taiwan lies in both the politics of 
redistribution and accumulation. 
Analyses in Chapter Five and Chapter Six suggest the failures of the state functions 
originated from inertia in its warfare legacy, and flaws in democratic politics. The 
explorations of the state in section 6.2 demonstrated that the administrative, 
institutional and political capacities of the state have deteriorated during the process 
of democratization. Decreasing controls on the ideological, economic, political and 
military power resources accelerate the process of state's self-degeneration from 
within. Hence, the decreased industrial productivity and state extractive capacity 
mainly derived from state failures to unfold a new mode of governance for managing 
the severities and challenges from globalization and democracy. Self-serving, corrupt 
and factionalized politicians mired in `black-gold alliances' undermined the very 
foundations on which a remodeled state could be constructed. 
Moon and Rhyu present a similar diagnosis "the East Asian economic miracle was a 
product of a rational interventionist state, its collapse was an outcome of rigid, 
incompetent, inertia-driven state behavior" (2000: 83). Pempel also observes that 
"`the rules' by which bureaucrats operate are generated outside the bureaucracy itself' 
(1999b: 144). However, a bureaucracy in rational pursuit of self-evident national goals 
is difficult to visualize in democracy (Pempel, 1999b). There is a certain irony that 
just at the point the developmental state is most needed for supporting globally 
oriented Taiwanese industries it is unable to do so. Therefore, it is not an issue of the 
sovereignty of the state at bay; but the capacities of the state at bay. 
Following Jessop's ideal-typical SWPR prescription, the state role is an expanded 
version of an ideal Weberian bureaucracy that engages in promoting the competitive 
24 
strategies for innovations and plays a major role in meta-governance. 
Beside, it 
'' According to Jessop. meta-governance is the governance of governance'. It "involves a containing 
process of `muddling through'. It involves defining new 
boundary-spanning roles and functions, 
creating linkage devices, sponsoring new organizations, 
identifying appropriate lead organizations to 
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emphasizes the increasing role of self-organized governance to correct both for 
market and state failures. 244 By the same token, the governance structure constructed 
by Jessop is multi-layered and is more complex than depicted in statist or society 
oriented accounts of the developmental states (Jessop, 2002). Moreover, the SWPR 
highlights the far-reaching importance of "socializing long-term conditions of 
production as short-term calculation becomes more dominant in marketized economic 
activities" (ibid: 139). It is a reflexive meta-organization of meta-heterarchy designed 
to govern and scrutinize the constructions and procedures of economic and 
extra-economic systems (ibid). However, "the state gains greater role in the exercise 
of meta-governance" (ibid: 138). Hence, the SWPR might be an antidote to resolve 
contradictions between accumulation and distribution politics (see Appendix 8, 
p. 347). 
Therefore, the pivotal points for continuing the developmental legacy depends on 
how the state rejuvenates and redefines the boundaries of its institutional, 
administrative, political and technical capacities. The case of Taiwan shows how the 
demand for social welfare is co-opted into an electoral strategy by the KMT regime 
and has distracted the state from developing its technical capacity, and eroded its 
administrative, institutional and political capacities in democratization. The 
disabilities of the state are caused more by inefficiency of institutional mechanisms, 
and less from the weakening monopolization on material resources. Therefore, the 
relations between workfare and welfare politics in Taiwan should not be mutually 
exclusive, but should be reciprocal to each other by a complicated strategic selectivity 
to enhance the competitiveness of the state from within. 
coordinate other partners, designing institutions and generating visions to facilitate self-organization 
in different fields" (Jessop, 2002: 240). 
244 According to Jessop, the governance mode in SWPR is a third way "between the anarchy of the 
market and the hierarchy of imperative coordination among mutually interdependent actors" (Jessop, 
2002: 228). The SWPR "comprises efforts to steer the development of different systems by taking 
account both of their own operating codes and rationalities and of their various substantive, social and 
spatio-temporal interdependencies". "The rationality of governance is neither procedural nor 
substantive: it is best described as `reflexive'". It is "dialogic rather than monologic, pluralistic rather 
than mono-lithic, heterarchic rather than either hierarchic or anarchic. In turn, this suggests that there 
is no one best governance mechanism (Jessop, 2002: 228-9). In this sense, Jessop seems agree with 
point of the divergence of capitalism. 
264 
7.1.2 Developmentalism vs. democracy: the crisis of state autonomy and capacity 
Many researchers conclude that the EA developmental state model in Taiwan will be 
eroded by globalization (Beeson, 2003,2005; Huang, 2002; Lee, 2002; Leng, 1996b; 
Wang, 1999; Wu, 2004) They also claim that developmentalism and democracy are 
incompatible. These researchers predict the demise of the developmental state by 
pointing to its decreased control of material, tangible, accountable resources, and the 
institutional resources formerly monopolized by the bureaucracy and politicians. 
However, even if their diagnoses are right, the prescriptions are too one-sided. As 
Olson (2005) argues there are inextricable connections between democracy and 
welfare. There is a danger that prescriptions posited by neo-statists implicitly justify 
an authoritarian developmental state that depresses welfare provisions. 
In Weiss's governed interdependence model (1998; 2000; 2003), the transformative 
capacity prescription is overly concerned with the methods the state might use to 
re-gain the power to pioneer, steer and govern the private sector. Weiss also explicitly 
suggests the exclusion of domestic politics (or the inner wheels, in Wade's 
terminology (2000)) in her deductive model (Weiss, 2000: 33-41). However, I argue, 
on the contrary, that any transformation of the developmental state should include the 
domestic politics and society variables, since relations between democracy and 
developmentalism need not have a zero-sum character. As criticized in Chapter One, 
the EA developmental state model was a product of post-war spatio-temporal fixes. It 
is unreasonable to assume the international (exogenous) and domestic (indigenous) 
contexts will not vary over time. As such, a new mode of governance with is vital for 
invigorating the developmental state model. 
In the chapters probing the IEMP trajectories of civil society and domestic capitalism, 
there is sufficient evidence to justify that both variables benefited from the advantages 
of economic liberalization. In a horizontal constellation, domestic capitalism and civil 
society gradually ascended, paralleling the state with their enhancing power resources 
(Figure 0.4. p. 256). This configuration implies the coordinated institutional 
mechanisms between them will be more important than the hierarchic one (Figure 4.5, 
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p. 160). The discussions in Chapter Five and Chapter Six demonstrate the vivid 
dynamic and reflexivity of these two variables. Increases in power resources have 
stimulated domestic capital and civil society into more mature and autonomous 
formations. 
However, state autonomy and capacity in Taiwan are incrementally weakened by 
politicians' ambitions for winning elections and self-serving interests in an immature 
democracy after 1990. As Chapter Six demonstrates corrupted alliances exist where 
rents exist. The climbing non-performing loan ratio of public banks, bid rigging on 
the state infrastructural projects, special licenses, land-based economic rents, public 
procurements all became a drain on the public purse. These public resources nurture 
the `black-gold alliances' and further strengthening them in a vicious circle with more 
powerful resources on vote buying, running campaigns and winning political offices 
(Chin, 2003). As the black-gold alliances took control of important offices or 
committees and instrumentalized budget reviews, investigating committees, they had 
access to rent-seeking opportunities (Huang, 2000). For passing their bills and budget 
without delay, the bureaucrats were forced to take part in bargaining games with 
elected representatives at every level of government. 245 Without the protection of an 
authoritarian state, losing controls on economic and political power resources, the 
bureaucracy was no more insulated from the society and was generally captured by 
the representatives `representing the interests of society'. Those deficits developed out 
of governmental organizations that were never really well-institutionalized with 
sufficient transparency in the authoritarian period. In this scenario, collective and 
unified national goals were dispersed and fragmented into pieces. The governing 
capacity of the state was eroded by representativeness in the process of 
democratization (see Diamond, 1996). 
The evidence in Chapter Five and Six also demonstrate that the KMT party-state was 
245 In Taiwan, the elected representatives at different level will utilize the strategies of pending budget 
and bills or threat to deduce the budget for specific projects to force the bureaucrats to compromise 
and exchange `mutual profits'. For these representatives, the purposes are generally self-interested 
rent-seeking. For bureaucrats (office authority), they can get the budget for the projects that want to 
implement. 
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unable to resolve challenges and pressures from globalization and democratization, it 
sheltered under an umbrella of security and identity. and rested on the legacy and the 
inertia of economic nationalism. Moreover, as the KMT chose the strategy to 
cooperate in black-gold alliances, the institutional core of autonomous and component 
bureaucracy was mostly eroded and captured by politicians. As Beeson comments 
"there are limits to what states can do, specific circumstances in which planned 
development seems to be effective, and a danger of entrenching a counter-productive 
institutional inertia where the relationships between political and economic elites are 
inadequately monitored and transparent, or where they linger on past their use by 
dates" (2005: 10). The institutionalized patterns of interactions have ossified into 
self-serving obstacles to reform the state with more competitive advantages and 
blurred the responsibility of the politicians that should be put under surveillance by 
society. As such, there are impending concerns on how to construct long-term 
mechanisms that can prevent self-serving and corrupt relations. 
In an ideal-typical democracy, "representative institutions and procedures embody a 
`sovereign view' of power, since the leaders of parties winning electoral contests are 
authorized to take charge of the commanding height of the state and make decisions 
on behalf of their citizens. ... They are restrained 
by constitutional and legal 
arrangements" (Luckham, 2002: 308). However, this remains an ideal depiction of 
democracy. There are, however practical problems with ensuring the accountability of 
elected politicians as has been demonstrated in the tumultuous politics of Taiwan in 
the latter half of the 1990s as corruption become obvious to civil society. One means 
of addressing this issue is look at the social basis of democratization. As Luckham 
observes "any seriously emancipatory strategy of democratization and likewise 
development would need to empower subaltern or marginalized classes and groups, 
and not simply the `bourgeois' groups in civil society, which are the mainstay of 
pluralist democratic theory" (Luckham, 2002: 312). In Taiwan's developmental 
process, civil society was earlier suppressed by KMT party-state; and civil society is 
again struggling to keep pace with political leaders as democratic politics developed, 
as illustrated by the scant regard to ordinary citizens given during the period of 
black-gold alliances. Civil society is less harmed by the drive towards export-led 
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growth. In past five decades, society as a whole moved from an economic backwater 
into a knowledge-driven economy. Living standards and income have significantly 
improved. Returning to authoritarian rule can not guarantee another wave of 
development; and more state control of the economy can not warrant more efficiency 
and security. The discourse that depicts a divergence between developmentalism and 
democracy is misdirected. I believe both are achievable. 
"Embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995) and "governed interdependence" (Weiss, 2000) 
can provide some degree of explanation on technical or transformative capacity 
needed by the state or particular sectors in globalization. However, a single emphasis 
on the importance of technical capacity is not enough. A democracy needs more 
prerequisites for constructing comprehensive institutional, administrative, and 
political capacities for preventing decomposition from within. As Beeson observes, 
"once the developmental state has effectively done its job and `caught up' with 
established industrial economies at the leading edge of production and knowledge, it 
is far from clear that the state planners are any wiser about the course of future 
technological development than the private sector" (2005: 10) Reluctance to relinquish 
some of the economic controls and policy tools will not help to reinvigorate the 
autonomy and capacity of the state. The pivotal point is to "distinguish between those 
factors that may have undermined the utility of the developmental state from within, 
and those that have affected it from without" (Beeson, 2003: 6). Well-institutionalizing 
domestic politics matter. 
In sum, as Manor comments "those who seek to foster democratization and the 
redefinition of the developmental state should not expect to change human nature and 
deflect politicians, entrepreneurs in the private sector, or members of other social 
groups from engaging in conflict in pursuit of their individual and collective interests. 
Nor should they expect personalized politics to give way entirely to institutions" 
(1998: 128). However, the weaknesses of the development state in Taiwan derived 
from state's incapability to launch mechanisms to balance the new emerging power 
configuration, to mediate balances between order ad conflict, between self-interested 
personalized politics and institutions, between informal and formal 
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politics/institutions during the process of democratization (see Manor; White. 1998). 
All of these need a set of thorough designs and mechanisms that link- state institutions 
and rejuvenate state autonomy and capacity to enable modernization and adaptation to 
the challenges of globalization. 
7.1.3 Warfare vs. a normalized state: the supremacy of constructed national security 
and national interests? 
The final debated issue in Taiwan is the domestic utilization of the warfare strategy. In 
section1.1, I identified the origins and resources of state autonomy in militarism and 
national security (Hobden, 1998; Hobson, 2000; Mann, 1988; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 
1990; Wad, 1999; Wade, 1990). According to statists and Weberfans the internal 
military strategy was useful for "promoting not only domestic capacity building 
processes but also to secure internal pacification" and "military force is the means by 
which the state eliminates internal and external threats to its authority" (Hansen, 2002: 
23). In a liberal democratic state, the domestic economic and civilian orders are 
supposed to be regulated by the administrative and institutional means of governances, 
including the judiciary, but not by military institutions. 
However, the specific spatio-temporal contexts of Taiwan gave the KMT state more 
rooms for strategic-selectivity (see Jessop, 2001), to create a regime with an inward 
military orientation. This regime enjoyed significant primacy over administrative, 
institutional and political functions. Moreover, the judiciary does not independently 
serve to hold the state accountable for their doing (see Chin, 2003). Prior to the end of 
Cold War, the anti-communist ideology and political-military rivalry between East 
and West alliances provided the KMT party-state with legitimacy for its political, 
economic and social mobilization or demobilization. The constellation emanating 
from this power hierarchy was outlined in Chapter Four and summarized in Figure 4.1. 
In that constellation, weak civil society and subordinated domestic capital with 
few 
IEMP resources forced them to follow the dedicated strong state retreating 
from 
mainland China. Therefore, the administrative, institutional, political and technical 
policy of the state and judiciary institutions were politicized and militarized under 
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authoritarian discipline. It is consistent with the typical model depicted in Lefftwich's 
"developmental state model" (1995; 1998) and Skocpol's "bringna in the state back 
in" approach (1979; 1990). Moreover, these militarist and nationalist legacies, and 
indeed inertia, were carried over into Taiwan's liberalization and democratization as 
the cross straits rivalry continues. 
Chapters Five and Six indicate how the KMT state attempted to utilize the inward 
warfare and national security strategies to resolve the challenges of transformation 
arising from Taiwan's liberalization and democratization. Taiwan's geopolitical 
importance and special relations with China provided the KMT government more 
room to develop these warfare strategies with feasibility internally and externally, 
even as Taiwan has transformed into a liberal democracy. Section 5.2 shows most of 
economic and industrial policies in 1990s were unfolded from an intention to reduce 
Taiwan's dependency on China and an attempt to decrease Taiwan's vulnerability and 
sensibility to China's `economic warfare'. Moreover, the social welfare policy, KMT's 
intra-party political struggles and social disorders caused by the `black-gold politics' 
were all bracketed into the national security and identity package. Hence, this 
diplomatically marginalized small state selected a concealed internal warfare strategy 
for its survival. 
Therefore, under the flags of national security and identity, the KMT (Lee's 
administration) could draw disparate and unrelated policies into the same package. 
State's failures, incompetence, corruption scandals could all be attributed to 
machinations from China. As such, national security is repeatedly utilized as a 
convenient instrument to deflect dissatisfactions and resentments emanating from 
society and businesses. The popular preferences are actually the product of 
manipulation by the state elite (Wu, 2000: 420). The political, economic and social 
pressures were met with a mixture of compromise and persuasion with the security 
issue of China kept visible in the background. As such, Taiwan's economy and society 
were repeatedly over-mobilized on issues of high-politics during the period of 
democratization. Even so issues of ethnic and identity began act as the basis for social 
fragmentation and conflicts since the mid-1990s. However, as argued, the 
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contradictions in the developmental state model were increasing seen by elements of 
civil society as indigenous. Therefore. I argue the inward warfare strate v could only 
be used to mitigate short term problems. From a long-term perspective, it might result 
in not only diplomatic marginalization but also economic marginalization. 
As Weldes argues identity and national interests are constructed and reconstructed in 
relation to others. Threats are the insecurities faced by particular identities 
(Nieuwkerk, 2004, Weldes, 1999). Nieuwkerk further argues "some threat perceptions 
are a direct function of identity...... Other threat perceptions are a function of 
interpretation of actions or events made possible through the symbolic technology that 
is the security imaginary. Interests-those `national interests' or `preferences' 
articulated by decision makers-are also two-fold: they can be a logical function of the 
identity itself, or a function of specific threats constructed in relation to the identity" 
(Nieuwkerk, 2004: 91). 246 In construction of national identity, interests and security 
conceptions, the state monopolizes the advantageous dominant position to "pursue 
two kinds of policy preferences to operationalize their perceived/constructed `national 
interest' : material or ideological" (ibid). In the case of Taiwan, we can clearly see how 
the KMT party-state attempted to construct a new nationalist identity and interest 
around the insecurity within society and threat from China. However, it is very likely 
that a national identity, based on a multiple ideological resources, including culture, 
would have been more widely accepted. 
Moreover, as Buzan et al identify the "existential threat and emergency measures" 
need to be scrutinized between "processes of politicization and processes of 
securitization" (Buzan et al, 1998: 21). However, generally the 
definition and criteria 
of security and why an agenda is designated as a security priority are 
hard to define. 
Buzan et al further clarify "national economies have a great claim to the right of 
survival, but rarely will a threat to that survival actually arise apart 
from wider 
security contexts, such as war. Unless the survival of the population 
is in question, the 
huge range of the national economy doing better or doing worse cannot 
be seen as 
246 Accordingly, Nieuwtiwkerk further argues "the three concepts are thus mutual constituted: 
it is in 
relation to identities, or identities and threat perceptions, that 
interests are identified" (Nieu«-kerk, 
2005: 91). 
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existentially threatening" (ibid: 22). Obviously, the cross-straits economic 
interdependence and the anxiety over `hollowing out' do not completely fit these 
criteria, not to mention the dichotomy between a workfare strategy and welfare policy 
and the ethnic conflict issues. 
Besides, Kahler (2004) posits two ways to assess economic insecurity: one is the 
vulnerability of individuals, groups and societies; the other is the internal political 
consequences of that vulnerability. According to Kahler's two assessments, the 
excellent macroeconomic performances of Taiwan in analyzed in Chapter Five 
suggested that the Taiwanese state was able to limit China's political leverage. 
Moreover, Cheng, Tung and Kastner comment: "China's willingness to impose 
sanctions against Taiwan will be constrained by the costs of sanctions, internal 
instability, and pressure of interest groups" (Tung, 2003: 35). The security externality 
of economic integration is unlike to undermine the long-term bargaining leverage 
within the context of the adversarial relationship (Kastner, 2004). The increasing 
economic interdependence might enhance security, rather than increasing Taiwan's 
vulnerability. Further, the `hollowing out effect' has proved to be a false alarm with 
industrial structures and employment patterns adapting to a new conditions (Cheng, 
2005: 113). Meanwhile, the populations of tourists and businessmen migrating across 
the straits increased rapidly in the 1990s, China has become the leading destination 
for the export of Taiwanese productions and capital in the 2000s. The radical 
pro-independence voters in every poll since 1990 were below 40%. It is worth asking 
by whom, by what criteria and referential objectives that national security, interests 
and identity should be defined? 
"Security constellations is a much wider concept than security complexes reflecting as 
it does the totality of possible interrelationships at all levels" (Buzan et al, 1998: 201). 
However, in a liberal democracy national security should not be merely defined by 
any self-referential politicians or partisans for their self-serving interests. It is a 
specific form of social praxis constructed by social relations (Buzan et al, 1998). The 
point prompted here is it do not matter whether China is hostile to Taiwan with 
`indecent intention'. The important question is whether elected politicians should 
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define security in narrow self-serving terms or whether they should incorporate the 
aspirations of civil society? Should politicians unlimitedly deploy the inward warfare 
strategy to cover their own incompetence and corruption? It is not merely an issue 
of political ethics or a politician's morality. The question of security is a broad one 
that of compelling interest in a democracy. 
Briefly, in a functioning liberal democracy, the origins of state autonomy should be 
established by bureaucratic institutionalization at every level, neutral administrative 
offices (bureaucracy), transparency in political processes and the independence of 
judiciary. These mechanisms would help consolidate a democracy or a SWPR. 
"Developmental statists most often imply that top bureaucrats either generate their 
own agenda or operate in pursuit of self-evident and unproblematic national goals" 
(Pempel, 1998: 144). Furthermore in a developmental state there is often a military 
theme embedded in the national developmental strategy which effectively gives an 
institution, the military, an inappropriate inward orientation. However, blurring the 
boundaries of state's warfare, welfare and workfare responsibilities will not rescue a 
sinking state. Long-termed over-mobilization around the high politics of security 
agendas exhausts the resources of the state, domestic enterprises and civil society. As 
such, I argue that if the government of Taiwan continues to follow the inward warfare 
legacy to resolve its domestic shortcomings, the threats of state dismantlement will 
not come from China, but from an internal decomposition. 
In summary, the continuity and discontinuity of the developmental state in Taiwan are 
an open-ended contingence that dependent decisively on whether the state can 
reconstruct flexible mechanisms for resolving the problems and contradictions in 
welfare, workfare and warfare politics from a long-term perspective. The 
sustainability of economy, politics, society and military depend heavily on the 
capability and reflexivity of the state; and the ability of the state to articulate a 
far-reaching developmental strategy. This mission needs innovatory dynamics and 
reflexivity from inside the bureaucracy and political party. Reinv, igorations of the 
institutional, administrative, political and technical capacities of the state would be 
encouraged by increased transparency and state support for an independent 
judiciary. 
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The state should have more confidence in the `quality and reflexivity' of indigenous 
enterprises, civil society and it own personnel. This will help create a robust political 
entity that can create policy structure what will support long term economic 
competitiveness. 
Section 7.2 Validations on theoretical arrow-diagram and analytic frameworks 
This section summarizes the evidences analyzed and inferences drawn, in the 
preceding chapters, to validate the theoretical arrow-diagram, test the hypothesis and 
establish the predictive model posited in Chapter Two. 
7.2.1 Hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis posits that the discontinuity of developmental state will be caused by 
power resources changes within four IVs (the international system, the state, the 
domestic enterprises and civil society), the state resistance to its resistances and 
incompetence of resistances. The null hypothesis is opposed to this. The historical 
sequences provide comparisons between independent variables and intervening 
variables in Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six demonstrate the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
The power constellations in Figure 4.5 (p. 160) and Figure 6.4 (p. 256) show the 
disparities in IVs' power resources at different levels and their reconfigurations. By 
the 1980s, the power constellation was a hierarchic configuration in which the 
international system was placed at the top of hierarchy, the state was supreme within 
the state territory, domestic capital was subordinated to the state and civil society was 
the weakest formation operating in the context of the developmental state. It is 
typology that strongly resembles an ideal-typical derived from Skocpol's "bringing in 
the state back in" approach (Figure 1.1, p. 3). The authoritarian strong state was 
established through the monopolization of ideological, economic, political and 
military power resources (tangible and intangible). After 1987, as a whole there are 
salient divisions between geo-politics (military) and geo-economy (ideology) 
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reflecting the trend towards globalization and the end of the Cold War era. During this 
period, civil society and domestic enterprises gain substantial strength in relation to 
the state. The transformative dynamics accumulate from incremental increases in the 
IEMP autonomous power resources of civil society and domestic capital following the 
process of liberalization and democratization. On the one hand, global and regional 
economic integration facilitate the autonomous power of the export-oriented big 
enterprises and SMEs to resist interventions of the state; on the other hand, the fierce 
domestic political struggles endorsed the domestic-oriented enterprises with more 
bargaining power to ally with state authority for rent-seeking. These changes also 
permit the exclusion of mainlanders and some less powerful KMT factions from the 
political prominence. However, the new conservative black-gold alliances are the 
eroding factor that decomposes the administrative, institutional, political and technical 
capacities of Taiwan's developmental state model. 
A number of political, economic, and social policies in this period were developed 
ostensibly to reduce Taiwan's integration and dependency on the mainland. This 
would, notionally at least, decrease Taiwan's vulnerability to the mainland and limit 
the possibility of China using an `economic warfare' approach (Deng, 2000). 
However, at a more substantial level, the new policies also undermined the capacities 
of the state to manage the contradictions between accumulation and legitimation. 
These defensive policies and also suggested the state was incapable of initiating a new 
mode of governance and shaping a new trajectory of development. The outcomes 
revealed divergence and contradiction between the intentions of the state and interests 
of domestic enterprises. 
Taiwan's capitalist development provides hints, that the logic of capitalism might 
develop beyond the capacities of state to control and manage in the context of 
globalization. Pluralized civil society also accumulated more IEMP power resources 
to bargain with the authoritarian state as democratization progressed. As an incumbent 
political party, the KMT was desperate to consolidate its authority by winning the 
majority of working and lower middle classes votes in various polls and compete with 
the challenge from the DPP. As such, the strategic utilization of social provisions 
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without sufficient preceding preparations resulted in the generous welfare expansions 
in the national health system, elders' pension provision and unprecedented fiscal 
deficits since the 1990s. Moreover, the KMT chose a damaging strategy of 
cooperating with gangster organizations, local factions, and big rent-seeking 
businesses for winning elections after some unsatisfactory results in the early 1990s 
elections and the defection of some important young mainlander members. 
In a conclusion, the comparisons of two historical sequences verify the four IVs 
gauged by measuring of autonomous power resources in the IEMP model are shown 
in the two distinctive TEMP power configurations depicted in Figure 4.5 (p. 160) and 
Figure 6.4 (p. 256) The increasing ideological, political, economic and military power 
resources at levels of the domestic capitalist development and civil society provide 
them with strength to resist the discipline of the state. Changes at the international 
level and two domestic variables have significant impacts on resisting and offsetting 
the strength of state autonomy and efficiency of state capacity. Globalization and 
democratization did cast challenges to the developmental state regime. However, the 
increased autonomous power resources at the domestic capitalist and civil society 
levels helped consolidate of Taiwan's liberal economic structures and social 
reflexivity. State autonomy and capacity were eroded by the warfare legacy and 
institutional inertia; and the incapability of the state to initiate new developmental 
trajectories and new modes of governance. These problems suggest a need for the 
reconstruction of the state's infrastructural (institutional, administrative, political and 
technical) capacities for accommodating itself to the forces of globalization and 
democracy. In the 1990s, the legacy of state technical capacity and mechanisms still 
contributed to the pioneering of some new competitive advantages in advanced and 
high-added value technology (electronic, IT, automatic industry, bio-chemical and 
nanometer- technology, TFT-LCD monitors) by supporting R&D resources used by 
private enterprises. These strategies contribute positive effects to macroeconomic 
performance, however the effects are sector-specific limited. Therefore, the validity of 
hypothesis one can be verified as it can be applied to deliberately explain power 
changes between two historical sequences. 
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7.2.2 The ideal power re-constellation in globalization and democracy 
Following the validation of the hypothesis, I outline a predictive model based on an 
ideal-typical power constellation of four IVs that suggests a model of how an EA 
developmental state might continue to function. The predictive model is purely 
theoretical and based on causal inferences that expresses trajectories of state 
transformation and outlines appropriate boundaries of state governance in the context 
of globalization and democracy. The authoritarian regime left few legacies in terms of 
effective coordination mechanisms and independent judiciary. As the state confronted 
challenges from internationalization of domestic capitalism and pluralized civil 
society, the interstitial gaps between these organizational weaknesses provided the 
`black-gold alliances' with chances to act as an alternative to the primary authoritarian 
state. 
The reconstruction of state should focus on institutionalizations and innovations of its 
institutional, administrative, political and technical capacities at both overarching and 
infrastructural levels. These institutions need to be protected from capture by 
fragmented interests in society and elected politicians. As a whole, the state trajectory 
should reflect the realities and dynamics at the international, domestic capitalism and 
civil society levels. Therefore, the unified goals or vision of the state at the 
overarching level should not be designed in an authoritarian sense by the dedicated 
politicians or a command bureaucracy. However, policies or projects at the 
infrastructural level need to be implemented with more despotic autonomy. As such, it 
suggests a duality on state capacities at the infrastructural level; whereas the 
overarching level should reflect demands of society coordinated and integrated 
by 
elected political authority under institutional scrutiny. Both of them need to 
draw on 
intangible institutionalized resources rather than dated controls on material resources. 
At the infrastructural level, the rejuvenation of state capacity and autonomy need to be 
linked, to identify the "specific procedural factors that block effective policy-making 
and implementation" (Jessop, 2002: 227). As such, the institutions at this 
level should 
be focused on the capacities to effectively balance and implement the welfare 
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(redistribution) and workfare policies (accumulation), to coordinate economic and 
extra-economic mechanisms. to manage and mediate the external and internal changes, 
and to meet infrastructural demands and logistics needed by capitalist development 
and civil society. Therefore, the ideological power of the state should not be directed 
to propagandize any particular political ideology but should focus to foster the 
citizenship, culture, education, reflexivity, virtues of democracy and citizens' 
obligations regulated by constitution, laws, and national vision. Most importantly, the 
state should not utilize the concealed inward warfare and manipulated ideological 
strategies to forge national identity and blur the boundaries of welfare, workfare and 
warfare politics for domestic political consumption or concealing their 
problem-solving incapability and accountability. 
As Leftwich emphasizes the "primacy and centrality of politics" are vital in shaping 
the forms and relations of both democratic and developmental "possibility and 
practice" (Leftwich, 1998: 77). The origins of state autonomy should be 
institutionalized and protected by the constitution, transparent laws and the judiciary, 
while not from the appointed political protection, insulation or any personal charisma. 
The incumbent bureaucracy (from central to local governments) is the institutional 
core of this reconstruction and their decision-making processes should be 
transparently scrutinized. This does not require the deployment of absolute power by 
the state. Restrained, or constrained, use of political and economic power and limited 
ideological power will be enough to achieve this purpose. However, infrastructural 
capacities should be operated in a more `despotic' or `coercive' sense to preventing 
interventions. As such, the predictive model suggests the EA developmental state 
model needs the reconstructions of administrative, political, institutional and technical 
capacities of the state as infrastructural prerequisites for its continuity and structural 
competitiveness. 
At the overarching level, the state's outward economic, political and military 
strategies should appropriately reflect public consensus and expectations within 
society. The top-down capacities of planning and coordination will endow state 
authority (elected) with autonomy to pursue collective projects and interests (Jessop, 
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20021. That is to say the overarching centralities and autonomy of warfare and 
workfare strategies can not be made without reflections to demands of civil society 
and capitalist development. Moreover, the institutionalization at this level also should 
be consistent with the regulation of global and regional organizations. These 
considerations suggest the process of securitization of politicians' behavior and 
decisions should be institutionalized in more deliberated designed and transparent 
mechanisms. The institutionalizations of these capacities will be the most difficult 
tasks for a developmental democracy. However, reasons for doing so have analyzed in 
7.1.3. The `technocratic-specificity in militarism' emphasized by Skocpol (1985) 
should be protected by careful institutional designs. Careful surveillance of security 
policy by society is a priority. 
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4 
Warfare + Workfare(reflective core overarching 
state capacities of elected authority ) 
The state level 
Domestic capitalism Civil society 
EP 
Workfare + Welfare (despotic core 
ý"" infrastructural capacities for bureaucracy) 
Figure 7.1 The ideal-typical power constellation in globalization and democracy as DV 
Note: I. Shadowed circles means the `hard core' of state autonomy and capacity. 
2. Dashed arrows mean `indirect' influence; solid arrows mean `direct' influence. 
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The state 
Generally, the military understanding of security has foreclosed "the option of 
fundamentally questioning any securitization... When locked into a military sector 
defined as `security' and faced with a military threat, it is difficult to do more than 
argue about how dangerous the threat is"(Buzan et al, 1998: 211). In the case of 
Taiwan, as an export-oriented state, the disparate developments of geo-politics and 
geo-economics at the international and regional levels delegitimize the nonmilitary 
security claims of other sectors or actors. An institutionalized global trade regime 
provides more security for Taiwan. 
As such, a critical security analysis on whether the state's outward or inward 
strategies are excessively securitized and unnecessarily draws in nonmilitary issues is 
needed. This critical analysis is very important for Taiwan's development and 
democratization. The purpose of this reflection is not to subordinate or normalize the 
nonmilitary security claims of other sectors into the `normal' politics of the market 
economy or pluralist politics (see Buzan et al, 1998). However, the predictive model 
suggests the overarching state capacity should simultaneously reflect its internal and 
external contexts; limit unnecessary securitization while reminding attentive to 
potential risks. 
According to the inference expressed in Equation 2 (p. 77) and on the bases of the 
evidence analyzed in the preceding chapters, I argue that recognizing the duality of 
the state's infrastructural and overarching capacities provides the basis for a feasible 
strategy to transform the developmental state model in Taiwan into a SWPR. However, 
the predictive model also implies that if the state in Taiwan fails to strengthen its 
capacity and continues to blur the boundaries warfare, workfare and welfare politics 
for political purpose, the discontinuity the developmental state will occur. 
In summary, the hypothesis is verified by the changing natures at different levels of 
IVs and the re-constellating power configuration of intervening variables. The 
verifications of Equation 1 (p. 76) and Equation 2 justify the liability and feasibility of 
the ideal predictive model and the validation of the theoretical arrow-diagram in 
Figure 2.3 on inferring the continuity and discontinuity of the EA developmental state 
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model. 
Section 7.3 Concluding remarks 
Empirically and theoretically, this thesis constructs a more nuanced analytical 
framework, based a more dynamic theoretical formulation, that can be used to explain 
transformation in the character of the EA developmental state under conditions of 
globalization and democratization. Methodologically, the thesis justifies 
methodological pluralism and reflectivism by going beyond a structure-agency 
dichotomy and deductive and inductive monism. The originality of the thesis lies in 
its presentation of a multi-causal and plural-methodological research design that 
stands as a clear alternative to orthodox EA developmental studies. These efforts 
achieve "higher degrees of consonance between the observed, the foreseen and the 
preferred"(Alker, 1996: 797) in Galtung's integrated conception of social science (see 
Figure 2.6, p. 91). The rest of this final section outlines the contributions made by this 
thesis to the divergence and convergence paradigms; and theories of international 
relations and developmental studies. 
7.3.1 Value-added Contributions to convergence and divergence paradigms 
This thesis has contributed to a critical evaluations of the existing body of EA 
developmental states model by providing an alternative open-ended approach that 
escapes the straitjackets of state-centrism and rationalism. These reflections do not 
prejudge the nature of structure over process and agency, privilege any system of 
"ecological dominance" over others (Jessop, 2000: 328), or give precedence to the 
overwhelmingly materialists account of state transformation over ideal and reflexive 
ones. However, this is not to suggest that the state transformation is "a process 
without a political subject" (Hay, 2004). On the contrary, this thesis is concerned with 
restating politics, re-politicizing the state and reconstructing the political processes in 
multi-causal and poly-centric perspectives. This thesis accounts for more variant 
forms of state regime and alternatives modes of governances (Cerny, 1995,1997: Hay, 
2004; Jessop, 2000,2002). 
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The EA developmental states model along with its special geo-political positions 
emerged as a contingent outcome of a variety of complex and case-specific outcomes 
influenced by the Cold War and the regime of Atlantic Fordism. Following the same 
vein in Mann's original IEMP power networks, any mode of governances, 
institutional mechanisms and state interventions in these states are context-dependent 
and contingent-shaped, but not constructed and maintained in a contextual-free 
vacuum. Ultimately identifying the theoretical and methodological flaws and defects 
in orthodox developmental state approach provides the expanded IEMP models with a 
clear departure point for constructing an alternative way of examining changes in 
these states. As such, on probing the continuity and discontinuity of the EA 
developmental states, this thesis suggests the necessities to "avoid being caught in a 
conceptual schema that provides only for either incremental change supporting 
institutional continuity through reproductive adaptation, or disruptive change causing 
institutional breakdown and innovation and thereby resulting in discontinuity" 
(Streeck &Thelen, 2005: 8). Evidence presented in this thesis has proved that the 
incremental processes of changes of IVs appear to cause gradual institutional 
transformations at different levels that accumulate to cause discontinuities of the 
developmental state model under conditions of globalization and democratization. 
The expansion of Mann's IEMP models can be justified on the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological grounds (see Table 1.6, p. 46). At the ontological 
level, of the expanded model allows for reformulated poly-centric, meta-theoretical 
and multi-causal analytic framework. At the epistemological level, the expanded 
model comprises convergent and divergent realities by utilizing the evidences of 
deductive materialism, rationalism and inductive idealism and reflexivity. At the 
methodological level, the ontological and epistemological purposes are concretized by 
analytic tools those go beyond structure and agency, the endogenous preferences of 
calculative rationality and account for ideational reflectivity or indigenous preferences 
in a diachronic period. 
At a more profound theoretical level, the core argument on continuity and 
discontinuity of the EA developmental states model is also a current debate within 
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comparative politics and political economy studies on divergence and convergence of 
various types of capitalism and modes of governance (see Coates, 2000: 
Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997; Jessop, 2000; Kitschelt et al, 1999). In this debate, the 
neo-institutionalists and neo-Marxists, at least, agree with two points. First, there are 
sources and dynamics of convergence across various types of capitalism. Second, the 
divergence of capitalism did exist across different nationals territories by the 
structural couplings co-evolving with the other dominant systems in the same 
spatio-temporal space or society. The institutional embeddedness of various kinds of 
capitalism means there is not only one kind of institution (the free market) for 
economic growth and coordination (see Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997; Jessop, 2000; 
Teubner, 2001). 
Even as Kim claims "considerable divergence rather than convergence suggests that 
there is no particular set of general contingencies that inexorably leads to a single way 
of structuring economic units and coordinating their activities" (Kim, 2000: 100). 
However, Kitschelt et al (1999) conclude that no regional and national political 
economies have developed governance structures stable enough to avoid disruption 
from the globalized economy. Institutional divergence between different states is 
constrained by the ecological dominance of globalizing capitalism both structurally 
and strategically (see Jessop, 2000; Kitschelt et al, 1999). The impact of the 
globalized economy is not unique to developing or developmental states. Western 
advanced states are also disruption by global economic forces. The Janus-faced 
developments of capitalism show different forms of divergence and convergence in a 
society and embed them in various spatial-temporal matrixes. The dynamics of 
contemporary capitalism propelled along by poly-centric-headed forces, do not 
develop dialectically in a zero-sum contradiction between the state and market. In 
short , 
it is an issue of `convergence' versus various `divergences'. 
247 Therefore, 
explorations on transformation of any definite state should be embedded in an 
understanding of macro-contexts of "global production networks" (see Henderson et 
," The convergent point is a global free market; the divergent points are the compounded 
spatio-temporal matrixes and legacies in every single state. 
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al, 2002) and geo-politics. 
In summary, this thesis suggests the EA developmental state model stands aside from 
the paradigms of convergence. The transformation of EA states need to be 
investigated in a more sober and broader perspective by probing its sources of 
divergence and convergence, and the sources of their continuity and discontinuity. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that both divergent and convergent paradigms can 
only reflect limited facets of the complex realities. Figure 7.2 indicates the trade-off of 
different approaches utilized to explore the developmental states by positioning them 
within Hay's `parsimony-complexity trade-off' and `inductive and deductive logics' 
category. In that the expanded Mann's models in this thesis are positioned as a more 
inductive, complex and reflexive approach for investigating the EA developmental 
states than the orthodox ones engaged in deductive, parsimony and rationality. Figure 
7.3 presents the theoretical and methodological stances of divergent and convergent 
paradigms of various approaches and suggests their possible advantages and limits 
when applied. This thesis shows that the expanded Mann's models possess properties 
and insights for simultaneously elucidating convergence and divergence of 
developmental state changes without reducing macro factors to micro ones. The 
application of the expanded IEMP models needs furthering testing by applying it to 
different political regimes or governance modes. However, this thesis has verified the 
models' validity in the case of Taiwan and accounted for consequences of the twin 
pressures of globalization and democratization. 
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Deductive Inductive 
Figure- 7.2 Positioning methods of orthodox EA developmental state models, revisions and 
expanded Mann's models in Hay's `parsimony-complexity trade-off' and ' inductive and 
deductive logics' category. Modified from Hay, 2002: 36,47. 
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Figure- 7.3 Value-added contributions of Mann's expanded frameworks to the 
divergence and convergence paradigms 
7.3.? Contributions to theories of the international relations and developmental state 
studies 
From a generalized perspective, the analytic frameworks and theoretical diagram in 
thesis proposed theoretical and methodological amendments to Mann's works on 
``non-reductionist theory of the state" and "second-wave Weberfan historical 
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sociolo«v" (Hobson. 2002: 174-213). In the theoretical and methodological designs, 
the analysis of the four independent variables, avoided reducing the explanation to 
any single line of causal and effect. The design also kept the second-tier of 
state-society relations in view (see Hobson, 2000). These efforts shifted from Weber's 
simplicity to complexity and enabled the concrete depiction of multiple and mutual 
embedded relations between the state and its resistances. Comparing two sequences in 
a contingent and open-ended design allowed for an inspection of the interstitial gaps 
between existing institutions for the 1Vs. Further, the incorporation of the ideational 
forces remedied the flaws of tendential rationalism and exogenous materialism in the 
orthodox state-centric developmental state theory on probing issues of state 
transformation or continuity and discontinuity of the EA developmental states. 
For theories of international relations, as Reus-Smit indicates: "re-conceptualizing and 
re-theorizing the sovereign state has been central to the development of' n historical 
sociology of international relations" (2002: 122). The theoretical constructions 
presented in this thesis joined with the concerns of historical sociology in 
international relations in three ways (see Reus-Smit, 2002). First, this thesis depicted 
the state as a singularly purposive agent but also permitted domestic capital and civil 
society to have a role in the constitution of the state. The allocations of active agents 
with autonomous powers go beyond that defined in Putnam's "two-level game" (1988) 
in which the major agencies are compressed into two macro variables (state and 
society) without clear definitions and boundaries. 
Second, the frameworks in this thesis retained the conventional emphasis on the 
international system and the state. Moreover, the domestic variables are given serious 
attention. This thesis clarified the complex interconnections between the state and its 
exogenous and indigenous resistant forces. It also allowed (ttr the mutually 
constructive relationships and multiple interdependences that construct the 
international system, state structures, and explains how the identities and interests at 
different levels are shaped under specific spatio-temporal fixes. 
Lastly, the thesis provided a directional character for the principle of multi-causality 
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when analyzing transformation of a `normalized' or `generalized' state. This thesis 
follows the lead of critical theory. historical institutionalism and constructivism in 
international relations by rejecting reductionist explanations based on rationalism and 
materialism, and reconstructing the multi-causality of power reconfiguration without 
occluding the role of ideas in identity and interest formation. 
In terms of developmental studies, this thesis rejects single line deductive models and 
provides another way of conceptualizing the changing trajectories of developmental 
states. This thesis suggests a way of identifying changes in initial power 
configurations, causal mechanisms and modified relations that will eventually 
constitute a state orientation to development (Beeson, 2005; Jayasuriya, 2000; Stubbs, 
1999). 
From a pragmatic perspective, the core prerequisites of the orthodox developmental 
state model have had been eroded or weakened by incremental convergences with 
globalized capitalism and the diffusion of democratic pluralism. The institutional 
connections between the state, private sectors and civil society that built up the 
miraculous economic prosperity during their developmental stages will be inevitably 
dismantled and discontinued by the emerging resistances to the state. Moreover, the 
merits of developmental states model are also criticized by its inevitable dark sides: 
the unregulated nature of capital (Coates, 2000), risk descending into self-serving 
venality (Beeson & Robison, 2000), cronyism, exclusionary politics, nepotism and 
corruption (Winters, 2000). 
However, the findings of this thesis do not support pessimistic claims about the future 
of the EA developmental states model or the end of Asian capitalism. On the contrary, 
in the case of Taiwan, the evidence implicitly suggests its Listian workfare legacy 
provides the state with the potential to transform into a SWPR rather than a reactive 
welfare state. I have suggested that an institutionalized duality that recognizes the 
differences, and links between the state's core overarching and infrastructural 
capacities might be a feasible way of rejuvenating the developmental state mode and 
enhancing its technical capacity. We need to be strongly aware of the differences 
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between the politics of warfare. workfare and welfare. Following this line of 
reasoning the expanded TEMP framework can be used to understand and guide the 
EA developmental states undergoing transformation. 
Hence, the redefinitions of the developmental state's boundaries in context of 
globalization and democratization mainly depend on its strategic IEMP power 
configuration. This constellation may need to be restructured to take account of the 
new forces of resistances remerging from the interstitial gaps in the existing 
constellation (see Cerny, 1990; Hay, 1999b, 2004; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997; Jessop, 1990,2000,2001; Kitschelt et al, 1999; Mann, 
1986). The autonomous power resource of a re-engineered developmental state 
originates from careful institutionalizations of both overarching and infrastructural 
bodies. Autonomous power also follows from developing administrative, technical 
and political capacities and aligning them with warfare, workfare and welfare policies 
to reformulate a new mode of meta-governance that can enhance the structural 
competitiveness of the economy. Therefore, the expansion of Mann's IEMP model 
preserves the Weberian's merits of the bureaucracy, reminds us of the risks of partisan 
politics, highlights the dynamics of capitalist development and the international 
system, and emphasizes the importance of reflexivity in civil society. 
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Theoretical references for constructing IEMMP criteria at different level 
Level Major theoretical bases Particular references The international system Putnam "two-level game" I 
(1988). Baldwin, 1993. 
Gourevitch (1978). Kegley, 1995. 
Strange(1988). Lamy, 2001. 
Kohen & Nye, 1977. Smith, 2001. 




Milner & Keohane, 1996. 
Garret, 1998. 
Swank, 2002 






Gill & Law, 1995. 
Stubbs, 1994. 
The state Jessop, 1990: 160. I, E 
Six dimensions of the state Campbell, 2001 
Campbell & Pedersen, 1998. 
Cox, 1986. 









Burrows & Loader, 1994. 
Hay, 1996 
King, 1992, 
Marsh et al, 1999 
Peck, 2000. 
Berger & Dore, 1996. 
Boyer, 1996. Coats, 2000. 
Rosecrance, 1999. 
Domestic capitalist Whitley, 1998,1999. I, E 
development and private Mann, 1997. Whitley, 1998,9999 
enterprises Jessop, 2000. Berger & Dore, 1996. 
Coats, 2000. 
Crounch & Streeck, 1997. 
Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997. 
Hay, 2000. 
ORru, Biggart & Hamilton, 
1997. 
M, P 
Jesso , 2000. 
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Chan, Clark & Lam 1998. 
Huang 2002. 
Gereffi, 1998. 
Moon & Prasad. 1998. 
Woo-Cuming, 1999. 
Civil society Cohen & Arato, 1992 I, E 
Jessop, 2000. Forbes, 1993. 
Pierson, 1991 (civil right, Haggard, 1989. 
political right and social right) M, P 






Note: the theoretical references are concretized into IEMP referential criteria at different level in Table 
2.1. 
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Structural Change of Sectors in Taiwan, R. O. C. 
Year Rate of Perw. -n Grow Can_-_- Growth Conti- Pe: Cep- Growth Contri- 
GDP tage Rate bution tage Rate bution tage Rate bution 
1952 11.98 32.22 11.75 3.79 19.69 3.33 0.71 48.10 16.11 7 47 1953 9.33 34.45 16.92 5.45 19.39 7.71 1.52 46.15 4.91 . 2 36 1954 9.54 28.03 -10.89 -3.75 23.92 35.13 6.81 48.05 14.04 . 6 48 1955 8.11 29.09 12.09 3.42 23.23 4.99 1.19 47.68 7.28 . 3 50 1956 5.50 27.45 -0.42 -0.12 24.41 10.86 2.52 48.13 6.51 . 3.10 
1957 7.36 27.32 6.86 1.88 25.26 11.07 2.70 47.42 5.76 2.77 
1958 6.71 27.76 4.52 1.24 24.83 4.88 1.23 48.41 8.94 4.24 
1959 7.65 26.35 5.97 1.60 27.10 17.50 4.34 46.56 3.53 1.71 1960 6.31 28.54 15.14 3.99 26.87 5.42 1.47 44.59 1.83 0.85 
1961 6.88 24.95 3.00 0.85 23.70 -3.70 -0.99 51.35 15.74 7.02 1962 7.90 23.81 2.95 0.74 24.19 10.15 2.41 52.00 9.27 4.76 
1963 9.35 22.29 2.40 0.57 24.88 12.46 3.01 52.83 11.09 5.77 
1964 12.20 22.48 13.15 2.93 26.01 17.27 4.30 51.51 9.41 4.97 
1965 11.13 21.81 7.83 1.76 26.50 13.23 3.44 51.69 11.52 5.94 
1966 8.91 20.56 2.66 0.58 27.76 14.13 3.74 51.67 8.88 4.59 
1967 10.71 19.53 5.18 1.06 28.92 15.34 4.26 51.54 10.43 5.39 
1968 9.17 18.77 4.93 0.96 30.57 15.36 4.44 50.66 7.30 3.76 
1969 8.95 16.55 -3.97 -0.75 33.01 17.65 5.39 50.45 8.49 4.30 
1970 11.37 15.49 4.27 0.71 34.71 17.12 5.65 49.80 9.94 5.01 
1971 12.90 13.84 0.84 0.13 36.84 19.84 6.89 49.32 11.81 5.88 
1972 13.32 12.58 3.00 0.42 38.92 19.71 7.26 48.50 11.43 5.64 
1973 12.83 11.50 3.11 0.39 40.07 16.15 6.29 48.44 12.69 6.15 
1974 1.16 11.61 2.19 0.25 38.96 -1.65 -0.66 49.43 3.24 1.57 
1975 4.93 10.61 -4.09 -0.47 39.44 6.24 2.43 49.94 6.01 2.97 
1976 13.86 10.09 8.26 0.88 42.13 21.60 8.52 47.78 8.94 4.46 
1977 10.19 9.51 3.79 0.38 42.97 12.41 5.23 47.52 9.59 4.58 
1978 13.59 8.28 -1.04 -0.10 44.78 18.36 7.89 46.94 12.21 5.80 
1979 8.17 8.01 4.64 0.38 44.50 7.51 3.36 47.49 9.43 4.43 
1980 7.30 7.32 -2.00 -0.16 45.33 9.28 4.13 47.36 7.01 3.33 
1981 6.16 7.30 -0.38 -0.03 45.38 6.30 2.85 47.32 7.04 3.34 
1982 3.55 7.73 2.45 0.18 44.40 1.30 0.59 48.87 5.85 2.77 
1983 8.45 7.30 1.78 0.14 44.95 9.80 4.35 47.75 8.15 3.98 
1984 10.60 6.33 1.80 0.13 46.16 12.69 5.71 45.22 9.82 4.69 
1985 4.95 5.78 2.22 0.14 46.27 3.66 1.68 47.95 6.51 2.94 
1986 11.64 5.54 -0.04 -0.02 47.11 13.30 6.02 47.35 11.48 5.50 
1987 12.74 5.30 5.86 0.32 46.45 12.43 5.71 48.05 13.75 6.51 
1988 7.84 5.03 1.05 0.06 44.83 5.18 2.37 50.14 10.97 5.27 
1989 8.23 4.90 -0.55 -0.03 42.31 4.50 2.01 52.79 12.28 6.25 
1990 5.39 4.17 2.08 0.10 41.35 1.09 0.47 54.60 9.17 4.84 
1991 7.55 3.79 1.76 0.08 41.07 6.82 2.82 55.14 8.54 4.66 
1992 6.76 3.45 -2.87 -0.11 40.11 4.28 1.76 56.44 9.27 5.11 
1993 6.32 3.42 5.44 0.19 39.29 4.12 1.65 57.29 7.93 4.48 
1994 6.54 3.07 -4.37 -0.15 38.97 5.69 2.24 57.96 7.77 4.45 
1995 6.06 2.96 2.40 0.07 38.88 5.79 2.26 58.16 6.43 3.73 
Average 
1952-62 7.93 28.18 6.17 1.74 23.87 9.76 2.17 48.04 8.54 4.02 
1963-80 10.00 14.49 3.06 0.55 35.91 14.00 4.75 49.60 9.41 4.70 
1981-95 7.52 4.74 1.24 0.06 43.16 6.46 2.85 51.67 9.00 4.57 
Source: Li, 2002. 
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Appendix 2-3 
Changes in Taiwan's economic structure since 1980s 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
1. ExpenditureStructure(% of GDP) 
Private consumption 51.56 50.20 53.50 58.50 61.30 
Government expenditure 15.90 15.90 16.80 15.30 15.20 
Investment 33.80 18.70 22.50 23.50 21.60 
Goods and service 
Exports 52.60 53.30 45.60 48.30 48.80 
Imports 53.80 39.80 40.80 46.10 46.80 
2. Industry Structure (% of GDP) 
Agriculture 7.7 5.8 4.2 3.5 2.7 
Industry 45.7 46.3 41.2 36.3 34.9 
Services 46.6 47.9 54.6 60.2 62.3 
3. Employment Structure(% of total 
employed persons) 
Agriculture 19.5 17.5 12.8 10.6 8.8 
Industry 42.5 41.6 40.8 38.7 37.9 
Services 38.0 41.0 46.3 50.7 53.2 
4. Breakdown of Manufacturing Industry (% of total 
manufacturing output) 
Heavy and chemical industry 46.2 47.4 55.9 66.4 71.5 
Light industry 53.8 52.6 44.1 33.6 28.5 
-Private sector 85.5 87.7 89.7 91.1 92.1 
State enterprises 14.5 12.3 10.6 8.9 7.9 
5. Export Structure (% of total exports) 
Agricultural and processed agricultural products 9.2 6.1 4.5 3.8 1.8 
Industrial products 90.8 93.9 95.5 96.2 98.2 
a. Heavy and chemical products 35.6 34.1 46.7 59.2 64,3 
b. Other industrial products 64.4 65.9 53.3. 40.8 23.9 
6. Import Structure (% of Total imports) 
Capital equipment 23.4 14.1 17.5 16.3 23.2 
Agricultural and industrial raw materials 70.8 76.9 70.4 72.0 63.8 
Consumer goods 5.8 9.0 12.0 11.7 13.0 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1999 cited in Chou, 2001: 72 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3-1 The Distribution of Governmental Expenditures According to Purpose, 
















1955 15.3 48.6 13.6 10.6 6.7 1.9 3.7 100 
1960 11.7 49.4 13.6 14.0 6.9 0.1 4.3 100 
1965 12.8 41.0 12.5 19.1 7.6 4.3 2.7 100 
1970 13.4 37.3 16.9 18.6 10.0 1.6 2.1 100 
1974 14.1 28.3 17.2 26.1 11.2 1.1 2.0 100 
1975 15.7 24.5 16.8 30.3 10.2 0.8 1.7 100 
1976 12.2 25.2 16.2 32.5 11.6 0.5 1.8 100 
1977 12.0 25.0 15.1 35.5 10.9 0.3 1.2 100 
1978 9.8 28.2 17.6 32.2 11.1 0.2 1.0 100 
1979 10.0 28.5 16.7 31.4 11.8 0.1 1.3 100 
1980 9.4 30.3 15.5 32.0 11.2 0.5 1.0 100 
1981 9.. 9 24.6 17.7 34.1 12.0 0.4 1.2 100 
1982 10.3 24.6 17.9 30.3 14.7 0.5 1.7 100 
1983 11.1 27.4 19.7 24.7 15.5 0.9 0.9 100 
1984 10.6 24.4 19.5 27.4 16.2 1.1 0.9 100 
1985 11.3 24.8 20.4 25.3 16.2 1.1 0.9 100 
1986 11.4 24.9 20.9 25.1 16.1 0.9 0.8 100 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2003, Taiwan Statistical Date Book 2003. Taipei: 
Council for Economic Planning and Development. 
Appendix 3-2 Economic related indexes as a share proposition (in %) of GDP and 


























1952 11.98 1,674 196 116 187 -71 - - 
1955 8.11 1,928 203 123 201 -78 3.73 - 
1960 6.31 1,717 154 164 297 -133 4.01 - 
1965 11.13 2,811 217 450 556 -106 3.30 245 
1969 8.95 4,915 345 1,049 1,213 -164 1.88 361 
1970 11.37 5,660 389 1,481 1,524 -43 1.70 540 
1971 12.90 6,589 443 2,060 1,844 216 1.66 617 
1972 13.32 7,906 522 2,988 2,514 475 1.49 952 
1973 12.83 10,727 695 4,483 3,792 691 1.26 1,026 
1974 1.16 14,458 920 5,639 6,966 -1,327 1.53 
1,092 
1975 4.93 15,429 964 5,309 5,952 -643 2.40 1,074 
1976 13.86 18,492 1,132 8,166 7,599 567 
1.78 1,516 
1977 10.19 21,681 1,301 9,361 8,511 850 
1.76 1,345 
1978 13.59 26,773 1,577 12,687 11,027 1,660 1.67 
1,406 
1979 17 8 33,229 1,920 16,103 14,774 1,329 
1.28 1,467 
1980 . 7.30 41,360 2,344 19,811 19,733 78 
1.23 2,205 
1981 6.16 47,955 2,669 22,611 21,200 1,412 
1.36 7,235 
1982 55 3 550 48 2,653 22,204 18,888 3,316 
2.14 8,532 
1983 
. 45 8 
, 52,503 2,823 25,123 20,287 4,836 2.71 
11,859 
1984 
. 10.60 59,780 3,167 30,456 21,959 8,497 
2.44 15,664 
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Major Country Merchandise Exports to China, Imports from Chin, and Trade 
Balances with China, 1999,2000 
(Billion dollars) 
Trading Partner Data Chinese Data 
Partner 1999 2000 1999 2000 
Exp Imp Bal Exp Imp Bal Exp Imp Bal Exp Imp Bal 
U. S. 13.1 81.8 -68.7 16.3 100. 
1 
-83.8 19.5 41.9 -22.4 22.4 52.1 -29.7 
Japan 23.4 43.0 -19.6 30.4 55.3 -24.9 31.5 34.0 -2.5 41.5 41.6 -0.1 
EU 20.4 52.3 -31.8 24.5 69.5 -45.0 22.4 30.2 -7.8 30.8 38.1 -7.3 
Hong Kong 57.6 77.9 -20.3 69.9 92.4 -22.5 6.9 36.9 -30.0 9.4 44.5 -35.1 
Taiwan 21.3 4.5 16.8 26.1 6.2 19.9 19.5 3.9 15.6 : 25.5 5.0 20.5 
Gernany 7.4 14.5 -7.1 8.5 16.8 -8.3 8.3 7.8 0.5 10.4 9.3 1.1 
S. Korea 15.0 8.2 6.8 ;- 17.7 11.1 6.6 17.2 7.8 9.4 23.2 11.3 11.9 
Singapore 3.9 5.7 -1.8 5.2 7.0 -1.8 4.1 4.5 -0.4 5.0 5.8 -0.8 
U. K. 1.9 5.7 -3.8 2.3 6.7 -4.4 3.0 4.9 -1.9 3.6 6.3 -2.7 
France 3.4 6.8 -3.4 3.1 7.5 -4.4 1.0 5.4 -4.4 3.9 
3.7 0.2 
Source: Lum T. & Nanto D. K., (2002), CRS3 1, calculated from International Monetary Fund. Direction 
of Trade Statistics Quarterly, June 2000 and June 2001; U. S. Department of Commerce; 
China. 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation; PRC General Administration of 
Customs; Taiwan. Board of Foreign Trade; EU. European Union Delegation of the European 
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Appendix 8 
Jessop's ideal-type SWPR 
Jessop suggests the practical strategies of his SWPR to resolve the accumulation and legitimation problems in the liberal-democracy regime in four dimensions. However. 
he emphasizes the reflexive strategies are more important than these concrete as followed: 
Neo-Liberalism 
I. Liberalization-promote free competition. 
2. Deregulation-reduce role of law and state. 
3. Privatization- sell off public sector. 
4. Market proxies in residual public sector. 
5. Internationalization-free inward and outward flows. 
6. Lower direct taxes-increase consumer choice. 
Neo-corporatism 
1. Rebalance competition and cooperation. 
2. Decentralized regulated self regulation. 
3. Widen range of private, public and other stakeholders. 
4. Expand role of public-private partnerships. 
5. Protect core economic sectors in open economy. 
6. High taxation to finance social investment. 
Neo-statism 
1. From state control to regulated competition. 
2. Guide national strategy rather than plan top-down. 
3. Auditing performance of private and public sectors. 
4. Public-private partnerships under state guidance. 
5. Neo-mercantilist protection of core economy. 
6. Expanding role for new collective resources. 
Neo-communitari ani sm 
1. Deliberalization-limit free competition. 
2. Empowerment-enhance role of third sector. 
3. Socialization-expand the social economy. 
4. Emphasis on social use-value and social cohesion. 
5. Fair trade not free trade; think global, act local. 
6. Redirect taxes-citizens' wage, carers' allowances. 
Source: Jessop, 2002: 262. 
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